Thesis (M.A.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Department of Philosophy, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references.

The understanding of terrorism has thus far been determined not by some independent line of inquiry but instead by a strong interplay between conflicting moral positions. Treated sometimes as a method or tactic and at other times as a distinct form of violence, the true nature of terrorism remains elusive, while a failure to understand it has squarely been blamed on the moral problem. The conceptual and theoretical debate in the field of terrorism studies as a result has not progressed in any meaningful way. Issues that were associated with terrorism when a formal inquiry into the problem was first launched still remain unresolved. Basic questions as to whether terrorism generates fear and if it is possible to identify its victim or perpetrator continue to plague the terrorism discourse. Meanwhile matters that are crucial, such as the widespread tendency to treat terrorism as a tactic, strategy or ideology and the essentially contested character of terrorism scholarship are either ignored or erroneously taken for granted. This thesis will show that our inability to define terrorism is not due to the moral problem as it is made out to be but because of our failure to understand the true nature of terrorism. To accomplish this task, it not only analyzes issues that are regularly contested but also discusses in detail the ones that are trivialized and overlooked. It ultimately concludes that terrorism primarily plays only an auxiliary or a facilitatory role and therefore the key to defining it and understanding its true nature lies in its utility and function.

The fundamental elements that shaped and gave rise to Christianity as a dominant religious movement rest in the crucifixion, death and resurrection of the person of Jesus of Nazareth. Had there been no crucifixion and had Jesus died a natural death, there would be no foundation for the Christian gospel as we have it today. Jesus had to die a violent death and be a human sacrifice in order for him to be a historical figure that he is today. My point in departure is to highlight that the events that constitute history are in many aspects very violent in nature. Therefore, it may not be a great exaggeration to conclude that the shedding and spilling of blood is necessary in the making of history, since war and history are so joined together like Siamese twins. War is so much part of our lives, it is said that only the dead have seen the end of it. And history according to James Joyce, is a nightmare from which [he is] trying to awake. Such has been the explicit nature of Just War Theory as it is rooted in the backdrop of Christian conviction. This thesis seeks to illuminate the topic of Just War Theory from a Church and Augustinian perspective. It demonstrates how Augustine’s writings are a rich resources for theological, political and judicial reflection on international politics. It critically examines the connection between Church and State, that is to say, the origins of the Just War Theory. Further, it goes on to demonstrate that for Augustine the two are intertwined and God ordained. It draws conclusions for current Just War practices as outdated since its failure to attain world-peace. / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2015. / tm2015 / Church History and Church Policy / MA / Unrestricted

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The legacy of Dietrich Bonhoeffer has largely been dependent upon the understanding of his position of pacifism and just war in the context of the Second World War. His own writings and presentations, particularly ones advocating for pacifism, seem contrary to his actions and involvement in the resistance movement against Nazi Germany. Scholars on both sides of this debate have presented compelling evidence to sway their audience one way or the other concerning Bonhoeffer's ethical position. This debate is further complicated by Bonhoeffer's own view of his life as a "straight and unbroken course." As many have claimed Bonhoeffer's ethics to justify their own stance on pacifism and just-war, the purpose of this paper is to determine if such claims are warranted. This paper seeks to investigate such claims by looking at Bonhoeffer's own writings throughout the course of his life. It traces his biography in attempts to place his writings in context. While many of his writings are important in understanding Bonhoeffer's worldview, this paper largely focuses on Sanctorum Communio as the basis for his theological framework, and his publications of Discipleship and Ethics wherein lies the tensions of understanding his position. This paper will attempt to show that while Bonhoeffer was not against pacifism and in fact advocated for peace, his contextual ethics serves as strong evidence that he was not a pacifist according to its most basic definition.

Denna uppsats syftar till att vara ett bidrag till den samtida debatten kring teorin om rättfärdiga krig. I uppsatsen utmanas rådande föreställningar om rättfärdiga krig, i synnerhet idén om att endast suveräna stater utgör legitima auktoriteter. Uppsatsen använder Hizbollah som fallstudie och författaren argumenterar för att rörelsens enorma popularitet och de facto kontroll över stora områden gjort Hizbollah till en legitim härskare. Därmed bör Hizbollah, trots att rörelsen är en icke-statlig aktör i Libanon, betraktas som en legitim auktoritet som kan utkämpa rättfärdiga krig. / This essay aims to be a contribution to the contemporary debate on the “Just War Theory” in a way that challenges traditional concepts of the theory, especially the idea that only sovereign states constitutes legitimate authorities. Using Hezbollah as a case study, the author argues that the organization’s enormous popularity and de facto control over considerable parts of Lebanon makes Hezbollah a legitimate ruler of its territory. Consequently Hezbollah, despite being a non-state actor, should be regarded as a legitimate authority and thus capable of fighting just wars.

Obemannade flygfarkoster har varit omtalat sedan kriget mot terrorn startade 11 september 2001 och det förekommer fortfarande frågor kring hur systemet nyttjas och om det är moraliskt korrekt. Det finns många användningsområden för farkosterna som exempelvis lägesuppfattning, sökandet av försvunna personer, attackuppdrag med flera. Studien undersöker hur farkosterna används inom attackföretag samt den militära nyttan av systemet. Eftersom det finns olika uppfattningar kring hur systemet används i krig och konflikt så kommer studien att redogöra för olika uppfattningar samt att konkretisera dessa. Det moraliska synsättet på Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle, UCAV, i konflikt och krig skiljer sig åt. De som talar emot systemet menar att detta i sig är hotet och inte hur det nyttjas. Andra menar att taktiken idag är densamma i konflikt och krig sedan 1960-talet. Detta användningsområde är därför inget nytt enligt de etiska teorierna gällande konflikt och krig. Tillämpningen av systemet har skapat att individer har en negativ uppfattning av det, medan andra ställer sig positiva. Enligt denna studie kan det anses moraliskt försvarbart att nyttja detta system om kriget eller konflikten uppfyller majoriteten av de sju kriterierna i rättfärdig krigsteori, Just War Theory. Dock spelar andra faktorer in för att starta ett krig vilket komplicerar eventuellt användande av systemet. Såsom nationens befolkning, dess intresse av kriget/konflikten, vilken grad hotet har och vilken nytta nationen får ut av konflikten eller kriget. Om tidigare nämnda exempel överensstämmer med nationens intresse kan det påstås vara moraliskt försvarbart att använda UCAV för attackföretag. / Unmanned aerial vehicles, popularly known as drones, have been up to debate since the start of the war on terror, 11th September 2001, and there are still a lot of questions about their use and moral legitimacy. There are a lot of useful applications for this kind of vehicle for example, situational awareness, searching for lost people and attack missions. This study is going to investigate how these vehicles are being used within attack missions and and what their military utility are. Since there are a lot of different opinions on the system in war and conflict, the aim for this study is to make the ethics more concrete and evaluate what military utility this system gives. The moral aspects of UCAV, Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle, in conflict and war differ a lot from person to person. Those who are against this kind of system mean that the UCAV, in itself, is a threat and not as much to how it is used. Supporters of the system, on the other hand, argue that similar tactics have been used in war since the 1960s hence the system does not need any change in ethics and morals. However the system has got a negative reputation because of they way it is being used. This study shows that it is morally right to use UCAVs when the conflict or war meets a majority of the seven criteria of Just War Theory. However it is not as simple as that, there are a lot more factors that come in play. The population of the nation and its interests in the conflict or war, the threat level and what kind of profit the nation will acquire through it are important factors. If all of these criteria are met then the use of UCAVs for attack missions can be seen as morally just.

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: What does it mean that the violence of aggression could justify the violence of resistance? What does such justification accomplish, and when, and how? What underlies the conditions and limitations of justified violence, as, for example, these have been formulated in western doctrines of "just war"? Most critically, how could one think about the possibility of a resistance to evil that would be effective without itself instituting further violence? The theoretical ground of this investigation is found in a close reading of the work of Emmanuel Levinas, specifically the section of his Otheruiise than Being, or Beyond Essence in which human consciousness is shown to be, from the first, called to justice in responsibility for others. For Levinas, to be a subject is to be always already for-the-other as a substitute or hostage. This is both a persecution and the "glory" of human being. Thus Levinas introduces an enigmatic "good violence" prior to any distinction between aggressive and just violences. The idea of an originary good violence opens up a reconsideration of the evil of aggression and the joyfulness of resistance. This in turn shows the instability or equivocation of just violence: even if it is inspired by goodness - by one's responsibility for the useless suffering of others - it is never finally good enough, and always at risk of slipping into injustice. The responsibility of a "just warrior" is thus not cancelled by the justness of the cause. The justness of the cause indeed demands ever greater responsibility, even for and before one's enemy. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Wat sou dit kon beteken dat die geweld van aggressie die geweld van verset regverdig? Wat word bewerkstellig deur sodanige regverdiging, en wanneer, en . hoe? Waarop berus die voorwaardes en beperkinge van geregverdigde geweld, soos dit byvoorbeeld geformuleer is in Westerse leerstellings oor "regverdige oorlog"? Nog belangriker: hoe kan 'n mens dink oor die moontlikheid van verset teen die bose wat effektief is, maar sonder om self verdere geweld daar te stel? Die teoretiese grondslag van hierdie ondersoek is 'n nougesette bestudering van die werk van Emmanuel Levinas, meer spesifiek die afdeling van sy Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence, waarin hy argumenteer dat die menslike bewussyn van meet af aan tot geregtigheid opgeroep word in verantwoordelikheid vir andere. Om 'n subjek te wees is vir Levinas om altyd alreeds vir-dié-ander te wees as 'n plaasvervanger of gyselaar. Dit is sowel 'n vervolging as die "heerlikheid" van menswees. Levinas argumenteer dus ten gunste van 'n "goeie geweld" voorafgaande aan enige onderskeidinge tussen aggressiewe en geregverdigde geweld. Die idee van 'n oorspronklike goeie geweld maak 'n herdenking van die boosheid van agressie en die vreugdevolheid van verset moontlik. Op sy beurt toon dit die onstabiliteit of dubbelsinnigheid van geregverdigde geweld: selfs al word dit geïnspireer deur goedheid - deur 'n mens se verantwoordelikheid vir die nuttelose lyding van ander - is dit nooit goed genoeg nie en loop dit altyd die gevaar om om te slaan in onreg. Die verantwoordelikheid van 'n "regverdige vegter" word daarom nie uitgekanselleer deur die regverdigheid van sy saak nie. Die regverdigheid van die saak eis trouens nog groter verantwoordelikheid, selfs vir en vóór jou vyand.

Should U.S. political decision-makers decide to wage a moral war, it is not as easy a merely saying go do it. To ensure moral targeting decisions, American national political leaders must suffer the costs of monitoring in terms of time and money, and provide not only detailed direction, but also constant oversight to ensure objectives are clear and subordinates carry out directions. Military officers must ensure that their motivations align with those of their principals, and they must ensure that constraining doctrine for planning and executing combat operations is followed. Having satisfied these variables, moral targeting decisions, wherein proportionality of non-combatant casualties is weighed against target necessity, should then be easily attainable. The process of aligning motivations with respect to desired outcomes, and the process of planning strategies according to doctrine together lead to moral targeting decisions. By following the processes of getting war plans approved according to published U.S. doctrine, a deliberate dialogue is followed with direction and feedback through several steps of planning and approval that result in multiple people working on a product that results in a sort of corporate buy- in. I posit that it is difficult to follow this process and end up with targeting decisions that do not weigh harm to non-combatants against the necessity of individual targets, especially when principals and agents come together to deliberately ensure they align their motivations with respect to objectives. This theory is applicable to U.S. involvement in war, but is not necessarily generalizable to other countries. Through case studies of American involvement in Desert Storm (the first Gulf War), Operation Allied Force (NATOs air war over Serbia), and the U.S. War on Terror (campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq), I find that only in the War on Terror were moral targeting decisions consistently made by US national leaders. Furthermore, that was the only case study wherein both constraining doctrine was present and principal-agent motivations were aligned with respect to objectives. The other two cases showed that the variables were not followed and proportionality- necessity decisions were not made.

Thesis advisor: Kenneth Himes / The category of jus post bellum (jpb, postwar justice and peace) is a welcome addition to discussions of the justice of war. The goal of this dissertation is to review the significance of this recent development within the just war tradition. This project is based on a proposition that just war should aim at just peace; peace does not mean the absence of armed conflict, but it requires the establishment of justice. There is no true peace if it exists for the strong but not for the weak, for the victor but not for the vanquished. At the heart of jpb is the establishment of a just peace. With this preliminary proposition in mind, this dissertation endeavors to challenge the view of those who argue that reconciliation, mainly political reconciliation, is the first and foremost ambition of jpb. Instead, it attempts to justify the proposition that achieving just policing, just punishment, and just political participation are key to building a just peace, of which the fundamental characteristic must be human security. In the immediate aftermath of war there is little or no policing, punishment, or avenues for political participation to protect the civilians of defeated states, especially the most vulnerable ones. Therefore, this project argues (i) that human security is a neglected theme in the discourse of moral and theological intellectual traditions; and (ii) that a more balanced understanding of jpb must pay direct attention to the elements comprising human security in a postwar context as well as the quest for reconciliation. In particular, holding a realistic view that war is inherently destructive of people, institutions, and infrastructure, this project focuses on justice in reconstruction—reconstruction of just policing, just punishment, and just political participation. This destruction raises questions about the fulfillment of justice in the damaged postwar society. Considering these issues through the lens of human security and political reconciliation theories, I propose my “maxim(um) of ethical minimalism” for jpb—the principle of achieving to the highest extent possible human security, which is the necessary and essential outcome for jpb. It is the norm for jpb of achieving the common good to the highest extent possible, with priority on human security, using nonviolent means insofar as possible and violent means when necessary. This proposal contends that determination of the content of the responsibilities for just war reconstruction should be specified on the basis of the damage to relationships that need to be not merely restored, but also fundamentally transformed in the postwar society that prevents future threats. This thesis pays particular attention to civil society peacebuilding, which needs to be considered only to the extent that it is an objective of the postwar discussion and to the extent it is affected by jpb decisions. Yet, my primary thesis is that this transformative vision of jpb should be distinguished from an extensive buildup of a civil society scheme, which requires a wider and longer range of peacebuilding efforts. Instead, it must be tempered by realism in a careful and concrete manner, since the priority should be given to human security in the immediate aftermath of war. This study is an exercise in applied political ethics that employs various disciplines—security studies, international law, and peacebuilding work—to address the topic of jpb as a means of illuminating the theological discourse. Plainly, I employ this literature to explore how contemporary scholars view the idea of jpb and how this relatively new development fits within the Christian tradition of just war, a moral tradition that is historically interdisciplinary. Further, this attempt is a valuable contribution to the just war tradition by identifying what I view as three key themes of jpb, namely, three practices that are essential to implementing jpb immediately after a war: just policing, just punishment, and just political participation. While examining the interrelated challenges of moral and social norms in both political and legal domains, this dissertation proposes an innovative methodology for linking theology, ethics, and social science so that the ideal and the real can inform each other in the ethics of war and peacebuilding. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2018. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.