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This thesis is concerned with the psychoanalytical concept of narcissism, and the effect that texts written by narcissistic writers have upon their readers. I use Søren Kierkegaard as an example of a narcissistic writer who produced narcissistic texts. In order to follow through the logic of the thesis, it is necessary to explain first the Freudian idea of narcissism, and then narcissism as considered by one post-Freudian school called Object Relations theory. It is also necessary, second, to summarise a psychoanalytic model of what happens when we read any kind of text. The methodology of this thesis is usually called psychobiography, the systematic application of psychodynamic principles to the study of a life, and so, third, both the principles and some of the issues of this methodology are presented. Having established an operational definition of narcissism, the thesis looks first at Kierkegaard’s life, identifying a series of key events or stages that can be re-interpreted on the assumption that Kierkegaard was narcissistic. Three of his key texts are considered next - Fear and Trembling, Works of Love and The Sickness Unto Death. Each of these can be interpreted to show how his narcissism influenced his writing. Two substantial appendices are included. The first is a comment upon the relationship between God and psychoanalysis, presented primarily to introduce the ideas of Donald Winnicott. The second is on the concept of psychopathology, a difficult topic, since it is at once both heavily value laden, but is also persistent in any analysis of psychological difference. In conclusion I refer to several key Kierkegaardian themes, emphasising their narcissistic origins, and ask the reader to reflect upon their own responses to these issues, to consider how Kierkegaard’s narcissism influences their own emotions, and how these in turn affect any cognitive understanding of Søren Kierkegaard.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Gregoriana in Rom, 1980. / Includes indexes. Includes bibliographical references (p. 445-469).

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The study is an attempt to explore selected writings of Soren Kierkegaard in an effort to draw from these writings implications for counseling theory based on certain concepts central to his philosophy.

The purpose of this essay is to analyse Søren Kierkegaard’s “Fear and Trembling”, Karl Jaspers “Philosophy of Existence” and Paul Tillichs “Systematic Theology part 2” on their stand on Christian existentialism. The method used in the analysis is Hermeneutic, which is a must, when reading and understanding these three philosophical works. The essay will also have a comparative approach to obtain depth in the conclusions. Another purpose is to link the conclusions of the essay to the school values and the school curriculum. The link will not be strong but a correlation will become visible. The conclusions of this essay will show that the three authors have similarities and differences. The three authors unite in the idea that the purpose of life is faith in the Christian God. But how to reach that faith differs; Kierkegaard writes that an infinite resignation is a must, so that faith in the absurd will bring you everything back. Jaspers writes that science is a mean to create a framework for every individual. The framework will give you a perception of existence but can’t be used to achieve Existenz. Existenz is the goal in the search for the truth of yourself and what being means. Tillich writes that the purpose of life is to return to your being of essence, which means how man was supposed to be before “the fall”. Tillich writes an ontological analysis of being.

Thesis advisor: Richard Kearney / This dissertation presents a systematic reading of the four discourses Kierkegaard wrote on Matthew 6:24-34, which I am calling the Lily Discourses (“What We Learn from the Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air” (1847); “The Cares of the Pagans” (1848); “The Lily in the Field and the Bird of the Air” (1849); “Christ as Archi-Image” (1851)). Matthew instructs the reader to “consider the lilies,” and in reading this passage Kierkegaard presents the lilies as authoritative, rather than merely “figural” or “metaphoric”. The aim of this dissertation is to describe what Kierkegaard means by the authority of the lily and the bird. Since Kierkegaard engages with and in “figural” language in his pseudonymous as well as his signed texts, what he says about the lily and the bird in these four Discourses is significant for all of Kierkegaard’s work. In the first and the third Discourses Kierkegaard writes lyrically of the beauty of nature, but concludes with a brutal picture of nature’s death and decay. It is not nature, this dissertation argues, but the trace nature leaves in language, that Kierkegaard is investigating. Kierkegaard ends the first Discourse by invoking the positing power of language: he says, “Let the lily wither”. As if in response to the death at the end of the first Discourse, the second is written in praise “on the day all goes black.” If the first two Discourses describe the authority of the lily and the bird in terms of the performative – of positing and praise – the third Discourse describes this authority in terms of receptivity. The lily and the bird are obedient, Kierkegaard says there. He develops an account of obedience that is, on the one hand, required for reading the lily and the bird (for granting authority), and on the other, is the lesson taught by the lily and the bird. In the fourth Discourse Kierkegaard presents the archi-image (Forbillede, previously translated in English as “pattern” or “prototype”) and what corresponds to it: “imitation.” Only when we imitate, rather than ape mimetically or endlessly interpret, can the image (Billede) that we are responding to be the archi-image (Forbillede). The lily and the bird, the dissertation argues, have the authority of the archi-image only if we can read them in a certain way, that is, if our reading is non-mimetic imitation. For Kierkegaard imitation is an act, made by an individual person at a concrete time and place in history; it therefore commits the reader, in her full responsibility (including “social” or “political”) in the risk of reading. The dissertation has four chapters, each devoted to one of Kierkegaard’s Lily Discourses. Accordingly, Chapter One describes Kierkegaard’s account of the authority of the lily and the bird as positing, Chapter Two as praise, Chapter Three as obedience and Chapter Four as imitation. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Thesis advisor: Vanessa P. Rumble / <bold>Synthesis and Selfhood: A Comparative Study of Kierkegaard and Kant By Leslie Roy Ballard Advisor: Vanessa Rumble</bold> Many commentators on Kierkegaard's philosophy acknowledge that his writings draw from Kant's philosophy; but few essays trace the origin of specific categories in Kierkegaard's thought to their Kantian roots. While young scholars are especially prone to see in the philosophy of the previous century numerous links to Kierkegaard's writings, few question their ultimate source. The question of Kierkegaard's indebtedness to Kant recommends itself, then, to serious explorers of the sources of Kierkegaard's notion of selfhood, the role of Kant's ontology and moral philosophy in the latter, and the differences in their understandings of the relation between religious faith and moral obligation. Ronald M. Green and Ulrich Knappe examine Kierkegaard's familiarity with Immanuel Kant's philosophy. Green consults lecture notes, journal entries, and university documents to determine the nature and extent of Kierkegaard's engagement with Kant; he reviews public auction records to discover the books by Kant that Kierkegaard owned at the time of his death. Knappe bypasses such investigations to analyze the Kantian ideas apparent in Kierkegaard's texts &mdash; often a more substantive reflection than Green's, albeit sometimes speculative. This dissertation identifies and addresses interpretive problems like the ultimate unity of Kant's critical and ethical philosophies, and the autonomy of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms. Conclusions concerning Kierkegaard's use of Kant are drawn within these parameters. The early Climacus alludes to Kant's pure intuitions of space and time and the origin of consciousness in reflection. In spite of similarities in their depictions of the synthesis implied in human consciousness and knowledge, Climacus later criticizes Kant's presumed neglect of ethics for theory. Climacus' criticism, I argue, is based on a conflation of non-religious and religious ethics. The dissertation takes as its point of departure Kant's and Kierkegaard's non-religious formulations of identity in order to learn how each thinker understands human being and to allow each to present a conception of Christian selfhood. Three different, sometimes overlapping, stages emerge in the pseudonymous writings: the esthetic, the ethical, and the religious. In <italic>Either/Or</italic>, the first two are analogous to Kant's hypothetical and categorical motivation in terms of the universality and necessity of the law. A cogent analogy between their ethics requires the pseudonyms, however, to describe the law as a priori. William twice refers to a priority and mentions his familiarity with Kantian ethics. It is argued that William's ethical stage is a Kantian a priori ethics that other pseudonyms--namely, Silentio--overcome in the religious. The corpora understand sin differently, but agree that it hinders moral progress and causes the breakdown of the non-religious person. Anti-Climacus writes that revelation imparts knowledge of sin, and Haufniensis asserts that the convert needs dogmatics to guide the new self-understanding. Religious passion rather than reason primarily motivates the theological self. Kant thinks theology and its self-conception are good only insofar as they help pure practical reason to attain perfection; passion remains mostly suspect, and pure practical reason maintains its authority in moral deliberation. Silentio and Kant disagree whether the faith of religious life can be justified in violating universal ethical principles. Silentio claims that Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac presupposes the teleological suspension of universal ethics. Kant asserts that the laws of pure practical reason admit no exception. Abraham must comprehend the apparition's command as a temptation to commit murder, and not heed it. Silentio envisions extraordinary acts of faith <italic>apart</italic> from moral justification, but Kant argues the ethical is inviolate. Silentio welcomes the passionate and the miraculous; Kant leaves open the question whether his ethical rigorism is compatible with true biblical faith. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.