Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 400-422).

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1 Material Tensions between Natural Law and Positive Law and Approaches to its Solution Jakub Kříž Abstract The title of my dissertation - "Material Tensions between Natural Law and Positive Law and Approaches to its Solution" - refers to everlasting contrapositions of two different approaches to law: (i) natural law tradition which is concerned with a necessary continuity between law and the requirements of practical reasonableness and that describes law as "rational standard for conduct"1 and (ii) tradition of legal positivism, which understands law only as a social fact. Actually, in the world of jurisprudence, there is no single natural law theory on one side2 and unique legal positivism on the other side.3 It is 1 MURPHY, Mark C. Natural Law Jurisprudence. Legal Theory. 2003, No. 9, p. 244, MURPHY, Mark C. Natural Law Theory. In: GOLDING , Martin P., EDMUNSON, William A. (eds.). The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. s.l. : Blackwell Publishing, 2006, p. 15. 2 For many of them we can mention classical natural law theory of the thomistic philosophy, new natural law theory of G. Grisez and J. Finnes, legal realism of J. Hervada, "modern" natural law theories such as L. Fuller's concept of the Rule of Law and the inner morality of law or R. Dworkin's theory of the unique right...

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo justamente contribuir para uma melhor compreensão do papel da moral no projeto positivista de Hart. Estudando sua obra, recuperando textos importantes para o entendimento de seu sistema de pensamento, embora menos conhecidos, somos capazes de avaliar a coerência de sua tese da separabilidade entre o direito e a moral, tão complexa e diferente da tradição positivista clássica, e a viabilidade de uma teoria puramente descritiva, nos termos como seu modelo teórico foi concebido. Apresentarei, porém, um argumento bastante desafiador, porque atribui a esse sofisticado modelo uma intencionalidade que o próprio autor não estaria disposto a reconhecer. A seguir encontra-se, em breves linhas, uma visão panorâmica desse argumento, cujos termos, aqui expostos de maneira bastante superficial, serão elucidados com maior profundidade ao longo dos capítulos. / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo justamente contribuir para uma melhor compreensão do papel da moral no projeto positivista de Hart. Estudando sua obra, recuperando textos importantes para o entendimento de seu sistema de pensamento, embora menos conhecidos, somos capazes de avaliar a coerência de sua tese da separabilidade entre o direito e a moral, tão complexa e diferente da tradição positivista clássica, e a viabilidade de uma teoria puramente descritiva, nos termos como seu modelo teórico foi concebido. Apresentarei, porém, um argumento bastante desafiador, porque atribui a esse sofisticado modelo uma intencionalidade que o próprio autor não estaria disposto a reconhecer. A seguir encontra-se, em breves linhas, uma visão panorâmica desse argumento, cujos termos, aqui expostos de maneira bastante superficial, serão elucidados com maior profundidade ao longo dos capítulos.

Nesta dissertação pretendo reler o debate entre Ronald Dworkin e o positivismo jurídico. Farei isto sob o prisma da filosofia analítica, especificamente, contextualizando o debate no âmbito de uma discussão travada entre três teorias semânticas específicas: a descricional, o externalismo semântico e o bi-dimensionalismo ambicioso. Há algum tempo Dworkin lançou uma crítica ao positivismo, qual seja, o positivismo jurídico pretende reduzir a forma direito de como as coisas são à conformação puramente descritiva de como o mundo é. Disse, ainda, que somente quando concebido como uma teoria semântica é que o positivismo jurídico tornar-se-ia inteligível. Os posivistas, a seu turno, argumentam que a Jurisprudência analítica é um projeto teórico pelo direito e não pelo significado do termo direito e que, portanto, deveríamos manter separados dois tipos de questionamentos: O que é direito? e O que é direito?. Se tudo correr bem, ao reler o debate entre os positivistas e Ronald Dworkin a partir do instrumental obtido no âmbito da teoria semântica, poderemos perceber que pode ser verdade que o positivismo jurídico, enquanto projeto teórico, é sobre o direito, o referente, e não sobre o direito, o termo; entretanto, a forma pela qual o positivismo concebe o questionamento O que é direito?, ele mesmo, parece acabar por qualificá-lo, num sentido não trivial, como semântico. / I intend to reread the debate between Ronald Dworkin and legal positivism. I will do that through the prism of analytic philosophy, specifically in the context of the debate between three specific semantic theories: descriptional, externalism and the ambitious bidimensionalism. Dworkin criticized legal positivism: the legal positivism aims to reduce the law-way of things to the purely descriptive form of the world. He also said that only when conceived as a semantic theory is that legal positivism would become intelligible. The posivists argue that analytical Jurisprudence is a theoretical project about law and not about the meaning of \"law\", therefore we should keep separated two types of questions: \"What is law?\" and \"What is \'law\'?\". If all goes well, when rereading the debate through the prism of the discussion in the context of semantic theories, we will realize that it may be true that legal positivism is about law, the referent, and not about \"law\". However, the way in which positivism conceives the question \"What is law?\" seems to qualify it as semantic in a nontrivial sense.

During the past 10 years Sweden has updated its penal code for sexual crimes twice. Despite this few are convicted for the crime of rape in Sweden. As the majority of perpetrators being male, this is a problem concerning women’s rights to respect for their bodies and personal integrity. A possible explanation, and this study’s point of departure is a potential discrepancy between the intention of the law and the interpretation of the same as the Swedish legal system rests on a foundation of legal positivism. Hence focus of this study has been the motives behind the definition of rape in the law and the interpretation of the same. The purpose has been to establish the development of the rape law and its political motives, how the judicial system has interpreted the legal text in actual cases and if this is in alignment. As to explain why so few are convicted for the crime of rape and to critically examine how this affects women’s rights as well as how the interpretation of the definition of rape can be carried out in a more legally secure way for the victims. This has been done firstly by examining the states public investigations and state bills before the update of the penal codes definition of rape in 2005 and 2013. Secondly by an analysis of arguments used by the Swedish courts, mainly the district courts, in two rape convictions and three verdicts of acquittal. Arguments used by the courts have then been compared to the motives behind the legal definition of rape to see if the perceived discrepancy between the intended meaning of the law and the interpretation of the same existed. Thirdly, the judicial systems legal basis for interpretation was criticised from the two theoretical perspectives of the study; a criticism to legal positivism and a gender hierarchical perspective.   The analysis shows that the updates of the rape law are clearly morally motivated and women’s rights based. In contrast to the legal positivistic judicial system interpretations, avoiding morally based argumentation relying on the systems foundation solely. The critical investigation shows that both a the perceived gender neutral system as well as legal positivistic tradition of sidestepping moral argumentation in courts result in lack of questioning the system and how it comes to its decisions.  Hence the discrepancy between the two systems can be a part of the explanation why women’s rights are not secured in Sweden.

Issued also as inaugural dissertation, Zürich. / "Literatur-Verzeichnis": p. [127]-129.

Legal positivism posits that the observation of how officials and citizens treat the legal system’s rules combine to constitute law’s existence. This is not an understanding verified by cases such as Nigeria’s legal system. Using historical evidence from the UK National Archives, and examples of recent court cases, I attempt to show that although such legal systems do, in fact, exist, they defy positivism’s conceptualization. They suggest that while the legal legitimacy of law is one thing, it does not account for obedience; and neither is the social fact of obedience necessary in defining legal validity. This thesis aims to suggest that far from being an outlying case, Nigeria provides interesting philosophical illumination about what positivism does not explain about legal systems in general—namely, what determines obedience. This thesis uses the political philosophies of Aristotle and Rousseau to construct a philosophical understanding of the basis for obedience to law. It suggests that it is by participation in the function of a legal system, that law is shown to a given population to have a specific purpose that is tied to the moral nature of the state. This thesis asserts that participation serves to illuminate law’s moral legitimacy as an especial type of legitimacy that is, in a sense, prior to its legal legitimacy and as what explains obedience separately from law’s legal validity, which simply explains its plain existence. This thesis further uses a field experiment centred on a transportation system in Lagos, Nigeria to test, empirically, the hypotheses generated by its theoretical investigations that: 1: the greater a people’s direct participation in creating their laws, the greater they perceive of the law’s moral legitimacy. and 2: The greater the people’s belief in the law’s moral legitimacy, the greater their free obedience to the law. The results suggest that the manner in which citizens are allowed to participate on the formulation and enactment of rules affects the extent to which they go on to obey those rules. These results, further, give empirical grounds for the thesis’ theoretical combination of an Aristotelian understanding of law’s authority with a reformulation of Rousseau’s argument that participation is necessary for, and derived from, freedom.

This thesis provides a reinterpretation of J.A.G. Griffith’s lecture ‘The Political Constitution’—a reinterpretation that stresses the commitment Griffith expressed in that lecture to the normative dimension of legal positivism. I call this normative dimension ‘normative positivism’. Identifying Griffith as a normative positivist serves to clarify a number of debates surrounding Griffith’s arguments in ‘The Political Constitution’ and serves to clarify our understanding of the concept that has come to be known in UK public law scholarship in recent years as ‘political constitutionalism’, of which Griffith is regarded as a leading exemplar. The thesis argues that Griffith’s political constitutionalism is best understood as a form of normative positivism and is very different from some more recent defences of political constitutionalism available in the scholarly literature. The thesis also considers how the big constitutional questions of the age in the UK—questions relating, for example, to bills of rights and devolution—play out in the light of our discovery and appreciation of Griffith’s normative positivism.

207 f. / Submitted by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura (anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2013-07-26T22:09:25Z No. of bitstreams: 1 MARCOS DE AGUIAR VILLAS-BÔAS.pdf: 983210 bytes, checksum: 450fcef94d38b64e3ac540bcceaa0773 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura(anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2013-07-26T22:10:26Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 MARCOS DE AGUIAR VILLAS-BÔAS.pdf: 983210 bytes, checksum: 450fcef94d38b64e3ac540bcceaa0773 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-07-26T22:10:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 MARCOS DE AGUIAR VILLAS-BÔAS.pdf: 983210 bytes, checksum: 450fcef94d38b64e3ac540bcceaa0773 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / A Ciência do Direito vem passando por muitas mudanças nos últimos anos. Os estudos avançaram bastante, formando novos movimentos e teorias, que devem guiar a pesquisa jurídica nos próximos anos. A aproximação entre o direito e os sujeitos, os fatos e os valores é cada vez maior. O enfraquecimento do positivismo jurídico impõe uma revisão dos temas estudados sob o seu enfoque, o que também ocorre no direito tributário. O in dubio pro contribuinte é uma das matérias que merecem uma nova análise, ainda mais se considerarmos a crescente preocupação do jurista com a efetividade dos direitos fundamentais do cidadão. A partir das noções pós-positivistas que têm influenciado a ciência do direito, como a tópica, a argumentação jurídica e a teoria dos princípios, cumpre investigar se o in dubio pro contribuinte pode receber uma outra roupagem, funcionando como um princípio constitucional que busca dar máxima eficácia aos direitos fundamentais do contribuinte frente aos excessos do poder estatal e que pode ser desdobrado ainda em outras categorias normativas: regra e postulado. O in dubio pro contribuinte, como um princípio constitucional, influenciaria a construção das demais normas do sistema tributário brasileiro, impediria a construção de normas que não conferissem máxima efetividade aos direitos fundamentais e determinaria a aplicação de um postulado que imporia, nos casos difíceis tributários, um aumento da argumentação para a limitação desses direitos. / Salvador