[pt] O desenho atual de mercado do seguro obrigatório de veículos no Brasil tem apresentado questionamentos em relação ao seu modelo, destacando ineficiência na transferência de recursos dos proprietários de veículos para as vítimas de acidentes de trânsito e ausência de incentivo à eficiência na gestão dos recursos. Este é um mecanismo de alta complexidade, com natureza híbrida (parcela destinada a políticas públicas e parcela de natureza indenizatória) cujo desenho é um desafio constante ao regulador brasileiro. Com o objetivo de mitigar os problemas apresentados, fornecemos uma opção ao modelo atual em que o governo define diretamente a seguradora responsável e o valor de prêmio cobrado. Este estudo propõe-se um novo desenho de mercado, com a utilização de leilões em um processo mais transparente e eficiente para alocação e descoberta de preço para o Seguro DPVAT. Em um leilão reverso multiunidade de preço uniforme, as seguradoras ofertam quantidades e valor de prêmio por categoria de veículo e Unidade da Federação. Os resultados indicam que a estrutura da indústria de seguros e as decisões do governo possuem papel fundamental no desempenho do mercado. / [en] The current market design of mandatory vehicle insurance in Brazil has raised questions regarding its model highlighting inefficiency in the transfer of resources from vehicle owners to victims of traffic accidents and lack of incentive for efficiency in resource management. This is a highly complex mechanism with a hybrid nature (public policies and private insurance) whose design is a constant challenge for the Brazilian regulator. Looking to mitigate some of the problems, we provide an option to the current model in which the government directly defines the insurance company and the premium. This study proposes a new market design, using auctions for a more transparent and efficient process for allocation and price discovery for DPVAT Insurance. In a uniform reverse multi-unit auction, insurers bid quantities and premium by vehicle category and State. The results indicate that structure of the insurance industry and government decisions play a key role in market performance.

Blockchain-based peer-to-peer (P2P) electricity markets received considerable attention in the past years, leading to a rich variety of proposed market designs. Yet, little comparability and consensus exists on optimal market design, also due to a lack of common evaluation and benchmarking infrastructure. This article describes LabChain, an interactive prototype as research infrastructure for conducting experiments in (simulated) P2P electricity markets involving real human actors. The software stack comprises: (i) an (open) data layer for experiment configuration, (ii) a blockchain layer to reliably document bids and transactions, (iii) an experiment coordination layer and (iv) a user interface layer for participant interactions. As evaluation environment for human interactions within a laboratory setting, researchers can investigate patterns based on energy system and market setup and can compare and evaluate designs under real human behavior allowing alignment of intentions and outcomes. This contributes to the evaluation and benchmarking infrastructure discourse.

Most modern electricity markets do not guarantee that generation is reliable and sufficient to provide all consumer’s electricity needs at all times. This is due to design-flaws and regulatory intervention. During the coming decades, increased electricity demand and decarbonization trends will affect the electricity market greatly. As the share of wind and solar power increases in the generation mix, the inertia in the power system is expected to decrease. This can potentially increase the systems exposure to blackout risk. Therefore, it is important to ensure that electricity is traded in a way that ensures enough supply even during scarcity events. The study aims to compare six different capacity market designs that are widely discussed in the scientific literature. Furthermore, this study uses MATLAB to simulate how the utility for the strategic reserve in Sweden has changed over the past few years. The study finds no ideal capacity market design but concludes that different solutions come with their own advantages and trade-offs. The simulation results show that the utility of the strategic reserve in Sweden has increased during the last few years. Additionally, the simulation results suggest that demand for the strategic result varies on a daily time frame. / De flesta moderna elmarknader kan inte garantera pålitlig och tillräcklig produktion för att tillgodose konsumenters elbehov under alla tillfällen. Detta har att göra med brister i designen av elnätet och regleringar. Under de kommande decennierna kommer trender inom avkarbonisering att ha stor inverkan på elmarknaden. Med en ökande andel vind och solkraft som kraftproduktionsslag förväntas trögheten i kraftsystemet att minska. Detta kan potentiellt höja systemets utsatthet för strömavbrott. Därför är det viktigt att el handlas på ett sätt som försäkrar tillräcklig elförsörjning även under fall då produktionen är begränsad. Med målet att jämföra sex olika designer av kapacitetsmarknader som är etablerade i tidigare forskningsstudier. Vidare använder denna studie MATLAB för att simulera hur behovet av effektreserven i Sverige har ändrats under de senaste åren. Studien finner ingen ideal design för en kapacitetsmarknad, men fastställer att olika lösningar har sina egna fördelar och avvägningar. Studien finner vidare att behovet av effektreserven har ökat under de senaste åren. Dessutom indikerar simuleringsresultaten att behovet av effektreserven varierar med elbehovet under dag. / Kandidatexjobb i elektroteknik 2022, KTH, Stockholm

Dominant market theories analyze markets as ahistorical entities without the need for professional groups that manage crucial functions within them. This thesis, in contrast, approaches markets as historical systems that develop over time and that can be constituted in many different ways because of different historical trajectories. Different professional groups managing market routines, further, are seen as a crucial part of markets. Two concepts are introduced: “market architecture”, the specific way a market is constituted at a given time; and “market technocrats”, the seemingly disinterested third party functionaries that manage routines in markets and advocate changes in market architecture. The thesis argues that market technocrats exist because of uncertainty and lack of trust between market actors, and that they are an important part of how market architectures develop over time. It presents an analytical framework for understanding market technocrats and how they interact with and develop markets. Four different aspects of market technocrats are explored: the process of establishing market technocrats in market routines; the capture of the authority of market technocrats by other market actors; the expansionistic behavior of market technocrats; and the way changes in economic theory, as an important part of how economists with technocratic authority advocate market change, can help to explain changes in markets. These aspects are explored through four empirical papers: The Market Technocracy of Import Substitution: The Role of Asymmetric Information and The Swedish Seed Association 1880–1935; Limits of Market Technocracy: Swedish Fertilizer Research and the Crisis of Objectivity 1945–1960; Central Banks, and the Pursuit of Influence, Prestige, and Legitimacy: The Creation of the Nobel Memorial Prize; and From Market Engineering to Institutional Engineering: Reform Economics in Sweden 1950–2000. The results of the papers form the basis of a hypothetical narrative of how the role of market technocrats has changed during the 20th century. This provides a roadmap for further research in the development of markets and the role of market technocrats.

O atual desenho de mercado do Setor Elétrico Brasileiro (SEB) está apresentando uma série de problemas em seu funcionamento, destacando: (i) sustentabilidade econômica e financeira; (ii) sinal de preços; e (iii) complexidade técnica e regulatória. Esta combinação de problemas diminui a eficiência econômica e resulta em um ambiente de negócios inadequado e que não permite a correta alocação de custos e riscos. Todavia, apesar dos problemas apontados destaca-se que entre as ferramentas do SEB estão os Leilões de Energia, os quais são internacionalmente reconhecidos como eficazes na atração de investimentos e na segurança do suprimento. Assim, visando solucionar os problemas identificados no SEB, este estudo tem como objetivo propor um novo desenho de mercado de energia elétrica no Brasil com a utilização de leilões como principal elemento alocativo, introduzindo elementos que aprimorem a contratação de energia elétrica e a operação do SIN. Como um segundo objetivo, apresenta-se os fundamentos teóricos de leilões e de desenho de mercados de energia elétrica, visando uma base sólida e consistente nas proposições, a qual faça sentido para aqueles que desejam analisar e avançar sobre o tema. O novo desenho de mercado proposto considera a criação de um Mercado de Capacidade segregado do Mercado de Energia e a separação da parcela fio e comercialização da Distribuidora, sendo que a comercialização seria caracterizada como uma Loading Service Entity (LSE). A criação do Mercado de Capacidade manteria a liberdade da política energética e resolveria a questão da segurança do suprimento do SIN, sendo que isto combinado com a criação das LSEs permitiria a liberalização de 100% dos consumidores no Mercado de Energia. A operação do SIN também sofreria alteração, migrando do atual modelo de tight pool para um modelo de loose pool, no qual se estabelecem leilões competitivos para a operação do SIN. Um ponto crítico para o sucesso do novo desenho de mercado é o período de transição, e considerando a complexidade do SEB recomenda-se que este processo seja organizado e com previsibilidade de ações, para qual estima-se um período de 72 meses. Ao final, o novo desenho de mercado do SEB busca a eficiência econômica e a correta alocação de riscos, com um ambiente de negócios mais organizado e que esteja em condições de igualdade com os mercados de energia elétrica mais desenvolvidos. / The current Brazilian market design of electricity sector (SEB) is showing many problems, and I point out three severe ones: (i) Economic and financial sustainability; (ii) Poor price signal; (iii) Technical and regulatory complexity. These three problems combined diminish the allocative efficiency and create an unfriendly business environment, which distorts the cost and risk allocation. Brazil has a strong tradition in electricity auctions, highlighting those auctions are internationally recognized as an effective tool in attracting new investments and assuring supply adequacy. Therefore, the primary goal of this study is to present a new Brazilian electricity market design that uses auctions as the main allocative mechanism, including the introduction of features that improve the efficiency of the system and grid operations, as well. The second goal is to organize and present the auction and market design theory in Portuguese, providing a reference to others that want to research and study the theme. The proposal of a new market design splits the Capacity from Energy, and Grid Services from Commercialization in Distributors\' market, observing that the Distributors Commercialization part would be allocated in a Loading Service Entity (LSE). The creation of a Capacity Market would keep the energy policy room and address the supply adequacy concern, and this market combined with LSEs would allow the liberalization of all consumers to choose their suppliers. The Grid Operation also would be modified from a tight pool model to a loose pool model, and the new model would include auctions as the main allocation mechanism. One critical point to the success of a new Brazilian market design is the transition process; especially due to the complexity of SEB this study proposes a 72-month transition process. In the end, the new Brazilian market design will seek for more economic efficiency and a correct risk allocation, creating a better-organized business environment on par with conditions in more advanced electricity markets.

O atual desenho de mercado do Setor Elétrico Brasileiro (SEB) está apresentando uma série de problemas em seu funcionamento, destacando: (i) sustentabilidade econômica e financeira; (ii) sinal de preços; e (iii) complexidade técnica e regulatória. Esta combinação de problemas diminui a eficiência econômica e resulta em um ambiente de negócios inadequado e que não permite a correta alocação de custos e riscos. Todavia, apesar dos problemas apontados destaca-se que entre as ferramentas do SEB estão os Leilões de Energia, os quais são internacionalmente reconhecidos como eficazes na atração de investimentos e na segurança do suprimento. Assim, visando solucionar os problemas identificados no SEB, este estudo tem como objetivo propor um novo desenho de mercado de energia elétrica no Brasil com a utilização de leilões como principal elemento alocativo, introduzindo elementos que aprimorem a contratação de energia elétrica e a operação do SIN. Como um segundo objetivo, apresenta-se os fundamentos teóricos de leilões e de desenho de mercados de energia elétrica, visando uma base sólida e consistente nas proposições, a qual faça sentido para aqueles que desejam analisar e avançar sobre o tema. O novo desenho de mercado proposto considera a criação de um Mercado de Capacidade segregado do Mercado de Energia e a separação da parcela fio e comercialização da Distribuidora, sendo que a comercialização seria caracterizada como uma Loading Service Entity (LSE). A criação do Mercado de Capacidade manteria a liberdade da política energética e resolveria a questão da segurança do suprimento do SIN, sendo que isto combinado com a criação das LSEs permitiria a liberalização de 100% dos consumidores no Mercado de Energia. A operação do SIN também sofreria alteração, migrando do atual modelo de tight pool para um modelo de loose pool, no qual se estabelecem leilões competitivos para a operação do SIN. Um ponto crítico para o sucesso do novo desenho de mercado é o período de transição, e considerando a complexidade do SEB recomenda-se que este processo seja organizado e com previsibilidade de ações, para qual estima-se um período de 72 meses. Ao final, o novo desenho de mercado do SEB busca a eficiência econômica e a correta alocação de riscos, com um ambiente de negócios mais organizado e que esteja em condições de igualdade com os mercados de energia elétrica mais desenvolvidos. / The current Brazilian market design of electricity sector (SEB) is showing many problems, and I point out three severe ones: (i) Economic and financial sustainability; (ii) Poor price signal; (iii) Technical and regulatory complexity. These three problems combined diminish the allocative efficiency and create an unfriendly business environment, which distorts the cost and risk allocation. Brazil has a strong tradition in electricity auctions, highlighting those auctions are internationally recognized as an effective tool in attracting new investments and assuring supply adequacy. Therefore, the primary goal of this study is to present a new Brazilian electricity market design that uses auctions as the main allocative mechanism, including the introduction of features that improve the efficiency of the system and grid operations, as well. The second goal is to organize and present the auction and market design theory in Portuguese, providing a reference to others that want to research and study the theme. The proposal of a new market design splits the Capacity from Energy, and Grid Services from Commercialization in Distributors\' market, observing that the Distributors Commercialization part would be allocated in a Loading Service Entity (LSE). The creation of a Capacity Market would keep the energy policy room and address the supply adequacy concern, and this market combined with LSEs would allow the liberalization of all consumers to choose their suppliers. The Grid Operation also would be modified from a tight pool model to a loose pool model, and the new model would include auctions as the main allocation mechanism. One critical point to the success of a new Brazilian market design is the transition process; especially due to the complexity of SEB this study proposes a 72-month transition process. In the end, the new Brazilian market design will seek for more economic efficiency and a correct risk allocation, creating a better-organized business environment on par with conditions in more advanced electricity markets.

The electricity high voltage transmission networks are interconnected over most of the continents but this is not the case of the power system organizations. Indeed, as described with the concept of integrated power system, the organization over these large networks is divided by several kinds of internal borders. In this context, the research object, the cross-border coordination of operation, is a set of coordination arrangements over internal borders between differing regulatory, technical and market designs. These arrangements can include for instance the famous market couplings, some cost-sharing agreements or common security assessments among several other solutions. The existence and improvement of the cross-border coordination of operation can be beneficial to the whole integrated power system. This statement is verified in the European case as in 2012 where several regional and continental coordination arrangements are successfully implemented.In order to benefit from the European experience and contribute to support the European improvement process, this thesis investigates the cross-border coordination of operation in the European case with four angles of study. First, a modular framework is built to describe the existing solutions and the implementation choices from a regulatory point of view. Second, the thesis analyses the tools available to assess the impact of an evolution of the cross-border coordination. Third, the role of the European Union (EU) is described as critical both for the existing arrangements and to support the improvement process. The last angle of study focuses on two dimensions of the economic modes of coordination between transmission system operators.

La transition énergétique, en partie caractérisée par le déploiement massif des énergies renouvelables, a relancé un débat de longue date sur les architectures de marché fournissant les meilleures incitations aux investissements dans les marchés libéralisés de l’électricité. Ces incitations sont essentielles pour garantir la sécurité d’approvisionnement à long terme. Pour choisir l’architecture de marché adéquate, les décideurs publics doivent évaluer et comparer les performances économiques des solutions disponibles. La présente thèse complète la littérature sur les incitations aux investissements et la sécurité d’approvisionnement en étudiant trois aspects importants : (i) le comportement des marchés de l'électricité en présence d’acteurs averses au risque, (ii) la compatibilité entre les incitations des acteurs à mettre leurs actifs sous cocon et les objectifs de sécurité d’approvisionnement et (iii) les performances économiques de différentes architectures de marché dans un contexte de forte pénétration des énergies renouvelables. Pour ce faire, une modélisation de type System Dynamics est utilisée pour représenter les dynamiques de long terme résultant des décisions des acteurs dans un marché libéralisé. La thèse est organisée en trois chapitres correspondant à chacun des points mentionnés ci-dessus. Les principaux résultats sont les suivants : Premièrement, les mécanismes de capacité sont nécessaires pour faire face aux effets néfastes de l’aversion au risque des investisseurs. Ce phénomène affecte de manière significative les marchés de l’énergie de type energy-only, qui subissent alors une baisse des investissements et des pénuries plus importantes. Les marchés de capacité résistent mieux à l’aversion au risque des investisseurs. Cependant, cette résilience dépend du plafond des prix dans les enchères de capacité. Pour qu'une telle architecture de marché donne des résultats satisfaisants en termes de sécurité d’approvisionnement, ce plafond de prix doit tenir compte du risque d'investissement supporté par les acteurs. Deuxièmement, si les acteurs du marché en ont la possibilité, leurs décisions de mettre leurs actifs sous cocon peuvent modifier les dynamiques d'investissement et de fermeture à long terme. En outre, dans un monde caractérisé par des actifs indivisibles, cette possibilité augmente le niveau de coordination nécessaire pour assurer la sécurité d’approvisionnement. Cela est particulièrement vrai pour les marchés de type energy-only, dans lesquels la mise sous cocon augmente le niveau des pénuries, au point de contrebalancer les économies de coûts qu’elle génère. En revanche, les marchés de capacité peuvent fournir la coordination nécessaire pour assurer la sécurité d’approvisionnement même lorsque les acteurs ont la possibilité de mettre leurs actifs sous cocon. Troisièmement, parmi les architectures de marché proposées dans la littérature, les marchés de capacité apparaissent comme la meilleure solution du point de vue du surplus social. Néanmoins, du point de vue des investisseurs, et dans certaines conditions liées à une forte pénétration des énergies renouvelables, les marchés de capacité avec des contrats annuels ne suppriment pas entièrement le problème dit de "missing money". Les résultats indiquent que l'attribution de contrats de capacité pluriannuels atténue le problème. / The ongoing energy transition, partly characterized by the massive deployment of renewables, has reignited a long-lasting debate on the best market design options to provide adequate investment incentives and ensure capacity adequacy in liberalised electricity markets. To choose the appropriate market design, policymakers need to assess and compare the economic performances of available solutions in terms of effectiveness and cost-efficiency. This dissertation complements the existing literature on market design for long-term capacity adequacy by focusing on three research topics: (i) understanding how electricity markets perform under different assumptions regarding investors’ risk preferences, (ii) analysing the compatibility of private agents’ incentives to mothball capacity resources with security of supply objectives and (iii) assessing the economic performance of different market designs in a context of a high penetration of renewables. To this end, the System Dynamics modelling framework is applied to represent long-term dynamics resulting from private agents’ decisions in liberalised electricity markets. The dissertation is organised in three chapters corresponding to each of the topics mentioned above. The main results are outlined below. Firstly, capacity remuneration mechanisms are necessary to deal with the detrimental effects of investors’ risk aversion. Energy-only markets are significantly affected by this phenomenon as they experience reduced investment incentives and higher levels of shortages. Capacity markets are more resilient to private investors’ risk aversion. However, this resilience depends on the level of the price cap in the capacity auctions. For such a market design to provide satisfactory outcomes in terms of capacity adequacy, this price cap should account for the investment risk faced by market participants. Secondly, when market participants have the possibility to mothball their capacity resources, these mothballing decisions can potentially modify investment and shutdown dynamics in the long run. Furthermore, in a world with capacity lumpiness (i.e. indivisibilities), mothballing increases the level of coordination needed to ensure capacity adequacy. This is especially true in energy-only markets, where mothballing increases the level of shortages to an extent that seems to overweigh the cost savings it generates at system level. Capacity markets can provide the required coordination to ensure capacity adequacy in a world with mothballing. Thirdly, among proposed market designs in the literature, capacity markets appear as the preferable solution to ensure capacity adequacy from a social welfare point of view. Nevertheless, from a private investor’s perspective and under certain conditions related to high penetration of renewables, capacity markets with annual contracts do not entirely remove the so-called “missing money” problem. The results indicate that granting multiannual capacity contracts alleviates the problem.

The traditional electricity market, holding centralized authority over consumers, is no longer adequate seeing a shift towards a more electrified, decentralized, and digitalized society. Increased energy prices, raising concerns about climate change, and tightening governmental regulations have resulted in that an extensive diffusion of renewable energy sources has evolved. This development is expected to change the structure of the sector, despite that an appropriate market design that can deal with these remains to be identified. The purpose of this study was to investigate how a business model of a digital platform, managing energy trading within a local community could be designed. This study contributes to a new dimension of energy transitions within a Multi-Level Perspective by studying a particular field of the transition in terms of flexibility market platforms. The rising need for flexible solutions, making the consumer a prosumer, and enabling shared energy through a digital platform involves uncertainty and challenges, where a suitable business model linking new technology to the emerging market needs to be defined. Despite the novelty of the research field of local energy markets, the aim of investigating business model designs for a local energy market platform has been reached through an exploratory case study and integration of theories from several fields. This study makes an analytical contribution of investigating five pioneering projects, all developing digital platforms enabling integration of flexibility into the electricity market. This further contributes to the design-implementation gap of theories when developing a local energy market, by suggesting the most vital parameters to take into account. Based on the findings, a suggestion on a suitable business model design and a corresponding market design was developed. The main objective of the proposed market design is to serve as a basis to bring forward flexibility available from prosumers and their controllable demand and supply arrangement, including renewable energy technology generation and storage devices. The intention is to maintain a balanced and transparent distribution network at the lowest possible costs, while, at the same time functioning as reserve storage towards the main grid, reducing the risk of capacity shortage. Additional insights were raised that can be helpful in the evaluation of utilizing flexibility energy assets before making grid investments, following the recently presented recommendation of the EU's Clean Energy package. / Den traditionella elmarknaden, karaktäriserad av en centraliserad styrning, är inte längre hållbar då utvecklingen av marknaden går mot ett allt mer elektrifierat, decentraliserat och digitaliserat samhälle. Ökande energipriser, växande oro för klimatfrågor tillsammans med en allt snävare reglering av energimarknaden har resulterat i en omfattande ökning av förnybara energikällor. Denna utveckling förväntas förändra sektorns struktur, där en lämplig marknadsdesign som kan hantera detta återstår att identifiera. Syftet med denna studie var att undersöka hur en affärsmodell för en digital plattform, anpassad för att hantera lokal energidelning, kan utformas. Denna studie bidrar till en ny dimension av energitransformationen från ett multi-nivå-perspektiv genom att studera ett särskilt område av övergången i form av flexibla marknadsplattformar. Det ökande behovet av flexibla lösningar, där konsumenter blir prosumenter och energi delas lokalt via digitala plattform innebär osäkerheter och utmaningar. En lämplig affärsmodell som kan anknyta de nya tekniska lösningarna som krävs till lokala energimarknader bör därav definieras. Trots att forskningsområdet som berör lokala energimarknader kan anses relativt nytt och delvis outforskat, har målet att undersöka affärsmodellkoncept för en lokal energimarknadsplattform uppnåtts genom en fallstudie och iterationer av teorier inom flertalet områden. Denna studie bidrar med en analytisk undersökning av fem innovativa projekt som alla utvecklar digitala plattformar för att möjliggöra integrering av flexibilitet till elmarknaden. Detta bidrar även till det kunskapsgap som har identifierats mellan design och implementering fas vid utvecklandet av lokala energimarknader, genom föreslagna parameter som anses grundläggande och som bör tas hänsyn till. Baserat på resultatet presenterades ett förslag på en lämplig design för affärsmodell samt en tillhörande marknadsdesign. Huvudsyftet med den föreslagna marknadsdesignen är att utgöra en grund för gynnandet av en mer flexibel elektricitet hantering. Detta möjliggörs genom introduktionen av prosumenter till marknaden, där allt mer elektricitet produceras från förnybara källor och där konsumtion samt produktion regleras med hjälp av integrerade lagringsenheter. Målet är att upprätthålla ett balanserat och transparent distributionsnät till lägsta möjliga kostnad, medan marknaden även fungerar som ett reservlager mot kraftnätet, vilket minskar risken för kapacitetsbrist runt om i Sverige. Ytterligare insikter från denna studie påvisar hur de befintliga energitillgångarna kan utnyttjas på ett mer flexibelt och effektivt sätt, vilka stöds av de nyligen presenterade rekommendationerna från EU:s Clean Energy-paket.

This thesis analyses the necessity for the establishment, main functions and the viability of the Turkish Wholesale Electricity Trading and Contracting Company, TETAS in the short, mean and the long term. In order to understand the necessity for the establishment of TETAS, Turkish Energy Policies such as the state-led energy policies and the competition based market orientation are put under scrutiny. The thesis also discusses whether Turkish Government has carried out a comprehensive, deterministic and effective &ldquo / Liberalization Policy&rdquo / in the electricity sector by looking at the present situation and the principles outlined in Laws No: 4628, 5654 and 5686 and the Strategy Paper. The dissertation then examines the life span of TETAS by looking at the impacts of the strategy paper, liberalization procedure of the overall electricity market and newly enacted laws such as Law No: 5654 and 5686 in the short, mean and the long term. In addition, TETAS is examined whether it is a &ldquo / monopoly&rdquo / or not in Turkish Electricity wholesale market by calculating the supply concentration of TETAS using the Herfindahl Hirschman Index. Despite the studies on the establishment of the liberal market such as the envisagement of Law No: 4628 and the strategy paper, this thesis study envisages that it is still not possible to talk about a liberal electricity market. In addition, it is also concluded that the statements outlined in Laws No: 5654 and 5686 hinder the overall liberalization efforts since these laws are postponing the liberalization of electricity sector and making the life span of TETAS longer. As a result, liberalization efforts on the electricity market are unsuccessful in the mean term and TETAS seems to hold its dominance position in the wholesale market as a state-owned wholesale trading company in the long run.