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<p>Denna litteraturstudie avser reda ut den eventuella kopplingen mellan bonus och dagens finanskris samt undersöka om ett bonusstopp för bankanställda kan minska risken för en framtida finansiell kris. Uppsatsen inleds med en förklaring av bankväsendets särart och vikten av ett statligt skyddsnät. Senare avhandlas relevant bonusteori och moral hazard, därefter en redogörelse för bonusens betydelse i finanskrisen. Vidare utreds bonusprogrammens inverkan i svenska bankers expansion i Baltikum. Vi har kommit fram till att belöningsstrukturen inom finansbranschen har varit felaktigt utformad då dessa belönat kortsiktiga vinster på riskfyllda affärer. Detta har varit en av orsakerna till subprimekrisen. Ett bonusstopp minskar därför risken för liknande finansiella kriser men kan däremot inte helt eliminera risken för finanskriser.</p>

<p>I denna uppsats undersöks hur moral hazard påverkas i grupplån vid frånvaro av sociala band, övervakning, och kontinuerliga krediter. Undersökningen förklarar grupplån i teori men presenterar även empiriskt material från andra författares artiklar. Undersökningen visar att de sociala banden inte har den avgörande betydelsen som teorin förutsätter. Vidare konstateras att nära övervakning och låntagarens behov av framtida lån har stor betydelse för att reducera moral hazard.</p>

Denna litteraturstudie avser reda ut den eventuella kopplingen mellan bonus och dagens finanskris samt undersöka om ett bonusstopp för bankanställda kan minska risken för en framtida finansiell kris. Uppsatsen inleds med en förklaring av bankväsendets särart och vikten av ett statligt skyddsnät. Senare avhandlas relevant bonusteori och moral hazard, därefter en redogörelse för bonusens betydelse i finanskrisen. Vidare utreds bonusprogrammens inverkan i svenska bankers expansion i Baltikum. Vi har kommit fram till att belöningsstrukturen inom finansbranschen har varit felaktigt utformad då dessa belönat kortsiktiga vinster på riskfyllda affärer. Detta har varit en av orsakerna till subprimekrisen. Ett bonusstopp minskar därför risken för liknande finansiella kriser men kan däremot inte helt eliminera risken för finanskriser.

Syfte: Studiens syfte är att undersöka ”venture capital”-branschen och hur omfattande problemen med asymmetrisk information och ”moral hazard” är samt hur risk hanteras. Syftet är också att arbeta fram en hypotes för framtida kvantitativ forskning.   Ansats/metod: Med en deduktiv ansats har en kvalitativ studie genomförts. Datainsamling av empirisk primärdata har skett genom semi-strukturerade intervjuer.   Teoretisk referensram: Det teoretiska kapitlet tar upp grundläggande teorier kring asymmetrisk information, ”moral hazard”, ”agency costs” och riskhantering. Avsnittet tar även upp metoder för att motverka och minimera effekterna av agent-problemet.   Empiri: I empirikapitlet redogörs för de fem intervjuer som genomförts med personer som representerar fem olika VC-bolag. Det empiriska kapitlet visar hur bolagen arbetar i investeringsprocessen med att hantera risk.   Slutsats: Uppsatsens slutsats visar på relativt stora skillnader mellan vad som beskrivs i den teoretiska referensramen jämfört med hur svenska VC-bolag arbetar.

Essay One examines the asymmetric information problem between primary insurers and reinsurers in the reinsurance industry and contributes uniquely to the separation of adverse selection from moral hazard, if both are present. A two-period principal-agent model is set up to identify the signals of adverse selection and moral hazard generated by the actions of the primary insurer and to provide a basis for corresponding hypotheses for empirical testing. Using data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and A.M. Best Company, the empirical tests show that the problem of adverse selection exists in the reinsurance market between the affiliated insurers and non-affiliated reinsurers, and even between closely related affiliated insurers and reinsurers. There is no evidence indicating the presence of moral hazard in the reinsurance market. To address the issue of soaring property insurance premiums and coverage availability in states that are subject to hurricane risks, state and federal governments have not only regulated the private insurance market but have also intervened directly into markets by establishing government-funded insurance programs. With coexisting public and private insurance mechanisms and price regulation, the risk of cross subsidization and a subsequent moral hazard problem may arise. By using data from the Florida Citizens Insurance Corporation, the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, the Flood Insurance and the private homeowner insurance market in Florida from 1998 to 2007, the second essay examines the moral hazard problems arising from government regulation and involvement in the private insurance sector. In sum, the provision of national flood insurance is found to be positively related to the population growth in the state of Florida, which shows that state immigrants can take advantage of the lower cost of flood insurance when relocating in higher-risk areas. Further, we find that national flood insurance and the catastrophe fund complement the development of the private insurance sector, while the residual market hinders the development of private property insurance market.

Three independent models are built based on information asymmetric to analysis discipline effects brought by banks` issuance of subordinated debts. The research results offer the theory of subordinated debts discipline effects. First, an adverse selection model is built to examine banks¡¦ policies when issuing subordinated debts based on the banks¡¦ credit risks. The result shows that banks with lower credit risks are more likely to issue subordinated debts, since after the issuance, the yields of these debts are lower. When depositors observe the lower yields of the subordinated debts, they would presume that these banks have lower credit risks. As a result, banks with lower credit risks can decrease their operational costs by issuing subordinated debts. This model has demonstrated that the market can discipline banks indirectly through the issuance of subordinated debts. Second, a moral hazard model to show that issuing of subordinated debts by banks can bring direct market discipline and indirect market discipline to make their loans less risky. The direct market discipline means that the risk level of bank will be evaluated by professional investors. The investors will require that the yields accord to the banks risk. For lowering the cost of issuing subordinated debts, banks will make their loans less risky. The indirect market discipline means that the depositors would take the yields of these debts as a significant signal indicating banks risk levels. The depositors will decide to withdraw their savings when the bank signals a higher risk, and keep their saving when the bank signals a lower risk. I prove that issuing of subordinated debts by banks can bring about these two kinds of market discipline. The model has also demonstrated that if the bank supervisor can utilize the information of issuing subordinated debts effectively, they will achieve higher supervisory goal. Third, a reputation model is built to show that for reputation concerns, a bank would change its monitoring decisions if it issues subordinated debts. Reputation effect in banks is different in different scenarios. When the good banks probability of success is very high, reputation effect would induce the bad bank to start monitor it`s borrowers, and the efforts of bad banks monitoring would be increased by time. When the bad banks probability of success is very low, reputation effect would induce the good bank start monitoring its borrowers. and the efforts of bad banks monitoring would be decreases by time.

Wirtschaftswiss. Fakultät der Humboldt-Univ., Diss.--Berlin, 2006. / Zsfassung in dt. Sprache.

The first two chapters of this dissertation concern the effect of public catastrophic insurance programs. In the first chapter, I show how these programs, which only protect against large health shocks, induce advantageous selection in private insurance. I use data on older Americans with Medicare insurance from the Health and Retirement Study to test if individuals with supplemental private health insurance are systematically lower-risk in states with public catastrophic insurance programs. I find that these programs decrease the average health risk for the privately insured by $700 and that a one standard deviation increase in an individual’s health risk decreases her probability of having private insurance by 4 percentage points. In the second chapter, I show that these programs reduce the incentive to invest in risk-reducing activities. I find large decreases in self-protection after a program is introduced and that individuals for whom the program is less generous are more likely to engage in self-protection. These effects are stronger for women than for men and apply to a variety of investments in health, including decisions about smoking, obesity, and cancer screening. The third chapter considers a different form of government intervention in insurance markets. In this chapter, I study laws mandating that employer-sponsored health insurance provide coverage for mental illness. I show that industries for which mental health coverage became more generous had larger increases in the average mental distress of their insured workforce. Part of the increase in generosity was due to regulations mandating coverage of mental health benefits. I then show that these regulations affected the behavior of individuals in the labor market—individuals who value more generous mental health benefits and switch jobs work longer hours after these regulations take effect, but individuals who do not value mental health benefits decrease their labor supply. These results are consistent with firms cutting back on their demand for labor due to the cost of the mandate, which leads to lower wages and a decrease in labor supply by individuals who do not value mental health benefits, but an increase in labor supply by individuals who do value mental health benefits highly.

I denna uppsats undersöks hur moral hazard påverkas i grupplån vid frånvaro av sociala band, övervakning, och kontinuerliga krediter. Undersökningen förklarar grupplån i teori men presenterar även empiriskt material från andra författares artiklar. Undersökningen visar att de sociala banden inte har den avgörande betydelsen som teorin förutsätter. Vidare konstateras att nära övervakning och låntagarens behov av framtida lån har stor betydelse för att reducera moral hazard.