This thesis critically assesses ‘relaxed realism’ – a group of views that have entered the metaethical debate recently (Dworkin, 1996; Kramer, 2009; Parfit, 2011; Scanlon, 2014). Relaxed realism promises a novel perspective on our normative practice. In particular, it aims for a view that is genuinely distinct from traditional non-naturalism on the one hand, and sophisticated forms of expressivism on the other. This thesis calls into question whether such an aspiration can be met. The approach is twofold. First, the thesis argues that relaxed realism can meet various of its objectives better by relying on theoretical resources that expressivism offers. To argue for this claim, it discusses three challenges that relaxed realism should be able to meet according to its own objectives. With regards to each challenge, it then shows that as it stands relaxed realist views fail to adequately respond to it. Finally, the thesis suggests that relaxed realism can better respond to the respective challenges – and hence, better meet their own objectives – by endorsing certain expressivist resources. Second, the thesis argues that relaxed realism is an inherently unstable view. It does so by raising a dilemma. Either relaxed realism fails to establish the desired difference to expressivism or it succeeds, but at the expense of erasing the difference to traditional non-naturalism. The conclusion of the thesis is critical: the relaxed realist aspiration for a novel take on our normative practice – distinct from both traditional non-naturalism and expressivism – remains unmet.

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This thesis explores whether a viable theistic program of psychological research is possible. The importance of this exploration has to do with naturalism's monopoly on psychological science, inasmuch as naturalism prevents other worldviews from competing fairly in psychology's scientific marketplace by controlling the criteria of psychological science. Because theism is naturalism's most complete rival, considering theism's scientific potential in psychology is crucial to dismantling naturalism's monopoly. Contrary to conventional wisdom, theism encompasses a unique set of understandings about the natural events that constitute the discipline of psychology. Therefore, a robust scientific conception of theism would change how psychological researchers understand and utilize existing research methods and psychological topics. Not only are quantitative and qualitative methods capable of theistic deployment; traditionally theistic topics and radically secular topics within psychology can also be reconceptualized and investigated theistically. Indeed, theistic reconceptualizations of psychological theories and topics lead to new and different research questions, hypotheses, and predictions as well as original studies and prospective programs of research, suggesting that theism is heuristic for the discipline of psychology in its current constitution. A viable theistic program of psychological research is not only possible, but also necessary for psychological science.

[pt] A dissertação A linguagem no Crátilo de Platão pretende, a partir da análise das teses apresentadas por Platão no diálogo Crátilo acerca da correção dos nomes e de suas respectivas refutações, realizar uma reflexão sobre modo como Platão irá direcionar as investigações filosóficas em relação à linguagem; e a presente dissertação pretende ainda ressaltar a importância de tal diálogo não só para o pensamento platônico, mas, também, para a preservação de algumas das primeiras discussões em torno da linguagem na história do pensamento humano. Esta dissertação é fruto de uma investigação mais geral que pretende analisar a relação, no contexto da filosofia grega, entre a filosofia e a sofística (retórica). Entre os comentadores é comum encontramos a ideia de que no século V e início do IV a.C, houve, por assim dizer, uma batalha, iniciada por Platão, entre a filosofia e a sofística, visando o monopólio intelectual na sociedade grega. E uma discussão capital neste embate entre a filosofia e a sofística diz respeito às funções, poderes e limites do logos. Então, ao analisar o Crátilo é possível perceber as particularidades platônicas em relação a tal discussão sobre a linguagem. / [en] The dissertation The language in Plato’s Cratylus intends, through the analysis of the theses presented by Plato in the Cratylus about the correctness of names and their refutations, make a reflection on how Plato will direct the philosophical investigations in relation to language; and also highlight the importance of such dialogue not only to Platonic thought, but also for the preservation of some of the first discussions about the language in the history of human thought. This dissertation is the result of a more general research that seeks to analyze the relationship in the context of Greek philosophy, between philosophy and sophistry (rhetoric). Among the commentators is common to find the idea that in the fifth century BC and early, there was, so to speak, a battle, begun by Plato, between philosophy and sophistry, seeking the intellectual monopoly of Greek society. And a discussion on this capital clash between philosophy and sophistry with regard to the functions, powers and limits of the logos. So, in analyzing the Cratylus is possible to identify particular with respect to such Platonic discussion of the language.

Cette thèse porte sur l’œuvre de Huysmans allant de ses premiers écrits jusqu’à la veille de sa mésentente avec Zola, À Rebours étant en cela le point de disjonction entre une première période de formation et la suite d’expériences littéraires multiples dont la méthode naturaliste est garant d’unité. Car si l’écriture naturaliste fut, à un moment donné de la vie de Huysmans une forme d’initiation, elle n’a pas cessé d’être une manière de penser et l’auteur se réclame de cette part naturaliste même dans ses romans les plus mystiques. Huysmans veut donc écrire un livre en se gardant d’idéaliser le monde, c’est-à-dire un livre anti-romanesque. En cela il s’inscrit en pleine mouvance naturaliste. Car, bannir les intrusions de l’auteur, au nom de l’objectivité expérimentale est l’un des fondements du courant naturaliste. Mais, résultat paradoxal, en poussant le discours théorique du Roman expérimental jusqu’au bout de sa logique, l’écriture de Huysmans va aboutir à une sorte d’éclatement de la structure traditionnelle du roman, tel que va l’attester quelques années plus tard l’écriture d’À Rebours. En effet, Huysmans tire parti à sa manière de la théorie naturaliste de Zola. Il a très tôt compris que cette théorie va aboutir à une impasse et qu’il faut aller aux confins de cette expérience pour pouvoir passer à d’autres. Mais cette étape de sa formation l’a définitivement marqué, surtout comme méthode de documentation. L’expérience littéraire de Huysmans pendant cette décennie est symptomatique d’un état plus général et laisse comprendre que le roman repose sur un terrain mouvant. / This thesis deals with the work of Huysmans ranging from his first writings until the eve of his disagreement with Zola; À Rebours being the point of disjunction between an initial period of setting up and a series of multiple literary experiences where the naturalistic method is the guarantor of unity. For if naturalistic writing was, at some point in the life of Huysmans, a form of initiation, it has not ceased to be a way of thinking and the author claims this naturalist part even in his most mystical novels. Huysmans therefore wants to write a book while avoiding idealizing the world, that is to say, a non-fiction book. Through this, he takes part in the naturalist movement. For, to banish the intrusions of the author, in the name of experimental objectivity, is one of the foundations of the naturalist current. But paradoxically, by pushing the theoretical discourse of the experimental novel to the end of its logic, Huysmans' writing will lead to a sort of break-up of the traditional structure of the novel, as evidenced some years later the writing of À Rebours. Indeed, Huysmans draws in his own way Zola's naturalist theory. He quickly realized that this theory will lead to a dead end and that we must go to the edge of this experience in order to be able to pass on to others. But this stage of its formation definitely marked it, especially as a method of documentation. The literary experience of Huysmans during this decade is symptomatic of a more general state and makes it clear that the novel rests on a moving field.

Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (EAAN) begins with the following simple idea: the evolutionary process of natural selection selects organisms due to adaptive behaviors, but not necessarily due to true beliefs. If this notion is even possibly true, then it is also possible that some (or many) of our own beliefs are not veridical and that our reasoning processes may not successfully point to truths (but are merely evolutionarily advantageous). Once the deliverances and processes of our cognitive faculties have been thus called into question, it seems improper to provide an argument that one can trust one’s cognitive faculties and processes (because such an argument requires the presupposition of what one is trying to prove). The reflective metaphysical naturalist, upon seeing this, realizes that she has a defeater for her belief in the reliability of her cognitive faculties, and this eventuates into a defeater for all of her beliefs (including the belief in naturalism). So, a belief in naturalism, when conjoined with a belief in current evolutionary theory, puts the reflective naturalist in an epistemically undesirable (i.e., irrational) position. It is better, Plantinga says, to discard one’s belief in metaphysical naturalism. Plantinga’s argument is not a globally skeptical one. His ultimate goal is to persuade people to give up naturalism as a metaphysical explanation, and to adopt theism instead. EAAN is an argument against naturalism that is intended to open a door for some later argument for theism; EAAN in itself is not an argument for theism. In this paper, I attempt to: (1) explain EAAN via its historical development and refinement; (2) examine what I feel to be some of the most important critiques of EAAN (along with some of Plantinga’s responses); (3) put the argument in an Extended Summary in Logical Form; (4) comment upon the Extended Summary and, in the process of discussing the premises, settle upon what I feel to be the two main contested premises of EAAN; and, (5) conclude that Plantinga’s argument has thus far survived attack, and explain why I expect it to continue to do so in the future.

This thesis articulates a critique of scientific naturalism from the perspective of John Dewey. Scientific naturalism can be defined by two explicit, metaphysical commitments, one ontological and one epistemological. Implicit to these commitments is a further commitment concerning the nature of human experience. This understanding of human experience can be described as epistemic reductionism because it reduces the whole of experience and all empiricism to epistemology. Scientific naturalism is the orthodox position for most contemporary, Anglo-American philosophy. Many philosophers within this tradition are dissatisfied with scientific naturalism and attempt to critique scientific naturalism from the perspective of "liberal" naturalism. One major objection from the liberal perspective concerns the ontology and placement of moral qualities: where are moral qualities to be placed in a scientifically naturalistic ontology? However, due to the fact that liberal naturalists share with scientific naturalists a commitment to an epistemically reductionistic understanding of the nature of human experience, liberal naturalism fails to adequately address the placement problem.

Paul Russell argues that the interpretation of Hume as a classical compatibilist is misguided. Russell defends a naturalistic reading of Humean freedom and moral responsibility. On this account, Hume holds two theses: that moral responsibility is a product of our moral sentiments, and that our concept of moral freedom is derived from our considerations of moral responsibility. Russell claims that Hume’s theory of the passions is non-cognitivist, and thus that his account of moral judgment fails to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary actions or qualities of mind. He concludes that Hume’s account of moral responsibility is inadequate. I argue that Hume has a cognitivist account of the passions. For Hume, our character is judged to be a proper object of praise or censure on account of our ability to partake in a moral community with our fellows. I conclude that Hume does not naturalize freedom and moral responsibility, but socializes it.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Delaware, 2009. / Principal faculty advisor: Nina Athanassoglou-Kallmyer, Dept. of Art History. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2003. / Title from OhioLink abstract page. Abstract. Abstract available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.