La propriété intellectuelle est un des droits fondamentaux. Conformément à l’esprit résultant de la théorie de l’ordre de valeur objectif, les intermédiaires de l’Internet doivent assumer une obligation de protection active en matière de propriété intellectuelle. Cependant, en raison d’une relation de répartition des obligations entre les titulaires de droits de propriété intellectuelle, les usagers, l’État et les intermédiaires de l’Internet, l’obligation de protection qui incombe à ces derniers doit être limitée. Afin d’éviter que les obligations des intermédiaires de l’Internet ne soient ni excessives ou ni insuffisantes, un certain nombre de principes juridique et économique et de critères permettant d’adapter l’obligation aux objets de diffusion, aux modes d’exploitation ainsi qu’au caractère lucratif doit être prise en compte lors de la mise en place de ces obligations. Plus précisément, les intermédiaires de l’Internet ne doivent pas prendre en charge une seule et unique obligation mais de multiples obligations, y compris l’obligation de filtrage. Ces obligations forment un système complet leur permettant d’assurer de manière active la protection des droits de propriété intellectuelle / Intellectual property is one of fundamental rights. By developing and applying the objective value order theory, the internet intermediaries should assume the obligation to actively protect the intellectual property. Meanwhile, as shared obligations distributed among the government, the right holder, the internet intermediaries, and the user, the active obligation of IP protection that the internet intermediaries can carry out is limited. In order to insure the moderation of obligation, it would be preferable to respect the pertinent legal and economic principles, and distinguish the target of dissemination, the business model, and the profit factor in choosing the type of obligations. It should be noted that this active protection would not be accomplished only through a unique obligation. It should articulate several types of obligation, including but not limited to filtering obligation. These obligations, all together, form an obligation system which enables internet intermediaries to actively protect intellectual property

1 Dissolution of a limited company with liquidation; the assignment of rights and enforceability of obligations Abstract The diploma is concerned about the issue of the enforceability of commitments and the cessions of rights, especially with regard to the shortening of creditors' rights in the event of winding up a corporation, during a liquidation or insolvency process. The diploma does not attempt to analyze in detail the process of liquidation or eventually the process of insolvency, but chooses the specific problems and procedures that are applied to meet the needs of a shareholder corporate model, which means to enrich the ownership structure to the maximal potential extent, including in this procedure the influential and controlling persons who in some way manage to influence decision-making process in the corporation at the expense of creditors. The introductory chapter gives a general description of the liquidation process, including regulations which apply to it. The comparison of foreign legislation, mainly focusing on the law applied in the United Kingdom from which the Czech legislation was also inspired by, is important with regard to legal proceedings of subjects acting on behalf the corporation, especially in case of a liquidator acting in the process of liquidation, furthermore it is...

L'obligation naturelle est souvent de l'actualité. Cette belle inconnue du droit des obligations est dérivée du droit romain et le code civil français n'a pas définit sa vraie nature. Ce flou juridique est aussi poursuivi dans la recherche des auteurs. Elle serait particulière dans ce point que la contrainte du débiteur à exécuter son devoir ne serait pas possible mais son accomplissement est reconnu par l'impossibilité de la répétition. Cela rend l'obligation naturelle différent par rapport de l'obligation civile, plus particulièrement parce que le créancier est pourvue du pouvoir de contrainte. Il se parait qu'il existe du domaine du droit et de la morale dans un titre quasi juridique. Cette est visée à définir une régime de l'obligation naturelle en droit français actuel. / The natural obligation is often in the news. This beautiful stranger contract law is derived from Roman law and French civil code does not define its true nature. This legal uncertainty is also continued in the search for the perpetrators. It would be special in this regard that the stress of the debtor to perform his duty would not be possible but its achievement is recognized by the impossibility of repetition. This makes the natural obligation different from the civil obligation, especially because the creditor is provided with the power of coercion. It seems that there is the area of ​​law and morality in a quasi-judicial capacity. This is referred to define a system of natural obligation in current French law.

Le bicentenaire du Code civil était l’occasion du bilan ; la réforme du Code civil ouvre le temps des perspectives. Ou plutôt, d’une perspective : celle des sources d’obligations qui, bien qu’elle fixe la ligne des dispositions du nouveau Titre III du Livre III, n’en reste pas moins à dessiner à leur image. L’affirmation peut surprendre. Il est en effet souvent soutenu que la réforme s’inscrit, à bien des égards, dans la continuité, et qu’il n’est de notions aux contours mieux tracés au cours de l’histoire que celles du contrat, du quasi-contrat, de la responsabilité civile, ou de l’engagement unilatéral de volonté. Qui ne voit, pourtant, que cette impression d’une inébranlable constance pourrait bien tenir de l’indistinction d’un droit nouveau qui se meut encore dans les limbes ?Le présent travail entend profiter de la césure introduite par la réforme pour opérer un retour sur nos doctrines. À l’inverse du praticien, qui en redoute les soubresauts, le théoricien ne craint pas les mouvements du droit, qui lui offrent de contempler les dynamiques de fond à l’œuvre. L’étude des évolutions consommées par la réforme du droit des obligations, menée dans une double optique historique et systématique, laissera ainsi apparaître, tant au plan particulier de chaque source qu’à leur conjonction, d’importants bouleversements qui pourraient bien interdire, dans l’avenir, de penser en théorie l’ouvrage rénové autrement qu’à travers un nouveau paradigme / The bicentenary of the french civil Code was the occasion for an assessment ; with the reform of the french civil Code it’s time to look ahead to the prospects. From that point of view, one of the major preoccupations should be the definition of the sources of obligations, which determines the implementation of the new law of obligations. This assertion can be surprising. It is often suggested that the reform mostly provides continuity and that there are no other notions as known as contract, quasi-contract, civil liability or commitment by unilateral will. Yet, how can we fail to see that this impression of an unwavering consistency could be an effect of the new provisions’ shadows ?This work aims to take advantage of the gap of the reform to come back to our doctrines. Unlike practitioner, who fears instability, theoretician is not afraid by the motions of the law, which provide him to consider their background. The study of the evolutions implied by the law of obligations’ reform, conducted through an historical and systematic lens, will thus reveal, at the level of each source and at the conjunction of all, significant upheavals which would probably require to think about the law of obligations differently that we used to do

I argue that, if God exists, moral facts ontologically depend on him. After distinguishing a variety of ways in which moral facts might ontologically depend on God, I focus my attention on the most prominent and most well-developed account of the relationship between God and morality viz., the account developed by Robert Adams in his Finite and Infinite Goods. Adams’ account consists of two parts—an account of deontic moral properties and an account of axiological moral properties. Adams’ account of deontic moral properties is a version of divine command theory according to which the property of being morally right (obligatory) and the property of being morally wrong are identical to the property of being commanded by God and the property of being forbidden by God, respectively. I argue that although Adams’ divine command theory is not vulnerable to many prominent objections that afflict other versions of divine command theory, his view is, nevertheless, both unmotivated and implausible. Next, I explain Adams’ account of axiological properties, which is a particular version of what I call “theistic valuational particularism.” According to Adams’ theistic valuational particularism, the property of being intrinsically good or excellent is identical to the property of faithfully and holistically resembling God. I argue that because Adams’ conception of excellence is so broad, there are some things that have the property of being excellent but fail to resemble God. I argue that the same problem afflicts other, modified versions of theistic valuational particularism, including one that is defended by Scott Hill and another that is championed by Mark Murphy. Nevertheless, I argue that this problem does not afflict what I call “theistic moral valuational particularism,” the view that moral goodness is identical to the property of resembling God in certain, specified ways. Furthermore, I argue that, if God exists, theistic moral valuational particularism is not only well motivated theologically, but it can withstand the two most prominent objections that have been lodged against it, viz., the arbitrariness objection and the divine ascription problem.

In this dissertation, I argue for a set of interpretations regarding the relationship between moral obligation and reasons for acting in the theories of Hobbes, Hutcheson, and Hume. Several commentators have noted affinities between these naturalist moral theories and contemporary ethical internalism. I argue that attempts to locate internalist theses in these figures are not entirely successful in any clear way. I follow Stephen Darwall's suggestion that addressing the question “why be moral?” is one of the fundamental problems of modern moral philosophy. Since, as some have argued, there is a tension between accepting internalism and providing an adequate response to the “why be moral” question, I argue that each figure maintains a distinctive response to this question given the sort of internalism, if any, he would accept. In the introduction, I provide the key distinctions that arise from contemporary discussions of ethical internalism, and I motivate my project of looking for insight into the relationship between internalism and amoralism in the British Moralists. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the moral theory Hobbes who, I argue, would accept a version of constitutive existence internalism because he holds that there is a necessary connection between one's being contractually obligated and one's being in certain rationally motivating states. I then present the fool's objection as an objection to the assumption of a relevant similarity between divine obligation and contractual obligation. I argue that, irrespective of this dissimilarity, the fool has some rational motive to keep his covenants in virtue of the fact that making covenants changes one's decision situation in such a way that it becomes reasonable to treat covenants as if they imposed categorical constraints on behavior. I claim that Hobbes's response to the fool is, at least in part, that the fool fails to understand what moral obligation consists in. In the remainder of the dissertation I turn my attention to two classical sentimentalist moral theories. I examine the theories of Hutcheson and Hume because it is not clear what resources moral sentimentalism has available to it in order to address questions about the reasonableness of moral action. In chapters 3 and 4, I develop an interpretation of Hutcheson who, because he distinguishes between exciting and justifying reasons, is able to say there is some non-derivative sense in which moral actions are reasonable. I argue that he develops a theory whereby moral obligation is to be understood in terms of the non-motivating states of approval of moral spectators, and I do not think, contrary to Darwall, that there is anything puzzling about his doing so. I argue that Hutcheson does not accept a version of motive internalism, but that he shares much in common with internalist views: he claims that there is a very strong, if contingent, connection between our states of approval and our motivational states. I offer an explanation of how Hutcheson could respond to the amoalist, which holds that we ought to be moral because, in part, we all already have the motives for and the interests in doing the sorts of things of which moral spectators approve. In chapters 5 and 6, I turn my attention to Hume who, because he makes no distinction between motivating and justifying reasons, does not seem to have anything to say about the non-derivative reasonableness of moral action. I argue that a textually grounded interpretation of Hume's theory of the passions provides us with more reason to favor an (appraiser motive) internalist reading over an externalist reading of his moral theory. Much of my argument depends on an interpretation of Hume's claim that it is possible for agents to be moved to act from a sense of duty alone. When we ask what Hume can say to the question “why be moral,” some of the options that Hutcheson pursues are initially open to him. However, I argue that Hume thinks philosophical theorizing must give way to the operations of psychological mechanisms that are causally responsible for inspiring agents to act morally by giving rise in them to particular kinds of affections. I conclude with some general remarks about the problems surrounding Darwall's interpretation of Hume's theory of justice, and use this discussion to lend further support to the claim that the actual theories of Hobbes, Hutcheson, and Hume do not neatly fit into the taxonomies that Darwall seems to think they do.

This thesis explores the moral significance of agent beliefs and epistemic states. In particular it will explore the following question: is an agent's moral obligation a function of her actual circumstances, what she believes those circumstances to be, or what her evidence indicates those circumstances are? Three corresponding views are explored and it is argued that each of these views is subject to one of two substantial worries, which are developed in this thesis (i.e. the manipulation worry and the unreasonableness worry).

p.p1 {margin: 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px; font: 12.0px Times} Thomas Scanlon provides a theory of why we ought to keep our promises according to which the wrong of breaking a promise is a moral wrong that does not depend on any social practice. Instead a promise provides a recipient with assurance and the value of assurance establishes a moral obligation to keep our promises. However, it is often charged that theories like Scanlon’s are untenable because they are subject to a vicious circularity. I address some recent critics of Scanlon’s theory, all of whom maintain that his account does not adequately show how a promise provides assurance and therefore does not overcome the charge of circularity in explaining why we are obligated to keep our promises. I revise Scanlon’s theory and show how a promise can provide a recipient with assurance, demonstrating that Scanlon’s account is a tenable theory of why we have an obligation to keep our promises.

Kant’s idea of the person and its place within his so-called “Formula of Humanity” has taken on an important role in contemporary discussions of normative ethics. Yet, despite its popularity, confusion remains as to what Kant really means by person and personality in his exposition of the moral imperative. This confusion has led to the attribution of positions to Kant that he clearly does not hold. My concern in this thesis is to engage the texts of Kant’s moral philosophy in an effort to clarify his idea of person/personality. Accordingly, my concerns are primarily exegetical, though I do engage some contemporary trends in Kant scholarship and Kantian ethics. I have divided the thesis into three main sections, which comprise Sections II, III, IV. In Section II, I look to Kant’s precritical ethics, examining his initial discovery of the formal and material principles of morality and his interest in the role feeling plays in the moral life. Of particular interest is Kant’s first introduction of a connection between the feeling of respect for persons and moral duties. In Section III, I suggest that reading Kant’s critical moral philosophy in continuity with the precritical ethics brings into relief Kant’s move from popular morality to an analytic demonstration of the connection of the moral imperative to the will of a rational being. I argue that respecting Kant’s analytic move helps to prevent us from (i) conflating the idea of humanity and personality, which is commonly done in contemporary Kant scholarship and (ii) attributing a strict “two-world” ontology to Kant’s moral philosophy. Finally, in Section IV, I return to Kant’s conception of moral feeling as respect for persons, and I briefly discuss its motivating force in the fulfillment of the demands of morality. Together, these three sections display the importance of understanding Kant’s idea of personality for any project aiming to faithfully interpret his moral thought.

Texte remanié de: Th. doct.--Droit privé--Paris 1, 2002. / Bibliogr. p. 437-478. Index.