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In the last several decades there has been immense international emphasis and promotion of gender equality and female participation in the social, economic, and political spheres of society. There has also been an increase in civil conflict recurrence in countries as well as countries transitioning to democracy. This study explores the effect of female participation on peace and democracy. In the first part, I focus on the effect female participation has on decreasing the risk of peace failing in post-civil conflict countries. In many countries, women are marginalized and conflict further marginalizes them. However, I argue that the post-conflict environment allows women to escape this cycle of marginalization and their inclusion and participation is very crucial to sustaining peace. I find that female political and social female decreases the risk of peace failing in post-civil war countries. In the second part, I focus on the effect female participation has on decreasing the risk of authoritarian reversals in countries that have transitioned to and toward democracy. Previous empirical research has focused on women’s role in transitions to democracy, factors that contribute to the survival of democracy, as well as how women’s participation affects the stability country. I argue that women’s social, economic, and political participation decreases the risk of authoritarian reversals in countries that have newly transitioned to and toward democracy. I find that female social participation sustains democracy in countries that have transitioned to democracy and that female economic participation sustains democracy in countries that have transitioned toward democracy. Overall I find support that female participation matters for both peace and democracy.

This thesis is submitted to an English university and English expressions are used throughout. Foreign words and expressions are italicised except for those accepted in common English use, e.g. the Holy Koran. Principal place names are as appearing in The Times Atlas. Minor place, tribal and family names are italicised and included in the Glossary of Arabic Terms (below). Diacritical marks are omitted throughout. Dates are given for the Common Era (C.E.), and comparative tables of Al Hijra (A.H.) and Common Era years follows the Glossary. Throughout the thesis, the Kingdom means the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and The Prophet means the Prophet Mohammad salla-Hahu alayhi wa- salam ("God bless him and give him peace"). The Majlis Ash-Shura means the Consultative Council, and is referred to as such throughout this thesis.

Cette thèse analyse l’effet du taux de participation sur la performance subséquente de l’élu. En mettant en lumière ce nouveau sujet, elle contribue à la littérature de « l’agence politique » qui étudie divers moyens d’améliorer le fonctionnement des postes élus. Chapitre 2 estime l’effet du taux de participation dans la 18ème Assemblée nationale sud-coréenne (2008-2012), la législature du pays. Les données se composent de paires législateur-circonscription. Pour surmonter l’endogénéité du taux de participation, il utilise la pluviométrie inhabituelle le jour du scrutin et le nombre de bureaux de vote par électeur. Grâce à ces instruments, il trouve des effets positifs sur la performance législative. Ensuite, il propose une explication théorique pour les résultats, dans lesquels le taux de participation signale de la fraction des électeurs qui apprendront la performance du titulaire. La théorie a une implication négative sur le vote obligatoire, car il permettra de réduire le rôle de signalisation du taux de participation. Chapitre 3 étend ce cadre empirique dans la 13ème Assemblée nationale française (2007-2012). Une différence importante de l’homologue sud-coréenne est sa capacité limitée d’initiative législative, ce qui en fait un environnement idéal pour tester la généralité de la relation trouvée en Corée du Sud. Les estimations révèlent des effets positifs sur la présence et la participation aux débats, mais pas sur la législation formelle ou la surveillance du gouvernement. Les explications possibles de cette différence sont discutées. Enfin, le chapitre 4 présente une explication inspirée de la théorie des jeux pour les résultats empiriques, dans un modèle d’agence politique à deux périodes. Une élection a lieu au début de chaque période afin de déléguer une décision politique à un homme politique, dont les préférences politiques sont des informations privées. Un électeur représentatif décide, à chaque élection, de voter pour un candidat ou s’abstenir. Le vote a un coût d’opportunité, qui est son information privée ; et les candidats sont identiques ex ante. Malgré la sous-optimalité statique de voter dans la première élection, l’électeur peut choisir de le faire, pour signaler sa volonté-faible coût-pour punir une mauvaise politique à l’élection suivante. Le modèle a une implication positive pour avoir plus de bureaux de vote et une implication négative pour faire le jour du scrutin un jour férié, qui découlent de leurs impacts sur la distribution des coûts de vote. / This dissertation analyzes the effect of voter turnout on the subsequent performance of the elected official. By shedding light on this new topic, it contributes to the ‘political agency’ literature which studies various ways to improve the functioning of elected offices. Chapter 2 estimates the effect of turnout in the 18th National Assembly of South Korea (2008-2012), the country’s legislature. The data consists of a cross-section of legislator-constituency pairs. To overcome the endogeneity of turnout, it utilizes the variation in turnout caused by the unusual rainfall on election day and the number of polling places per voter. It finds positive effects on legislative performance. Then it proposes a theoretical explanation for the findings, in which turnout signals the share of voters who will learn the incumbent’s performance. The theory has a negative implication for compulsory voting, because it will reduce the signaling role of turnout. Chapter 3 extends this empirical framework in the 13th National Assembly of France (2007-2012). An important difference from the South Korean counterpart is its limited capacity to initiate legislation, which makes it an ideal environment to test the generality of the relation discovered in South Korea. It finds positive effects on attendance and participation in debates, but not on formal legislation or government monitoring. Possible explanations for this difference are discussed. Finally, Chapter 4 presents a game-theoretic explanation for the empirical findings, in a twoperiod model of political agency. An election is held at the beginning of each period to delegate a policy decision to a politician, whose policy preferences are private information. A representative voter decides, in each election, whether to vote for a politician or abstain. Voting incurs an opportunity cost, which is her private information; and politicians are identical ex-ante. Despite the sub-optimality of turning out in the first election, she may still do so, to signal her willingness-low cost-to punish wrong policy in the following election. The model has a positive implication for having more polling places and a negative one for making election day a public holiday, which follow from their impacts on the distribution of voting cost.

The government of Malawi has embarked on a decentralisation program, whose primary objective is to improve service delivery. The program is implemented by transferring responsibility and authority from central office to the district assemblies. The study aimed at assessing the implementation situation of education decentralisation and its effects on the district education office operations and the primary school support. The study uses qualitative research method and undertook a case study of two districts. Data was collected by using in-depth individual interviews and document analysis. The results show that decentralisation is a complex phenomenon with problems at all stages from design to implementation. On the one hand the government appears committed to transferring responsibilities and authority gradually to district assembly level while on the other hand it is not prepared to compensate for the disparities existing in the districts by increasing resources. There is an acute shortage of material and human resources in terms of numbers as well as competency levels. This has affected the pace and smooth implementation of decentralisation. Because decentralisation is not a ‘once and for all’ act but a complex process, it is recommended to intensify advocacy, capacity building and support with relevant resources at all levels.