Henry Longueville Mansel (1820-71), Anglican theologian and philosopher, hastypically been remembered as a Kantian agnostic whose ideas led to those of Herbert Spencer. This thesis provides a critical challenge to this picture, and offers a thorough revisioning of Mansel's theology in context. First, concerning misrepresentation, I argue it was Spencer himself who, having had a youthful relationship with Mansel's sister Katherine, developed a prejudice against him, distorted the reception of his work, and promoted the caricature image of Mansel as an unwitting agnostic and "Kantist". With the help of Liberals such as Goldwin Smith and Leslie Stephen, Spencer's portrayal has stuck. I refute this picture and offer an alternative reading of Mansel. Second, concerning personalism, I show that Mansel was essentially a theistic personalist, indebted to the traditions of Bishop Browne, Bishop Butler, and Scottish common sense philosophy. Mansel represents a mid-Victorian example of "IThou" philosophical theology, grounded in the religious practice of Christian prayer. Mansel's theistic personalism had much in common with Newman's theology, and I explore the ways in which Newman's Grammar of Assent was written in response to Mansel's Bampton Lectures. Third, concerning politics, I argue that Spencer's distorted picture of Mansel as a Kantian agnostic served the political interests of partisan Liberals, and was aggressively spread by them because of Mansel's own Tory commitments. Located in context, Mansel, is here interpreted with reference to key personal relationships and personal networks, including his connection with leading Tories, such as Lord Carnarvon and Benjamin Disraeli. Crucially, I interpret his controversies with Frederick Denison Maurice and John Stuart Mill with reference to the political events of 1859 and 1865. These controversies were simultaneously religious and political, and receive a careful contextual reading.

Selon la version courante du « dilemme d’Euthyphron », on considère que lorsque les théistes tentent de décrire la relation entre Dieu et la morale, ils doivent choisir entre volontarisme théologique et objectivisme robuste (le réalisme moral, en particulier). Selon la première option, les statuts moraux fondamentaux dépendent essentiellement des volontés contingentes, ou nécessaires, de Dieu. Selon la deuxième, Dieu agit en conformité avec un ordre moral objectif et nécessaire, en lui-même indépendant de sa volonté, comme il l’est de tout type de volonté ou de pro-attitude, au moins pour ce qui est des statuts moraux fondamentaux (et les propriétés morales sont conséquentielles aux propriétés non morales, sinon réductibles à elles). Ici nous argumentons en faveur de l’existence d’une troisième possibilité pour les théistes, refusant l’externalisme moral assumé par les deux premières options. Selon cette troisième option, on nie qu’objets, états de choses, actions ou personnes puissent posséder une valeur ou générer des obligations morales indépendamment de l’ensemble de nos pro-attitudes et des fins que nous sommes inclinés à poursuivre. Nous proposons, contre les objections réalistes en particulier, la défense d’une version universaliste (ou non relativiste) de cette position métaéthique, et tentons de montrer sa compatibilité avec le théisme classique : la théorie anti-objectiviste de la loi naturelle, selon laquelle les valeurs et les normes pertinentes pour nous dépendent de notre complexe motivationnel, en dépendant de nos inclinations universellement partagées et des fins (ou de la fin) en lesquelles (en laquelle) nous trouvons notre achèvement et notre bonheur. / According to the common version of the “Euthyphro dilemma”, it is generally considered that when theists try to describe the relation between God and morality, they must either opt for theological voluntarism or for hard objectivism (moral realism, in particular). According to the first option, fundamental moral statuses depend essentially on God’s contingent, or even necessary, will. According to the second, God acts in conformity to an objective (and necessary) moral order that is in itself independent of His will, as it is of any kind of pro-attitude, will or desire, at least for the most fundamental and prior moral statuses (and moral properties are consequential upon nonmoral ones, if not reducible to them). I argue here for the existence of a third possibility for theists, rejecting the metaethical externalism assumed by the first two options. According to this third option, it is not the case that objects, state of affairs, actions or persons can have value or generate obligations to us independently of all our pro-attitudes and of the ends we are inclined to pursue. I propose a defence, against realist objections in particular, of a universalist (or non relativist) version of that metaethical position and try to show its compatibility with classical theism : the anti-objectivist natural law theory, according to which values and norms relevant for us depend on our motivational set, depending on our – universally shared – natural inclinations or essential dispositions to love and pursue certain ends (or possibly one ultimate end) preferently to others, and to find our completion and happiness in them (in it).

This study explores how the corporal punishment experienced by learners in Nepalese schools can impact upon multiple aspects of their lives. I examine how these short and long-term effects can extend into adulthood using an auto/biographical methodology; from a perspective influenced by my own encounters as a corporal punishment survivor from Nepal. Corporal punishment continues to be used in Nepalese schools, with the support of many teachers, parents and school management committees, despite several government policy initiatives and court rulings against it. In contrast to worldwide developments (notably in Scandinavia and America), research into corporal punishment in Nepal tends to be rare, quantitative and focused upon the prevalence and short-term effects as described by group participants and newspaper articles. This study addresses the urgent need to increase public awareness, using personal accounts describing the long-term outcomes of corporal punishment, with a depth of detail facilitated by an auto/biographical research methodology. Participants in the study expressed feelings of relief and increased self-understanding, although for myself at least, these were accompanied by feelings of grief and confusion. The lives of five corporal punishment survivors are explored through a series of interviews carried out in the Devchuli municipality of Nawalparasi, Nepal, between November 2015 and January 2016. The first is my own story, the second is a pilot interview and the other three are discussed under the themes of immediate compliance, severing dichotomies, disempowered bodies and the spiritual threat of spatio-temporal appropriation. The participants, whose identities are protected, look back, as adults, upon their experiences of corporal punishment at school and consider possible links between these and their current social, political, economic and spiritual challenges. Simultaneously, the study questions whether ‘effects’ can ever be conceptually or temporally contained within ‘multi-faceted’ and ‘becoming’ identities, using examples from the participants’ self-appraisals. I examine literature from the global debate on the effects of corporal punishment upon children, including the contrasting methodologies of Murray Straus, Alice Miller and Elizabeth Gershoff. The impact of corporal punishment upon notions of personhood is explored using Theodor Adorno’s interpretation of reification and comparable notions of objectification challenged by Andrea Dworkin, Martha Nussbaum and Paolo Freire. Corporal punishment is discussed in relation to power, conflict and the Holocaust, using Adorno and Bauman’s descriptions of authoritarian behaviours and immediate compliance, and Nietzsche and Foucault’s notions of punishment as a spectacle. Conditions for the possibility of corporal punishment are located to traditions deifying teachers, judgement-based belief systems and neo-liberal ideologies of competition and performativity. These are contrasted with alternative, non-punitive pedagogical and theological resources. Participants explore the ways in which healing and holistic self-development can be blocked by everyday vocabularies of violence and conditionality, triggering destructive individual and collective over-determined reactions. My study ‘concludes’ with reflections upon how corporal punishment has affected my participants’ lives: with their social roles hampered by defensive masks and evasive dances; their political lives blocked by fears of punishment; their economic lives stilted by caution and low self-esteem and their spiritual lives distorted by disenchantment and disappointment. Methodology and theory converge as my study rejects inherently disciplinarian, Enlightenment-led demands fo**r rational or scientific ‘proof’ of psychological effects, by presenting auto/biography itself, especially ‘child-standpoint’ narratives, as valid revolutionary praxis, effervescent with resistance to punitive ideologies and practices and dedicated to the liberation of our present from a painful past.

This research will focus specifically on SWB [spiritual well being] among members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS). By virtue of his membership in this denomination, the researcher is more familiar with the theology, religious life and traditions of the LDS than those of any other denomination. Latter-day Saint theology has been well defined, and because of a fundamental belief in the prophetic ability of a single leader of the church, the doctrine and practices of the Latter-day Saints are consistent throughout the United States and the world.

Prophecy appears to play an important role in the Book of Mormon. The prophets evidently felt it necessary to include a considerable amount of prophetic material in this modern book of scripture. Three general divisions of book of mormon prophecy can be made: (1) prophecies which relate to the period of time prior to the year 421 A.D., the approximate date of the final writing on the plates of Mormon, (2) prophecies which relate to the period 421 to 1830, the publication date of the Book of Mormon, and (3) prophecies which relate to the period 1830 onward. The first two divisions above pertain to the period of time prior to the year 1830 A.D. and thus are not pertinent to the discussion under consideration in this thesis. It would be natural to suppose that many of the prophecies relating to the third division would have been already fulfilled. The evidence of fulfillment of prophecies following the publication of the Book of Mormon is added proof of its genuine authenticity. The scriptures indicate that the fulfillment of prophecies made by a prophet is one way of knowing whether or not he is a genuine prophet. There are a number of problems which present themselves as the prophecies of the Book of Mormon are read and considered. Some of these problems are: 1. How much importance is attached to prophecy? 2. What seems to be the purpose of prophecy? 3. Are the prophets dealing with similar basic issues in their prophecies? 4. If so, what are these issues? 5. Can a classification be made of the prophecies? 6. Are the prophecies which deal with the same subject consistent in that which is foretold? 7. Is there sufficient evidence to show fulfillment of the prophecies which should have come to pass since the publication of the Book of Mormon? This thesis will deal with the above problems. The writer will attempt to classify the prophecies of the Book of Mormon that relate to the period from 1830 onward and to present evidence in regard to the fulfillment of these prophecies.

No description available.

Evil poses a particular problem to early modern thinkers. Late scholasticism, while itself variegated, provided a number of resources for dispelling concerns about the justice of God raised by the existence of evil. With much of the metaphysics of the scholastics rejected, the new philosophers needed either to find inventive ways to make the old solutions fit into their new systems, to come up with new resources for dispelling the difficulties, or to accept the difficulties as insurmountable, likely via fideism or atheism. Leibniz, I claim, provides a provocative mixture of the first two approaches. Many readers think Leibniz's solution to the problem of evil can be summed up in as little as a page, perhaps even a compound sentence, that sentence being, "God created the best possible world, and so He cannot be blamed for the existence of evil." My primary purpose is to show that this conception is false. Not only does Leibniz offer a complex response to the problem of evil which involves a unique combination and reinterpretation of components from the history of philosophical thinking about evil, but his solution changes a number of times throughout his career. And how could it not? It is nearly uncontested that Leibniz's metaphysics underwent important changes between the early 1670s and the mid 1680s. The thesis that Leibniz's metaphysics changed significantly at least once between the mid 1680s and the end of his life is becoming more and more accepted among scholars. Given the importance of theology to Leibniz's metaphysical thinking and the importance of metaphysics to Leibniz's theological thinking, it could hardly be the case that Leibniz's thought on the problem of evil could remain unchanged throughout these changes. What follows is structured as three developmental stories each revolving around the role of one conceptual tool used by Leibniz as a part of a solution to the problems posed by evil--these conceptual tools being the doctrine that God created the best possible world, the distinction between willing and permitting (in particular as it relates to God's relationship to evil), and the doctrine that sin is a privation. Each chapter highlights the way Leibniz's conception and use of the particular tool changed throughout his life and the differing ways these concepts interact with each other. I begin by examining the doctrine that this is the best possible world. Early in his career (in particular in the Letter to Magnus Wedderkopf of 1671) Leibniz thought that this doctrine was sufficient for explaining the goodness of God in spite of the evils in the world. In that letter he explicitly denied that divine permission was possible, and within a few years explicitly denied that the doctrine that sin is a privation was of any use in securing the goodness of God. The doctrine that God created the best possible world itself went through a few changes as Leibniz's thought developed. Of most significance is the change from seeing God's creation of this world as necessary to holding that it is a contingent fact that God created the best possible world. Shortly after this change occurs and, I argue, partly because this change occurs, Leibniz begins to see the problem of evil split in such a way that it is no longer sufficient for procuring divine goodness to point out that God has a good reason for bringing evils about. It must now be argued that God brings evils about for a good reason and remains morally upright in doing so. Regarding the other two doctrines--divine permission and the privative nature of sin--Leibniz's thought undergoes radical change. Once Leibniz feels the need to go beyond giving a reason why God choose to create a world that contains evil, he reverses his opinion about whether God can be said to permit anything. Regarding privations, Leibniz's thought undergoes a number of changes. Around 1678, He reverses his opinion about whether there is any value to holding that sins are privations. Further, the phrase `sins are privations' takes on different meanings as Leibniz develops. In 1686, he takes the phrase to mean that sins are the result of the limitation of the creature. By the time of the Theodicy(1710), however, he thinks of sins both as the result of limitations of creatures and as having a privative aspect (i.e., there is a defect in the action itself, and thus a double-role of the concept of privation). These changes require changes in Leibniz's metaphysics and in particular a change in the way Leibniz thinks of the causal interactions between God and human actions, and substances and human actions. This lends support to the still controversial but increasingly accepted view that Leibniz's metaphysics undergoes a significant change between the Discourse on Metaphysics and the Monadology.

While much has been written about the conflicts, supposed or actual, between logic and faith, science and religion, few accounts of the personal turmoil these conflicts can cause exist. Likewise, many of these nonfiction accounts are written from a distinctly polarized place leaning either to science or faith. In this thesis, I mix research and history with memoir and a sense of poetry to explore my personal experience with this conflict. At its outset, I hoped for this project to capture my struggle as an orthodox member of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) in dealing with the questions my own sense of logic provided that institution. This goal was achieved in part. However, by the end of the project I had also captured a narrative exploration of my experience leaving the LDS Church and learning, instead of trusting the authority provided by a structure of orthodoxy, to feel comfortable trusting my own sense of reason. The first chapter captures my initial struggle with acknowledging questions within a religious structure. This is accomplished, in part, by merging the personal narrative with a researched account of French priest and paleontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. I show both his struggle with questions and faith, and my desire to lean on his example as someone who acknowledged question without leaving his faith--in Chardin's case the Catholic Church. The second chapter, again following this pattern of mixing research with memoir, explores the feelings of exile I had during the time while I was still an orthodox member of the LDS church. This personal narrative is woven into several historical and literary accounts of exile. In the third chapter, I struggle with the question of what to do with the spiritual experiences I had during my time in the LDS Church after having separated myself from that institution. The short fourth chapter takes a strictly narrative line as I address my spiritual and mental outlook upon the completion of this project.

Rhetorical agency is an ideologically contentious facet within communication and rhetorical research. While its importance in scholarship can be traced back to early works by Kenneth Burke and Pierre Bourdieu, debate continues regarding the source of agency, how it is enacted in rhetorical application and communication, and who/what can claim responsibility for the communication practices one may utilize in enacting their respective levels of agency. Thus, the ways in which the rhetoric of popular, influential individuals/antecedents affects the rhetorical agency and invention practices of those without significant levels of influence must be examined. American Christianity, in particular the culture created through heavy use of televised and web-media (televangelism), provides an excellent context to examine this subject. The present thesis discusses relevant literature to the topics of rhetorical agency, invention, and antecedents, as well as American Christianity, televangelism, and the changes that have occurred in religious rhetoric within the culture. Additionally, results indicate a high propensity towards rhetorical agency influenced through the themes of identity, adaptation, and audience sensitivity, and encourage pastors to focus on the identity and context through which their agency is manifested.

A brief review of the history of western interest in the Qur'an from Keaton's 1143 C.E. translation to the present and a comparison between the western and traditional views on the Qur'-am's textual history serves to place the western theories on the collection and transmission of the Qur'an in their historical and intellectual context. The theories of Richard Bell, John Burton, Leone Caetani, Paul Casanova, Arthur Jeffery Alphonse Mingana, Theodor Ntildeke, John Wansbrough and W. Montgomery Watt are given primary consideration; Nabia Abbot, Hartwig Hirschfeld, D.S. Margolicuth, William Muir and Ajmal Khan receive secondary consideration. The traditional history of the Qur'anic text serves as the outline for the thesis. Theories suggesting that the Qur'an could not have been written down during the life of the Prophet are considered against extant physical evidence in inscriptions and papyrii of early Arabic writing. The questions surrounding the 'personal" or "metropolitan- collections are treated next, followed by two chapters on 'Uthman's recension and the Hajjaj collection. The two most recent studies, Wansbrough's and Burton's, reach opposing conclusions and their theories are considered against the work which preceded them. The thesis concludes that the morass of conflicting and differing conclusions regarding the history of the Qur'anic text may be the result of subjective analysis and selective use of evidence rather than intrinsic mystery of the subject matter.