<p> Cognitive science has been beset for thirty years by foundational disputes about the nature and extension of cognition&mdash;e.g. whether cognition is necessarily representational, whether cognitive processes extend outside the brain or body, and whether plants or microbes have them. Whereas previous philosophical work aimed to settle these disputes, I aim to understand what conception of cognition scientists could share given that they disagree so fundamentally. To this end, I develop a number of variations on traditional conceptual explication, and defend a novel explication of cognition called the sensitive management hypothesis.</p><p> Since expert judgments about the extension of &ldquo;cognition&rdquo; vary so much, I argue that there is value in explication that accurately models the variance in judgments rather than taking sides or treating that variance as noise. I say of explications that accomplish this that they are <i> ecumenically extensionally adequate</i>. Thus, rather than adjudicating whether, say, plants can have cognitive processes like humans, an ecumenically adequate explication should classify these cases differently: human cognitive processes as paradigmatically cognitive, and plant processes as controversially cognitive.</p><p> I achieve ecumenical adequacy by articulating conceptual explications with <i>parameters</i>, or terms that can be assigned a number of distinct interpretations based on the background commitments of participants in a discourse. For example, an explication might require that cognition cause &ldquo;behavior,&rdquo; and imply that plant processes are cognitive or not depending on whether anything plants do can be considered &ldquo;behavior.&rdquo; Parameterization provides a unified treatment of embattled concepts by isolating topics of disagreement in a small number of parameters.</p><p> I incorporate these innovations into an account on which cognition is the &ldquo;sensitive management of organismal behavior.&rdquo; The sensitive management hypothesis is ecumenically extensionally adequate, accurately classifying a broad variety of cases as paradigmatically or controversially cognitive phenomena. I also describe an extremely permissive version of the sensitive management hypothesis, arguing that it has the potential to explain several features of cognitive scientific discourse, including various facts about the way cognitive scientists ascribe representations to cognitive systems. </p>

Scientific communnities have proven to be extremely successful at solving problems. They are inherently parallel systems and their macroscopic nature makes them amenable to careful study. In this paper the character of scientific research is examined drawing on sources in the philosophy and history of science. We maintain that the success of scientific research depends critically on its concurrency and pluralism. A variant of the language Ether is developed that embodies notions of concurrency necessary to emulate some of the problem solving behavior of scientific communities. Capabilities of scientific communities are discussed in parallel with simplified models of these capabilities in this language.

Technological mediation| The implications of technology on the human experience

Thesis (M.A.)--Guo li Taiwan da xue, 1965. / Reproduced from typescript, on double leaves. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2003. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains viii, 145 p.; also includes graphics. Includes abstract and vita. Advisor: Louise M. Antony, Dept. of Philosophy. Includes bibliographical references (p. 142-145).

<p>This thesis will attempt to show how computer simulated models can act as a tool for philosophers. To accomplish this goal, this thesis will be broken down into six sections. The first three sections will go into more detail regarding the nature of the term &lsquo;computer simulated model.&rsquo; They will discuss the history of computer simulated models, outline the process of constructing computer simulated models, and give context for the current use of computer simulated models in science. These sections will rely heavily on the work of Eric Winsberg to give a proper understanding of the functions of computer simulated models. The forth section will give a historical overview of different philosophical methods, including the dialectical method, Conceptual Analysis, and the work of Paul Churchland with Artificial Neural Networks. This section will also attempt to show how these philosophical methods relate to computer simulated models. The fifth section will discuss how American Pragmatism provides a positive framework for the utilization of computer simulated models by philosophers, specifically pulling from the works of Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. The sixth and final section will address the notion that computer simulated models are reliable without seeking truth and use that notion to tie together the argument that computer simulated models can serve as a tool for philosophers. </p>

<p> Philosopher of science Wilfrid Sellars argues that there are two mutually exclusive images of human-in-the-world that philosophy ought to unify: the "manifest image" of common, shared experience and the "scientific image" of imperceptible objects. Process philosophy, as a metaphysical framework, is in a unique position to allow both images to sit together in dynamic tension, rather than allowing one image to collapse into the other. Not only do I maintain that process philosophy is logically robust, but I also argue that there are several instances of empirical verification of process as an ontology.</p><p> Taking a process ontology seriously, however, requires that we re-articulate an understanding of the two grand narratives that are utilized to explain our origins: the socio-cultural evolution of consciousness and the objective evolution of the universe. I call these the <i>history of science</i> and the <i>science of history,</i> respectively. In Western academia, the <i>science of history</i> is usually given ontological priority; but within a process metaphysic, neither can be said to be explanatorily primary. That which holds these two narratives together, and that which produces spacetime itself, I refer to as "pretemporal origination." The mode through which this process elicits evolution is through creative-discovery, wherein creation and discovery are not two separate modes of mind-universe interaction, but unified on a continuum of constraints.</p>

Scientific realists and non-realists disagree over the reach of scientific knowledge: does it extend beyond the observational realm. Intuitions about abductive inferences are at the heart of many realist positions, but are brought into question by the non-realists' contention that theories are underdetermined by data, and the alleged circularity of realist attempts to show that such inferences are reliable. Some realists have tried to circumvent this problem by constructing methodological arguments for realism: if realism is embedded in scientific practice, the realist's picture of science might provide the best explanation of scientific success. Some non-realists reply by again pointing to the circularity of this strategy, which relies, again, on an abductive inference. Others deny that scientists do adopt realist stances. A methodological realist position is constructed: realist constraints on the acceptance and pursuit of theories-for instance requirements of intertheoretic coherence, and the avoidance of ad hoc explanation-have often contributed to progress in science. The position is immune to non-realist worries about the circularity of realist arguments, for it is a thesis about how science is practised, not the kind of knowledge it provides. The argument is pursued within a diachronic account of theory appraisal: Imre Lakatos' methodology of scientific research programmes (MSRP) examines the principles that govern the construction of theories, and provides criteria-achievement of progress-for the appraisal of research programmes. Although Lakatos may have seen these selection criteria, when fulfilled, as symptoms of something else-the fulfilment in the theory's development of some ideal of scientific honesty-achievement of Lakatosian progress can Serve as an end in itself. The realist methods mentioned in the last paragraph are then appraised as means to this end. Since the position has a methodological formulation and background, it is applied as a historical thesis to case studies in line with Lakatos' metamethodology. These comprise two explanatory forays into history: the consistency of Bohr's 1913 model of the atom, and the construction by Heisenberg and Schrodinger of the two original formulations of quantum mechanics. There follows one contemporary application: the construction of explanations in quantum chemistry using approximate models of molecules.

Evolutionary psychology has recently developed out of dissatisfaction with the Standard Social Science Model utilised by mainstream psychology. This model focuses on culture and reason as the underlying cause of human behaviour and proposes that the mind is a 'general purpose learning device' (Siegert & Ward, 2002). Here the mind is seen as a blank slate at birth, which is subsequently influenced by experience, environment and culture. Biological variables are minimised or ignored. However it seems that all human behaviour cannot fully be explained by the focus on nurture in the Standard Social Science Model; sexual jealousy, parental investment, and mating preferences are examples which are not fully explained by learning or environmental experience. On the other hand, evolutionary psychology, founded on the principles of cognitive science and evolutionary biology, argues that a person's nature is the primary cause of their behaviour, with the influences of nurture being of lesser importance. According to these principles, evolutionary psychology has been very successful in providing explanations, for example in the areas of human mate selection and parental investment. However evolutionary psychology has received criticism on a number of counts, including its supposed reductionism, and, its reliance on 'just so' stories which are untestable, hypothesised scenarios which look to the past in order to explain the evolution of human behavioural features. With the above mentioned matters as background, this thesis investigated whether evolutionary psychology offers a new paradigm for integrating psychology with science, and if so, how it accomplishes this. In investigating this, conceptions of science, psychology, and evolutionary theory, in particular evolutionary psychology, were examined. More specifically, issues addresses included why evolutionary psychology is dissatisfied with the SSSM, the notion of the mind as blank slate, the nature-nurture paradigm, and the mind as a general purpose learning device. Two aspects of evolutionary theory are described, natural and sexual selection, in terms of their importance to evolutionary psychology. The main arguments of evolutionary psychology as a discipline are outlined, looking at its aims, and the ways in which it combines the disciplines of evolutionary biology and cognitive psychology toward a new integrative model for studying human behaviour. A case study demonstrates how evolutionary psychology offers a useful explanation of mate selection. This thesis then turns to the philosophy of science, setting out the differences between Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos' theories, and focusing on the latter's theory as a model of scientific philosophy which could be useful for evolutionary psychology, including discussing how this could be best achieved. This thesis then sets out various criticisms of evolutionary psychology, including the critique of domain-specific modularity, the focus on the Pleistocene period as problematic, the over-reliance on natural selection, just-so stories, the reductionism of evolutionary psychology, and that it is politically conservative. This thesis concludes that the attempt of evolutionary psychology to combine cognitive science and evolutionary theory has been successful in showing how the integration of psychology into the sciences is not only possible but inevitable.

Thesis (M.A.)--Guo li Taiwan da xue, 1965. / Reproduced from typescript, on double leaves. Includes bibliographical references.