Abstract not available.

From an examination of how environmental issues reshape politics, this inquiry focuses on the theoretical grounds of deliberative democratic theory to ask whether such a vision offers the best means of resolving environmental problems. Arguing that the very terms in which environmental politics have been defined retain features better suited to previous historical circumstances, the analysis proceeds from features typical of environmental problems to a more context-specific assessment of the role for democratic participation. Engaging the works of Jürgen Habermas, the author details the way in which deliberative democratic theory is indebted to a concept of communicative action that defines complex environmental issues as beyond the scope for successful resolution. Covering theoretical as well as empirical aspects of environmental deliberation, this inquiry includes a comparative framework for evaluating the performance of differing deliberative institutions according to the type of environmental problem addressed. Following this critical assessment of deliberative democratic theory, the analysis turns to the effects of authoritative expertise on democratic involvement in environmental issues. Given that authoritative expertise cannot be dispensed with despite the asymmetry it introduces into the relationship between experts and lay citizens, it is asserted that the conditions for justifiable deference should be encouraged by cultivating institutions that promote trust between experts and lay citizens. The analysis proceeds to link the way in which decentralized institutions decrease the risks inherent in trust with an assessment of the precautionary principle as a standard against which regulatory decisions can be evaluated. The inquiry concludes by turning to proposals for global democratic governance, arguing that the fragmented landscape of international environmental law offers increased opportunities for resolving environmental disputes due to the proliferation of coordinated but decentralized institutions and codification of the precautionary principle.

By virtue of his powerful notion of overdetermination, Althusser lays the groundwork for the fusion of Marxism and postmodernism. Althusser's overdetermination is an attempt to go beyond or break out of the essentialist dichotomies. As is interpreted by the Amherst School, Althusserian overdeterminism does not take Marxism and postmodernism as oppositional and alternative theoretical frameworks but sees them as closely related and even inseparably intertwined in taking Marxism in new directions. One contribution of my work is in the presentation and elaboration of this articulation between Marxism and postmodernism. In light of Althusserian overdeterminism, I will demonstrate these points of articulation from Marxism to postmodernism using instances of postmodern expressions and impulses found in the works of Lenin, Lukacs, and Gramsci. My project therefore is an attempt to shed light on the postmodern moments in the Marxist tradition through the theoretical framework of Althusserian overdeterminism. This, however, is not to say that these theorists are full-blown postmodernists. I would rather like to make visible the glimpses or impulses of the overdeterminist (postmodern) theory they formulate while they are attacking non-Marxist thinking as, what may be called, essentialist (modernist).

The objective of this study is to provide the basis of demarcation between radically alternative philosophies, between different theories of society, and between competing politics, by rearticulating what-Althusser calls the Marxist Philosophy that Marx practices in his critique of capitalism. I argue and demonstrate how the Marxist theory of the condition of discourse about history illuminates the epistemological nature and political implications of various discourses, making coherent and effective praxis possible. Demarcation of radical alternatives is critical now more than ever because the alternative to the hegemonic practices, along with the very notions of demarcation and radical alternative, is severely undermined. As a case in which the alternative discourse and politics were sorely needed but conspicuously missing, I analyze U.S. public discourses about the North Korean nuclear program. The philosophical nature of the postmodern/poststructuralist anti-totalization needs to be closely examined and critiqued, because it has practically declared the death of Marxism as a critical theory of history and claims its place as the source of political inspiration for profound social change. I rearticulate the Althusserian Marxist theory of discourse in terms of the relations between philosophy and theory, between theory and the object of theory, between structure and a concept. From the perspective of the Althusserian Marxist theory of discourse and ideology, humanist notions of rationality and objectivity/subjectivity (that postmodernism and its critique have revived) are critiqued and juxtaposed with Althusserian concepts of 'determination of consciousness by ideology' and the 'relative autonomy of ideology and consciousness from the other historical conditions'. The central thesis of Marxist Philosophy is that determination and overdetermination are the key and organic properties of structure. It is also the basis of my critique of postmodern/poststructuralist anti-totalization. I examine the ways in which Foucault's Archaeology is an unwarranted return to the familiar empiricist inversion of Hegelian idealism. I argue that Derrida's deconstruction, his rejection of the very notion of philosophy that leads to sustainable knowledge, is based on the naturalization of the hegemonic philosophy in which the discursive universe consists of the dichotomy of empiricism and idealism.

<p> The field of environmental political theory has made great gains in its relatively short existence as an academic discipline. One area in which these advancements can be noticed is the strong discussion surrounding the foundations, institutions, and processes of Western liberalism and the relationship of these elements to issues of environmentalism. Within this discussion has manifested the bedrock assumption that the underlying components of classical liberalism &ndash; namely individualism, negative liberties, and instrumental rationality &ndash; preclude or greatly hinder progress toward securing collective environmental needs. This assumption has great intuitive strength as well as exhibition in liberal democracies such as the United States. However, in using this assumption as a launchpad for reconsidering elements of liberalism scholars have inadvertently closed alternate routes of analysis and theorization. This thesis aims to explore one such alternate route. </p><p> Libertarianism, the contemporary reincarnation of classical liberalism, has been generally disregarded in policy and academic realms due to its stringent and inflexible adherence to self-interest, instrumental rationality, and individualism; in discussions of environment, these complaints are only augmented. These criticisms have been validated by a libertarian scholarship that emphasized nature as a warehouse of resources specifically suited for human use. But from where in libertarianism does this ontology develop, and is it correct? This thesis carries this investigation through its overarching research question: can nonhumans have self-ownership within libertarian theory, and what would that mean for libertarian theory? </p><p> Part I of the thesis introduces us to the foundation, tenants, and overall logical structure of contemporary libertarian theory. Finding autonomy to be the key to moral standing, and finding autonomy to be a contested criterion, we discover the shaky ground on which the totality of libertarianism stands. After identifying the relationship of libertarianism and the environment &ndash; one of atomistic, instrumental, and anthropocentric utilization &ndash; we connect the current non-standing moral status of nonhumans in libertarian theory directly to criteria of autonomy. With autonomy acknowledged as a contested subject, we thus arrive at the conclusion that the lack of moral status awarded to nonhumans has arisen not through logical derivation but the reification of tradition. </p><p> Part II centers on the establishment of a proper framework for the task of evaluating libertarianism&rsquo;s main criteria of autonomy. This framework is grounded foremost in the recognition of the inherent social embeddedness within libertarian theory; this embeddedness is founded in the necessary <i> reciprocation</i> of liberty protections through the principles of non-aggression and non-interference and, while acknowledged by libertarian theorists, remained a largely undernourished portion of libertarian theory. To counter anthropocentric bias &ndash; in effort to ward off the influence of tradition &ndash; additional ecological criteria are added to this framework, culminating in an open, non-anthropocentric framework. Afterward, the chapter examines the Naturalistic Fallacy. Finding our answer in the naturally morally pragmatic nature of Man, this discussion finalizes our analytic framework by emphasizing the practical importance of moral reasoning. </p><p> Part III sets about the task of examining the criteria of autonomy utilized within libertarian theory. Two conceptions of autonomy &ndash; minimalist and prudentialist &ndash; are defined, with discussion showing libertarianism to rely, inherently and explicitly, on prudentialist forms of autonomy. The two primary criteria of prudentialism used, life-planning and reason, are then analyzed in turn; this analysis manifests the critique that in the practical usage of morality both criteria rely on and collapse into minimalism. Prudentialism as a standard is then examined to show its paradoxical reliance on pre-formulated conceptions of human lives, to the detriment of logical consistency and the virtues of negative liberty. Singer&rsquo;s criterion of suffering is then briefly examined, with discussion outlining its inapplicability within libertarian theory. Narveson&rsquo;s question of the moral egoist completes the chapter, with the linkage between nonhuman domination and human domination solidifying the argument that full nonhuman moral standing will reduce both to the advantage of libertarian society. From these critiques, then, we observe the critical failure of prudentialism to hold in praxis and see minimalist autonomy as the necessary foundation for libertarian theory. </p><p> Part IV outlines some consequences of minimalist autonomy within libertarian theory. The questions of reciprocity and nonhuman violence are examined, with discussions of complications and critiques following. These complications comprise the intersection of ecological libertarianism with extant issues within libertarian theory, such as Nozick&rsquo;s Principle of Rectification, the moral allowance of self-defense, and the question of the moral standing of children. Afterward, the broader conversation is considered along with specific consideration of the potential environmental impacts of an ecological libertarian theory. Lastly, some doors for future theorizing are opened &ndash; namely the conceptualization of nonhuman labor and nonhuman property rights &ndash; for future critical investigation. (Abstract shortened by ProQuest.) </p>

Naturalistic philosophers aim to understand the world on the basis of science. A naturalist takes empirical evidence to be the ultimate arbiter of our beliefs. As naturalists, our investigations of the nature of truth itself should respect this empiricist methodology. In this essay, I argue that the existence and character of truth are open empirical questions, to be answered by scientific inquiry. I then argue against an a priori proof of the existence of truth. / text

Recent literature concerning laws of nature highlight the close relationship between general metaphysics and philosophy of science. In particular, a person's theoretical commitments in either have direct implications for her stance on laws. In this dissertation, I argue that an ontic structural realist should be a realist about laws, but only within a non-Whiteheadean process framework. Without the adoption of a process framework, any account of laws the ontic structural realist offers will require metaphysical commitments that are at odds with ontic structural realism. In arguing towards this aim, I adopt an attenuated methodological naturalistic stance to show that traditional substance metaphysics, of the sort neo-Aristotelians endorse, is problematic and that we have naturalistic reasons for further developing process metaphysics. I then apply this framework to develop a processual account of mereological structures and show how we can understand structures as being stable processes. In the final section, I argue that these are the kind of structures with which the ontic structural realist concerns herself. By adopting a realist account of laws the ontic structural realist can explain how these structures enter into modal and causal relations.

<p>Naturalism faces problems caused by a lack of agreement about whether there is or can be a meaningful and useful conception of naturalism as a general research position. Without a widely agreed upon account of what naturalism in general amounts to there is no clear and definitive way to adjudicate disputes as to what is consistent with naturalism; the absence of such an account also makes it impossible for specific projects in naturalistic inquiry to take guidance from naturalism in general. In the following, I develop a determinate account of naturalism in general, which I think could find acceptance among naturalists because it accounts for many of the features commonly associated with naturalism. To do this, I first lay out the problem to be solved, express its importance, and explain what a solution to the problem would involve. I then make appeal to an account of naturalism developed by Penelope Maddy and use this account to show that the published and unpublished work of Charles Sanders Peirce offers, prima facie, a more determinate account of naturalism than is commonly recognized and that goes beyond the account given by Maddy. With this Peircean account developed, I then measure it against the criteria I develop and conclude that a Pericean account of naturalism does promise to adjudicate various disputes in the naturalism literature and to offer guidance to the development and application of specific projects in naturalistic inquiry.</p> / Dissertation

The extended mind debate juggles the possibilities of whether or not the mind extends out into the world. Today, with the rise in technology, we have an additional claim that our tools are responsible for extending our minds. The internet, smart phones, and other tools give us a foothold in the extended mind debate by providing real world examples of how our mind is perceived as extending out into the world. In discovering where the divide between mind and environment exists we can come up with a conclusion whether or not the mind truly extends out into the world.

This thesis looks at a relatively new line of research in Cognitive Science – embodied cognition. Its relation to the computational-representational paradigm, primarily symbolicism, is extensively discussed. It is argued that embodied cognition is compatible with the established paradigm but challenges its research focus and traditionally assumed segregation of cognition from bodily and worldly activities Subsequently the impact of embodied cognition on philosophy of Cognitive Science is considered. The second chapter defends the applicability of mechanistic explanation to cases of embodied cognition. Further, it argues that a proposed alternative, dynamic systems theory, is not a substitute to the mechanistic approach. The last chapter critically examines the thesis that mind is extended beyond the bodily boundary and into the world. It is concluded that arguments in favour of the extended mind thesis are inadequate. Considerations in favour of the orthodox view that the does not “leak” out into the world are also presented.