Orientador: Jézio Hernani Bomfim Gutierre / Banca: José Carlos Pinto de Oliveira / Banca: Maria Eunice Quilici Gonzalez / Resumo: Este trabalho resulta de uma reflexão acerca do convencionalismo na filosofia da ciência de Karl Popper. O mote central é dado pela tentativa de se compreender a crítica de Popper ao convencionalismo clássico e uma concomitante defesa popperiana do emprego de convenções na ciência. Primeiramente, ocupamo-nos da crítica ao convencionalismo. Com o fim de detectar os elementos que teriam levado Popper a rejeitar essa visão de ciência, procedemos a um exame da corrente convencionalista clássica, aqui circunscrita às obras de Henri Poincaré e Pierre Duhem, em suas contribuições à filosofia da ciência. Nesse exame, encontramos evidências que ensejam o questionamento da imagem de convencionalismo fornecida por Popper. A seguir, detivemo-nos na filosofia da ciência popperiana, comumente denominada falsificacionismo, cuja análise revela o importante papel nela desempenhado por certo convencionalismo. A contraposição das duas visões de ciência, falsificacionismo e convencionalismo, mostra que a visão popperiana da corrente convencionalista merece questionamentos e permite a afirmação de que o convencionalismo está muito menos distante do falsificacionismo do que Popper faz supor. Por fim, sugerimos que a análise do convencionalismo clássico não só se mostrou uma fonte para o tratamento de questões centrais da filosofia da ciência como também de abordagens esclarecedoras para a explicitação do método científico defendido por Popper. / Abstract: Our research is related to the discussion of conventionalism within Karl Popper's philosophy of science. Our central aim is that of understanding Popper's critique of classical conventionalism as well as his acceptance of conventions in science. In the first part of the dissertation, the Popperian attack against conventionalism is discussed. Trying to detect the elements that ground Popper's rejection of that approach, we proceed to an evaluation of the classical conventionalist proposal, here restricted to Henri Poincaré's and Pierre Duhem's contributions to the philosophy of science. In such an inquiry, we find evidences that threaten the Popperian image of conventionalism. In the sequence, we focus upon the specifically Popperian philosophy of science, usually labeled "falsificationism", and reveal the relevant role that conventionalism assumes within that philosophy of science. The resultant parallel between those different visions of science, falsificationism/conventionalism, paves the way to the conclusion that the Popperian interpretation of conventionalism is at least questionable and provides evidence to the impression that conventionalism is much closer to falsificationism than Popper would be ready to admit. Finally we maintain that the analysis of classical conventionalism, more than just a valuable tool for the treatment of central questions of the philosophy of science, provide crucial elements for the understanding of Popper's methodology of science. / Mestre

Orientador: Marcelo Carbone Carneiro / Banca: Carlos Alberto Albertuni / Banca: Aguinaldo Robinson de Souza / Resumo: O trabalho inicia-se com a apresentação das ideias sobre a verdade nas tradições racionalista e empirista, com a posterior avaliação dessas duas tradições por Popper. Em seguida, aborda-se o problema da indução de David Hume (fundamental no debate sobre a verdade), e a solução apresentada por Popper. A concepção de ciência de Popper é explicada, com especial atenção para o caráter provisório do conhecimento científico, sua racionalidade e potencial de progresso e a importância do critério de verossimilitude. A concepção de aprendizado de Popper é apresentada a partir de suas críticas da teoria do senso comum do conhecimento, da teoria dos três mundos, da importância que ele atribuía aos problemas e de suas idéias sobre a evolução do conhecimento, tendo o evolucionismo de Darwin como modelo. É feita uma retomada dos argumentos, trabalhos e autores que pesquisaram sobre a relevância da Filosofia da Ciência para o Ensino de Ciências, procurando-se identificar pontos importantes de influência. Ao final se procura estabelecer a relevância da contribuição de Popper para o Ensino de Ciências, identificando-se os pontos fortes de sua contribuição. / Abstract: This work begins with a presentation of ideas concerning truth according to rationalist and empiric traditions, with a posterior evaluation of both traditions given by Popper. Following, it dels with the problem of David Hume's induction (fundamental in the discussion concerning truth) and the solution presented by Popper. Popper's conception of science is explained, giving special attention to the temporary characteristic of scientific knowledge, its rationality and its capability of progress and the value of the criterion verisimilitude. The concept of learning conceived by Popper is presented commencing with his critical insight of the theory of commom sense of knowledge, the theory of three worlds, of the importnace he used to attribute to problems and his ideas concerning evolution of knowledge, using Darwin's evolution theory as a model. A retaken of arguments is accomplished, works and authors who conducted research about the relevance of philosophy of science for the teaching of science, attempting to identify points of influence. Finally one attempts to establish the relevance of Popper's contribution to the teaching of sciences, thus identifying the strong points of this contribution. / Doutor

Orientador: Marcelo Carbone Carneiro / Banca: Gláucia Maria da Silva Degrève / Banca: Mauricio de Carvalho Ramos / Banca: João José Caluzi / Banca: Silvia Regina Quijadas Aro Zuliani / Resumo: O Méthode de Nomenclature Chimique publicado em 1787 é considerado uma das mais importantes obras a estabelecer uma estrutura lógica da linguagem na química, e muitos de seus termos são utilizados até hoje. Este trabalho se propôs a analisar a linguagem elaborada pela Química do século XVIII (sobretudo por Lavoisier e Morveau), utilizando a perspectiva teórica da epistemologia de Fleck, que compreende a ciência como construção histórica e constitutiva de uma certa forma de pensar (coletivo de pensamento e de um estilo de pensamento). A pesquisa foi conduzida a partir do referencial teórico de análise interna, derivada de uma atividade social intensa, dos conceitos da obra Méthode de Nomenclature Chimique e da compreensão histórica dos trabalhos produzidos pelo coletivo de pensamento em relação à linguagem científica no século XVIII, sobretudo as cartas da correspondência de Lavoisier e de Guyton de Morveau. Toda a discussão e os resultados podem ser explorados por professores no debate sobre a estrutura interna da ciência e produção sociológica da ciência e/ou história da ciência / Abstract: The Méthode de Nomenclature Chimique published in 1787 is considered one of the most important works to establish a logical structure of language in chemistry, and many of its terms are used now. This work aims to analyze the language elaborated by Chemistry of the eighteenth century (especially by Lavoisier and Morveau), using the theoretical perspective of Fleck's epistemology, which comprises science as a historical and constitutive construction of a certain way of thinking of thought and of a style of thought). The research was conducted from the theoretical reference of internal analysis, derived from an intense social activity, from the concepts of Méthode de Nomenclature Chimique and the historical understanding of the works produced by the collective of thought in relation to the scientific language in the century XVIII, especially the correspondence letters of Lavoisier and Guyton de Morveau. All the discussion and results can be explored by teachers in the debate on the internal structure of science and the sociological production of science and / or the history of science / Doutor

No description available.

This project is about the asymmetry of time. The main source of discontent for physicists and philosophers alike is that even though in every physical theory we developed and/or discovered for explaining how the universe functions, the laws are time reversal invariant; there seems to be a very genuine asymmetry between the past and the future. The aim of this project is to examine several attempts to solve this friction between the laws of physics and the asymmetry and provide a new proposal that makes use of modern cosmology. In the recent history of physics and in contemporary philosophy of science there have been several attempts to explain the asymmetry of time and reconcile this asymmetry with time reversal invariant physical laws. David Albert developed one of the most recent attempts at solving the problem in Time and Chance (2000). Albert claims that there is a conclusive solution to the problem of asymmetry of time: namely, combining the laws of mechanics with several novel concepts that he introduces, the most important of which is what he calls "the past hypothesis". Eric Winsberg developed another modern attempt to solve the problem of the asymmetry of time. Winsberg combines Hans Reichenbach's branch systems proposal with a "framework" view of laws to solve the problem. Although this version of the branch systems proposal overcomes several problems associated with Reichenbach's original construction of the proposal, certain aspects of it are still open to critique. Following a brief introduction, my chapters include 1) a history of the problem of the asymmetry of time, in which I provide a historical overview of the issues particularly discussed by Boltzmann and his interlocutors, 2) a detailed evaluation of David Albert's account of the asymmetry of time, where he argues that we can solve all the problems if we use a combination of laws of physics and the past hypothesis, 3) a detailed overview of Eric Winsberg's account that depends a specific way of looking at the laws of physics--the framework view, and 4) my account, which attempts to solve the problem of the asymmetry of time, making extensive use of the developments on modern cosmology, specifically regarding the inflationary mechanism. I claim that if we take into account recent developments in modern cosmology and proposals for laws for initial conditions, then we cannot maintain the metaphysical status of the past hypothesis in Albert's project. Specifically, I argue that in order for a theory to make use of initial conditions of the universe, it has to include a set of laws from modern cosmology pertaining to that initial condition. I defend the position that inflation can supply the source of asymmetry when supported by the aggregate view of laws, which I introduce in the last chapter. The explanation of the asymmetry of time requires the use of dynamical equations from modern cosmology that would produce the boundary conditions. The boundary condition produced in this way would fill in for the source of the asymmetry of time. Consequently, I argue that the explanation of the asymmetry of time is encoded in the laws of modern cosmology.

This thesis describes an analysis of science textbooks, eight years after the implementation of the Years 1-10 Queensland Science Syllabus, which suggested a move towards constructivist teaching in Queensland schools (QSSC 1999). The textbooks have been analysed for evidence of constructivism, and this has led to recommendations for writing better textbooks. This thesis has been written in five chapters. In Chapter 1, a review of literature develops a conceptual framework, which is the basis of this research. Chapter 2 describes the process used to develop its methodology, and Chapter 3 presents the results of this analysis. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the findings of this research and its implications for textbook content and design. In the literature review the themes of constructivism and the nature of science and the use of textbooks by teachers are explored. It suggests that textbooks continue to be central to developing curriculum, that they are used as a reference and as an independent learning tool, rather than as a guide to enacting curriculum. It also shows constructivist teaching closely aligns with authentic science, that it moves school science closer to that practised by scientists, and that it can engender improvements in teaching practice and in student interest. The data from this research has been collected using an analytical grid developed from three successive trials, after the literature review showed no previously developed analytical grid was suitable. In this final version of the grid, Likert scales are used to observe four dimensions of constructivism in textbook activities: coherence (use knowledge and concepts in a range of contexts), student-centredness of inquiries, language used and analysis questions to practice making new knowledge claims. The unit of analysis was ecology chapters of four middle school science textbooks. The research questions asked in this study are as follows: • Is a constructivist approach discernable in the textbooks reviewed in terms of the four dimensions of constructivism identified in the literature review? • What elements of constructivism are readily identifiable, and therefore are easily included in textbooks? • What elements of constructivism are not discernable? The results of this research have been synthesised and show no textbook could be considered constructivist, although one textbook had inquiries that could be considered exemplary. Two of the textbooks had no claim to be constructivist because they lacked inquiries, and this is where students experience the methods of scientists and practise making knowledge claims.   Other conclusions of this research include the following: •All textbooks reviewed were deficient in at least one dimension of constructivism, and those with one inquiry cannot be constructivist; •Activities and contexts made textbooks more coherent; •Technical terms were reduced compared to what has been traditionally covered by textbooks, however technical terms are also essential to scientific literacy and need to be used appropriately; •Most methods of inquiries are prescribed, so they do not allow students to solve problems in their own relevant contexts; even in those textbooks with more inquiries; •There was little evidence of hypothetico-deductive reasoning in inquiries rather data collection and simple analysis were usually suggested. Guidelines for writing better textbooks have become apparent from this research. Coherent textbooks are inherently constructivist because they apply concepts across contexts, and have more inquiries. Inquiries with a rigorous, authentic hypothetico-deductive approach arise naturally when the methods, concepts and language of science are applied in contexts that students are likely to find relevant and interesting, and where real-life problems need to be solved. Adopting these recommendations could lead to textbooks being more centrally positioned in enacting curriculum than now, because they are more likely to be constructivist (and represent the best thinking in the field).

The opposition between the realists and the anti-realists isas old as Western science. The question as to whether the“furniture of the world”we call the“things”is to be considered real or not hasconsistently been at the forefront in the debates about scienceand philosophy. This urgent interest is motivated by the closeconnection to another question–namely that of scientificobjectivity - an issue that seldom receives proper treatment.Objectivity has rather been taken for granted in thetraditional Newtonian paradigm with its well-known slogan: Thedetached observer is the objective one and the rational mind ofclarity. It was impossible to continue with this dictum, which isresponsible for the cleft between the natural and socialsciences and still presents a ban on human feelings inscientific endeavours, after the findings of quantum mechanicsat the beginning of the 20th century. However the penetratingpower of this important insight has been astonishingly weak andwith the emergence of computer science in the middle of thecentury, Newtonian science’s self-assumed status ofobjectivity has been apprehended as both very doubtful and asevere hindrance in other areas outside the quantum domain ofscientific activity. The efforts of computer modelling andsimulation analysis revealed a pronounced observer-dependencyregarding investigation. For these reasons this thesis will scrutinise the activityof science and the art of modelling–proposing the use ofa 2-step model of modelling (metamodel) to clarify andemphasize the involvement of the observer in the process ofobservation. This approach reveals that the object-orientedapproach (OOA), which has been the prevailing one since thedawn of Western science and is one of the basic tenets of theNewtonian paradigm, makes science unable to describe itsobjects of discourse in an observer-independent manner. Such ascience is at risk to be considered inconsistent, incompleteand non-objective and for that reason unfit for consensualscientific use. The main claim of this thesis is that the object-orientedapproach is responsible for the genesis of Cartesian dualismand other inconsistencies, which are met in present dayscience. Such a claim is not novel however, but I will arguethat when science is dressed up as the Subject-orientedApproach to Knowledge (SOA) a long row of embarrassing andbewildering situations encountered in classical humanconceptualisation will vanish–in a way that, as far as Iknow, has never been explicitly explained before. This approachalso promises a unification of the different disciplines ofsciences so that e.g. the social sciences can be treated on anequal footing with the natural sciences–and thus thisembarrassing gulf of human knowledge can be removed. This is aprofound shift of paradigm in science and the re-orientation ofhuman thinking required is both considerable andtime-consuming. For this reason this thesis is not a systematic presentationof the SOA, but rather tries, in Part 1, to pave the way for anunderstanding of this approach by an introductory discussionabout the means and scope of science and the essential role ofsymbolic modelling in this endeavour–and in particularthe way these activities will be influenced by the anticipatedchange of paradigm. Some historical aspects of this particularSOA are also given as a background and this section iscompleted by a brief survey of the modern trends in scientificmodelling. Part 2 is collection of papers dealing with the principlesof modelling and simulation, and, rather more importantly, asequence of papers reflecting how the ideas of the SOA havedeveloped throughout the years due to the inconsistencies metwith in these and adjacent areas. To my mind they prove -beyond the point of any consensual doubt–that therealist’s position in science cannot be defended anylonger and that the“things of the world”by thescientific community must be considered merely privateallusions. More important however is the insight that the Newtonianparadigm is unable to produce an observer-independentdescription of this world with its conceived things and theonly way out of this embarrassing dilemma seems to be theacceptance of the SOA–with its hitherto strictly bannedfeature of subjectivity. Using this approach, we claim, sciencecan be given a consensual and consistent foundation–andthe price to pay is the loss of scientific ontology. As alreadypointed out this thesis merely hints at the new path to take–instead concentrating on the reasons for the impendingdemise of scientific realism and need of a constructive systemsscience.

The purpose of the study is to analyse an interdisciplinary research (IDR) project in order to identify whatconstitutes a strategy of integration of disciplinary insights. Through interviews, observations andanalysis of scientific articles produced by the researchers, the study explores the processes of IDR andrelates them to psychological and sociological theories of group research. The results show thatresearchers employ an emergent strategy which they design ad hoc, and which consists of certain patternsof behaviour that allow them to navigate conflict and partially integrate their insights into the problem.The study offers a number of recommendations that might be useful to take into consideration whendesigning an IDR project.

<p>The opposition between the realists and the anti-realists isas old as Western science. The question as to whether the“furniture of the world”we call the“things”is to be considered real or not hasconsistently been at the forefront in the debates about scienceand philosophy. This urgent interest is motivated by the closeconnection to another question–namely that of scientificobjectivity - an issue that seldom receives proper treatment.Objectivity has rather been taken for granted in thetraditional Newtonian paradigm with its well-known slogan: Thedetached observer is the objective one and the rational mind ofclarity.</p><p>It was impossible to continue with this dictum, which isresponsible for the cleft between the natural and socialsciences and still presents a ban on human feelings inscientific endeavours, after the findings of quantum mechanicsat the beginning of the 20th century. However the penetratingpower of this important insight has been astonishingly weak andwith the emergence of computer science in the middle of thecentury, Newtonian science’s self-assumed status ofobjectivity has been apprehended as both very doubtful and asevere hindrance in other areas outside the quantum domain ofscientific activity. The efforts of computer modelling andsimulation analysis revealed a pronounced observer-dependencyregarding investigation.</p><p>For these reasons this thesis will scrutinise the activityof science and the art of modelling–proposing the use ofa 2-step model of modelling (metamodel) to clarify andemphasize the involvement of the observer in the process ofobservation. This approach reveals that the object-orientedapproach (OOA), which has been the prevailing one since thedawn of Western science and is one of the basic tenets of theNewtonian paradigm, makes science unable to describe itsobjects of discourse in an observer-independent manner. Such ascience is at risk to be considered inconsistent, incompleteand non-objective and for that reason unfit for consensualscientific use.</p><p>The main claim of this thesis is that the object-orientedapproach is responsible for the genesis of Cartesian dualismand other inconsistencies, which are met in present dayscience. Such a claim is not novel however, but I will arguethat when science is dressed up as the Subject-orientedApproach to Knowledge (SOA) a long row of embarrassing andbewildering situations encountered in classical humanconceptualisation will vanish–in a way that, as far as Iknow, has never been explicitly explained before. This approachalso promises a unification of the different disciplines ofsciences so that e.g. the social sciences can be treated on anequal footing with the natural sciences–and thus thisembarrassing gulf of human knowledge can be removed. This is aprofound shift of paradigm in science and the re-orientation ofhuman thinking required is both considerable andtime-consuming.</p><p>For this reason this thesis is not a systematic presentationof the SOA, but rather tries, in Part 1, to pave the way for anunderstanding of this approach by an introductory discussionabout the means and scope of science and the essential role ofsymbolic modelling in this endeavour–and in particularthe way these activities will be influenced by the anticipatedchange of paradigm. Some historical aspects of this particularSOA are also given as a background and this section iscompleted by a brief survey of the modern trends in scientificmodelling.</p><p>Part 2 is collection of papers dealing with the principlesof modelling and simulation, and, rather more importantly, asequence of papers reflecting how the ideas of the SOA havedeveloped throughout the years due to the inconsistencies metwith in these and adjacent areas. To my mind they prove -beyond the point of any consensual doubt–that therealist’s position in science cannot be defended anylonger and that the“things of the world”by thescientific community must be considered merely privateallusions.</p><p>More important however is the insight that the Newtonianparadigm is unable to produce an observer-independentdescription of this world with its conceived things and theonly way out of this embarrassing dilemma seems to be theacceptance of the SOA–with its hitherto strictly bannedfeature of subjectivity. Using this approach, we claim, sciencecan be given a consensual and consistent foundation–andthe price to pay is the loss of scientific ontology. As alreadypointed out this thesis merely hints at the new path to take–instead concentrating on the reasons for the impendingdemise of scientific realism and need of a constructive systemsscience.</p>

Conservation science applies research in the natural and social sciences to practical problems of nature conservation, thus presupposing various goals and values. This dissertation examines normative roles for the decision sciences in biological conservation. I am primarily concerned with two philosophical problems that arise in applications of the decision sciences to biological conservation problems: commensurability of multiple values and cooperation between multiple agents. I argue that models from decision analysis should be used to construct preferences over complex tradeoffs, and game theoretical models should be used to identify situations in which multiple agents pursuing their own interests cause outcomes that are worse for everyone. While these models allow values to be made explicit for decision-making, in other situations conservationists’ goals and values are obscure. I discuss this distinct problem in the context of conservation biology, where the central concept of biodiversity is analyzed and shown to necessarily reflect the values of its users. The multiplicity of meanings of ‘biodiversity’ and measures of biological diversity raise risks for conservation biology and motivate multi-criteria approaches to conservation decision-making. Finally, the goals and values of conservation scientists and landscape managers may or may not reflect those of people who are affected by conservation policies. I argue that while decision science can aid in making values of various stakeholder groups explicit, facilitating reflection and learning, it cannot resolve ethical dilemmas on its own without input from normative and applied ethics, particularly in identifying legitimate stakeholders and weighing multiple biological concerns against concerns for rights, welfare, and social justice. / text