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<p>Bertrand Russell is one of the grandmasters of 20^th Century Analytic Philosophy. It is surprising, then, that his work fell out of fashion later in his career. As a result, very little has been discussed concerning Russell’s work from the period of 1927 – 59. This thesis provides an analysis of Russell’s philosophical work from this era. Our attention here is on Russell’s theory of perception and the underlying metaphysical structure that is developed as a result of his scientific outlook. Russell’s philosophy during this time focused almost exclusively on perception, knowledge, and the epistemic relationship humans have with the world according to science. It is these topics that are engaged with and explicated. We discover that, due to Russell's outright acceptance of that conclusion found in physics, metaphysically he defends a four-dimensional neutral monist event ontology; perceptually he defends a causal theory where one's perceptions must be understood as only being of one's brain; and epistemically he is a fallibilist, wherein justification can be found in a coherent set of beliefs founded on intrinsically credible individual propositions, but knowledge itself is ultimately a vexed and imprecise concept.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

Questions concerning the ethics of terraforming Mars have received some attention from both philosophers and scientists during recent decades. A variety of theoretical approaches have been supplied by a number of authors, however research pursuant to this thesis has indicated at least two major blindspots in the published literature on the topic. First, a broad category of human considerations involving risks, dangers, and social, political, and economic inequalities that would likely be associated with efforts to terraform Mars have been woefully overlooked in the published literature to date. I attempt to rectify that oversight by employing the interpretive lens of environmental justice to address questions of environmental colonialism, equality in terms of political participation and inclusion in decision making structures, risks associated with technological progressivism, and responses to anthropogenic climate change. Only by including the historically marginalized and politically disenfranchised "voices," of both humans and nonhumans, can any future plan to terraform Mars be deemed ethical, moral or just according to the framework provided by environmental justice. Furthermore, broader political inclusion of this sort conforms to what ecofeminist author Val Plumwood calls the "intentional recognition stance" and provides an avenue through which globally societies can include nonanthropocentric considerations in decision making frameworks both for questions of terraforming Mars and also for a more local, contemporary set of environmental issues. The second blindspot I seek to correct concerns motivations for attempting terraforming on Mars previously inadequately philosophically elaborated in the published discourse. Specifically, the nonanthropocentric considerations postulated in the second chapter by various authors writing about terraforming, and elaborated in third with regard to environmental justice, reach their culmination in an ecofeminist ethic of care, sustainability, reproduction, and healthy growth which I uniquely elaborate based on a metaphorical similarity to the relationship between a gardener and a garden. Although at first glance, this metaphor may appear overly domineering, or uncritically paternalistic, I argue a deep understanding of its implications will be eminently beneficial for discussions of what is moral, good, right, and just to do regarding not only whether or not to terraform Mars, but for contemporary environmental concerns as well. Ultimately, extreme caution and a robust precautionary principle are the moral prescriptions arrived at in this thesis for the near term future. Until a sustainable civilization and just society can be established and effectively maintained, efforts to terraform and colonize another planet are practically certain to produce as much that is undesirable as that which might be good.

Esta dissertação caracteriza-se como um estudo de história da filosofia da ciência. O objetivo central é analisar e compreender a construção da filosofia da ciência não apenas a partir das apresentações da produção intelectual do matemático e polímata inglês William Whewell (1794-1866), como também de alguns elementos de sua biografia e de seu contexto histórico. Esse objetivo é complementado pela análise dos critérios e pressupostos filosóficos, científicos, teológicos, morais e educacionais empregados por Whewell no estabelecimento de uma distinção entre o processo de descoberta científica e os métodos de justificação de teorias distinção entre, em termos atuais, os assim denominados contexto da descoberta e contexto da justificação. Atualmente, filósofos e historiadores da ciência vitoriana consideram o tratado Filosofia das ciências indutivas, fundadas em suas histórias (1840 e 1847), de Whewell, como a primeira sistematização histórico-filosófica da ciência. Assim sendo, nada mais apropriado do que tomar em consideração a biografia intelectual desse autor (pouco conhecido do público brasileiro) para entender os passos de sua pr odução, bem como os seus propósitos, compromissos e algumas peculiaridades de sua personalidade. A importância deste trabalho é justificada não somente pela compreensão que proporciona a respeito da emergência da filosofia da ciência como ramo de investigação, disciplina especializada e discurso legitimador, mas também pelo tipo de abordagem que utiliza, a qual procura articular as motivações intelectuais e morais do autor com as suas circunstâncias culturais e institucionais. / This dissertation is a study in the history of the philosophy of science. The main objective is to analyze and understand the formation of the philosophy of science regarding the presentation of the intellectual production of the mathematician and polymath William Whewell (1794-1866), and concerning some of the features of his biography and his historical context. The objective of this work is complemented by an analysis of the philosophical, scientific, theological, moral and educational criteria and assumptions used by Whewell to establish a distinction between the process of scientific discovery and the methods of justification of theories (in current terms, the distinction between thus called context of discovery and context of justification). Nowadays philosophers and historian of Victorian science consider Whewells books History of the Inductive Science s, from the earliest to the present time (1st edition, 1837) and The Philosophy of the Inductive Science, founded upon their histories (1 st edition, 1840) as the first historical and philosophical systematization about the pure and empirical sciences. In this sense, it is important to investigate the intellectual biography of Whewell (usually unknown by the Brazilian academician and students) in order to better understand the steps of his production, as well as his purposes, commitments and some peculiarities of his personality. The importance of this work justifies itself not only because it provides a better understanding of the emer gence of the philosophy of science as a real field of investigation, as a specialized subject and as normative speech about the scientific thought and practice, but also for the kind of a pproach used in this work, which articulates most of Whewells intellectual, moral, cultura l and institutional motivations to his own historical and social circumstances.

Esta dissertação caracteriza-se como um estudo de história da filosofia da ciência. O objetivo central é analisar e compreender a construção da filosofia da ciência não apenas a partir das apresentações da produção intelectual do matemático e polímata inglês William Whewell (1794-1866), como também de alguns elementos de sua biografia e de seu contexto histórico. Esse objetivo é complementado pela análise dos critérios e pressupostos filosóficos, científicos, teológicos, morais e educacionais empregados por Whewell no estabelecimento de uma distinção entre o processo de descoberta científica e os métodos de justificação de teorias distinção entre, em termos atuais, os assim denominados contexto da descoberta e contexto da justificação. Atualmente, filósofos e historiadores da ciência vitoriana consideram o tratado Filosofia das ciências indutivas, fundadas em suas histórias (1840 e 1847), de Whewell, como a primeira sistematização histórico-filosófica da ciência. Assim sendo, nada mais apropriado do que tomar em consideração a biografia intelectual desse autor (pouco conhecido do público brasileiro) para entender os passos de sua pr odução, bem como os seus propósitos, compromissos e algumas peculiaridades de sua personalidade. A importância deste trabalho é justificada não somente pela compreensão que proporciona a respeito da emergência da filosofia da ciência como ramo de investigação, disciplina especializada e discurso legitimador, mas também pelo tipo de abordagem que utiliza, a qual procura articular as motivações intelectuais e morais do autor com as suas circunstâncias culturais e institucionais. / This dissertation is a study in the history of the philosophy of science. The main objective is to analyze and understand the formation of the philosophy of science regarding the presentation of the intellectual production of the mathematician and polymath William Whewell (1794-1866), and concerning some of the features of his biography and his historical context. The objective of this work is complemented by an analysis of the philosophical, scientific, theological, moral and educational criteria and assumptions used by Whewell to establish a distinction between the process of scientific discovery and the methods of justification of theories (in current terms, the distinction between thus called context of discovery and context of justification). Nowadays philosophers and historian of Victorian science consider Whewells books History of the Inductive Science s, from the earliest to the present time (1st edition, 1837) and The Philosophy of the Inductive Science, founded upon their histories (1 st edition, 1840) as the first historical and philosophical systematization about the pure and empirical sciences. In this sense, it is important to investigate the intellectual biography of Whewell (usually unknown by the Brazilian academician and students) in order to better understand the steps of his production, as well as his purposes, commitments and some peculiarities of his personality. The importance of this work justifies itself not only because it provides a better understanding of the emer gence of the philosophy of science as a real field of investigation, as a specialized subject and as normative speech about the scientific thought and practice, but also for the kind of a pproach used in this work, which articulates most of Whewells intellectual, moral, cultura l and institutional motivations to his own historical and social circumstances.

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<p>Currently, there is significant divergence in scholarly opinion as to whether or not human nature exists. In my PhD thesis, I argue for the existence of human nature. In so doing, I critique rival views on human nature and orthodox entry points into the issue. I also offer a partial explanation as to why such a strong divergence of expert opinion may exist, and argue that accuracy on the issue is important with respect to individual and collective problem solving. The view of human nature I defend is what I call ‘ecological.’ This construct aligns with the fact that biological systems exist at multiple levels of organization and relative to varying ecologies, developmental stages, frames of reference, and viable systems of orientation. Given this, I contend human nature is not something that ‘inheres’ and projects out from the organism; rather, human nature is diffuse and exists at simultaneous levels of biological organization, and at the intersection of genetic and epigenetic factors, past and present, and scientific truth and pragmatism.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)