Conservation science applies research in the natural and social sciences to practical problems of nature conservation, thus presupposing various goals and values. This dissertation examines normative roles for the decision sciences in biological conservation. I am primarily concerned with two philosophical problems that arise in applications of the decision sciences to biological conservation problems: commensurability of multiple values and cooperation between multiple agents. I argue that models from decision analysis should be used to construct preferences over complex tradeoffs, and game theoretical models should be used to identify situations in which multiple agents pursuing their own interests cause outcomes that are worse for everyone. While these models allow values to be made explicit for decision-making, in other situations conservationists’ goals and values are obscure. I discuss this distinct problem in the context of conservation biology, where the central concept of biodiversity is analyzed and shown to necessarily reflect the values of its users. The multiplicity of meanings of ‘biodiversity’ and measures of biological diversity raise risks for conservation biology and motivate multi-criteria approaches to conservation decision-making. Finally, the goals and values of conservation scientists and landscape managers may or may not reflect those of people who are affected by conservation policies. I argue that while decision science can aid in making values of various stakeholder groups explicit, facilitating reflection and learning, it cannot resolve ethical dilemmas on its own without input from normative and applied ethics, particularly in identifying legitimate stakeholders and weighing multiple biological concerns against concerns for rights, welfare, and social justice. / text

My dissertation studies three problems that threaten our functional explanatory practices. The first study, The Normativity Problem and Theories of Biological Function, attempts to explain how it is that biological tokens can perform their functions better or worse, and can retain their functions even when not currently performing them. Etiological theories can try to account for the normativity of functions by cumulative selection or by their contributions to fitness. I argue that neither strategy succeeds. Systemic theories hold that functions are the causal contributions of systemic components to the overall capacities of their containing systems. At first glance, systemic theories do not explain the normativity of functions either. I argue that adding a feedback condition to systemic theories can account for the normativity of functions. The second study, The Malfunction Problem and the Functional Individuation of Biological Traits, attempts to dissolve an apparent paradox about how, if biological traits are functionally individuated, it is possible for an organism to possess a biological trait that malfunctions. The malfunction problem articulates the apparent paradox: A ‘malfunctioning’ trait token seems to no longer belong to its functional type and hence cannot malfunction. I show that distinguishing between the functional type that a token instantiates and the current performance of its function dissolves the paradox. The third study, The Necessitation Problem and the Causal Relevance of Functional Properties, attempts to address a vacuity worry about causal explanation that seems to arise when a property referred to by a causal explanation is individuated by its very effects. Since functional properties are individuated by their functions, and functions are effects, it is hard to see how the ascription of functional properties can play an explanatory role. For the relevant explanations seem to be vacuous: the property that purportedly explains the effect is just the property of having that very effect. I argue that causally relevant functional properties are individuated by historical effects, whereas the effects that they causally explain are current. Since the effects individuating causally relevant properties are distinct from the effects that are causally explained, the vacuity worry does not arise. / Philosophy

The critical aim of this dissertation is to show the lack of explanatory value of typological generalizations in generative research paradigms, and the constructive aim is to propose an alternative conception of typology which gives a justifiable place to typological facts. My contention is that we cannot conclude that the human language faculty (HLF) lacks the means to generate a linguistic phenomenon from only the lack of such a phenomenon in the languages of the world. The temptation to do so arises from equivocation regarding the term Language as used within different generative paradigms: the classical generative paradigm, and the generative-parametric paradigm. The former characterizes Language, understood as HLF, the mental object which allows us to produce and understand languages. For the latter, however, Language also includes the distribution of linguistic structures in the world. HLF is a natural kind; the distribution of linguistic structures in the world is not. Equivocation of the term ‘Language’; occurs when one notion is exchanged for the other within an argument. The problem: only natural kinds support induction. The goal of characterizing HLF is discovering what is necessarily true of HLF. The distribution of linguistic phenomena in the world, although constrained by what HLF allows us to acquire, is also constrained by historical contingency. Generalizations based on these accidental factors are valueless in characterizing HLF: I show this in two case studies, which deal with syllable structure and verbal morpheme order. I argue that the study of the distribution of linguistic phenomena in the world is a historical science, which requires a different set of assumptions than an experimental science such as the classical generative paradigm. The alternative I offer is called ideal-typology. Ideal-typology replaces inductive inference based on natural kinds with pragmatic explanation based on ‘ideal-types’. Ideal-types are convenient fictions, purpose-built to manipulate our cognitive systems into understanding the diversity of historical-scientific data. I illustrate the practice of ideal-typology by showing how the diversity of Chinese tone systems can be measured and organized by the use of ideal-types. Beyond increasing understanding of the data themselves, ideal-typology yields hypotheses that experimental sciences can test.

The central issue in this study is the question of how insight into the relation between faith and science in the philosophy of CA van Peursen can contribute to the wide ranging faith-science debate in contemporary thought. The study is contextualized by asking how the resultant insight into the relation between faith and science can be brought to bear on the notion of a "Christian science" as it has developed within a specific philosophical tradition. It is argued that CA van Peursen's philosophy relies on the basic distinction between thought and reality, and more specifically, the interrelation between the two. Van Peursen utilizes a broad definition of rationality as networks of symbols with which human consciousness works, in order to facilitate an appropriate response to the challenges of its surroundings. At this point Van Peursen also makes use of the notion of "narrative" to emphasize the dynamic character of the symbolic networks that exist. Objective reality and subjective rationality can never be separated, but they are attuned to each other, and the one should, as it where, be "read off' against the other. A typology of the faith-science debate, that is developed in the initial stages of the study, is subsequently used as a heuristic instrument to draw out the implications of Van Peursen's philosophy for the question regarding the relation between faith and science. It is argued that Van Peursen's thought is consistently non-reductionist, in the sense that he grants both faith and science their own integrity. Faith and science are not equal, however. Faith constitutes a much broader, more immediate and concrete reaction to the challenges of reality than science does. Science strives towards objectivity and abstraction, and therein lies it's power, but it nevertheless always remains bound to the real world of everyday experience. Science therefore has a "relational autonomy". The insights gained into the relation between faith and science problematizes the idea of a separate Christian science that is construed as being antithetical to so called secular science. The notion of Christian science can be salvaged along two ways: Christian science may be seen as a commitment to good science, and it may be seen as a dialogue between the narratives of western science and Christian faith. / Thesis (M.A. (Philosophy))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2004.

This paper considers the philosophy of science that is central to Critical Realism (CR). Following a discussion of the foundational transcendental arguments of the movement, it reviews stratification, emergence, and the possibility of a unity between the natural and the social sciences. CR is broadly contrasted with other versions of scientific realism, empiricism, and idealism. the philosophy of psychology is considered as a test case in which critical realism can be demonstrated to be a workable theory of science. Specifically, a theory is propsed of social psychology that would be scientific in virtue of meeting the standards of a critical realist view of science. / i, 95 leaves ; 28 cm.

<p>Cognitive neuroscience is an interdisciplinary enterprise aimed at explaining cognition and behavior. It appears to be succeeding. What accounts for this apparent explanatory success? According to one prominent philosophical thesis, cognitive neuroscience explains by discovering and describing mechanisms. This "mechanist thesis" is open to at least two interpretations: a strong metaphysical thesis that Carl Craver and David Kaplan defend, and a weaker methodological thesis that William Bechtel defends. I argue that the metaphysical thesis is false and that the methodological thesis is too weak to account for the explanatory promise of cognitive neuroscience. My argument draws support from a representative example of research in this field, namely, the neuroscience of decision-making. The example shows that cognitive neuroscience explains in a variety of ways and that the discovery of mechanisms functions primarily as a way of marshaling evidence in support of the models of cognition that are its principle unit of explanatory significance.</p><p> </p><p>The inadequacy of the mechanist program is symptomatic of an implausible but prominent view of scientific understanding. On this view, scientific understanding consists in an accurate and complete description of certain "objective" explanatory relations, that is, relations that hold independently of facts about human psychology. I trace this view to Carl Hempel's logical empiricist reconceptualization of scientific understanding, which then gets extended in Wesley Salmon's causal-mechanistic approach. I argue that the twin objectivist ideals of accuracy and completeness are neither ends we actually value nor ends we ought to value where scientific understanding is concerned. </p><p>The case against objectivism motivates psychologism about understanding, the view that understanding depends on human psychology. I propose and defend a normative psychologistic framework for investigating the nature of understanding in the mind sciences along three empirically-informed dimensions: 1) What are the ends of understanding? 2) What is the nature of the cognitive strategy that we deploy to achieve those ends; and 3) Under what conditions is our deployment of this strategy effective toward achieving those ends? To articulate and defend this view, I build on the work of Elliot Sober to develop a taxonomy of psychologisms about understanding. Epistemological psychologism, a species of naturalism, is the view that justifying claims about understanding requires appealing to what scientists actually do when they seek understanding. Metaphysical psychologism is the view that the truth-makers for claims about understanding include facts about human psychology. I defend both views against objections.</p> / Dissertation

The central issue in this study is the question of how insight into the relation between faith and science in the philosophy of CA van Peursen can contribute to the wide ranging faith-science debate in contemporary thought. The study is contextualized by asking how the resultant insight into the relation between faith and science can be brought to bear on the notion of a "Christian science" as it has developed within a specific philosophical tradition. It is argued that CA van Peursen's philosophy relies on the basic distinction between thought and reality, and more specifically, the interrelation between the two. Van Peursen utilizes a broad definition of rationality as networks of symbols with which human consciousness works, in order to facilitate an appropriate response to the challenges of its surroundings. At this point Van Peursen also makes use of the notion of "narrative" to emphasize the dynamic character of the symbolic networks that exist. Objective reality and subjective rationality can never be separated, but they are attuned to each other, and the one should, as it where, be "read off' against the other. A typology of the faith-science debate, that is developed in the initial stages of the study, is subsequently used as a heuristic instrument to draw out the implications of Van Peursen's philosophy for the question regarding the relation between faith and science. It is argued that Van Peursen's thought is consistently non-reductionist, in the sense that he grants both faith and science their own integrity. Faith and science are not equal, however. Faith constitutes a much broader, more immediate and concrete reaction to the challenges of reality than science does. Science strives towards objectivity and abstraction, and therein lies it's power, but it nevertheless always remains bound to the real world of everyday experience. Science therefore has a "relational autonomy". The insights gained into the relation between faith and science problematizes the idea of a separate Christian science that is construed as being antithetical to so called secular science. The notion of Christian science can be salvaged along two ways: Christian science may be seen as a commitment to good science, and it may be seen as a dialogue between the narratives of western science and Christian faith. / Thesis (M.A. (Philosophy))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2004.

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This thesis describes an analysis of science textbooks, eight years after the implementation of the Years 1-10 Queensland Science Syllabus, which suggested a move towards constructivist teaching in Queensland schools (QSSC 1999). The textbooks have been analysed for evidence of constructivism, and this has led to recommendations for writing better textbooks. This thesis has been written in five chapters. In Chapter 1, a review of literature develops a conceptual framework, which is the basis of this research. Chapter 2 describes the process used to develop its methodology, and Chapter 3 presents the results of this analysis. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the findings of this research and its implications for textbook content and design. In the literature review the themes of constructivism and the nature of science and the use of textbooks by teachers are explored. It suggests that textbooks continue to be central to developing curriculum, that they are used as a reference and as an independent learning tool, rather than as a guide to enacting curriculum. It also shows constructivist teaching closely aligns with authentic science, that it moves school science closer to that practised by scientists, and that it can engender improvements in teaching practice and in student interest. The data from this research has been collected using an analytical grid developed from three successive trials, after the literature review showed no previously developed analytical grid was suitable. In this final version of the grid, Likert scales are used to observe four dimensions of constructivism in textbook activities: coherence (use knowledge and concepts in a range of contexts), student-centredness of inquiries, language used and analysis questions to practice making new knowledge claims. The unit of analysis was ecology chapters of four middle school science textbooks. The research questions asked in this study are as follows: • Is a constructivist approach discernable in the textbooks reviewed in terms of the four dimensions of constructivism identified in the literature review? • What elements of constructivism are readily identifiable, and therefore are easily included in textbooks? • What elements of constructivism are not discernable? The results of this research have been synthesised and show no textbook could be considered constructivist, although one textbook had inquiries that could be considered exemplary. Two of the textbooks had no claim to be constructivist because they lacked inquiries, and this is where students experience the methods of scientists and practise making knowledge claims.   Other conclusions of this research include the following: •All textbooks reviewed were deficient in at least one dimension of constructivism, and those with one inquiry cannot be constructivist; •Activities and contexts made textbooks more coherent; •Technical terms were reduced compared to what has been traditionally covered by textbooks, however technical terms are also essential to scientific literacy and need to be used appropriately; •Most methods of inquiries are prescribed, so they do not allow students to solve problems in their own relevant contexts; even in those textbooks with more inquiries; •There was little evidence of hypothetico-deductive reasoning in inquiries rather data collection and simple analysis were usually suggested. Guidelines for writing better textbooks have become apparent from this research. Coherent textbooks are inherently constructivist because they apply concepts across contexts, and have more inquiries. Inquiries with a rigorous, authentic hypothetico-deductive approach arise naturally when the methods, concepts and language of science are applied in contexts that students are likely to find relevant and interesting, and where real-life problems need to be solved. Adopting these recommendations could lead to textbooks being more centrally positioned in enacting curriculum than now, because they are more likely to be constructivist (and represent the best thinking in the field).

This thesis describes an analysis of science textbooks, eight years after the implementation of the Years 1-10 Queensland Science Syllabus, which suggested a move towards constructivist teaching in Queensland schools (QSSC 1999). The textbooks have been analysed for evidence of constructivism, and this has led to recommendations for writing better textbooks. This thesis has been written in five chapters. In Chapter 1, a review of literature develops a conceptual framework, which is the basis of this research. Chapter 2 describes the process used to develop its methodology, and Chapter 3 presents the results of this analysis. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the findings of this research and its implications for textbook content and design. In the literature review the themes of constructivism and the nature of science and the use of textbooks by teachers are explored. It suggests that textbooks continue to be central to developing curriculum, that they are used as a reference and as an independent learning tool, rather than as a guide to enacting curriculum. It also shows constructivist teaching closely aligns with authentic science, that it moves school science closer to that practised by scientists, and that it can engender improvements in teaching practice and in student interest. The data from this research has been collected using an analytical grid developed from three successive trials, after the literature review showed no previously developed analytical grid was suitable. In this final version of the grid, Likert scales are used to observe four dimensions of constructivism in textbook activities: coherence (use knowledge and concepts in a range of contexts), student-centredness of inquiries, language used and analysis questions to practice making new knowledge claims. The unit of analysis was ecology chapters of four middle school science textbooks. The research questions asked in this study are as follows: • Is a constructivist approach discernable in the textbooks reviewed in terms of the four dimensions of constructivism identified in the literature review? • What elements of constructivism are readily identifiable, and therefore are easily included in textbooks? • What elements of constructivism are not discernable? The results of this research have been synthesised and show no textbook could be considered constructivist, although one textbook had inquiries that could be considered exemplary. Two of the textbooks had no claim to be constructivist because they lacked inquiries, and this is where students experience the methods of scientists and practise making knowledge claims.   Other conclusions of this research include the following: •All textbooks reviewed were deficient in at least one dimension of constructivism, and those with one inquiry cannot be constructivist; •Activities and contexts made textbooks more coherent; •Technical terms were reduced compared to what has been traditionally covered by textbooks, however technical terms are also essential to scientific literacy and need to be used appropriately; •Most methods of inquiries are prescribed, so they do not allow students to solve problems in their own relevant contexts; even in those textbooks with more inquiries; •There was little evidence of hypothetico-deductive reasoning in inquiries rather data collection and simple analysis were usually suggested. Guidelines for writing better textbooks have become apparent from this research. Coherent textbooks are inherently constructivist because they apply concepts across contexts, and have more inquiries. Inquiries with a rigorous, authentic hypothetico-deductive approach arise naturally when the methods, concepts and language of science are applied in contexts that students are likely to find relevant and interesting, and where real-life problems need to be solved. Adopting these recommendations could lead to textbooks being more centrally positioned in enacting curriculum than now, because they are more likely to be constructivist (and represent the best thinking in the field).