This thesis looks at a relatively new line of research in Cognitive Science – embodied cognition. Its relation to the computational-representational paradigm, primarily symbolicism, is extensively discussed. It is argued that embodied cognition is compatible with the established paradigm but challenges its research focus and traditionally assumed segregation of cognition from bodily and worldly activities Subsequently the impact of embodied cognition on philosophy of Cognitive Science is considered. The second chapter defends the applicability of mechanistic explanation to cases of embodied cognition. Further, it argues that a proposed alternative, dynamic systems theory, is not a substitute to the mechanistic approach. The last chapter critically examines the thesis that mind is extended beyond the bodily boundary and into the world. It is concluded that arguments in favour of the extended mind thesis are inadequate. Considerations in favour of the orthodox view that the does not “leak” out into the world are also presented.

<p> Classical, scientific, and Abrahamic origin stories of knowledge establish grounds. Upon excavating these grounds, this dissertation has found repeated and entangled emphases on isolation related to a materially grounded cosmology. The core evidence for this position comes from their comparable displays of the psyche/mind/soul/spirit&rsquo;s entry into and/or imprisonment within body, the symbolic restraint of Classical and Abrahamic progenitors with stone, and the initiation of philosophy&mdash;according to Aristotle&mdash;with a theory of materialism. Symbolic interpretations of the religious myths are supported by commentary from within the respective traditions. </p><p> Following a consideration of the existential implications of a material ground and (fundamentally) isolated self-image, the work considers mythic liberations of progenitors from stone and Einstein&rsquo;s liberation of scientific traditions from material reductionism. As Einstein&rsquo;s labors included an integration of wave dynamics into the way matter is seen, Herakles&rsquo; and Christ&rsquo;s liberations of Prometheus and Adam are actuated by symbolic fluids. Later, their transcendence and atonement(s) are actuated by fluid. As is shown, Classical, Christian, and scientific knowledge narratives all contain reactions to a material ground of being contingent with the integration/imbibing of waves/fluids. The primary examples for this include the hydra-blood that freed Prometheus from stone and Herakles from life, the nectar of immortality he drank upon his death, the wine-blood of Christ that freed Adam from stone and his followers from mortality, and the form of waves and fields Einstein added to the theoretical particle. </p><p> This dissertation argues that the reason fluids have played such integral roles in the historical and symbolic transcendence of material/embodied isolation and Classical atoms (isolated matter) is because&mdash;unlike material particulates&mdash;fluids and waves are capable of union and harmony. My read of particle-wave duality is as a new foundation that challenges atomized cosmologies and worldviews leading many towards a vision of self as estranged from other. My final argument is that each of these prominent Western knowledge traditions present stories that follow a meta-narrative arc defined by an initial commitment to a materially grounded cosmology that is later enhanced&mdash;if not healed&mdash;by theoretical waves and symbolic elixirs. </p><p> <i>Keywords:</i> Mythology, Philosophy, Science, Religion, Wave</p>

<p> This dissertation examines the importance of geography, performance, and microscopy in the construction of theories of human difference in Europe in the eighteenth century, with a particular focus on "fringe groups" such as albinos with black parents and individuals with complexion disorders. It joins a growing discussion in history, the history of science and medicine, and critical racial theory about the social and philosophic bases of early-modern human taxonomic schemas. Collectively, the fields analyzed in this study share a common conceptual root in their dependence on transferable physical processes&mdash;techniques&mdash;as much as on the intellectual frameworks investing those gestures with meaning. The necessarily embodied processes of exploration, spectatorship, and microscopic visual analysis produced discrete ways of seeing human difference which influenced the conclusions that natural philosophers reached through those embodied experiences. Marginal groups of individuals with unexpected or "abnormal" complexions drew a disproportionate amount of attention in the eighteenth century, because they were not easily identifiable with pre-existing conceptions of human difference and consequently provided a strong impetus to reconsider those epistemic categories. Overwhelmingly, the perspectives of eighteenth-century natural philosophers were profoundly non-racial in nature; instead, they drew upon ideas as varied as monstrosity, morality, self-analysis, dramatic tragedy, entertainment, and imagination to position experiences of unexpected human diversity in a distinctly valuative and sensational understanding of human difference. Through the interrogation of new and underutilized sources, this dissertation argues for an enrichment of our understanding of the "history of race" by taking into account the diversity of the physical techniques that were used by eighteenth century thinkers to arrive at ideas about human difference, while simultaneously demonstrating the centrality of hitherto understudied groups&mdash;such as albinos with black parents&mdash;in the formulation of systems of human difference. </p>

<p> The psychologist J. J. Gibson, and later the enactivists, espoused a view of perception emphasized active sensory exploration, and the biological functions perception serves. They tended to neglect the internal complexity of perceptual systems. Neuroscientists and computer vision researchers, on the other hand, focus on the complex structure and inner workings of perceptual systems, to the neglect of biological and behavioral context. Here I will formulate a version of ecological realism which reconciles and critiques these seemingly disparate approaches. </p><p> I argue that the objects of perception are relational invariant structures preserved within the changing flux of perceptual input. The function of perception is to enable appropriate behavior with respect to affordances, which are objective three-way relations between worldly features, animal abilities, and animal needs. The invariant relationships perceived tend to be those which signify affordance relationships for the species and individual in question. </p><p> The perception-action cycle is but one example of the circular dynamics of perceptual systems. The neural portions of such systems are also in a state of constant feed-forward and feedback dynamical interaction with one another. These dynamics confer an active autonomy on perceptual systems as manifested by phenomena like dreams, hallucinations, and perceptual illusions. Metaphorically, such systems may function to constantly formulate and test hypotheses about affordances based on perceptual evidence and prior categorical experience. Hierarchical predictive models of perception, in which perceptual systems consist of a hierarchy of Bayesian statistical predictors, represent a possible means by which this metaphor might be crafted into a testable scientific hypothesis. Perception, even if it involves actively autonomous perceptual systems coping with ambiguous input, is epistemically reliable most of the time, because it is constantly tested by action. Perceptual states are true or valid if they bear an appropriate relationship to objective affordance relationships, and false or invalid if they do not. These views require a reformulation of the venerable distinction between `direct' and `indirect' perception. Perception is ontologically direct in the sense of dealing in objective relationships in the world, but justificationally indirect in the sense of requiring an argument that perceptual beliefs are generally epistemically reliable.</p>

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Sydney, 2008. / Title from title screen (viewed February 23, 2009) Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Dept. of Studies in Religion, Faculty of Arts. Degree awarded 2008; thesis submitted 2007. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print form.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2008. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-05, Section: A, page: 1811. Adviser: Alexander L. Mayer. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 304-329) Available on microfilm from Pro Quest Information and Learning.

Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1995. / Shipping list no.: 1998-0921-M. "August 1997." Also available via Internet from the Air University Press web site. Address as of 11/3/03: http://aupress.au.af.mil/SAAS%5FTheses/Pellegrini/pellegrini.pdf; current access is available via PURL.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 236-239).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Irvine, 2007. / (UMI)AAI3271310. Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-07, Section: A, page: 2965. Adviser: Ellen Burt.

Includes bibliographic references (p. 260-264).