Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / Bibliography. Also available via the Internet.

<p> This qualitative study uses children&rsquo;s writing to explore the divide between a conception of Science as a humanistic discipline reliant on creativity, ingenuity and out of the box thinking and a persistent public perception of science and scientists as rigid and methodical. Artifacts reviewed were 506 scripts written during 2014 and 2016 by 5th graders participating in an out-of classroom, mentor supported, free-choice 10-week arts and literacy initiative. 47% (237) of these scripts were found to contain content relating to Science, Scientists, Science Education and the Nature of Science. These 237 scripts were coded for themes; characteristics of named scientist characters were tracked and analyzed. Findings included NOS understandings being expressed by representation of Science and Engineering Practices; Ingenuity being primarily linked to Engineering tasks; common portrayals of science as magical or scientists as villains; and a persistence in negative stereotypes of scientists, including a lack of gender equity amongst the named scientist characters. Findings suggest that representations of scientists in popular culture highly influence the portrayals of scientists constructed by the students. Recommendations to teachers include encouraging explicit consideration of big-picture NOS concepts such as ethics during elementary school and encouraging the replacement of documentary or educational shows with more engaging fictional media.</p><p>

<p> According to Craig Keener there are hundreds of millions of people around the world who believe that they have experienced or witnessed a healing miracle. Unfortunately, the vast majority of these miracles (Special Divine Action) occur in the third world and lack medical and scientific documentation. However, in Craig Keener&rsquo;s text <i>Miracles: The Credibility of the New Testament Accounts</i> (2011), he details over one hundred modern medical miracles which have documentation from American doctors and scientists. In addition to Keener, the Vatican&rsquo;s <i>Medica Consulta</i> has also catalogued seventy cases of modern medical miracles originating from the shrine at Lourdes France which meet the Vatican&rsquo;s rigid documentation criteria. Finally, the Renewal linked <i>Global Medical Research Institute </i> (GMRI) has begun an extensive study to verify and document claims of personal medical miracles. Thus, there is strong scientific evidence for the occurrence of modern miracles. </p><p> While proving the occurrence of modern miracles is foundational in the development of a Renewal apologetic, the theological implications and meanings of the miraculous are the larger questions according to Polkinghorne, Richard Swinburne and others. What is ultimately needed in the development of a Renewal apologetic, is a comprehensive theology of the miraculous, which places modern miracles within the larger history of God&rsquo;s interaction with his creation, as a means for the expansion of his kingdom. This will be the focus of the second part of this paper, as modern miracles are shown to be an integral part of the Renewal and expansion of the Kingdom of God; and ultimately the development of a Renewal Apologetic.</p><p>

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Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / Scientific realism and antirealism are two main views in the philosophy of science regarding the status of unobservable entities in science and whether we have good epistemic reasons to believe that our current successful scientific theories are (approximately) true. Briefly, the former claims that our scientific theories are (approximately) true and unobservable entities these scientific theories postulate exist. On the other hand, the latter claims that we do not have good epistemic reasons to believe that our scientific theories are (approximately) true and that unobservable entities our scientific theories postulate exist. The scientific realism has two primary tenets, one axiological (i.e., science should seek truth) and the other epistemological (namely, our current successful theories are (approximately) true). In this thesis, the issue has been examined from standpoint of the account of Peirce’s philosophy of science, more accurately based on his understanding of reality, truth and basic idealism. In the first chapter, I outline the main points of the debate from the perspectives of both sides. In the second chapter, I give reasons why the scientific realists’ argument is not convincing. In the third chapter, I attempt to draw an accurate picture of the account of Peirce’s views on the nature of scientific theories. In the last chapter, I make a case for scientific realism from the Peircean account of philosophy of science. I have claimed why the current debate cannot be settled without accepting a kind of Peirce's basic idealism and his understanding of reality. I think both scientific realists and antirealists accept a kind of naïve realism. This is the main reason why it is not possible to settle the debate from their standpoints. In order to overcome this issue, I attempt to develop a more sophisticated realism based on Peirce’s understanding of reality, truth and basic idealism.

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<p>Theories that engender fundamental transformations in our world view seldom come perfect from the outset for two reasons. First, the empirical discoveries and theoretical framework necessary for their full explanatory efficacy are often not yet in place. Secondly, as a consequence of the first, some of the auxiliary theories and assumptions they rely upon are often antiquated and erroneous. For these reasons, anomalies are frequent in scientific theories. In this thesis, I discuss some of the major scientific anomalies, including particularly, the paradox of altruism. I suggest that the paradox of altruism arises because one of the most fundamental Mendelian genetic principles is misapplied. I show that today’s explanatory models err in supposing altruism and selfishness to be genetic allelomorphs. The supposition is inconsistent with the field data on altruism, and entails a logical inconsistency in accounting for the evolution of altruism. Largely, the models that purport to resolve the paradox hinge on the conditional expression of the altruistic gene, a move which I argue contradicts the theoretical assumption that engenders the paradox in the first place. I demonstrate from the empirical data that altruism and selfishness are rather plastic phenotypic expressions of a single genotype. And by supplanting the standard neo-Darwinian assumptions with the principle of phenotypic plasticity, I provide a parsimonious account of the evolution and maintenance of altruism which entails no paradox.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

This dissertation considers the “strategic naturalism” of Sandra Harding’s standpoint theory in the philosophy of science, and it should be applied to epistemology. Strategic naturalism stipulates that all elements of inquiry are historically and culturally situated, and thereby subject to critical reflection, analysis, and revision. Allegiance to naturalism is de rigueur, yet there is no clear agreement on the term’s meaning. Harding’s standpoint theory reads the lack of definition as indicative of its generative possibilities for epistemic progress. The driving question is why Harding’s approach has not been considered a viable candidate for determining progress in epistemology. Beyond the fact that epistemic labor, in its scientific and non-scientific forms, is a social activity, Harding’s approach recognizes that it is situated in and reinforced by a broader network of social institutions, beliefs, and practices. Harding’s strategic naturalism would invigorate epistemology by increasing the awareness, acceptance, and respect for epistemic difference and drive epistemic progress that not only acknowledges pluralistic ways of knowing but also gives a more accurate account of the knowing subject. Chapter one is a discussion of non-naturalized epistemology and Quinean Naturalized Epistemology (QNE), framed by Harding’s historical account of the related projects of modern epistemology and science. This chapter highlights two important issues. The first issue is that epistemology is more complex than the story Quine offers. The second, and decisive issue is that the shared history of modern epistemology and science demonstrates the influence of social and cultural values on that history, and the long shadows they cast on naturalism debates in epistemology, science, and philosophy of science. Chapter two is an exegetical account of the origins of and motivations for critical feminist responses to both the received epistemological theory and QNE discussed in chapter one. The justifications for the feminist critiques and the problematic issues that motivate these critiques provide the backdrop for the initial, positive response to QNE, as well as their disenchantment with Quine’s influential proposal. Ultimately, feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science assess QNE as not naturalized enough to address their concerns. Chapter three considers several feminist standpoint theories to show that they are more naturalistic and better at providing a multi-faceted theory that is based on actual scientific practice, and re-introduces social values and interests as having a positive influence on epistemology and philosophies of science. This chapter shows that given the closely shared histories and assumptions of modern epistemology and science, FSE would be a viable resource for a more naturalistic epistemology. The final chapter argues that the project of naturalizing epistemology could incorporate FSE insights and the positive role FSE’s controversiality would play in naturalizing epistemology and philosophies of science. If we are to take seriously the concept of situatedness and what that entails, then naturalism must also be situated, and revisited with a critical and reflective eye. The implications on both our epistemic theories and our accounts of what kinds of knowing subject we are would foster epistemic progress.

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