In Chapter 1, I discuss the background to the problems which confront a realist account of the growth of scientific knowledge. At the beginning of Chapter 2, I explain in what sense relativism constitutes a challenge to this account. Four interconnected questions are then posed which are said to underlie the realist position. The chapter finishes with an explanation of how some of them arise in an actual case study. Chapter 3 deals with a general argument of Quine's for the view that reference is inscrutable. In reply I maintain that the argument does not hold good, either with respect to interpreting our own language or when it comes to translating an alien language. With Chapter 4, I begin to answer the four questions. I explain how Tarski's theory of truth can be seen as a correspondence theory. It is argued, however, that Tarski's theory itself presupposes theories of reference and extension, and certain recent attempts to overcome this lacuna are criticized. In the next chapter I draw an analogy between natural kind predicates, which are of particular importance in science, and proper names, and offer cluster theories of reference for both. This answers the third most basic of the four questions. These theories are defended against criticisms made by Kripke and Putnam, Chapter 6 aims to answer the second most basic question by considering in detail how we can understand what earlier scientific theories were about. I develop some arguments of Davidson's as a counter to Quine's doctrine of the indeterminacy of translation of sentences. I claim that although translation might in fact be indeterminate, Quine, through concentrating on behavioural evidence to the exclusion of other physical evidence, has failed to show that it is, and that in any case indeterminacy of sentence translation does not imply inscrutability of reference of terms. Finally, in Chapter 7, I sum up ray explication of the realist's account of the growth of science with respect to natural kind predicates. I then consider two cases of theory change of different sorts and suggest how my work might be extended.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:31:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2008-04-25Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:22:43Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 rufatto_ca_dr_bauru.pdf: 363707 bytes, checksum: b6fd24f55ae0b377afc00b5dec69a478 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / O trabalho inicia-se com a apresentação das ideias sobre a verdade nas tradições racionalista e empirista, com a posterior avaliação dessas duas tradições por Popper. Em seguida, aborda-se o problema da indução de David Hume (fundamental no debate sobre a verdade), e a solução apresentada por Popper. A concepção de ciência de Popper é explicada, com especial atenção para o caráter provisório do conhecimento científico, sua racionalidade e potencial de progresso e a importância do critério de verossimilitude. A concepção de aprendizado de Popper é apresentada a partir de suas críticas da teoria do senso comum do conhecimento, da teoria dos três mundos, da importância que ele atribuía aos problemas e de suas idéias sobre a evolução do conhecimento, tendo o evolucionismo de Darwin como modelo. É feita uma retomada dos argumentos, trabalhos e autores que pesquisaram sobre a relevância da Filosofia da Ciência para o Ensino de Ciências, procurando-se identificar pontos importantes de influência. Ao final se procura estabelecer a relevância da contribuição de Popper para o Ensino de Ciências, identificando-se os pontos fortes de sua contribuição. / This work begins with a presentation of ideas concerning truth according to rationalist and empiric traditions, with a posterior evaluation of both traditions given by Popper. Following, it dels with the problem of David Hume's induction (fundamental in the discussion concerning truth) and the solution presented by Popper. Popper's conception of science is explained, giving special attention to the temporary characteristic of scientific knowledge, its rationality and its capability of progress and the value of the criterion verisimilitude. The concept of learning conceived by Popper is presented commencing with his critical insight of the theory of commom sense of knowledge, the theory of three worlds, of the importnace he used to attribute to problems and his ideas concerning evolution of knowledge, using Darwin's evolution theory as a model. A retaken of arguments is accomplished, works and authors who conducted research about the relevance of philosophy of science for the teaching of science, attempting to identify points of influence. Finally one attempts to establish the relevance of Popper's contribution to the teaching of sciences, thus identifying the strong points of this contribution.

abstract: Do emotions help explain our behaviors? Can they condemn us, excuse us, orr mitigate our moral responsibility orr blameworthiness? Can they explain our rationality and irrationality, orr warrant such attributions? Can they be justified orr warranted? Are they constitutive aspects of our consciousness, identity, characters, virtues, orr epistemic status? The answer to these questions, at least to a significant extent, depends on what emotions are. This illustrates the importance of what emotions are to academics across multiple disciplines, as well as to members of governing bodies, organizations, communities, and groups. Given the great importance of emotions to various aspects of our lives, this dissertation is about the relevance of the topic of emotion as an area of study for the discipline of philosophy. This dissertation is also broadly about the need to bridge the interests, concerns, and collective bodies of knowledge between various distinct disciplines, thereby contributing to the process of unifying knowledge across the various disciplines within the realm of academia. The primary aim in this dissertation is to initiate the unification of the interests, concerns, and collective bodies of knowledge across disciplines of academia. To do so, however, this dissertation aims to bridge some disciplinary divides between the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. I fulfill this aim by first demonstrating that interdisciplinary research and theorizing is needed within the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. I do this by considering how the problem of skepticism arises within these two disciplines. I also derive, propose, and argue for the acceptance of a new foundation for academic research and theorizing in response to the problem of skepticism. I refer to my proposal, in general, as The Proposal for Unification without Consilience (UC). / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Philosophy 2014

abstract: Systems biology studies complex biological systems. It is an interdisciplinary field, with biologists working with non-biologists such as computer scientists, engineers, chemists, and mathematicians to address research problems applying systems’ perspectives. How these different researchers and their disciplines differently contributed to the advancement of this field over time is a question worth examining. Did systems biology become a systems-oriented science or a biology-oriented science from 1992 to 2013? This project utilized computational tools to analyze large data sets and interpreted the results from historical and philosophical perspectives. Tools deployed were derived from scientometrics, corpus linguistics, text-based analysis, network analysis, and GIS analysis to analyze more than 9000 articles (metadata and text) on systems biology. The application of these tools to a HPS project represents a novel approach. The dissertation shows that systems biology has transitioned from a more mathematical, computational, and engineering-oriented discipline focusing on modeling to a more biology-oriented discipline that uses modeling as a means to address real biological problems. Also, the results show that bioengineering and medical research has increased within systems biology. This is reflected in the increase of the centrality of biology-related concepts such as cancer, over time. The dissertation also compares the development of systems biology in China with some other parts of the world, and reveals regional differences, such as a unique trajectory of systems biology in China related to a focus on traditional Chinese medicine. This dissertation adds to the historiography of modern biology where few studies have focused on systems biology compared with the history of molecular biology and evolutionary biology. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Biology 2016

It locally contains or heaven, or hell; There’s no third place in’t. (Webster 1993) Husbandry in its original sense is a ‘being together’, based on dwelling in a particular place. There is an intricate connection between modern science and industrialised agriculture, both of which developed on the basis of particular values associated with Good Husbandry – those which focused on individual innovation, profit-related productivity, quantitative measurement, objective, ‘puritan’ truth and control of nature. Ideals of the earth as a ‘commonwealth’, and of traditional stewardship, were down-played. The writings of Francis Bacon provide an example of a positivist, pioneering attitude which has continued to underpin modern science. In retrospect, however, these ideals sound rather one-sided. Nature herself is not well represented in the modern science relationship. In this thesis, Virgil’s Georgics and Lucretius’ de rerum natura are used to derive a poetics of Being and of Husbandry, which applies not only to the world of poetry, but to events which underlie scientific research. Virgil’s use of verbs verifies that life’s activities are shared by all living things. Lucretius asserts that even inanimate atoms both exist in themselves and are creative. ‘To be’ can be visualised as a dynamic, balancing act between striving to stay in being and longing to engage creatively with another. The basis of this thesis is that a shaping of research towards good husbandry involves a fair relationship with nature, which in turn involves the acknowledgement in writing that nature is active, dynamic and a good collaborator. Husbandry defined as a continually unfolding third place between extremes or between self and other – this holistic, concentric definition – applies at all scales, all levels of experience. This work was derived from practice-led research involving the writing of poetry and therefore the findings exist in parallel as a sequence of poems.

I aim to offer an innovative interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy, first by examining how the various views that make up his ontology of individual substance involve a persistent rejection of atomism in natural philosophy and secondly, by exploring the significance of this rejection in the larger context of Seventeenth-century physics. My thesis is structured as a developmental story, each chapter analyzing the discontinuities or changes Leibniz makes to his views on individuation and atomism from his early to late years. The goal is to illuminate underrepresented views on individuals and atoms throughout Leibniz’s works and thus bring a clearer understanding of his philosophy. I, therefore, argue that the New System of Nature, published towards the end of Leibniz’s middle period (1695), marks an important landmark in his philosophical evolution, a radical terminological and ontological shift in his metaphysics of substance. Once Leibniz elaborates the concept of “simple substance,” the future synonym of “monad,” the problem of individuation of his early and middle years (1663-1686) becomes secondary. The focus changes from what makes substances “individual” to what makes them “simple” and truly “one,” i.e., “metaphysical” atoms. I prove that this shift was marked by a two-tiered critical confrontation: a first, direct confrontation, 1) with Descartes’ physics, through the critique of the notion of extended matter and of Descartes’ principle of individuation through shared motion and, a second confrontation, 2) with different strands of Seventeenth-century atomism, including Cartesian Gérauld de Cordemoy’s quasi-“metaphysical” atomism and its attempt at improving Descartes’ individuating principle. I claim that this double confrontation ultimately led Leibniz to formulate a more fundamental ontology, in terms of the “metaphysical atomism” of his Monadology (1714). My analysis complicates a persistent scholarly assumption in recent Leibniz studies, claiming that, throughout his entire career, Leibniz continued to hold the same fundamental positions on substance, individuation and, implicitly, atoms. Against this type of general continuity thesis, I show that: 1) far from being a constant concern, Leibniz’s interest in what makes substances individual fades towards the end of his life (New Essays 1703, correspondence with Samuel Clarke, 1714); 2) I trace the changing fate of some of Leibniz’s early and middle period views on substance and the individual (the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, space-time as individuating properties) in his late works; and 3) I prove the claim that Leibniz really embraced atomism, either for a short time or all throughout his philosophy is problematic. While he does refer to some sort of atoms during his Paris period (1672-1676), this is insufficient proof of a commitment to atomism. Instead, the episode has to be understood in the broader framework of a bundle of interrelated issues, such as the problem of the cohesion of bodies and the problem of minds or mind-like principles individuating those bodies. Thus, as I show through an analysis of Leibniz’s arguments against atomism in the correspondences with his scientific contemporaries (Christiaan Huyghens 1692-1695, Nicholas Hartsoeker 1706-1714), rejecting physical atomism remains a fundamental and surprisingly constant point of his philosophy.

This thesis is a response to the increasingly widespread belief in the potential for technology and modern science to enable finite subjects to overcome the essential limitations constitutive of finitude and, hence, subjectivity. It investigates the truth and extent of such claims, taking as its focus quasi-miraculous technological developments in neuroscience, in particular Brain-Computer Interfacing systems and cognitive imaging technologies. The work poses the question of whether such emergent neurotechnologies signal a profound shift beyond receptivity and finitude by effectively bridging the gap between interiority and exteriority. Organised around a quadripartite division, the thesis pursues this idea firstly with regard to the act of artistic creation; secondly through an exegesis of Kant’s account of the original or infinite creativity of the Supreme Being; thirdly through readings of Freud and Jung and their respective models of the psyche; and finally through an interrogation into the possibility of telepathy and the various ways in which it can be conceived. Each chapter thus takes place as an extended thought experiment, exploring the consequences of a seemingly unprecedented proposition that promises to eradicate the finite gap between internal and external. This is followed to the limits of conceivability before asking in each case whether we may in fact need to rethink the very premises around which each proposition has framed the problem.

Media psychology involves the scientific examination of the cognitive processes and behavior involved in the selection, use, interpretation, and effects of communication across a variety of media (e.g., via the Internet, television, telephone, film). Media are central to people's lives, with projections indicating that an average person spent over 3,515 hours using media in 2012. New technologies are increasing the importance of media. Data from two content analyses demonstrate the underrepresentation of media psychology in mainstream psychological literature and in undergraduate and graduate psychology course offerings. We argue for the importance of a psychological approach to the study of media because of its presence in people's lives and because psychologists use it in their research and their choices may affect the external validity of their findings. We provide a useful framework from which psychologists can approach the study of media, and we conclude with recommendations for further areas of scientific inquiry relevant to psychological science.

Purpose: This article provides an empirical identification of groups of marketing scholars who share common beliefs about the role of science and the logic of scientific discovery. Design: We use Topology Representing Network quantization to empirically identify classes of marketing researchers within a representative sample of marketing professors. Findings: We find six distinct classes of marketing scholars. They differ with regard to popularity (size) and productivity (levels of publication output). Comparing the sub-samples of German-speaking and US respondents shows cross-cultural differences. Value: The study enhances our understanding of the current scientific orientation(s) of marketing. It may help to motivate marketing scholars to ponder on their own positions and assist them in judging where they may belong. Future comparisons over time would give us indication about the future of the academic discipline of marketing.(author's abstract)

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