Financial literacy is commonly defined as the knowledge, skills, and ability to navigate the increasingly complex financial markets, and is considered to empower consumers to make responsible financial decisions. Financial literacy is increasingly promoted as a crucial life skill in the aftermath of global financial crisis by numerous global initiatives and became part and parcel of national strategies of financial inclusion. By utilizing theoretical insights from Michel Foucault’s late work on governmentality, this dissertation analyzes financial literacy education initiatives in Turkey with ethnographic research. Cultural political economy perspective articulated in this dissertation underlines the importance of theorizing the financialized capital accumulation dynamics together with the reshaping of culture and the constitution of financialized subjectivities. It is argued that financial literacy is a “technique of the self” seeking to govern the everyday conduct of subjects in line with the long-term interests of financial capital. Financial literacy curricula provide not only the basic knowledge of finance but also instruct subjects ways to conduct oneself on financial planning, budgeting, debt management, creditworthiness, saving and investment. Financial literacy agenda deepens neo-liberal governmentality with the promotion of entrepreneurial subjectivity and responsibilization of individuals for social risks such as unemployment, economic downturn, and pensions. By problematizing the constitution of financially literate subjectivity and providing an everyday and cultural perspective on financialization, this dissertation contributes to the discipline of International Political Economy. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

“Payments for ecosystem services” (PES) represents a new form of environmental governance rooted in the logics of capitalist economics. As such, PES frequently produces new conceptions and material forms of nature that embody the principles of neoliberal ideology. This thesis explores the processes by which these policies have been deployed and taken root in Costa Rica, one of the foremost sites of financialized conservation worldwide. It provides a historical account of policy formation and the neoliberalization of Costa Rican nature. I situate this analysis in a critique of capitalist logic, explaining the particular type of neoliberalization that emerges as a consequence of capital's own internal contradictions. I place particular emphasis on ideological inconsistencies in the deployment of neoliberal ideals while highlighting the justice implications that inevitably still emerge. I do so by adopting a critical political-ecology perspective that sees questions of environmental management as fundamental questions of social and environmental justice – how are conservation mechanisms designed, by whom, for what purposes, and to whose ultimate benefit? Specifically, I consider three aspects of neoliberalization in Costa Rica's national Pagos por Servicios Ambientales (PSA) program: the design of a new market-like financing mechanism; the promotion of individualized contracting and participation; and the expansion of exclusionary land management practices. I show that these actions produce the conditions for uneven development, facilitate the consolidation of control over resources, and enable the accumulation of benefits among larger, wealthier landowners. I further explore conceptual understandings of neoliberalism (as ideology or process) and address the growing concern in the critical literature with ways that policy deviates from doctrine. I explain that such an emphasis on ideologically divergent practice distracts from the material and justice effects of encroaching neoliberalization, which invariably operates in partial and unfinished ways. Finally, I revisit the role of the internal contradictions of capital in producing the patterns of governance that constitute this era of neoliberal environmentalism.

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While nationalism remains a vital element in the production of the political and economic landscape, it is often treated as a static container for other processes or neglected altogether. Rather, it must itself be treated as a process--a nationalizing project--emerging from a constellation of often contradictory social forces. One such process of nationalization is the development of large-scale transportation infrastructure, such as railroads. These projects produce both new spheres of circulation and new understandings critical to navigating these novel environments, which together radically transform the relation between people, government, and territory. In early twentieth century China, the complicated contest over railroad rights produced and was produced by a fractured political economic geography. Understandings of both identity and space remained fragmented, cohering only partially into a singular entity, thus demonstrating the intimate interrelation between state power, political identity, and territories both real and imagined.

This study examined the relationship between CARICOM governments and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The study focused on three research questions: (1) What do the CARICOM leadership and other stakeholders believe are the major reasons why they continue to rely on the financial assistance and intervention of the IMF? (2) Under which paradigm of development do these leaders and stake holders perceive their relationships with the IMF? (3) How do younger and older CARICOM citizens perceive the future growth of their countries, under the leadership of the IMF? Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used in this study to analyze the research questions; therefore, this study used a mixed-methods design. Research question one was analyzed using a qualitative design, while the second and third research questions used a quantitative analysis in the form of descriptive statistics. The analysis, which was limited to six interviews, contained 13 questions. Thematic analysis explored themes such as unique crafting of policies to meet challenges; rationale to undergo IMF programs; ability to meet domestic and international payment obligations; and most applicable economic paradigm to CARICOM. This study also examined the economic paradigms undergirding CARICOM leaders’ decision to use the International Monetary Fund in addressing the socioeconomic and political development issue of the region. The sample consisted of 49 participants. The study concluded that the IMF policies are uniquely crafted to suit the specific CARICOM countries’ needs. These countries tend to invite the IMF interventions out of a sheer necessity and often are reluctant to do so. Yet, doing so provides access to additional funding and other resources that would likely have been otherwise unavailable. While the intent of the IMF programs is to eliminate the inefficient use of resources in these states, sometimes government spending can be impacted by its political nature and yield unintended consequences.

Rapid economic growth in emerging economies since the end of the Cold War has driven debate on American 'relative decline'; the relative diminution of US material capabilities with respect to other states. Such relative decline poses potential constraints on US power and has thus manifested itself in arguments over the economic merits of the United States' expansive military commitments. Contributing to this literature, my thesis answers the following question: does American military strategy generate economic benefits? I argue that that there is significant evidence to suggest that US military strategy has influenced international economic relationships in ways beneficial to US national interests. Principally, my analysis shows American military strategy acts as a 'underwriter' for the extant international economic system. I explore two logics associated with this. Firstly, a general 'status quo' logic which sees military power as both a guarantor and promoter of specific structural configurations of the international political economy. And secondly, a more specific 'utility' logic operating on other states either bilaterally or multilaterally. This pathway assumes that US military strategy, particularly its security guarantees, may alter the utility of other states decisions in America's favour. This thesis also shows that specific results often prove far more tentative and circumstantial than commonly articulated by scholars in the literature. Nearly all specific and 'utility' pathways through which the United States is hypothesized to derive economic benefit suffer from foundational generalisability issues, irrespective of methodology. This suggests that specific avenues and instances of US military strategy influencing international economic relationships are not likely to be a reliable or prudent source of future policy making. Rather, the principal political-economic influence to consider is the role US military power plays in underwriting the contemporary American centred international order, which is the prerequisite for other specific pathways to emerge.

<p>This thesis consists of three papers in dynamic political economy:</p><p>"Ideology and the Determination of Public Policy Over Time" investigates how public policy responds to persistent ideological shocks in dynamic politico-economic equilibrium. We develop a tractable model to analyse the dynamic interactions among ideology, public policy and individuals' intertemporal choice. Analytical solutions are obtained to characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium. Our main finding is that the relationship between ideology and the size of government turns out to be non-monotonic. In particular, a right-leaning ideological wave may lead to higher taxation, which makes the size of government much less distinctive under different political regimes. Incorporating ideological uncertainty per se has its theoretical relevance. Sufficient ideological uncertainty helps pin down a unique equilibrium. This is in contrast with recent works on dynamic political economy which feature multiple equilibria and have no sharp empirical predictions.</p><p>"Dynamic Inequality and Social Security" analyses the dynamic politico-economic equilibrium of a model where the repeated voting on social security and the evolution of household characteristics are mutually affected over time. Political decision-making is represented by probabilistic voting a la Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). We analytically characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium. The equilibrium social security tax rate are shown to be increasing in wealth inequality. The dynamic interaction between inequality and social security leads to growing social security programmes. The predictions of our model are broadly consistent with empirical evidence. We also perform some normative analysis, showing that the politico-economic mechanism tends to induce too large social security transfers in the long run.</p><p>"A Markovian Social Contract of Social Security" analyses the sustainability and evolution of the pay-as-you-go social security system in a majority voting framework with intra-cohort heterogeneity. We find that there exists a Markovian social contract through which the self-interested middle-aged median voter has incentives to support the system. This is in contrast with the approaches in the existing literature, which either resorts to the imperfect temporal separation of contributions and benefits, or builds the expectation of future social security benefits on variables that are payoff-irrelevant for future policymakers. Correspondingly, our model has a number of distinctive empirical implications. First, the social security tax rate converges along an increasing path to the steady state. Second, the growth of social security is negatively correlated with income inequality. Third, the impact of income inequality on the equilibrium social contract induces a non-monotonic relationship between income inequality and social security. These predictions are broadly consistent with the data from the OECD countries.</p>

This thesis consists of three papers in dynamic political economy: "Ideology and the Determination of Public Policy Over Time" investigates how public policy responds to persistent ideological shocks in dynamic politico-economic equilibrium. We develop a tractable model to analyse the dynamic interactions among ideology, public policy and individuals' intertemporal choice. Analytical solutions are obtained to characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium. Our main finding is that the relationship between ideology and the size of government turns out to be non-monotonic. In particular, a right-leaning ideological wave may lead to higher taxation, which makes the size of government much less distinctive under different political regimes. Incorporating ideological uncertainty per se has its theoretical relevance. Sufficient ideological uncertainty helps pin down a unique equilibrium. This is in contrast with recent works on dynamic political economy which feature multiple equilibria and have no sharp empirical predictions. "Dynamic Inequality and Social Security" analyses the dynamic politico-economic equilibrium of a model where the repeated voting on social security and the evolution of household characteristics are mutually affected over time. Political decision-making is represented by probabilistic voting a la Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). We analytically characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium. The equilibrium social security tax rate are shown to be increasing in wealth inequality. The dynamic interaction between inequality and social security leads to growing social security programmes. The predictions of our model are broadly consistent with empirical evidence. We also perform some normative analysis, showing that the politico-economic mechanism tends to induce too large social security transfers in the long run. "A Markovian Social Contract of Social Security" analyses the sustainability and evolution of the pay-as-you-go social security system in a majority voting framework with intra-cohort heterogeneity. We find that there exists a Markovian social contract through which the self-interested middle-aged median voter has incentives to support the system. This is in contrast with the approaches in the existing literature, which either resorts to the imperfect temporal separation of contributions and benefits, or builds the expectation of future social security benefits on variables that are payoff-irrelevant for future policymakers. Correspondingly, our model has a number of distinctive empirical implications. First, the social security tax rate converges along an increasing path to the steady state. Second, the growth of social security is negatively correlated with income inequality. Third, the impact of income inequality on the equilibrium social contract induces a non-monotonic relationship between income inequality and social security. These predictions are broadly consistent with the data from the OECD countries.