The Principles of Private Law In my thesis I occupied myself mainly with representative principles that master private law and that should lead to the implementation of the idea of justice as an ultimate goal of a legal set of rules in general. Despite of Sisyphean character of this task and impossibility of reaching it, there is nothing that can discourage from trying it again and again. I would like to admit that this attempt was at least ambitious and meaningful. Inability of perfect recognition "an sich" turns attention into extralegal sources of information, such as ethics, political sciences, sociology, economy and the head of all sciences - philosophy. This thesis also reflects intuitive approach to the principles of private law as a result of dependency on my personal preferences and cited sources and their authors (which also reflects my own disposition). The main issue was a function of the principles of private law in the normative set of rules. These principles make an important place in the normative set of rules as they form its limits. We can hardly imagine its "commission" without such principles of private law. They protect the integrity and the compactness, because Czech private law is nowadays extremely heterogeneous complex of rules. According to the restriction mentioned in the...

Digitalisation and convergence continue to transform the ways in which audio-visual content is supplied and consumed. This thesis examines the implications for the legacy regulatory frameworks of the analogue era. It explores the relationship between the prevailing approach to concurrent regulation under sector-specific legislation and general competition law, and the competitive conditions for the supply of premium pay-TV in the UK and Australia. Theories of harm for the assessment of market power relating to horizontal concentration of ownership, exclusive rights and refusal to supply, are also reviewed. Whilst acknowledging an enduring role for sector-specific regulation, the thesis advocates an increasing residual role for the enforcement of general competition law. This is supported by the reinforcing effects of digitalisation and convergence upon the network industry aspect of pay-TV and the multi-sided platform characteristics of pay-TV providers. The thesis identifies the need for greater emphasis on the dynamic aspect of competition in the premium pay-TV context. This calls for a broader conceptualisation of competition which critically reflects the growth of online streaming, the global phenomenon around premium drama and the rise of multi-media firms in a global communications sector. These findings are significant and timely because failure to employ a sufficiently broad concept of effective competition may perversely deter competitive conduct and unduly impede the investment incentives that are critical to premium pay-TV. It may also produce outcomes that are ostensibly inconsistent with the normative basis for sector-specific regulation. The thesis suggests reform at the interface between sector-specific legislation and general competition law, and refinement of the principles of competition law in their application to premium pay-TV. In doing so, it proposes a model of regulation which aims to more effectively balance the shared interest of viewers, as consumers and citizens, in the future development of pay-TV and the wider communications sector.

<p>Skuldsaneringslagen trädde i kraft 1994 och innebär att överskuldsatta personer kan få en chans att bli skuldfria. Detta genom att under en begränsad tid leva på existensminimum och under denna tid avbetala så mycket som möjligt på sina skulder. Den bakomliggande orsaken till Skuldsaneringslagen var att efter 1980-talet hade de svenska hushållen ökat sin belåning avsevärt och fastighetskraschen i början av 1990-talet hade försatt många i en ekonomisk hopplös situation.</p><p>För att avgöra vilka som ska beviljas skuldsanering ställer lagstiftaren vissa krav på vilken typ av skulder och under vilka förutsättningar som en gäldenär kan beviljas skuldsanering, dessa krav återfinns i 4 § Skuldsaneringslagen. Vad dessa krav innebär kan inte utläsas direkt ur lagtexten, utan en studie av förarbeten och praxis måste ske.</p><p>Skuldsaneringslagen har nu funnit i 12 år och en mängd fall har varit upp till prövning i domstol och där har den huvudsakliga frågan varit om de krav som uppställs i 4 § har uppfyllts eller inte. Under denna tid har även Skuldsaneringslagen varit föremål för ett flertal statliga utredningar och dessa har utmynnat i ett förslag till en ny skuldsaneringslag. Den kritik som framkommit i utredningarna av Skuldsaneringslagen har i huvudsak bestått i att förfarandet är tidsödande och oflexibelt. Den nya lagen syftar till att göra skuldsanering enklare och snabbare än vad det är idag.</p><p>Denna uppsats ämnar att utreda vad de krav som uppställs i Skuldsaneringslagen innebär från lagstiftarens sida och hur kraven har behandlats i praxis. Även de huvudsakliga förslagen till den nya Skuldsaneringslagen kommer att granskas.</p>

<p>Uppsatsen handlar om återvinning i konkurs vilket regleras i 4 kapitlet konkurslagen. Uppsatsen är främst inriktad på den generella återvinningsregeln i 4 kap. 5 § KL och återvinning av betalning i 4 kap. 10 § KL. I 4 kap. 10 § KL finns tre rekvisit för när en återvinning av betalning kan ske och det är om betalningen skett i förtid, om betalningen skett med osedvanliga betalningsmedel eller om betalningen avsevärt försämrat gäldenärend ekonomiska ställning. Det finns dock en möjlighet att undgå återvinning och det är om betalningen är att anse som ordinär. Frågan om återvinning har de senaste fem åren inte varit uppe till bedömning i avsevärt många fall, men det går att konstatera att rättstillämpningen gärna beviljar återvinning och det tror jag beror på det preventiva syfte återvinningsreglerna har.</p>

Skuldsaneringslagen trädde i kraft 1994 och innebär att överskuldsatta personer kan få en chans att bli skuldfria. Detta genom att under en begränsad tid leva på existensminimum och under denna tid avbetala så mycket som möjligt på sina skulder. Den bakomliggande orsaken till Skuldsaneringslagen var att efter 1980-talet hade de svenska hushållen ökat sin belåning avsevärt och fastighetskraschen i början av 1990-talet hade försatt många i en ekonomisk hopplös situation. För att avgöra vilka som ska beviljas skuldsanering ställer lagstiftaren vissa krav på vilken typ av skulder och under vilka förutsättningar som en gäldenär kan beviljas skuldsanering, dessa krav återfinns i 4 § Skuldsaneringslagen. Vad dessa krav innebär kan inte utläsas direkt ur lagtexten, utan en studie av förarbeten och praxis måste ske. Skuldsaneringslagen har nu funnit i 12 år och en mängd fall har varit upp till prövning i domstol och där har den huvudsakliga frågan varit om de krav som uppställs i 4 § har uppfyllts eller inte. Under denna tid har även Skuldsaneringslagen varit föremål för ett flertal statliga utredningar och dessa har utmynnat i ett förslag till en ny skuldsaneringslag. Den kritik som framkommit i utredningarna av Skuldsaneringslagen har i huvudsak bestått i att förfarandet är tidsödande och oflexibelt. Den nya lagen syftar till att göra skuldsanering enklare och snabbare än vad det är idag. Denna uppsats ämnar att utreda vad de krav som uppställs i Skuldsaneringslagen innebär från lagstiftarens sida och hur kraven har behandlats i praxis. Även de huvudsakliga förslagen till den nya Skuldsaneringslagen kommer att granskas.

Uppsatsen handlar om återvinning i konkurs vilket regleras i 4 kapitlet konkurslagen. Uppsatsen är främst inriktad på den generella återvinningsregeln i 4 kap. 5 § KL och återvinning av betalning i 4 kap. 10 § KL. I 4 kap. 10 § KL finns tre rekvisit för när en återvinning av betalning kan ske och det är om betalningen skett i förtid, om betalningen skett med osedvanliga betalningsmedel eller om betalningen avsevärt försämrat gäldenärend ekonomiska ställning. Det finns dock en möjlighet att undgå återvinning och det är om betalningen är att anse som ordinär. Frågan om återvinning har de senaste fem åren inte varit uppe till bedömning i avsevärt många fall, men det går att konstatera att rättstillämpningen gärna beviljar återvinning och det tror jag beror på det preventiva syfte återvinningsreglerna har.

The meaning of the covert co-ownership is that the parties must have intended that the property should be their common. A party must, to be able to claim ownership, have con-tributed to the acquisition financing through the financial contribution. Further shall the fact that the property should be their common be agreed or have been assumed by the par-ties. There are the circumstances for the purchase that should be considered in determining if covert co-ownership is presumed. Covert co-ownership has been established although one party only contributed a small part to the acquisition. The party with a possible loan is also considered to have acquired the property, although the party who claims to be the hidden owner is the one who pays the loan. If one of the parties has received a soft loan or a preferential price, the difference seems to be viewed as a financial contribution, which al-so applies to work on the property. The requirements for covert co-ownership of property is the same at cohabitation compared with marriage and case law in the area ends in the same result, so there is no difference for the two forms of relationship. Although the par-ties have established cohabitation agreement or marriage contract for a property have co-vert co-ownership still been considered to exist. The perception is not in that clear condi-tion which had to be expected in the current situation. The fact that case law does not al-ways reach the same result also shows that there are no clear conditions to follow for when the covert co-ownership shall be deemed to be achieved, despite the requirements estab-lished.

The fundamental question of private law’s remedies is how do subsequent remedial actions rationally address prior failures. This question can be approached either intrinsically or extrinsically. While the former justifies and explains the remedial action from within the original plaintiff-defendant relationship, the latter welcomes external principles and goals. The arguments of this thesis fit within an intrinsic approach to private law’s remedies. To this end, several arguments are levied against the extrinsic perspective, and, in particular, its confidence in the separation of rights and remedies. For positive inspiration, it looks to two leading intrinsic theoretical accounts—those of Ernest Weinrib and John Gardner, respectively—with an eye to revealing what, if any, meaningful differences there are between the two. Using the language and logic of practical reasons and reasoning, this dissertation suggests that remedies can be understood in one of two ways. First, the remedy is just the same as the original reason. If I fail to pay my debt on the date it is due, my subsequent remedial action in paying it later is carried out because of the original reason, namely, that I owe a debt to someone. Second, the remedy is a reflection of certain second-order reasons that are part of the original (operative) reason. These are reasons not to act for certain other reasons that counsel against the performance of the first-order reason to do the obligatory action. These reasons stick around and tell you to do something; that doing nothing is not optional. If I break your toe, I can no longer satisfy the original reason not to break your toe; however, I can and must do something to address my initial failure. The content of this reparative action is constrained by the original reason not to break your toe. While its first-order strength is no longer available—one can no longer act for the reason it recommends—it can nonetheless provide guidance with respect to what the next-best thing might be.

The fundamental question of private law’s remedies is how do subsequent remedial actions rationally address prior failures. This question can be approached either intrinsically or extrinsically. While the former justifies and explains the remedial action from within the original plaintiff-defendant relationship, the latter welcomes external principles and goals. The arguments of this thesis fit within an intrinsic approach to private law’s remedies. To this end, several arguments are levied against the extrinsic perspective, and, in particular, its confidence in the separation of rights and remedies. For positive inspiration, it looks to two leading intrinsic theoretical accounts—those of Ernest Weinrib and John Gardner, respectively—with an eye to revealing what, if any, meaningful differences there are between the two. Using the language and logic of practical reasons and reasoning, this dissertation suggests that remedies can be understood in one of two ways. First, the remedy is just the same as the original reason. If I fail to pay my debt on the date it is due, my subsequent remedial action in paying it later is carried out because of the original reason, namely, that I owe a debt to someone. Second, the remedy is a reflection of certain second-order reasons that are part of the original (operative) reason. These are reasons not to act for certain other reasons that counsel against the performance of the first-order reason to do the obligatory action. These reasons stick around and tell you to do something; that doing nothing is not optional. If I break your toe, I can no longer satisfy the original reason not to break your toe; however, I can and must do something to address my initial failure. The content of this reparative action is constrained by the original reason not to break your toe. While its first-order strength is no longer available—one can no longer act for the reason it recommends—it can nonetheless provide guidance with respect to what the next-best thing might be.

This thesis seeks to provide a deeper understanding of the Scots law of fraud. Adopting a method that is both historical and doctrinal, it provides a critical analysis of the current understanding of fraud and argues for an approach that is more consistent with Scotland’s legal history which, in turn, was profoundly influenced by a much older tradition of European legal thought. It begins by exploring the historical scope of fraud in both a criminal and civil context with specific focus on questions of definition and the extent to which “fraud” was used in the broader sense of activities not involving deceit. A detailed analysis is given of the widespread concept of presumptive fraud by means of which Scots law was able to provide a remedy for unfair or unwarrantable behaviour without any requirement for a deceitful intention and for misstatements made unintentionally. The argument is made that presumptive fraud was a mechanism for delivering substantive justice and that its conceptual roots lie in an Aristotelian understanding of justice as equality. A comparison is made between the scholastic doctrine of restitution, which was developed by Thomas Aquinas as the outworking of the Aristotelian virtue of justice, and the scheme of Scots law created in the Institutions of the Law of Scotland by Viscount Stair (1619-1695), who is said to be the founding father of Scots law. It is suggested that the religious and philosophical conditions which existed in seventeenth century Scotland were particularly fertile soil for scholastic legal ideas which conceptualised law within a moral and religious framework. The second half of the thesis undertakes a doctrinal analysis of fraud in three parts. First, the complex relationship between fraud, error and misrepresentation is examined and the case is made that misrepresentation, whether intentional or unintentional, sits more comfortably in the law of fraud than in the law of error. Secondly, modern legal literature is critically assessed and the dominant modern narrative – that error induced by misrepresentation is a native concept in Scots law – is questioned. Thirdly, a new taxonomy of fraud is proposed which distinguishes between primary and secondary fraud. The operation of secondary fraud (which amounts to “participation” in the primary fraud of another and therefore involves three-party situations) is explored through the application of two familiar legal maxims: the “fraud” principle (that no one should be enriched through the fraud of another) and the good faith purchaser for value. In the context of secondary fraud, it is argued that the criteria for its operation - mala fides and a gratuitous transaction - are both core components of the older concept of presumptive fraud. The thesis comes full circle as it is suggested that while the broader equitable definition of fraud, rooted in equality, may have disappeared in the context of primary fraud, secondary fraud retains it.