I EU råder det idag en tänkt etableringsfrihet för företag inom gemenskapen. EUD har genom ett antal avgörande domar gett en bild av hur tolkningen av den stadgade etableringsfriheten ska ske. På grund av etableringsfriheten och EUDs praxis genom åren har möjligheter kommit upp för medlemsstater att konkurrera med varandra för att erhålla den bästa lagstiftningen för bolag att starta upp sin verksamhet i. Vissa förespråkare anser att möjligheten till regelkonkurrens riskerar att försämra medlemsstaternas bolagsregler ur ett arbetstagarperspektiv då medlemsstaterna i framtiden kommer att utforma lagar som är förmånliga för bolagen men med ett sämre skydd för arbetstagare, ett såkallat race to the bottom. Andra menar att regelkonkurrens tvärt om stärker den inre europeiska marknaden då medlemsstaterna aktivt strävar efter att utforma de bästa lagarna ur allas perspektiv och att en sådan konkurrens behövs inom gemenskapen för att aktivt lyfta och utveckla kvalitén på medlemsstaternas bolagsregler, ett såkallat race to the top. Inom EU diskuteras idag förslag till ett gemensamt privat europeiskt aktiebolag (SPE-bolag) som ska gälla inom hela EU och där bolagsreglerna är desamma i alla medlemsstater. Gemensam harmonisering bland medlemsstaterna kan tänkas motverka en negativ utveckling av regelkonkurrensen (race to the bottom med försämrat arbetstagarskydd som följd) men kan även medföra att den goda utvecklingen som kan ske genom fri regelkonkurrens mellan nationella bolagsregler stannar upp bland medlemsstaterna. Vad gäller SPE-bolaget så motverkar inte det möjligheten för negativ regelkonkurrens mellan medlemsstaterna ur ett arbetstagarskyddsperspektiv utan snarare öppnar upp för mer negativ regelkonkurrens. En möjlighet till god regelkonkurrens bland medlemsstaterna utan att konsekvenserna av att ett race to the bottom skulle uppstå är att den europeiske lagstiftaren utfärdar en gemensam arbetstagarskyddslagstiftning vilket alla medlemsstater måste följa. En sådan lagstiftning skulle reglera alla väsentliga arbetsrättsområden som skulle kunna förbises om en negativ regelkonkurrens skulle utvecklas mellan medlemsstaterna. Därefter skulle det råda en fri regelkonkurrens. En sådan lösning skulle ta de bra delarna ur regelkonkurrens samtidigt som de negativa delarna förhindrades.

<p>I EU råder det idag en tänkt etableringsfrihet för företag inom gemenskapen. EUD har genom ett antal avgörande domar gett en bild av hur tolkningen av den stadgade etableringsfriheten ska ske. På grund av etableringsfriheten och EUDs praxis genom åren har möjligheter kommit upp för medlemsstater att konkurrera med varandra för att erhålla den bästa lagstiftningen för bolag att starta upp sin verksamhet i.</p><p>Vissa förespråkare anser att möjligheten till regelkonkurrens riskerar att försämra medlemsstaternas bolagsregler ur ett arbetstagarperspektiv då medlemsstaterna i framtiden kommer att utforma lagar som är förmånliga för bolagen men med ett sämre skydd för arbetstagare, ett såkallat <em>race to the bottom</em>. Andra menar att regelkonkurrens tvärt om stärker den inre europeiska marknaden då medlemsstaterna aktivt strävar efter att utforma de bästa lagarna ur allas perspektiv och att en sådan konkurrens behövs inom gemenskapen för att aktivt lyfta och utveckla kvalitén på medlemsstaternas bolagsregler, ett såkallat <em>race to the top.</em></p><p>Inom EU diskuteras idag förslag till ett gemensamt privat europeiskt aktiebolag (SPE-bolag) som ska gälla inom hela EU och där bolagsreglerna är desamma i alla medlemsstater. Gemensam harmonisering bland medlemsstaterna kan tänkas motverka en negativ utveckling av regelkonkurrensen (<em>race to the bottom</em> med försämrat arbetstagarskydd som följd) men kan även medföra att den goda utvecklingen som kan ske genom fri regelkonkurrens mellan nationella bolagsregler stannar upp bland medlemsstaterna. Vad gäller SPE-bolaget så motverkar inte det möjligheten för negativ regelkonkurrens mellan medlemsstaterna ur ett arbetstagarskyddsperspektiv utan snarare öppnar upp för mer negativ regelkonkurrens.</p><p>En möjlighet till god regelkonkurrens bland medlemsstaterna utan att konsekvenserna av att ett <em>race to the bottom</em> skulle uppstå är att den europeiske lagstiftaren utfärdar en gemensam arbetstagarskyddslagstiftning vilket alla medlemsstater måste följa. En sådan lagstiftning skulle reglera alla väsentliga arbetsrättsområden som skulle kunna förbises om en negativ regelkonkurrens skulle utvecklas mellan medlemsstaterna. Därefter skulle det råda en fri regelkonkurrens. En sådan lösning skulle ta de bra delarna ur regelkonkurrens samtidigt som de negativa delarna förhindrades.</p>

[pt] O trabalho analisa a fragilidade dos mecanismos de accountability apresentados pelo Novo Banco de Desenvolvimento (NDB) em seu Ordenamento Socioambiental, Environmental and Social Framework (ESF), principalmente no que tange o acesso à informação e a participação da sociedade civil. Essa falta de accountability é um dos potenciais problemas advindos do modelo de sistemas nacionais avançados pelo ESF. A ausência no ESF de um mecanismo robusto que garanta a transparência e o controle socioambiental dos projetos da instituição, unido com a promoção do uso dos sistemas nacionais, pode dificultar a participação de membros da sociedade civil organizada e de comunidades potencialmente afetadas de importantes partes do processo. Após uma análise dos mecanismos de accountability no ESF do Banco Mundial, o trabalho argumenta que ocorreria um race to the bottom dos padrões de proteção socioambientais de ambos Banco Mundial e NDB, devido a uma competição no setor de financiamento para o desenvolvimento. / [en] This paper analyzes the fragility of the accountability mechanisms in the Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) of the New Development Bank (NDB). Two accountability elements were highlighted: access to information and civil society participation.t is argued in the paper that one potential problem derived from the use of the country systems, supported by the ESF, is an absence of oversight. The lack of a robust accountability mechanism, which guarantees transparency and strong environmental and social protection in the NDB s projects, coupled with the use of country systems, may hamper the participation of affected peoples during the entire process. After a comparative analysis of the World Bank s ESF, it is suggested that a development financing competition of sorts might be occurring, leading towards a race to the bottom in the environmental and social protection standards in both the World Bank and the NDB.

The passage of PRWORA in 1996 gave states the opportunity to engage in secondorder devolution (SOD), which allows local governments to exercise more discretionary power in the implementation of welfare policies. Currently 14 states have engaged in significant SOD, with a number of other states practicing SOD to a lesser degree. Given this trend in TANF administration, it is important to explore if and how SOD affects the implementation of TANF work sanctions and work-related policies. Opponents of welfare decentralization insist SOD may lead to a ‘race to the bottom’ in welfare generosity to avoid the immigration of the poor, the loss of business revenue, and financial burden due to fiscal relationship, while proponents of welfare decentralization insist that local governments better understand the needs of the poor and are therefore better able to provide more appropriate services to their welfare clients, thus improving program performance. Existing scholarship on SOD under TANF has focused on the increase in discretion to local government, and how this may enhance variation in policy outcomes or contribute to policy success or stringency across local jurisdictions (Cho et al. 2005 ; Fording, Soss and Schram 2007). However, these studies are limited by the fact that they examine a single state. To date there has been no systematic analysis of the impact of administrative structure on the implementation of welfare policy which compares centralized states with SOD states. In this dissertation, I conduct an analysis of the effects of SOD across the states by exploring how differences in administrative structure due to SOD affect different implementation outcomes. First, I examine the impact of SOD on the implementation of TANF work sanctions, using individual-level administrative data combined with county level data. Second, I examine the impact of SOD on TANF work sanctions, caseload decline, and several work-related TANF outcomes with state-level data. Multilevel analysis and OLS with panel corrected errors are applied for the analyses. Specifically, I test the conventional wisdom that success and punitiveness in policy implementation is enhanced in second-order devolution states, compared to centralized states, due to increased discretion granted to local governments in SOD states.

Submitted by Maurício Muniz (mauriciopmuniz@gmail.com) on 2018-08-13T21:23:13Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação MPE Maurício Muniz_vbiblio.pdf: 1473567 bytes, checksum: 03f51f4efb0f4f2c255d29536d74933b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Thais Oliveira (thais.oliveira@fgv.br) on 2018-08-14T15:42:28Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação MPE Maurício Muniz_vbiblio.pdf: 1473567 bytes, checksum: 03f51f4efb0f4f2c255d29536d74933b (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzane Guimarães (suzane.guimaraes@fgv.br) on 2018-08-14T17:19:28Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação MPE Maurício Muniz_vbiblio.pdf: 1473567 bytes, checksum: 03f51f4efb0f4f2c255d29536d74933b (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-14T17:19:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação MPE Maurício Muniz_vbiblio.pdf: 1473567 bytes, checksum: 03f51f4efb0f4f2c255d29536d74933b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-07-04 / A definição das instâncias governamentais adequadas para a gestão de diferentes recursos e políticas públicas é tema de extensa e histórica discussão. Partindo do princípio de que a população de um país disfruta e exerce livre movimento no seu território, podendo migrar e se estabelecer em novas localidades, argumenta-se que, de acordo com as especificidades de cada política ou o nível central ou os níveis locais dos governos seriam melhores gestores/alocadores e garantiriam a maximização da utilidade dos impostos aos seus “consumidores”, ou seja, os habitantes de uma nação. O presente trabalho busca analisar esse fenômeno utilizando a política habitacional brasileira como indicador. Em 2009, através do Programa Minha Casa Minha Vida, denotouse a retomada parcial à competência federal desse tipo de política desde o fim do BNH (Banco Nacional de Habitação) em 1986 e, a partir dela, torna-se válido analisar se o aumento da centralização federal trouxe ganhos de eficiência na alocação dos recursos. A literatura e artigos sobre o tema apresentam teoria e evidências de que a gestão local de políticas habitacionais de cunho social podem causar spillover populacional entre municípios vizinhos advindo do welfare migration e, ao tomar isso como verdade, instaurar um jogo estratégico dos gestores municipais para reduzir a provisão de habitação popular (Mattos et al. 2014), o chamado race to the bottom. Este estudo investiga se após 2009, com o aumento da centralização na tomada de decisão da política, ainda é possível verificar essa interação, e procura encontrar indícios que a política habitacional seria uma potencial causadora de movimentação populacional, através de uma análise de spillover laboral entre os municípios. Utilizando um painel com dados anualizados de 2009 a 2014, aplicado a modelos de autocorrelação espacial, constatou-se que na média nacional ainda existem evidências de um jogo estratégico intermunicipal na alocação de recursos da política habitacional. No entanto, ao analisarmos a evolução quantitativa dos indicadores do Programa, sugere-se que a centralização da política inverteu o panorama de Race to the Bottom para um de Yardstick Competition, ou seja, um ganho significativo de eficiência quando comparado com a política local anterior. Os resultados também sugerem que há indícios de uma correlação estatisticamente significativa entre investimentos de política habitacional com movimentações laborais entre os municípios o que pode estar relacionado à teoria de Welfare Migration. / The choice of appropriate governmental instances for managing different resources and public policies is the subject of extensive and historical discussion. Assuming that a country’s population enjoys and exercises free movement within its territory, being able to migrate and settle in new localities, it is argued that, according to the specificities of each policy, the central or local levels of governments would be better managers / allocators and would ensure the maximization of utility of taxpayers. The present essay seeks to analyze this phenomenon using the Brazilian housing policy as an indicator. In 2009, through the establishment of the Minha Casa Minha Vida Program, the policy got partially back to federal government control since the end of BNH (National Housing Bank) in 1986 what raised the valid question of assessing if the increase of federal centralization brought efficiency gains on the allocation of resources. The literature and articles on the subject present theory and evidence that local management of social housing policies can cause population spillover among neighboring municipalities arising from Welfare Migration. This could establish a strategic game of municipal managers to reduce the provision of social housing when they assume the migration actually takes place (Mattos et al., 2014), the so-called Race to the Bottom. This study investigates if after 2009, with the increase of centralization in the policy decision making, it is still possible to verify this game, and seeks to find evidence that housing policy would be a potential cause of population movements through a labor spillover analysis. Using a panel with annualized data from 2009 to 2014 applied to spatial autocorrelation models, it was observed that in the national average there is still evidence of a strategic intermunicipal game in the allocation of housing policy resources. However, when analyzing the quantitative evolution of the Program indicators it is suggested that the policy centralization reversed the panorama from Race to the Bottom to one of Yardstick Competition, what is a significant gain of efficiency when compared with the previous local politics. The results also suggest that there is indeed evidence of a statistically significant correlation between housing policy investments with labor movements which, in turn, could be related to the Welfare Migration theory.

This dissertation argues that stormwater management is fragmented both at that vertical fragmentation (at the level of intergovernmental relations) and horizontal fragmentation (within the level of governments). The first essay focuses on the institutional arrangements used by states to implement stormwater management policies. Building on the race to the bottom literature, I examine the impact of the institutional arrangement centralization on state water quality in California, Texas, Virginia, and Minnesota. A five-year (2013-2018) permitting cycle was used to analyze five dimensions: formalism, coercion, education, prioritization, and accommodation.There is an inverse relationship between the quality of stormwater and the degree of centralization in the institutional arrangements adopted by state governments to implement their stormwater management policies. The second essay focuses on a local government's decision to join an inter-local agreement to comply with federal/state stormwater management policies. Building on the transaction cost framework, the study used a cross-sectional design to analyze a case study. The case study consists of 119 cities subjected to stormwater regulation requirements in northern Texas during 2017. The dependent variable is the membership of the regional inter-local agreement, and the independent variables are the number of neighboring cities and population density. Community wealth, public works spending, stormwater fees, government type, and the percent of the population over 65 were used as control variables. Logistic regression was used for data analysis. This study concludes that the increase in the number of neighboring regulated local governments is associated with an increase in the likelihood of a decision by the regulated local government to join an interlocal agreement (ILA), as well as finding that an increase in the population density is associated with an increase in the likelihood of a decision by the regulated local government to join the ILA. In addition, the study found that the type of government also affects a decision to enter into a cooperative relationship to meet the regulative burdens associated with implementing the stormwater management policies imposed by state/federal governments. The results found in this dissertation contribute to bridging the gap in our knowledge on the impact of the institutional framework adopted by the states to implement environmental policy through empirically evaluating the effect of institutional arrangements (as represented in the States general MS4 permits) on the policy output (reducing the level of stormwater pollution).

Magister Legum - LLM / In this paper I delve into the connection between trade policy and labour rights as probably one of the most controversial issues, which the international trading system is faced with today. Labour laws differ from country to country and of course it is a cause for concern where some countries have higher standards than others, it becomes problematic for these countries with high standards to compete with countries with lower standards. Even though there is a definite link between trade and labour, my argument is that incorporating labour standards into the international trading system is not the best way forward to deal with the problem of abuse of labour standards. I further investigate the two organizations at the forefront of this debate, being the WTO and the ILO. In an attempt to ascertain which of the two is the best forum to deal with the issue I further look at the relationship between these two organizations. Compliance with international labour standards is a growing concern as worldwide standards are deteriorating and nothing is being done to alleviate the problem. Accordingly, I explore the causes for the abuse of labour standards and seek to find the better alternative, by looking at the respective positions of the parties who are for and against the linkage of trade with labour standards. Here the views and concerns of the developed world are weighed up against those of the developing world and looking at possible alternatives concludes the paper. / South Africa

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2015-12-15T12:50:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 erikacristinabarbosadealmeidaribeiro.pdf: 999031 bytes, checksum: bad7bf06e1c548d476fd710f3f22a105 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2015-12-15T13:05:10Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 erikacristinabarbosadealmeidaribeiro.pdf: 999031 bytes, checksum: bad7bf06e1c548d476fd710f3f22a105 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-12-15T13:05:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 erikacristinabarbosadealmeidaribeiro.pdf: 999031 bytes, checksum: bad7bf06e1c548d476fd710f3f22a105 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-05-25 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Em um país como o Brasil, marcado pelas desigualdades de renda pessoal e regional, o governo pode e deve utilizar políticas fiscais para tentar reduzir essas desigualdades. Caracterizado também por uma alta carga tributária e, por vezes, regressiva, a busca pela redução das desigualdades por meio de impostos no Brasil parece não surtir tanto efeito. Uma das formas para resolver esse problema seria focar nos gastos públicos de forma a tentar melhorar o bem-estar dos indivíduos brasileiros. Contudo, para tornar a política de gastos públicos eficiente é necessário conhecer as despesas municipais e entender as suas dinâmicas ao longo do tempo e do território brasileiro. Assim, essa tese busca verificar a existência de fenômenos que podem afetar o desempenho dos gastos públicos, sendo eles: efeito flypaper, race to the bottom (corrida para o fundo) e welfare migration (migração de bem-estar). O primeiro fenômeno ocorreria quando a sensibilidade dos gastos públicos fosse maior em relação a aumentos nas transferências intergovernamentais do que em relação a aumentos na renda local, se contrapondo ao Teorema do Eleitor Mediano. Já os outros dois fenômenos, a saber, race to the bottom e welfare migration, estariam ainda mais relacionados. Economistas argumentam que a migração de bem-estar (welfare migration) e a competição tributária poderiam gerar uma situação em que esses gastos municipais (direcionados a suprir a demanda de bens públicos) tenderiam a valores muito baixos, ou seja, a uma corrida para o fundo (ou, em inglês, race to the bottom). Na presença desses fenômenos, aconteceria uma interação espacial entre os gastos dos municípios com os gastos dos seus vizinhos. As análises da existência do efeito flypaper, da corrida para o fundo e da migração de bem-estar são feitas em dois ensaios para os municípios brasileiros. O primeiro contempla os anos 2000 e 2010 e analisa o efeito flypaper e suas variações, considerando a dependência financeira, a heterogeneidade espacial e desmembrando os gastos públicos entre despesas correntes e despesas de capital. Já o segundo ensaio busca indícios dos outros dois fenômenos nos mesmos anos, 2000 e 2010. Ambos usam dados em painel com correção espacial. Os principais resultados indicam a existência de efeito flypaper e de migração de bem-estar. Todavia, não são encontradas evidências de corrida para o fundo. / In a country like Brazil, marked by inequalities of personal and regional income, the government can use fiscal policy to try to reduce these inequalities. Also characterized by a high tax burden and sometimes regressive, the quest for reducing inequalities through taxes in Brazil seems not to take much effect. One way to solve this problem would be to use public expenditure in order to try to improve the welfare of Brazilian individuals. However, to make the expenditure policy effective is necessary to know the municipal expenditures and understand their dynamics over time and over Brazilian territory. Thus, this thesis seeks to verify the existence of phenomena that can affect the behavior and efficiency of public spending, namely: flypaper effect, race to the bottom and welfare migration. The first phenomenon occurs when public spending is more sensitivity to increases in intergovernmental transfers than to increases in local income, in contrast to Theorem of Median Voter. The other two phenomena, namely, race to the bottom and welfare migration, are still more related. Economists argue that the welfare migration and tax competition could lead to a situation in which these municipal expenditures (targeted to meet the demand for public goods) tend to very low values. In the presence of these phenomena, a spatial interaction between spending of municipalities with the spending of their neighbors takes place. Analysis of the existence of the flypaper effect, the race to the bottom and the welfare migration is done in two essays for the municipalities using spatial panel data. The first essay covers the years 2000 and 2010 and analyzes the flypaper effect considering the financial dependence, spatial heterogeneity and separating public expenditure between current and capital expenditures. The second one seeks for evidence of race to the bottom and welfare migration in the same years, 2000 and 2010. The main results indicate the existence of flypaper effect and welfare migration. However, there is no indication of race to the bottom.