Zugl.: Braunschweig, Techn. Univ., Diss., 2006

Zugl.: München, Techn. Univ., Diss., 2007 / Hergestellt on demand

Diss. Univ. St. Gallen, 2008.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Industrial & Systems Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2007. / Dr. Dirk Gunther, Committee Member ; Dr. Hayriye Ayhan, Committee Member ; Dr. Ellis L. Johnson, Committee Chair ; Dr. Pinar Keskinocak, Committee Co-Chair ; Dr. Julie Swann, Committee Member

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 147-148).

No description available.

This dissertation includes four independent essays. Essay one (chapter two) considers a two-echelon, two-supply chain (SC) system in which manufacturers supply a generic product to their exclusive retailers, who then use service level and retail price to compete for heterogeneous consumers. We question: how do varied consumer preferences get reflected not only in differentiated products/services, but through them to the choice of SC structure that delivers them? We find that SCs can strategically manipulate the product/service strategy and SC structure to hedge themselves from horizontal competition. The key finding is that in a market where consumers have stronger diminishing marginal utility on service, then less differentiated products/services will be observed, and only decentralized supply chains can be the market equilibrium. This is in contrast to the well-known result in marketing that choosing vertical integration is always a Nash equilibrium, and that choosing decentralization can only be a Nash equilibrium when product substitutability is high. Essay two (chapter three) explores the classical revenue management problem in a competitive context, with both price and seat inventory competition. The main question is how should management make strategic marketing (pricing) and operational (seat allocation) decisions in such a competitive market? Do the conventional approaches (models and algorithms based on a monopoly market) give us the appropriate strategies? We find that in a market where price competition dominates, managers should set a lower price and safety protection level for full fare customers than in a monopoly or alliance market. In a market where seat inventory competition dominates, managers should set a higher price and safety protection level than a monopoly or alliance would. Interestingly, in a market where the two levels of competition are more evenly matched, managers should set a lower price and a higher safety protection level than a monopoly. We also explore the effect of the degree of competition and the market structure on the strategic decisions, and whether there is a first adopter advantage or second adopter disadvantage with revenue management. Essay three aims to extend the understanding of the Newsvendor model to a competitive framework. In a market with both price and inventory competition, newsvendors can gain customers with price and secure the sales with availability. We find that the newsvendors should adjust their inventory (safety stock or total inventory) and pricing strategies responsively to the nature of the competitive market. The profits of the newsvendors and their suppliers are also different under different competitive contexts. Both the Nash equilibrium strategy and the players' profits are influenced by the demand correlation and variability, but in different ways under different competitive scenarios. These observations provide some theoretical basis for the strategic selection made by newsvendors operating in certain competitive markets. Essay four (chapter five) explores the issue of competitors cooperating. It is a commonplace observation that even the most competitive firms often find it in their best interests to cooperate. An example of cooperation in operations management is when two supply chains agree in advance to transship or 'pool' surplus product for use by another. The alternative is to let their customers switch unsatisfied demand to a competitor. Which is preferable, and how does such a preference depend on the many parameters, prices, the nature of competition, the degree of competition, wholesale prices etc? To get answers, we study a stylized model under three market environments: a market with an exogenous retail price, an endogenous retail price, and with price competition. The summary answer is that strong price competition between substitutable goods should lead to caution in signing transshipment contracts. But with little price competition and particularly where retailers are free to set the transshipment price, then transshipment is probably the way to go. We also address the issue of an optimal transshipment price in each scenario, and compare the Nash equilibrium strategies between competing and transshipping. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

Esta investigación se centró en el análisis de los modelos y metodologías para la fijación de precios en habitaciones de hoteles con la finalidad de establecer la metodología adecuada dependiendo si el hotel es de cadena o independiente.  Se desarrolla con la finalidad de presentar las metodologías para establecer precios de habitaciones que puedan ser usadas, tanto para fines académicos como en el ejercicio profesional de los hoteleros. Se utilizó la metodología de revisión bibliográfica, partiendo del análisis de publicaciones académicas acerca de metodologías/modelos utilizados en hoteles para la fijación de precios de habitaciones, preferentemente generadas dentro del periodo 2013 hasta el 2020. Se usó como base investigaciones previas sobre la aplicación del revenue management en hoteles, los cuales tienen en cuenta que el precio es uno de los factores más importantes en la decisión de compra de los consumidores. Como resultado se obtuvo que el revenue management se dirige a hoteles de cadena, mientras que el modelo de Hubbart es preferible en hoteles de una categoría menor enfocados en la competencia por costos. Por último, el modelo hedónico puede ir dirigido a cualquiera de los establecimientos, ya sean estos independientes que no tienen acceso a un software más sofisticado, u hoteles parte de una cadena. / This research focused on the analysis of models and methodologies for price setting in hotel rooms in order to establish the appropriate methodology depending if the hotel is part of a chain or independent. It is developed with the purpose of presenting methodologies to establish room prices that can be used for academic and professional purposes of hoteliers. The methodology for the bibliographic review was based on the analysis of academic papers about methodologies and models used in hotels for setting room prices, preferably within the period 2013 to 2020. Previous research on the application of revenue management in hotels was used as a basis, which establish that price is one of the most important factors in the purchase decision of consumers. As a result, it was found that revenue management is aimed at chain hotels, while the Hubbart model is more suitable for hotels of a lower category focused on price competition. Finally, the hedonic model can be used by all the establishments, these being independent with no access to sophisticated software, or even hotel chains. / Trabajo de investigación

In this dissertation, we study inventory and revenue management problems for perishable products with customer choice considerations. This dissertation is composed of six chapters. In Chapter 1, we provide an overview and the motivation of problems. Subsequently, in Chapter 2, we propose a joint inventory and pricing problem for a perishable product with two freshness levels. After a stochastic time, a fresh item turns into a non-fresh item, which will expire after another random duration. Under an (r, Q) ordering policy and a markdown pricing strategy for non-fresh items, we formulate a model that maximizes the long-run average profit rate. We then reduce the model to a mixed-integer bilinear program (MIBLP), which can be solved efficiently by state-of-the-art commercial solvers. We also investigate the value of using a markdown strategy by establishing bounds on it under limiting regimes of some parameters such as large market demand. Further, we consider an Economic Order Quantity (EOQ)-type heuristic and bound the optimality gap asymptotically. Our results reveal that although the clearance strategy is always beneficial for the retailer, it may hurt customers who are willing to buy fresh products. In Chapter 3, we extend this model to the dynamic setting with multiple freshness levels of perishable products. Due to the complexity of the problem, we study the structural properties of value function and characterize the structure of the optimal policies by using the concept of anti-multimodularity. The structural analysis enables us to devise three novel and efficient heuristic policies. We further extend the model by considering donation policy and replenishment system. Our results imply that freshness-dependent pricing and dynamic pricing are two substitute strategies, while freshness-dependent pricing and donation strategy are two complement strategies for matching supply with demand. Also, high variability in product quality under dynamic pricing benefits the firm, but it may result in significant losses with a static pricing strategy. In Chapter 4, we study a joint inventory-pricing model for perishable items with fixed shelf lives to examine the effectiveness of different markdown policies, including single-stage, multiple-stage, and dynamic markdown policies both theoretically and numerically. We show that the value of multiple-stage markdown policies over single-stage ones asymptotically vanishes as the shelf life, market demand, or customers’ maximum willingness-to-pay increase. In chapter 5, with a focus on blood products, we optimize blood supply chain structure along with the operations optimization. Specifically, we study collection, production, replenishment, issuing, inventory, wastage, and substitution decisions under three different blood supply chain channel structures, i.e., the decentralized, centralized, and coordinated. We propose a bi-level optimization program to model the decentralized system and use the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions to solve that. Although centralized systems result in a higher performance than decentralized systems, it is challenging to implement them. Thus, we design a novel coordination mechanism to motivate hospitals to operate in a centralized system. We also extend the model to the case with demand uncertainty and compare different issuing and replenishment policies. Analysis of a realistic case-study indicates that integration can significantly improve the performance of the system. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation and proposes future research directions. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Video games represent the largest and fastest-growing segment of the entertainment industry. Despite its popularity in practice, it has received limited attention from the operations community. Managing product monetization and engagement presents unique challenges due to the characteristics of gaming platforms, where players and the gaming platform have repeated (and endogenously controlled) interactions. These practices have also led to new customer concerns and thus regulation challenges. In this thesis, we describe a body of work that provides the first analytical results for revenue management and matchmaking problems in video games, as well as the fairness issues in many e-commerce platforms. In the first part, we discuss a prevailing selling mechanism in online gaming known as a loot box. A loot box can be viewed as a random bundle of virtual items, whose contents are not revealed until after purchase. We consider how to optimally price and design loot boxes from the perspective of a revenue-maximizing video game company, and provide insights on customer surplus and protection under such selling strategies. In the second part, we consider how to manage player engagement in a game where players are repeatedly matched to compete against one another. Players have different skill levels which affect the outcomes of matches, and the win-loss record influences their willingness to remain engaged. Leveraging optimization and real data, we provide insights on how engagement may increase with optimal matchmaking policies and adding AI bots. In the third part, we consider an increasingly important concern in many e-commerce platforms: the inequality induced by price discrimination. While the practice of discriminatory pricing is generally widespread, it can result in disparate impact against protected groups. We consider the problem of setting prices for different groups of customers under fairness regulations, which limit the differences of various metrics (such as price and demand) across the groups. We show that different types of fairness constraints may not coexist in general, and the impact of fairness levels on social welfare could be non-monotonic and non-trivial.