Fundação de Amparo a Pesquisa no Estado do Rio Grande do Sul / The present work is dedicated to a contemporary author who emphasized the incessant movement of the human species in their search for meaning: Richard Rorty. In this age-old effort to create meanings, thought manifested itself in many ways and in many different styles, and these changes have shaped the reason through time. The philosophy of Rorty is a "disenchantment" of philosophy, because undermines traditional concepts employed in philosophical inquiry and ultimately radically change the very notion of philosophy and what is philosophize. Thus, the insistent search for a last ground of knowledge, the attempt of philosophers - and scientists - to unveil the reality in their nature, are placed in check by Rorty, in favor of a much more "modest" purpose: achieve the best possible way to deal with the world without unequivocal or absolute assumptions. The development of these critical first appears in the book Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, published in 1979, a work of great impact in contemporary philosophy that put Rorty as one of the exponents of current neopragmatist. Rorty stands out in contemporary philosophy to be an essentially combative author. His writings pursue a very clear proposal: to overcome some traditional ideas that dictate the philosophical agenda at least since Plato. As a representative of pragmatism, Rorty's effort is to show the futility of certain ideas and (pseudo)problems that generate for thought and research. The result of this effort reveals a complete transformation of philosophy and, beyond this, much of the western culture. This work aims to present and evaluate some of the main theses of Rorty. / O presente trabalho dedica-se a um autor contemporâneo que deu ênfase ao movimento incessante da espécie humana em sua busca por sentido: Richard Rorty. Neste esforço milenar de criar significados, o pensamento manifestou-se de várias formas e nos mais diferentes estilos, e estas transformações moldaram a razão através do tempo. A filosofia de Rorty é um desencantamento da filosofia, pois abala concepções tradicionais empregadas na investigação filosófica e acaba por mudar radicalmente a própria noção de filosofia e do que seja filosofar. Deste modo, a insistente busca por um fundamento último do conhecimento, a tentativa dos filósofos e também de cientistas de desvelar a realidade em sua natureza intrínseca, são por Rorty colocadas em xeque, em favor de um propósito bem mais modesto : alcançar a melhor maneira possível de lidarmos com o mundo sem pressupostos unívocos, absolutos. O desenvolvimento destas críticas aparece pela primeira vez no livro A filosofia e o espelho da natureza, publicado em 1979, obra de grande impacto na filosofia contemporânea e que situou Rorty como um dos expoentes da corrente neopragmatista. Rorty se destaca na filosofia contemporânea por ser um autor essencialmente combativo. Seus escritos perseguem uma proposta bastante clara: superar algumas ideias tradicionais que ditam a agenda filosófica ao menos desde Platão. Como representante do pragmatismo, o esforço de Rorty é o de mostrar a inutilidade de certas ideias e os (pseudo)problemas que geram para o pensamento e a investigação. O resultado deste esforço revela uma transformação completa da filosofia e, indo além desta, de grande parte da cultura ocidental. A presente dissertação pretende apresentar e avaliar algumas das principais teses de Rorty.

Orientador : Bento Prado de Almeida Ferraz Junior / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-18T21:26:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Pulino_LuciaHelenaCavasinZabotto_M.pdf: 34736778 bytes, checksum: ccc70db6c2c14252c3b1d57588e6b188 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1994 / Resumo: Neste trabalho apresentamos as idéias de Richard Rorty, a partir de nossa leitura de Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature , 1979, em que ele critica o fundacionismo filosófico, Consequences of Pragmatism, 1982, em que ele explicita essa crítica, até Contingency, irony and solidarity, 1989, em que ele propõe uma nova filosofia. Mostramos como Rorty descontrói a Filosofia centrada na epistemologia, redescrevendo-a, em termos pragmáticos, como uma filosofia que não é mais o alicerce da cultura, mas se presta à busca de autonomia pessoal e auto-criação, deixando para a literatura o papel de possibilitar a criação e a manutenção do sentimento de solidariedade na comunidade. Salientamos o fato de Rorty propor a filosofia como busca de auto-realização inserida numa proposta mais ampla, a da sociedade liberal irônica, uma utopia criada pelo autor para superar os problemas não só filosóficos, mas sociais, políticos e éticos do homem contemporâneo / Abstract: In this work we present Richard Rorty's ideas, from our reading of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 1979, in which he criticises the philosophical foundationalism, Consequences of Pragmatism, 1982, in which he elucidates this critique, and Contingency, irony and solidarity, 1989, in which he proposes a new philosophy. We show how Rorty deconstructs the epistemology-centered philosophy, redescribing it, in pragmatical terms, as a philosophy that is not the foundation of culture any more, but serves for searching personal autonomy and auto-creation, letting to the literature the role of making possible for persons to create and maintaining the sense of solidarity in the comunity. We enphasize the fact that Rorty proposes the philosophy as searching for auto-realization inserted in a broader proposal, that of the liberal ironic society, a utopia created by the author to overcome not only philosophical problems, but social, politic and ethical problems of the contemporary man / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia

No description available.

Irony has for long been on the boundary between philosophy and arts owing to its both verbal/logical character and its aesthetic appeal. Recently, Rorty proposed irony as the main discursive attitude in a liberal society. In this study, I investigate liberal irony from a philosophical perspective. More specifically, I demonstrate that irony is representative of a certain view of subjectivity and an ethical stance, a critical tool that is of special importance in a coherence view of truth and a rhetorical form that appeals both to the rational and irrational.

Zugl.: Leipzig, Univ., Diss., 2007

Originally presented as the author's Thesis (doctoral)--Århus universitet, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references.

This dissertation examines Richard Rorty's liberalism, especially as articulated in Contingency, irony, and solidarity, from a perspective which is sympathetic to the broad features of his pragmatism. I argue that Rorty's liberalism is, in the first instance a moral, rather than a political project and I begin this dissertation by examining in Chapter One, the basis of this moral project in his rejection of any notion of human nature in favour of a focus on the individual as a contingent, self-creating vocabulary. The moral core of Rorty's work is found in the vision of the liberal self who abhors cruelty. His politics extends outward from one variant of this type, the liberal ironist, who tries to balance her liberal commitments with a disposition to radical doubt. In his attempt to secure society for, and from, the liberal ironist, Rorty constructs a vision of society based in a strong division between public and private. In Chapter Two I argue that we should reject this move, and I argue instead for a vision of society based in conversation. In Chapter Three, I argue that this conversational understanding offers us an increased chance to attain the sort of cosmopolitan community to which Rorty aspires. In particular, I argue that we should see conversation, rather than imagination and reading, as the best means to develop and extend our sense of solidarity. One of the biggest obstacles to our increasing solidarity through conversation is the way in which power operates to sustain existing social and political arrangements by setting the conversational agenda. Rorty, unfortunately, says little about the workings of power and so, in Chapter Four, I propose the use of Iris Marion Young's thought on oppression and domination as a means to illuminate the issue of power at work, and to help us in finding ways to deal with it. In the final chapter I look to the particular role of the intellectual in the conversation. I examine Rorty's rejection of philosophy-as-epistemology in favour of what he calls pragmatism, and how this move combines with a variety of other strategies to apparently silence intellectuals. I argue that in spite of these moves, Rorty's philosophy and his own example actually extend the space from which and through which intellectuals can participate in the conversation and its transformation. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2010.

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- McMaster University, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 305-313). Also available via World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.C.S.)--Regent College, Vancouver, BC, 1993. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 146-150).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2007. Graduate Programme in Education. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 222-233). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:NR29322