Why has the United States, given its status as the sole remaining superpower following its Cold War victory, been unable to translate its preponderance of power into the outcomes it desires? The system established by the United States over the course of the Cold War does not effectively translate its power into influence in the post-Cold War world. In fact, the way US-Soviet competition shaped global affairs created systemic problems, weak and failing states, terrorism, autocracy and human rights abuse, that cannot be solved by the mechanisms of influence the US relied upon to win the Cold War. However, precisely these issues now dominate the American foreign policy agenda as its strategic objective shifted from defeating communism to maintaining the stability of the liberal world order that resulted from communism’s defeat. The United States, reliant on Cold War era mechanisms of influence, lacks the tools to accomplish these new objectives because these mechanisms were designed to exploit or accept the problems of statehood that now plague the liberal world order. Therefore, for the United States to make effective use of its abundance of power, it must either change its tools or its objectives.

This thesis is a review of U.S. foreign policy in Pakistan through a realist lens. It critiques the current state of U.S. policy and recommends that the United States prioritize national security interests, particularly with regards to counterterrorism, over building Pakistani democracy and running civilian aid programs. It then further recommends ways for the United States government to account for ground level dynamics in Pakistani politics in crafting foreign policy aimed at bringing Pakistan into line with U.S. counterterrorism priorities.

The US military’s culture, structure, and process for providing advice to the president and his national security decision-making team are flawed due to the marginalization of unconventional warfare (UW) expertise -- UW is the military’s doctrinal term for support to resistance activities and movements. This marginalization results in inadequate consideration for applying UW as a strategic option for the nation. Through a qualitative methods case study analysis utilizing macro- and micro-level process-tracing with a conceptual framework based on Niklas Luhmann’s Systems Theory, the author shows that viable and acceptable resistance elements existed in Syria in March 2011 to June 2014 and that the conventional US military failed to recognize this development, adequately analyze its implications, and craft a strategic UW option for the national security decision-makers to consider. This finding is significant in that it exposes a deficiency in the US military’s culture, structure and process that results in an incomplete and insufficient menu of military options for the president. If these cultural, structural, and procedural flaws are left unaddressed, the US is likely to repeat this strategic error in the future. The author identifies specific recommendations for national security practitioners; however, the overarching theme is the need to change the institutional culture and the old structures of the conventional military to be able to provide the president a more complete, comprehensive, and creative menu of options to consider when assessing and responding to violent political crises short of conventional war.

China’s military modernization has allowed it to take a more assertive position on the territorial disputes it currently has with Japan and its Southeast Asian neighbors. The South China Sea (SCS) dispute is a clear example. Meanwhile, Japan is normalizing its military status to play a more proactive security role in the region. Japan’s normalization process has been greatly influenced by China’s growing military capabilities as it fears that China could pose a threat to its sea lanes of communications. Although Japan does not have territorial claims in the SCS, it regards the SCS as a strategically vital area. It is this particular concern that has brought Japan into the current territorial disputes in the SCS. This thesis analyzes how Japan has tried to forge partnerships with Southeast Asian countries in the form of foreign aid and the provision of military equipment and training that can potentially offset China’s assertiveness.

This paper examines the possible future of chemical weapons through an exploration of the origins and history of legal proscriptions on their use and the practical utility of their procurement and use. Past public misunderstanding of the extent of the chemical weapons threat, exacerbated by propaganda, as well as fears of retaliatory use motivated efforts to ban the use of chemical weapons. These prohibitions have had and continue to have weaknesses and loopholes that prevent their intentions from being fully realized. While chemical agents have a wide variety of applications and have several unique advantages, including psychological effects on victims, their use is limited by several drawbacks. The accessibility of some agents is also limited for actors who are not major powers. Recent developments in chemical weapons use, especially their use in the Syrian civil war, inform present understanding of international resolve to prevent chemical weapons use and the continued advantages chemical weapons provide. These findings provide a framework to understand future opportunities for actors to produce chemical weapons and the likelihood that these actors will actually use chemical weapons.

A growing number of researchers within the field of security studies address the blurring line between internal and external security. Some focus on the national level while others focus on the international level and the European Union (EU). Due to the changing nature of threat perceptions since the Cold War, many scholars hold that the distinction between internal and external security is dissolving. The aim of this study is to empirically examine how internal and external security discourses are merging within the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and how this merge is connected to the EU identity construction. This study uses a poststructuralist approach on discourse analysis of EU policies, EU council documents and speeches of the high representatives. Furthermore, an analytical framework for analyzing the merging of internal and external security discourses from an identity perspective is constructed. This study concludes that discursively constructed ”links” between internal and external security is merging the two discourses. Finally, in a co-constitutive relationship, the internal-external security nexus and the EU security identity are (re)constructing each other.

The purpose of this study was to assess the extent to which community colleges have implemented major post-Virginia Tech campus safety recommendations. In addition to gaining a comprehensive overview of the safety policies and practices in place, this study assessed if campus safety policy implementation levels at the community colleges correlated with institutional characteristics, and the internal and external forces that helped drive the implementation of these policies. Focusing specifically upon the Virginia Community College System, data on the policies and practices in place at each of the 23 Virginia community colleges were collected from institutional websites and through follow-up telephone calls. Interviews were then conducted with a small group of administrators from various Virginia community colleges. Analysis of the data indicated that large variance exists across the community colleges, as some have implemented most of the major campus safety recommendations that currently exist, while other have only implemented far less. The results also revealed potential support for larger community colleges with more resources and more campuses implementing more campus safety recommendations. Interview data detailed that external mandates and internal college leadership are the most important forces driving campus safety policy change among the community colleges. A number of policy implications arose regarding where community colleges need to improve their campus safety and how to best drive campus safety policy changes in the future.

This dissertation analyzed the internal incoherence of China’s grand strategy. To do so, it used the cultural driver of honor to explain the contradictory behavior of China, which ranges from peaceful, responsible international actor to assertive, revisionist rising power with hegemonic ambitions. The central research question asked why China often diverges from Peaceful Development, thus leading to major contradictions as well as possible misperceptions on the part of other nations. Honor was the standard of reference that was utilized and examined in order to establish congruence and coherence between deed and praxis. Accordingly, the first hypothesis of this study posited that if policy diverges from or is incongruent with China’s standard of national honor, then the grand strategy is internally incoherent. Second, two further hypotheses posited that China will tend to use peaceful means if its goal is to enhance external legitimacy, whereas it will tend to use assertive means if its goal is to enhance internal legitimacy. This dissertation began by broadly tracing the cultural driver of honor and the link between honor and legitimacy in Chinese history. The second part of the dissertation looked at the six most salient events within a six-year timeframe (2009-2015) by way of the focused, comparative single-case-study method. For each grand strategy policy input (military strategy, economic policy, and diplomatic policy), the two most salient events were carefully chosen. A fourth grand strategy input, legitimacy (both internal and external), was evaluated for each of these events as well. Methodologically speaking, this study used process tracing in these within-case studies of the single case of China’s grand strategy. Results showed that China’s grand strategy manifestations are by and large legitimacy-driven and that, therefore, peaceful or assertive actions may be differentiated in terms of relation to external or internal legitimacy. In sum, this dissertation advanced an innovative means of inquiry into the grand strategy of a non-Western country, contributed valuable information for the policy community, and offered results that enable a re-evaluation of the debate on the peaceful or violent rise of China.

Since the end of the Cold War, Japan’s defense policy and politics has gone through significant changes. Throughout the post cold war period, US-Japan alliance managers, politicians with differing visions and preferences, scholars, think tanks, and the actions of foreign governments have all played significant roles in influencing these changes. Along with these actors, the Japanese prime minister has played an important, if sometimes subtle, role in the realm of defense policy and politics. Japanese prime ministers, though significantly weaker than many heads of state, nevertheless play an important role in policy by empowering different actors (bureaucratic actors, independent commissions, or civil actors), through personal diplomacy, through agenda-setting, and through symbolic acts of state. The power of the prime minister to influence policy processes, however, has frequently varied by prime minister. My dissertation investigates how different political strategies and entrepreneurial insights by the prime minister have influenced defense policy and politics since the end of the Cold War. In addition, it seeks to explain how the quality of political strategy and entrepreneurial insight employed by different prime ministers was important in the success of different approaches to defense. My dissertation employs a comparative case study approach to examine how different prime ministerial strategies have mattered in the realm of Japanese defense policy and politics. Three prime ministers have been chosen: Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro (1996-1998); Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro (2001-2006); and Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio (2009-2010). These prime ministers have been chosen to provide maximum contrast on issues of policy preference, cabinet management, choice of partners, and overall strategy. As my dissertation finds, the quality of political strategy has been an important aspect of Japan’s defense transformation. Successful strategies have frequently used the knowledge and accumulated personal networks of bureaucrats, supplemented bureaucratic initiatives with top-down personal diplomacy, and used a revitalized US-Japan strategic relationship as a political resource for a stronger prime ministership. Though alternative approaches, such as those that have looked to displace the influence of bureaucrats and the US in defense policy, have been less successful, this dissertation also finds theoretical evidence that alternatives may exist.

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