[pt] O meu objetivo é investigar o colapso e abandono do Tractatus tomado como um projeto para desenvolver a atraente imagem de uma lógica completamente combinatória, sintática e neutra. Há neste projeto uma tensão insolúvel entre a imagem de uma lógica neutra e a demanda que ela deveria ser usada para analisar completamente os fatos do mundo. Há mais articulações lógicas que a lógica tractariana com suas tautologias, contradições e verafuncionalidade pode expressar. Assim eu lido aqui com quatro colapsos inevitáveis do Tractatus, nomeadamente: I) a composicionalidade; II a tabela de verdade, III) a Bildkonzeption; e IV) a Neutralidade da Lógica. Há também quatro pontos centrais que eu cubro com esta investigação: 1) Problemas com a expressao vero-funcional de cores e números, e sua relação com intuições funcionais e espaciais; 2) o papel central e limites da tabela de verdade como um sistema notacional privilegiado para revelar a essência da linguagem e para evitar absurdos; 3) a crítica da interpretação recorrente de isomorfismo entre proposições elementares e fatos atômicos no Tractatus; 4) o papel central de um holismo tractariano que forma o pano de fundo para inevitável colisão entre lógica e sua aplicação. Eu então evidencio o tipo de invasão de organizações e elementos empíricos no (alegado) domínio neutro da lógica. Lógica não poderia então tomar conta de si mesma. / [en] My aim is to investigate the collapse and abandonment of the Tractatus held as a project to develop the attractive picture of a logic completely combinatorial, syntactical and neutral. There is in this project an unsolvable tension between this image of a neutral logic and the demand that it must be used to completely analyze the facts in the world. There are more logical connections than the tractarian logic, with its tautologies, contradictions and truth-functionality, can express. Thereby I deal here with four unavoidable collapses of Tractatus maininterdependent pillars, namely: I) the Compositionality; II) the truth tables; III) the Bildkonzeption; and IV) the Neutrality of Logic. There are four central points that I cover respectively in this investigation: 1) Problems with a truth-functional expression of colors and numbers, and its relation with functional and spatial intuitions; 2) the central role and limits of the truth tables as a special notation to reveal the essence of the language and to avoid absurdities; 3) a criticism of the recurrent interpretation of an isomorphism between elementary propositions and atomic facts in the Tractatus; and 4) the central role of a tractarian holism which forms the background to the unavoidable collision between logic and its application. I highlight then the kind of conceptual invasion of empirical arrangements and elements in the (allegedly) neutral domain of logic. Logic could not at last take care of itself.

Le présent travail a pour objectif d'exposer le traitement que fait Wittgenstein de l'indexicalité dans les Recherches philosophiques. Essentiellement, la lecture proposée permettra au lecteur d'avoir une vue d'ensemble sur la contribution de Wittgenstein à propos des différents aspects du langage qui nécessitent un contexte pour signifier. Pour pouvoir saisir toute la richesse des remarques de Wittgenstein dans les Recherches philosophiques, la présentation de certains concepts essentiels et de philosophes importants est nécessaire. C'est pourquoi le chapitre I y est consacré. Le chapitre Il traite de l'indexicalité dans le Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Comme Wittgenstein dans les Recherches revient sur sa conception du langage du Tractatus, et cela à propos d'aspects pertinents quant à la question de l'indexicalité, le chapitre Il aidera à saisir les deux derniers chapitres. Le chapitre III présente la critique que fait Wittgenstein de son ancienne conception du langage pour mettre en place sa nouvelle, qui comprend les jeux de langage comme condition nécessaire d'interprétation. Ces derniers permettent à la définition ostensive, comme tout phénomène indexical, de signifier. Le chapitre IV sera l'occasion de voir que les objets privés (les sensations) auxquels nous nous référons parfois de manière ostensive, ne sont pas privés au sens où nous ne pouvons pas nous y référer. Cette idée montre que le philosophe apporte des réponses originales sur des questions qui concernent l'indexicalité de manière plus large. Il sera avancé dans ce texte que la philosophie des Recherches philosophiques aboutit à l'idée que ce n'est pas l'objet lui-même qui est essentiel à la signification, autant en ce qui concerne les définitions ostensives que les objets privés. Wittgenstein, avec les jeux de langage, montre que le contexte est nécessaire pour la signification, et qu'il n'y a rien de primitif dans l'objet de désignation qui puisse nous indiquer quelque chose sur lui. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Wittgenstein, Indexicalité, Jeux de langage, Définition ostensive, Objets privés.

This thesis is a comparison of the philosophical systems of Zen Buddhism, which is an Eastern Philosophy, with Ludwig Wittgenstein&rsquo / s philosophical studies, who is an extraordinary name of the Western Philosophy in the 20th century. The history and sources of Zen Buddhism were given with its adoption in the use of language and arts. Besides, this study exemplifies the philosophy of Zen Buddhism with the examples from the life story of Wittgenstein. The thesis is written with a full awareness of the sensitivity of comparing different systems which always embody counterexamples and speculations. This is the reason why speculative ideas and resources were deliberately ignored. The aim is to contribute the cultural life of Turkey by taking such a subject to the academic milieu. Moreover, Turkey is the passage of the East and the West both geographically and culturally. There are resemblances between Zen and Wittgenstein by means of method and the useof language. Furthermore, it was given the names of the books that Wittgenstein read and the philosophers who influenced Wittgenstein. The parallels between Zen and Wittgenstein are justified.

Le lien entre le Moyen Âge et l'époque moderne est un sujet âprement discuté en philosophie et en histoire, plus précisément la jonction entre ces deux époques et les phénomènes extraordinaires qui s'y produisirent, que ce soit les grandes explorations, la renaissance artistique, l'apparition de l'humanisme et la révolution scientifique. Dans une optique constructive, nous tentons dans ce mémoire de narrer les grands courants de pensée concernant le lien entre la révolution scientifique et le Moyen Âge tout en exposant leurs lacunes grâce aux travaux les plus actuels sur cet enjeu. Plus précisément, c'est le lien entre la scolastique tardive du XIVe siècle et l'apparition de la méthode des sciences modernes que ce mémoire expose à l'aide du concept d'intelligibilité fonctionnelle et de ses racines méthodologiques, scientifiques et mathématiques. Cette exposition se fait grâce à un procédé simple, soit la présentation d'un problème et de son histoire. Notre problème est celui de la mathématisation de la philosophie naturelle au XIVe siècle et notre histoire est celle d'un étrange ouvrage, le Traité des rapports entre les rapidités dans les mouvements écrit par Thomas Bradwardine, et de ses sources. En reconstruisant sommairement le contexte autant que l'univers conceptuel de Thomas Bradwardine, ce mémoire expose un cas particulier de la pratique scientifique à son époque. À partir de cette histoire, ce mémoire présente finalement des considérations générales sur le lien entre la scolastique du XIVe siècle et la révolution scientifique à partir d'un résultat probant, soit la méthode philosophique de Bradwardine, et son lien avec les intelligibilités fonctionnelles typiques de la révolution scientifique.

The so-called “Fabulae” written by Odo of Cheriton (1180/90-1246/47) owe their traditional title to Hervieux’s edition published in 1896, still used as a reference. This work aims at providing the reader with a new edition based on an accurate philological inquiry into the text and its manuscripts. If the literary features of Odo’s fables have, indeed, been studied, especially in regard to their innovative elements, such as their christianized morals and the relationship of the tales to preaching, the collection has not been studied from a philological point of view. Before this research there was no clarity in regard to the total number of tales, which varied in previous editions between 60 and 117, nor to the determination and inner divisions of the corpus; moreover, all previous editions are based on only one manuscript or little more. As a matter of fact, Hervieux basically published a codex optimus that he only occasionally emended – but did not declare where he operated basing the correction on other manuscripts and where he did so ope ingenii – which is Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, 441; other editions are the ones done by Voigt (1878), Oesterley (1868 and 1871) and Perry (1952). Voigt is the only one to study the relationship between codices, although only between a small portion of them (11); Oesterley uses only one manuscript in both his editions (although the two are different between one another) and Perry only publishes a selection of the tales present in Hervieux, adding an apparatus which informs the reader on variantes available in the already existing studies, but not conducting a new research himself. Other issues of Odo’s status queastionis are the absence of a comprehensive study of his works, all unpublished apart from 65 of his “Sermones dominicales” (Paris, 1520) and the tales themselves, the lack of a census and, concerning the fables, of a systematic analysis of the whole collection. This situation prevents from making extensive comparisons and evaluations of the author’s usus scribendi, which is why the first purpose of this dissertation was a general introduction that could account for the main literary features shared by the whole collection. Starting from a short contextualization of Odo’s biography and his other works, we looked into the prologue of the tales, that heavily references the Sacred Scriptures and relies on the allegorical method proper to exegesis, which is strongly stressed, even more so than the usage of Aesopical tales in the collection, although as important. Secondly, the title itself has been questioned: even if the collection is usually called “Fabulae”, the manuscripts never offer this lectio, which is instead Hervieux’s arbitrary choice. In the prologue, Odo talks of his work not as fabulae, but instead as a tractatus parabolicus: if one is to give the collection a proper title, then, the latter one must be used, although there is no evidence of a specific rubric redacted by Odo to be used as a title. One of the new discoveries made in this research is then the refusal of the title currently used and the clarification of another ambiguity derived by Hervieux’s edition. As a matter of fact, the French scholar not only arbitrary called the tales “Fabulae”, but also decide to publish some excerpta from Odo’s sermons under the title “Parabulae”. He did so by isolating these extracts from ms. Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16506, thus creating a significant confusion in subsequent research trying to address the two texts: even nowadays it is quite hard to understand if a catalog is, for example, talking about the tale collection or the sermons. During this research, it was discovered that some extracts on fables topics from the sermons actually circulated throughout the Middle Ages, as nine manuscripts who hold them included them into bigger exempla collections; nonetheless, these exceerpta never constituted an independent work, and the only tale collection produced by Odo is the one that should more properly be called tractatus parabolicus. Moreover, the introduction includes a short analysis of the main literary features of the text, with a particular attention given to the mixing up of the fable and exemplum genres in Odo’s work, as he used for every one of his stories the allegorical method proper to biblical exegesis. The aim of such an introduction is to be a first step into a deeper and more complex analysis of Odo’s works as a whole, an accomplishment that, however, will inevitably need wider studies dedicated also to the other books he wrote in order to be completed. In regard to the tale collection, particularly developed is its social and religious critique, which Odo wanted to express in his allegory-rich and heavily christianized morals. This critique is addressed especially against ecclesiastical hierarchies – not the Church itself, but its people – but not only those; it is against all who abuse their subjects when in a position to exercise power over others. Odo thus condemns not only bishops, ministers and prelates who only worry about earthly matters and fall short of their responsibilities, indulging in vices instead, but also rich masters and rulers who vex their subjects. However, Odo’s attack does not spare the humbles too, who are criticized when they try to improve their social standing and thus forget their place, or who are more generally guilty, as anyone, of the seven deadly sins, of lack in faith or of conducting themselves not virtuously enough. It can be easily noticed, then, that Odo had a strong drive towards contributing to reforming his contemporary society, whose morals felt in need of a deep renovation. Lastly, the introduction addresses shortly the success of Odo’s collection, which was translated into vernacular three times (into Gaelic, Chwedlau Odo, into Old-French, Les Parables Maystre Oe de Cyrintime, into old Spanish, Libro de los gatos); apart from these works, it must also be mentioned that Odo probably influenced Nicole Bozon, John of Sheppey and maybe, Clemente Sánchez, Stephan of Bourbon and the Speculum laicorum as well. After the analysis of the main literary features of the collection, the research proceeded with the production of a new, updated census of the manuscripts transmitting the Tractatus parabolicus. Seventy-one codices have been found, in comparison to Hervieux’s twenty-five and to other ten that had already been identified by previous bibliography (see Dicke-Grubmüller 1987 and Welter 1927). Thanks to this recensio we were also able to investigate the definition itself of Odo’s corpus, a topic made quite complex by the constitutive mobility of the fable genre in the Middle Ages. As a matter of fact, it is quite common for the author and text identity to be easily and almost immediately lost in this genre, also due to the easy addition or elimination of some of the apologues due to different motivations, that vary also from manuscript to manuscript. Since tales were often included into bigger collections that took on from various sources, it is extremely difficult to determine the original corpus. Moreover, in Odo’s case the matter is even more complicated due to a sometimes ambiguous internal division of tales, once again partially depending on Hervieux’s choices, partially on the tradition itself. As a matter of fact, Hervieux chose to number the tales not progressively, but by sometimes adding letters onto numbers, especially when he thought that two consequent tales revolved around the same topic. One then finds, for example, tales 56, 56a, 56b, 56c, which Hervieux separated in his edition but which should instead considered as only one fable; conversely, tales 1, 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d e 1e are on one hand independent ones (1, 1a, 1c, 1e), on the other the result of corruptions of the tradition (1b, 1d). At the same time, manuscripts sometimes don’t distinguish clearly between Odo’s tales, fusing some together or dividing others in peculiar ways, so a degree of uncertainty is to be found not only in the history of studies, but also in the tradition itself. Another accomplishment of this dissertation is thus precisely giving a new, clearer definition of the corpus, not only in regard to its internal divisions, based upon the manuscript tradition, but also to their number and the identification of spurious fables, such as 76, 1b and 1d. Starting from the new recensio, the dissertation then proceed onto the philological and textual analysis of the collection, with the hope of tracing a stemma codicum. We thus selected thirty-six manuscripts according to their antiquity, place of origin (with a predilection for England) and portion of the text transmitted, into which some loci critici that cover around one-third of the work were identified. Unfortunately, though, manuscripts present a lot of different variantes, but not of stemmatical importance: they are often lectiones adiaphorae and/or small differences in the order of words, alteration of conjunctions, verbal tenses and so on. It was then not possible to trace a proper stemma, but we still tried to account for the different features of the tradition. Five different orders in the transmission of the collection were found, which seem to present themselves also when studying the text of the loci critici. Apart from one (δ, linked to order D and to one manuscript of the order A), it is improper to talk about families, but it is only possible to group the non fragmentary codices – we intend with the expression “fragmentary codices” all those manuscripts that only transmit a maximum of ten tales, generally dispersed within the codex itself, which usually collects materials from different sources – based upon quite uniform geographical areas. That is to say that there seem to be a link between almost all German manuscripts and one Italian one (Wo, order B), between the bohemian and eastern-European codices (order C), between some English manuscripts and two French ones (order E), whereas the majority of the English codices (plus two German, one Austrian, one bohemian and two French) share order A. The five orders that can be identified in most of the tradition seem to have also a textual foundation, although only δ features proper errors. Once the philological inquiry, conducted on a wide portion of the textual witnesses, was completed, the impossibility of a stemma made necessary to conduct the edition based on different criteria. We have thus relied first of all on the most ancient manuscripts, dating back to the 13th century; in order to balance the fact that all of them, apart from C1, do not transmit tales 61-75, we have chosen to add to this number two German codices (B5 Ba), considering that the German group is the only one to hold this portion of the text as well, and another English manuscript, Du, in order to better represent the tradition. The critical edition thus follows a conservative approach, that mostly relies to C1, quite close to the author, but corrects its mistakes by integrating its testimony first of all with B2 C2 L4 O2 V, the most ancient manuscripts, and then B5 Ba Du, as already stated. For the portion of the text collated for the loci all the thirty-six manuscripts used in the collection itself were also included. The critical apparatus thus concerns nine codices for the whole text, thirty-six for the loci. Lastly, the edition also provides the first Italian translation of Odo’s fables and a small paragraph that, tale by tale, reminds the reader of the witnesses of the text and of other retellings available in a selection of other medieval Latin fabulists, apart from references to the principal repertoires of the genre. To sum up, this dissertation had as its purpose not only trying to account for the main literary features of the Odo’s fables collection, even if, of course, in a limited way, but also studying this work from a philological and textual point of view. We thus tried to offer a wide as possible exam of the tradition, although very complex, proposing then a new critical edition of the text that tries to overcome Hervieux’s, so as to give the reader the tools needed to approach a text as solid ad possible. We wish that, in the future, similar endeavors will be conducted for all of Odo’s works.

O presente trabalho tem como objeto de estudo o primeiro e único livro publicado por Wittgensein, seu Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Nosso tópico consiste nas dificuldades envolvidas em uma de suas teses mais centrais: a tese segundo a qual toda e qualquer proposição pode ser expressa em termos da aplicação de um operador de verdade primitivo de negação conjunta a proposições elementares. Dentre os problemas exegéticos envolvidos com o aforismo 6 e seu lugar na lógica do Tractatus, nos interessa tratar de dois grupos de questões sucitados na literatura secundária. O primeiro diz respeito à capacidade expressiva da notação do Tractatus, isto é, se podemos expressar, como afirma Wittgenstein, através da forma geral [ p, , N( )], toda função de verdade de proposições elementares apenas com “aplicações sucessivas do operador N” (5.32). O segundo grupo de questões diz respeito à possibilidade de conciliar a tese de 6 e 5.32 com o famoso resultado de que não pode haver um procediemento de decisão para todo o cálculo de predicados. No primeiro capítulo argumentaremos que a lógica do Tractatus é, em princípio, capaz de expressar qualquer proposição do cálculo de predicados de primeira ordem que contém quantificação (simples e múltipla) como resultado de um número finito de aplicações sucessivas do operador N. Defenderemos essa posição com base em uma sugestão de complemento notacional de Peter Geach que será defendida a partir de uma leitura da noção de generalidade do Tractatus, levando em conta dificuldades sucitadas contra essa posição por alguns comentadores, especialmente Robert Fogelin. No segundo capítulo argumentaremos, em um primeiro momento, que apesar de Wittgenstein estar comprometido com a decidibilidade da lógica no Tractatus, a tese de 6 e 5.32 é independente do cálculo de predicados ser decidível ou não.Em um segundo momento será argumentado (seguindo ideias sugeridas por Roger White e Michael Potter) que é uma possibilidade bastante plausível que o compromisso de Wittgenstein com a decidibilidade da lógica se fundamenta nas seguintes teses tractarianas: a)A proposição mostra seu sentido. b) O sentido de uma proposição consiste em suas condições de verdade. c) A proposição descreve a realidade completamente. Assim, mostraremos que a tese tractariana de que deve haver um procedimento de decisão para toda lógica pode estar fundamentada na concepção tractariana da compreensão do sentido proposicional.

MAGALHÃES, Tiago de Oliveira. Os papéis do psicológico na filosofia de Wittgenstein: do tractatus às investigações. 2010. 120f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2010. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-07T14:20:07Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2010-DIS-TOMAGALHAES.pdf: 968870 bytes, checksum: 91c6ca45e20937aeffd00d541bcb12fe (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo(marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2013-11-07T18:57:34Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2010-DIS-TOMAGALHAES.pdf: 968870 bytes, checksum: 91c6ca45e20937aeffd00d541bcb12fe (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-11-07T18:57:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2010-DIS-TOMAGALHAES.pdf: 968870 bytes, checksum: 91c6ca45e20937aeffd00d541bcb12fe (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 / The present study intends to enlighten the role that the reflection on psychological issues performs in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, embracing the most remarkable moments of the period that goes from his first philosophical book until his main mature work. In order to do it, the capital features of his thought are presented, so that it becomes possible to identify the function displayed by his awareness on that subject field. Thus, the development of the wittgensteinian philosophy itself is a highlighted topic. What can be noticed throughout this process is the philosopher permanent and explicit concern in making clear the structural distinction between the philosophical task and any form of scientific research on mental world, going along with a progressive enhancement of his interest on the psychological as matter of the philosophical activity. The conclusion is that both aspects are fundamental traits of Wittgentein’s thought. / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo evidenciar o papel desempenhado pela reflexão sobre o psicológico na filosofia de Ludwig Wittgenstein, abrangendo os momentos mais relevantes do período que vai de seu primeiro livro filosófico até a principal obra de sua maturidade. Com esse intuito, as principais características do pensamento do autor são expostas, de maneira que aí se possa identificar o lugar ocupado pela reflexão sobre aquele campo temático. Dessa forma, o próprio desenvolvimento da filosofia wittgensteiniana em si mesmo é um tópico em destaque. O que se observa ao longo desse processo é um permanente e explícito cuidado em tornar clara a distinção entre o trabalho filosófico e qualquer forma de pesquisa científica sobre o mundo mental, acompanhado por um progressivo aumento do interesse pelo psicológico enquanto tema da atividade filosófica. Conclui-se que ambos esses aspectos são fatores fundamentais da própria caracterização do pensamento wittgensteiniano.

O presente trabalho tem como objeto de estudo o primeiro e único livro publicado por Wittgensein, seu Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Nosso tópico consiste nas dificuldades envolvidas em uma de suas teses mais centrais: a tese segundo a qual toda e qualquer proposição pode ser expressa em termos da aplicação de um operador de verdade primitivo de negação conjunta a proposições elementares. Dentre os problemas exegéticos envolvidos com o aforismo 6 e seu lugar na lógica do Tractatus, nos interessa tratar de dois grupos de questões sucitados na literatura secundária. O primeiro diz respeito à capacidade expressiva da notação do Tractatus, isto é, se podemos expressar, como afirma Wittgenstein, através da forma geral [ p, , N( )], toda função de verdade de proposições elementares apenas com “aplicações sucessivas do operador N” (5.32). O segundo grupo de questões diz respeito à possibilidade de conciliar a tese de 6 e 5.32 com o famoso resultado de que não pode haver um procediemento de decisão para todo o cálculo de predicados. No primeiro capítulo argumentaremos que a lógica do Tractatus é, em princípio, capaz de expressar qualquer proposição do cálculo de predicados de primeira ordem que contém quantificação (simples e múltipla) como resultado de um número finito de aplicações sucessivas do operador N. Defenderemos essa posição com base em uma sugestão de complemento notacional de Peter Geach que será defendida a partir de uma leitura da noção de generalidade do Tractatus, levando em conta dificuldades sucitadas contra essa posição por alguns comentadores, especialmente Robert Fogelin. No segundo capítulo argumentaremos, em um primeiro momento, que apesar de Wittgenstein estar comprometido com a decidibilidade da lógica no Tractatus, a tese de 6 e 5.32 é independente do cálculo de predicados ser decidível ou não.Em um segundo momento será argumentado (seguindo ideias sugeridas por Roger White e Michael Potter) que é uma possibilidade bastante plausível que o compromisso de Wittgenstein com a decidibilidade da lógica se fundamenta nas seguintes teses tractarianas: a)A proposição mostra seu sentido. b) O sentido de uma proposição consiste em suas condições de verdade. c) A proposição descreve a realidade completamente. Assim, mostraremos que a tese tractariana de que deve haver um procedimento de decisão para toda lógica pode estar fundamentada na concepção tractariana da compreensão do sentido proposicional.

O presente trabalho tem como objeto de estudo o primeiro e único livro publicado por Wittgensein, seu Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Nosso tópico consiste nas dificuldades envolvidas em uma de suas teses mais centrais: a tese segundo a qual toda e qualquer proposição pode ser expressa em termos da aplicação de um operador de verdade primitivo de negação conjunta a proposições elementares. Dentre os problemas exegéticos envolvidos com o aforismo 6 e seu lugar na lógica do Tractatus, nos interessa tratar de dois grupos de questões sucitados na literatura secundária. O primeiro diz respeito à capacidade expressiva da notação do Tractatus, isto é, se podemos expressar, como afirma Wittgenstein, através da forma geral [ p, , N( )], toda função de verdade de proposições elementares apenas com “aplicações sucessivas do operador N” (5.32). O segundo grupo de questões diz respeito à possibilidade de conciliar a tese de 6 e 5.32 com o famoso resultado de que não pode haver um procediemento de decisão para todo o cálculo de predicados. No primeiro capítulo argumentaremos que a lógica do Tractatus é, em princípio, capaz de expressar qualquer proposição do cálculo de predicados de primeira ordem que contém quantificação (simples e múltipla) como resultado de um número finito de aplicações sucessivas do operador N. Defenderemos essa posição com base em uma sugestão de complemento notacional de Peter Geach que será defendida a partir de uma leitura da noção de generalidade do Tractatus, levando em conta dificuldades sucitadas contra essa posição por alguns comentadores, especialmente Robert Fogelin. No segundo capítulo argumentaremos, em um primeiro momento, que apesar de Wittgenstein estar comprometido com a decidibilidade da lógica no Tractatus, a tese de 6 e 5.32 é independente do cálculo de predicados ser decidível ou não.Em um segundo momento será argumentado (seguindo ideias sugeridas por Roger White e Michael Potter) que é uma possibilidade bastante plausível que o compromisso de Wittgenstein com a decidibilidade da lógica se fundamenta nas seguintes teses tractarianas: a)A proposição mostra seu sentido. b) O sentido de uma proposição consiste em suas condições de verdade. c) A proposição descreve a realidade completamente. Assim, mostraremos que a tese tractariana de que deve haver um procedimento de decisão para toda lógica pode estar fundamentada na concepção tractariana da compreensão do sentido proposicional.

Dans le cadre de leur interprétation phénoménologique de la pensée de Wittgenstein, Jaakko et Merrill B. Hintikka ont proposé un argument concernant la nature des objets de l’ontologie du Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Selon eux, les objets du Tractatus sont identifiables aux objets de l’épistémologie russellienne, à savoir les sense-data. Cette identification des objets tractariens aux sense-data les conduit à avancer que le symbolisme développé par Wittgenstein dans le Tractatus est un langage phénoménologique, celui dont le philosophe parle dans ses Remarques philosophiques de 1929. Dans le présent mémoire, je montre qu’il existe de bonnes raisons de douter de la vérité de la thèse des Hintikka et défends que l’interprétation non empiriste du Tractatus proposée par David Pears est plus convaincante que leur lecture phénoménologique de la philosophie du premier Wittgenstein.