The Thesis was inspired by a perceived need better to understand the unique description of unjust enrichment by the Australian courts, as a unifying legal concept. It demonstrates that concepts and principles are essential features of the common law because they identify the character and taxonomy of rules. The comparative study, encompassing Australian and English law primarily, and law of other jurisdictions, modern and ancient, elucidates the special characteristics of the concepts and principles of Anglo/Australian unjust enrichment and of concepts and principles generally. A like concept has had a place in the common law since its inception under several characterisations. It bears the mark of ancient Roman jurisprudence, but relates to independent principles. The jurisprudence was formed by special characteristics of its history. It is distinct from modern Roman/Dutch law but the doctrinal overtones of its foundational case law reflect the basis of reasoning which in Continental law, is found in the adopted ancient codes. It is this foundation of reasoning and the firm rejection of a normative general principle that makes Anglo/Australian law different in character and jurisprudence from unjust enrichment in USA and Canada. Stifled for centuries by quasi contract misconceptions, the law of unjust enrichment entered the modern law in the 20th C through the seminal judgements of Lord Wright in Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Coombe Barbour Ltd, and related cases and through the strong judicial and juristic following they inspired. That “…any civilised system of law is bound to provide remedies for … unjust enrichment…” became an imperative across the common law world: it has long held a place in the Roman Dutch jurisdictions of South Africa and Continental Europe. The special character of unjust enrichment in Anglo/Australian law is focussed upon a unique action where-by the law imposes an obligation upon the establishment of a recognised ground. The notion of breach of a primary rule does not arise: the obligation is therefore a primary obligation imposed by law, as distinct from a remedy for a breach. Important consequences flow from the characteristic. The juristic development of unjust enrichment in the common law has long been the sole prerogative of the superior courts. The place of historical features of the jurisprudence has however been subsumed by modern judicial methodology that is slowly assuming a unifying pattern of reasoning from case to case; from one ground to another. This is the special characteristic of the unifying legal concept and English principle of unjust enrichment. The thesis draws widely based conclusions about concepts and principles of unjust enrichment and the actions and obligations they sponsor. It portrays them as the substance of legal reasoning and analyses underlying theory. to this end, it addresses counter juristic and historical arguments. Its central conclusion are that there are sound jurisprudential arguments for actions based upon a unifying legal concept and English principle of unjust enrichment, and that the explanation of the unjust enrichment concept as the foundation of an independent branch of the common law and taxonomy is theoretically sustainable. In this manner concepts and principles of the common law are demonstrated as critical characteristics of the common law at large.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Breslau.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Köln.

No description available.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Berlin.

Thesis (LLM) - University of Queensland, / Includes bibliography.

Thesis (doctoral)--Philipps-Universitẗ zu Marburg.

LL.M. / Please refer to full text to view abstract

O presente estudo tem por objetivo demonstrar que, nas hipóteses em que alguém intervém na esfera jurídica alheia e obtém benefícios econômicos sem causar danos ao titular do direito ou, causando danos, o lucro obtido pelo ofensor é superior aos danos causados, as regras da responsabilidade civil, isoladamente, não são suficientes, à luz do ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, enquanto sanção eficaz pela violação de um interesse merecedor de tutela. Isto porque, como a principal função da responsabilidade civil é remover o dano, naquelas hipóteses, não fosse a utilização de um remédio alternativo, o interventor faria seu o lucro da intervenção, no primeiro caso integralmente e, no segundo, no valor equivalente ao saldo entre o lucro obtido e a indenização que tiver que pagar à vítima. A tese pretende demonstrar que o problema do lucro da intervenção não deve ser solucionado por intermédio das regras da responsabilidade civil, devendo, portanto, ser rejeitadas as propostas de solução neste campo, como a interpretação extensiva do parágrafo único, do artigo 944, do Código Civil, as indenizações punitivas e o chamado terceiro método de cálculo da indenização. Como alternativa, propõe-se o enquadramento dogmático do lucro da intervenção no enriquecimento sem causa, outorgando ao titular do direito uma pretensão de restituição do lucro obtido pelo ofensor em razão da indevida ingerência em seus bens ou direitos. Defende-se que a transferência do lucro da intervenção para o titular do direito tem por fundamento a ponderação dos interesses em jogo à luz da Constituição Federal, com especial atenção ao princípio da solidariedade, e da teoria da destinação jurídica dos bens. A tese procura demonstrar, ainda, que o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro não exige um efetivo empobrecimento do titular do direito para a configuração do enriquecimento sem causa e que a regra da subsidiariedade não impede a cumulação de ações, de responsabilidade civil para eliminar o dano (e no limite do dano), e de enriquecimento sem causa, para forçar a restituição do saldo positivo que permanecer no patrimônio do ofensor após o pagamento da indenização, se houver. Finalmente, a tese pretende provocar a discussão acerca da quantificação do objeto da restituição, propondo alguns critérios que deverão orientar o aplicador do direito. / The present study aims to demonstrate that when someone profits by interfering In: another persons rights without causing damage to the victim, or when the act does cause damage but the benefits so obtained are greater than the damage caused, tort rules alone are not enough, under Brazilian Law, as an efficient sanction for violation of an interest or right that deserves protection. Since the maIn: function of civil liability rules is to redress the damage, or make the victim whole, without an alternative remedy the wrongdoer would keep the benefits wrongfully obtained, fully In: the first case and In: the second case to the extent of the difference between the profits obtained and damages paid to the victim. I aim to show that the problem of benefits wrongfully obtained cannot be solved through tort rules alone, and some proposed measures In: this area, such as expansive interpretation of Article 944, sole paragraph, of the Civil Code, punitive damages and the so-called third method of quantifying damages should be rejected. As an alternative, I propose framing the question of benefits wrongfully obtained withIn: the rules on unjust enrichment, granting the victim the right to claim restitution of benefits obtained by the wrongdoer by interference In: the victims assets or rights. I argue that the transfer of the benefits wrongfully obtained to the victim should be based on a balance of conflicting interests In: light of the Federal Constitution, with special attention to the solidarity principle and on the theory of the juridical allocation of assets. Besides this, I argue that Brazilian law does not require the victim to suffer any kind of damage In: order to apply unjust enrichment rules and that the subsidiarity rule does not prohibit the filing of joint claims, a tort one to remedy the damage (limited to the actual damage caused) and an unjust enrichment one to force restitution of any positive balance that remains with the wrongdoer after payment of damages. Finally, I intend to stimulate discussions on how to quantify the amount of restitution In: these cases and offer some criteria that can guide judges.

A presente dissertação tem por objetivo solucionar duas questões acerca do enriquecimento sem causa. Primeiramente, busca definir se há utilidade na aplicação da figura jurídica, ou seria caso de uma regra descartável no ordenamento jurídico privado brasileiro. A partir da resposta à primeira indagação, questiona-se qual o campo de incidência da regra de vedação ao enriquecimento sem causa. Destarte, será possível formular um critério rígido, que evite a arbitrariedade do julgador na aplicação de normas abertas e cláusulas gerais. Porém, cabível um critério abrangente, vez que inclui no conceito de enriquecimento sem causa novo parâmetro, para além da posição tradicional. Para tanto, imprescindível analisar os elementos e fundamentos do enriquecimento sem causa e da subsidiariedade de maneira a evitar sua aplicação desmedida e sem critérios, ao bel-prazer do julgador. A hipótese, derradeiramente, repousa na necessidade de estabelecimento do campo de atuação da figura jurídica que fundamente o critério de aplicação no caso concreto. / The present dissertation has as a goal to solve two questions regarding the unjustified enrichment. First, it aims to define if there is any use in the application of the juridical figure or if it is the case of a disposable rule on the Brazilian private juridical order. Then, based on the answer to the first inquiry, it is questioned which is the application field for the prohibition to the unjustified enrichment. Therefore, it will be possible to formulate a rigid criterion that prevents the arbitrarity of the ruler in the applications of open norms and general terms. However, been appropriate a comprehensive criterion once it includes in the unjustified enrichment concept a new parameter, beyond the traditional understandment. For that matter, it is indispensable to analyze the elements and foundations of the unjustified enrichment and the subsidiarity in a way to prevent its unmeasured application, without any criteria and at the will of the ruler. Finally, the hypothesis lays on the necessity for the establishment of the action field of the juridical figure that justify the application criteria in the actual case.