Cette thèse se fixe comme tâche d’examiner la manière originale et inédite par laquelle Maurice Blondel revisite les preuves classiques de l’existence de Dieu, principalement, l’argument ontologique. Cet argument occupe, chez notre auteur, une place prépondérante, et constitue un moment essentiel dans le développement de sa doctrine. C’est une approche qui se comprend comme un retour à une doctrine ancienne (Cf. l’argument d’Anselme), mais en même temps comme une élaboration originale. De ce point de vue, la lecture suivie de L’Action laisse entrevoir trois axes d’interprétations de l’argument ontologique que notre thèse entend mettre en lumière.D’abord, Blondel relit les preuves de l’existence de Dieu dans la perspective de la dialectique de la volonté dont elles amorcent le « troisième moment » conflictuel, avant que le conflit ne se résolve en alternative ou en option. Car, il y a toujours une inadéquation entre ce qui est voulu et le dynamisme qui, en nous, est le principe du vouloir c’est-à-dire entre ce qu’il appelle la volonté voulue et la volonté voulante. En conséquence, c’est en vue de l’Unique nécessaire que Blondel ébauche une synergie des preuves et renouvelle, en quelque sorte, l’argument ontologique pour montrer que chaque homme y est inévitablement embarqué.Ensuite le recours « à un inconnu inaccessible, dont la présence est pourtant pressentie sans être encore reconnue » ou la référence explicite à des expressions apophatiques pour parler de l’Être ou de l’Absolu manifeste clairement un recours symptomatique à la théologie négative comme il le reconnaît, à la suite du Pseudo-Denys que « l’affirmation est moins juste, et la négation plus vraie », et d’autant plus qu’il ajoute : « c’est le néant qui le confesse ». Or, cette donnée n’affaiblit en rien la pertinence de la preuve, car Blondel en fait une véritable expérience spirituelle.Enfin la conséquence qu’il tire de cette relecture, en insistant sur la portée philosophique de l’option, constitue le lieu privilégié qui confirme bien que cette approche n’a pas pour visée la pleine possession de l’Être, mais une ouverture, une préparation nécessaire de notre indigence à admettre et à affirmer cette existence de Dieu. Car, pour chaque existence, « cette preuve est, moins une vue qu’une vie » et que suivant une influence de la preuve cartésienne « celle-ci n’est absolue que là où il y a idée parfaite de la perfection même, là où l’essence est réelle et l’existence idéale. Dans ces conditions, l’idée de Dieu, de l’Être est comme réfractée, conditionnée, obscurcie par notre imperfection. Cependant, elle nous contraint à affirmer, du lieu où somme toute elle n’est pas, sa réalité, sa perfection.À partir d’une reconsidération des articulations de la preuve dans L’Action, notre thèse aura eu comme tâche d’élucider la portée et la pertinence de ces trois axes qui constituent l’originalité de la lecture blondélienne de l’argument ontologique. / This thesis has set itself the task of reviewing the new and original way in which Maurice Blondel revisits the classic proofs of God’s existence, mainly, the ontological argument. This argument holds, in our author, a prominent place, and is a key moment in the development of his doctrine. It is an approach that makes sense as a return to an old doctrine (See the Anselm’s argument ), but at the same time as an original development. From this point of view, reading followed by L’Action suggests three lines of interpretations of the ontological argument that our thesis intends to highlight.Firstly, Blondel reread the proofs of God’s existence from the perspective of the dialectic of the will they begin the third time conflict before the conflict will be resolved in alternative or optional. Because, there is always a mismatch between what is wanted and dynamism which, in us, is the principle of the will that is to say between what he calls the necessary will and determination voulante. Consequently, it is for the One need Blondel draft synergy evidence and renewed, in a way, the ontological argument to show that every man is inevitably embedded.Then use an inaccessible stranger, whose presence is sensed without being yet still recognized or the explicit reference to apophatiques expressions to speak of Being or the Absolute manifests clearly symptomatic use of negative theology as acknowledges, following the Pseudo-Dionysius that “the statement is less just, and truest denial”, and especially as he adds, “ it is the nothingness that confess.” However , this data does not weaken in any way the relevance of the evidence , because Blondel makes a truly spiritual experience.Finally he draws the consequence of this replay, emphasizing the philosophical significance of the option, which is the central authority confirms that this approach has not referred to the full possession of Being, but an opening, a necessary preparation to admit our poverty and affirm the existence of God. For each existence, " the evidence is less a view that a life " and following the influence of the Cartesian evidence " it is absolute that where there is perfect idea of perfection , there where gasoline is real and the ideal existence . In these circumstances, the idea of God, of Being is refracted as conditioned , darkened by our imperfection . However, it forces us to state , after all, the place where it is not , its reality, its perfection.From a reconsideration of the joints of proof in L'Action, our thesis has had the task of clarifying the scope and relevance of these three areas which constitute the originality of the Blondel reading the ontological argument.

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published_or_final_version / Psychology / Master / Master of Philosophy

One of the most significant questions in ethics is this: under what conditions are people morally responsible for what they do? Assuming that people can only be praised or blamed for actions they perform of their own free will, the particular question that interests me is how we should understand the nature of this freedom – with what kind of freedom must people act, if they are to be morally responsible for what they do? A natural answer to this question – and the one I think is correct – is to point to the freedom to do otherwise. This is encapsulated in the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), the principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. PAP has led many to believe that the freedom required for moral responsibility must be incompatible with determinism or the existence of God because it is plausible to argue that if determinism is true or if God exists, then people would lack genuine freedom of choice and hence could not be morally responsible for their behavior. In the light of two important articles by Harry Frankfurt almost four decades ago, which challenged the claim that moral responsibility requires the freedom to do otherwise, compatibilism – the opposing view that the freedom for moral responsibility is compatible with determinism – has experienced a resurgence. Inspired by Frankfurt’s work, those wanting to reject PAP – typically compatibilists – attack the principle on two main grounds: directly and indirectly. First, they have argued directly that PAP is false by developing alleged counterexamples to it. Second, they have challenged PAP indirectly by arguing that there are alternative conceptions of freedom from freedom of choice that, it is claimed, are not reliant on alternative possibilities but are sufficient to capture the freedom required for moral responsibility. My dissertation evaluates these two lines of attack on PAP. In particular, I attempt to defend the truth of PAP against both kinds of challenge. / text

1998 Dozier Award Winner / It is widely recognized that the role of the physician has undergone dramatic changes in the last century changes which have serous implications for the patient-physician relationship. This is an ethnographic study examining how certain changes in the role and abilities of biomedical physicians have affected patient attitudes and expectations about end-of-life care. In-home interviews were conducted with eighteen persons age fifty-five and older, including a sample of Hemlock Society members. Results indicate a broad spectrum of end-of-life concerns including capacity, autonomy, pain, and burden to loved ones. Most participants reported a reluctance to begin a discussion of death or future deteriorating capacity with their physicians. Instead, when conversations about death were reported, they had been largely limited to the scenarios of catastrophic illness (e.g., hospitalization, ventilator, etc.) and the Living Will. While this discussion does not overlook the utility of the Living Will, it proposes that reliance on this document for preparing patients for end-of-life care is inadequate.

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One of the purposes of this thesis is to try to examine the concepts of mental sickness and responsibility (and some other related concepts) and see whether or not they can be defended against some of the criticisms that have been made against them. It has, for instance, been argued that the concept mental sickness is culture relative in a bad sense. If this criticism is valid, then we cannot be justified in saying that mental sickness has impaired a person's responsibility. Another criticism that has been made is that arguments that use mental sickness to explain and excuse criminal behaviour are circular. Most of the criticisms that I have discussed are intended to be general, i.e. they are criticisms of the concept of mental disorder im general, not just of a particular kind of mental disorder. Thus though Lady Wootton says that arguments that try to explain the psychopath's anti-social behaviour are circular, she thinks (at least in her more radical moments) that the circular process prevails in other mental disorders as well (e.g. with mental defectives. See <u>Social Science and Social Pathology</u>, page 256 ff.). Similarly, the argument that different standards of mental defect prevail in different cultures, and that therefore there is something wrong with the concept of mental defect, is intended to be (at least in her more radical moments) a general one, i.e. it is intended to apply, <u>mutatis mutandis</u> against other kinds of mental disorders also.

This dissertation focuses on The Ring Net, a documentary exhibition by the artist Will Maclean. The Ring Net is a collection of drawings, photographs and printed plans numbering more than three hundred and forty items, which was originally shown at the 'Third Eye Centre, Glasgow in 1978. It subsequently toured to various venues, mostly in Scotland, and was later bought by The Scottish National Gallery of Modern Art, Edinburgh where it is presently held. The project is based on a particular method of sea fishing which used to be practised on the West Coast of Scotland. The subject of fishing is a consistent feature in the work of Maclean, although this particular undertaking is somewhat unusual as the artist has chosen a documentary approach. The initial period of research for the project was enabled by an Edinburgh-based charitable organisation, the Scottish International Education Trust. The artist continued to work on the project for some time afterwards, and the eventual exhibition was not shown until four and a half years later. The aim of this dissertation is to look at The Ring Net in its context. The period of its making is explored in some depth, as is the showing of the project at the Third Eye Centre and the various venues included in its tour. Though the methods and media used in The Ring Net are discussed, they do not constitute the main objective of the work. More space has been devoted to the documentary aspect of the project and the effect this had on the finished result. Unpublished sources such as a series of letters from the artist to a collaborator in Kintyre have been used to some extent.

In philosophy the 'free will question' viz., "do we have free will by which we can freely perform an action of our own?" has been the cause and interest of one of the oldest debates of philosophy. The historical background of the 'free will debate' and of its participants can be traced back to the philosophy of Hellenistic (era) that covers the Peripatetic, Epicurean and Stoics schools. Then, it is extended from the Medieval tradition (St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas and so on) through the Modern (era) philosophy (the Cartesian, the Empiricists and the Common Sense Schools) to the Contemporary philosophy of action. Almost all philosophers of these schools have either directly or indirectly been involved in the debate. Today what we have inherited from this debate, which still continues, is three main doctrines. These are: 'libertarianism', 'determinism', 'compatibilism' (or 'soft determinism'). In fact all these doctrines give rise to the idea that today "there is no single philosophical problem that is the problem of free will. There are rather a great many philosophical problems about free will." (01). This thesis, in the historical frame that has been given above, shall undertake the evaluation of the free will question in "Thomas Reid's (1710-1796) philosophy of action' in the eighteenth century 'Scottish School of Common Sense'. Thus it aims to show the dimensions of Reid's contributions to the free will debate as regards his 'approach', 'method', 'suggestions', 'solutions', 'originality' and his 'influence' on other philosophers.