In the wake of the 2001 anthrax attacks in the US, States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention started to discuss the potential malign application of biological research and technology. This thesis examines how this issue of dual-use has been developed, discussed, and how solutions have been proposed. In order to do so, the thesis follows a neopragmatist approach. As a neopragmatist methodology is largely underdeveloped, the thesis explores some of the key aspects of neopragmatism, specifically its openness to various methods and theories, by directly applying it to the topic. As a result of this approach, the thesis starts with exploratory empirical research, which follows Bruno Latour’s Actor Network Theory. This research reviews how the problem of dual-use has been discussed in three communities: politics and security, ethics, and science. One of the results is that dual-use has primarily been discussed in the security community while the other two were only marginally involved. The proposed solution to the problem by the security community is to place the burden of responsibility on the scientific community. The second part of the thesis then uses theory, Niklas Luhmann’s social systems theory and Martin Heidegger’s work on questioning technology, to critically challenge this solution developed in the security community. The thesis concludes by identifying approaches to help deal with the dual-use issue. It also examines how the adoption of a neopragmatist methodology has influenced and guided the thesis.

Traditionally, the concept of cognition has been tied to the brain or the nervous system. Recent work in various noncomputational cognitive sciences has enlarged the category of “cognitive phenomena” to include the organism and its environment, distributed cognition across networks of actors, and basic cellular functions. The meaning, scope, and limits of ‘cognition’ are no longer clear or well-defined. In order to properly delimit the purview of the cognitive sciences, there is a strong need for a clarification of the definition of cognition. This paper will consider the outer bounds of that definition. Not all cognitive behaviors of a given organism are amenable to an analysis at the organismic or organism-environment level. In some cases, emergent cognition in collective biological and human social systems arises that is irreducible to the sum cognitions of their constituent entities. The group and social systems under consideration are more extensive and inclusive than those considered in studies of distributed cognition to date. The implications for this ultimately expand the purview of the cognitive sciences and bring back a renewed relevance for anthropology and introduce sociology on the traditional six-pronged interdisciplinary wheel of the cognitive sciences.

This work examines the relationship between Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy and the nonlinear dynamical systems framework for studying cognition. I argue that the nonlinear dynamical systems approach to cognitive science presupposes many key elements of his process philosophy. The process philosophical interpretation of nature posits events and the dynamic relations between events as the fundamental substrate of reality, as opposed to static physical substances. I present a brief history of the development of substance thought before describing Whitehead’s characterization of nature as a process. In following, I will examine the both the computational and nonlinear dynamical systems frameworks for investigating cognition. I will show that the computational paradigm is subject to many of the same criticisms as substance. Conversely, I will show that nonlinear dynamical cognitive science avoids these criticisms and is congenial to Whitehead’s philosophy insofar as it is suitable for describing emergent processes. To conclude, I suggest that the nonlinear dynamical cognitive science confirms and validates Whitehead’s philosophy. Furthermore, I argue that process philosophy is an appropriate characterization of nature for guiding inquiry in cognitive science.

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