abstract: Cancer has a financial impact worldwide. According to a study published by the American Cancer Society, “cancer accounts for 1.5% of global gross domestic product loss per year” (John & Ross, 2010). The legal and economic costs of death are not something normally addressed with patients prior to the occurrence of death. With an integrative approach, education may help reduce financial stressors for both the patient and family, while offering cost saving benefits to the facilities involved. Studies have shown that education pertaining to advanced care planning help to reduce hospital visits and the costs associated with the last six months of life. Integrating additional education in the form of legal and financial planning prior to death will benefit patients. This may benefit hospitals concurrently, by reducing hospital visits or length of stays, saving millions in Medicare costs to the hospital. Hospitals currently focus on the emotional, spiritual and intellectual needs of the patient post diagnosis of a terminal illness. Education related to funeral planning, preparing a will, and financial preparedness need to be included in the structured patient education offered at facilities. Individuals that have a higher socioeconomic status are typically more prepared for the costs associated with death. Offering financial education will allow more individuals experiencing the terminal diagnosis to prepare for their impending death. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Integrative Social Science 2020

Loving God is our highest perfection for Leibniz. It secures our belief and trust in the Creator, which is integral to the sciences as well as faith. Those who love God have justification for reasoning, that is, they can rationally expect to arrive at truth. This is because love is a receptivity to the perfection all of things; loving God, then, is a disposition and tendency toward the most perfect being, the ens perfectissimum. Individuals who perceive the divine nature “do not merely fear the power of the supreme and all-seeing monarch,” Leibniz writes, “but are assured of his beneficence, and lastly—and what brings everything together—burn with a love of God above all else.”1 In my dissertation, I argue that Leibniz’s qualification should be taken seriously: love of God “brings everything together.” The subject of my dissertation can be stated schematically. It consists of two pairs of claims, one pair philosophical, the other theological: A moral quality is required to secure our reason. From a most perfect unity, a moral quality follows. Love of God is our highest perfection. Love of God secures our reasoning. Both concern the security of reason, by which I mean the rational motivation for reasoning itself. They are reasons we ought to expect reasoning to lead to truth. Yet they do not form a tight demonstration: while an inference is clearly at work in the first pair, there are no inferences in the second. Also, there is a distinction between a moral quality and love for God. Unless they are identified, Leibniz’s philosophy and theology secure reasoning apart from one another. In 1686, Leibniz wrote his well-known “Discourse on Metaphysics.” A few months after, he composed a theological treatise, Examination of the Christian Religion. These texts, I argue, should be read side by side, and the first chapter compares how divine perfection secures our reasoning in both texts. Some Moderns’ notion of perfection—namely, Descartes’, Spinoza’s, and Malebranche’s—fail to secure our reasoning because their views entail arbitrariness in the world and the divine nature. But a proper sense of perfection, one that includes a moral quality, secures our reasoning by ensuring that everything is amenable to reason. Descartes also sought to secure our reasoning, and for the second and third chapters I compare his account with Leibniz’s own, then draw out the latter’s criticisms. For Descartes, the deity’s moral quality is characterized by an indifferent will, which is eminently and formally revealed throughout creation. Although recognizing the infinite source of all things directs our attention appropriate in the Cartesian system, Leibniz criticizes Descartes’ detached and indifferent God. When our disposition toward God is not characterized by love, we are less rational than otherwise. Leibniz finds intolerable moral implications in the Cartesian system, and I work out these implications in chapter three. Descartes’ criteria of true and false ideas does not settle dispute, but relies on “interior testimony.” Proper reasoning, then, does not tend toward unity among persons, and this is especially problematic in religious debate. Descartes’ method is Stoic, which also leads to trouble when it comes to church unity: one remains in the church by a sheer act of will, which can violate reason. Leibniz views such a detachment of faith and reasoning as dangerous, besides impoverishing the concept of reason altogether. Leibniz’s notions of God and perfection secure our reason by engendering love for God. “Discourse” and Examen begin with a moral disposition and tendency. In the last chapter, I argue that this is the case by considering two criteria Leibniz adopts—his test for perfection and the kinds of knowledge—as well as the foundation of his logic at the time. Leibniz can tolerate provisional beginnings, hypothetical truths, and original sin because of his robust conception of love. He distinguishes two ways we love God: spes, or hope, is a disposition or tendency to natural perfection, and caritas, or esteem, affection, or love, regards divine perfection. These states orient us according to the divine plan. Miracles are within the world as an effect of the deity’s moral quality: they are a means God personally relates to rational beings. Miracles reveal the moral effects of our perception of phenomena generally, included the regularity observed and classified by science. So, to conclude, I compare Leibniz’s discussion of revelation in Examen with his discussion of miracles in “Discourse” to draw out the significance of miracles for him. Besides much debate on the implications of miracles for his conception of substance, I argue that there is a moral motivation for retaining miracles, even those of the second rank.

In this essay I evaluate the legality of Karl Popper’s criticism against psychoanalysis, regarding this theory of Freud’s being pseudoscientific. Popper’s criticism is based on his theory of demarcation in which he states that an empirical theory must be possible to test by observations in order to be, as most important is, hypothetically possible to falsify based on other empirical statements – often in the form of new found facts that contradict the original statement/theory. In purpose of assessing Popper’s criticism I perform a modified idea analysis, based on a book by Evert Vedung (1977). By referring both to Popper and to spokespersons of psychoanalysis I structure the arguments pro and contra Popper’s criticism, in order to then weigh these arguments against each other. My main conclusion is that psychoanalysis, regardless of Popper’s criticism, is in fact an empirical theory since it can be internally validated based on the observations made by a psychoanalyst. But according to the theory of demarcation psychoanalysis can not be tested based on observations, probably because Popper by ”observations” meant only those that can be made and validated by independent scientists.

This work deals with the introduction of the constructivist school of thought and its comparison with the theory of scientific revolutions and the concept of the paradigm of Thomas Kuhn. In this work, constructivism is represented by radical interpretations of Foerster, Maturana and Varela. These are then confronted with Kuhn's interpretation of scientific revolutions. At the end of the thesis I argue that Kuhn's concept of the paradigm can be interpreted as typically constructivist. In the context of the main line of interpretation of this work, I also critically evaluate motives such as reality, the possibility of true knowledge and related ethical consequences. Key words: constructivism, knowledge, truth, philosophy of science, paradigm

<p>This dissertation is concerned with two of the largest questions that we can ask about the nature of physical reality: first, whether physical reality begin to exist and, second, what criteria would physical reality have to fulfill in order to have had a beginning? Philosophers of religion and theologians have previously addressed whether physical reality began to exist in the context of defending the Kal{\'a}m Cosmological Argument (KCA) for theism, that is, (P1) everything that begins to exist has a cause for its beginning to exist, (P2) physical reality began to exist, and, therefore, (C) physical reality has a cause for its beginning to exist. While the KCA has traditionally been used to argue for God's existence, the KCA does not mention God, has been rejected by historically significant Christian theologians such as Thomas Aquinas, and raises perennial philosophical questions -- about the nature and history of physical reality, the nature of time, the nature of causation, and so on -- that should be of interest to all philosophers and, perhaps, all humans. While I am not a religious person, I am interested in the questions raised by the KCA. In this dissertation, I articulate three necessary conditions that physical reality would need to fulfill in order to have had a beginning and argue that, given the current state of philosophical and scientific inquiry, we cannot determine whether physical reality began to exist.</p>

Tesis por compendio / [EN] Amartya Sen's Capability Approach (CA) makes an important contribution to the development literature. It moves from the conventional focus on a single indicator: opulence, to an emphasis on people, their plurality, and the multiple dimensions characterizing their quality of life. As such, it proposes an influential account of human beings and their agency. Its advantages notwithstanding, its notion of agency seems to warrant in depth scrutiny. This dissertation explores the actual scope of the CA's agency as well as its limitations, and suggests a way to complement it. An account of the capabilitarian agent encompasses two elements: freedom or choice and rationality or reasoning. Thus, the CA rejects the conventional rational agent, advancing instead a reasoning one. As such, the CA's agency seems to require attention to measurement and explanation (observables) as well as to meaning and interpretation (unobservables), which demands moving beyond a positivistic philosophy of science. At the same time, it is found that this notion seems to leave people who have others choosing and reasoning for them unaccounted for. To provide a complement the CA on both counts, John Dewey's pragmatism is proposed. It is a philosophy that provides an account of how people think and act. The elaboration of pragmatic agency is carried out from philosophical ontology. Pragmatism is located within the analyticist philosophy of science, as it adheres to mind-world monism and phenomenalism. While the former is evidenced in its concept of transaction, suggesting the mutual constitution of humans and their contexts, the latter is evidenced in its attention to objects, which are anything that a person notices (including in-principle unobservables). The meanings of objects are expressed in terms of action and depend on habits, which are predispositions for actions and, as such, more intimate and informative than choices. Pragmatism, therefore, encompasses more than reflective action.. Accounting for the pragmatic transagent, thus, requires the scrutiny of objects and habits, which implies the inclusion of meaning and interpretation. Consequently, it is found that the CA's reasoning agent can benefit from the inclusion of in-principle unbservables by dint of pragmatic objects and habits, enhance the elements constituting individuals with these same elements, make sense of the nature and function of values and preferences, and enrich its account of the relation between individuals and their context by dint of pragmatic transaction. Therefore, the pragmatic transagent can account for the groups dropped by the CA. Additionally, pragmatism can complement the CA in other aspects. Concerning ontology, while the CA has abstained from addressing ontological issues, pragmatism is found to adhere to an analyticist philosophy of science, which seems to agree with the CA's reasoning agent and its constituting elements: choice (observables) and reasoning (unobservables). As for empirical issues, the CA has supported its flexibility on a lay understanding of pragmatism, since it seems to maintain positivist traces. Subscribing to it philosophically could prove beneficial. Apropos of freedom, pragmatism's naturalist philosophy can contribute to alleviate the CA's focus on choice and to account for the continuity of behavior, encompassing non-reflective as well as reflective action, seemingly the main focus of the CA. With respect to democracy, pragmatism casts a wider net than the CA applying democracy to all levels of human association, not only society or the state, which seems to be the CA's concern. Finally, as regards normativity, although both are consequentialist, while the CA holds freedom and achievement as the end, pragmatism advances solely action. These are not incompatible positions. To the extent that the CA can further action, a pragmatic capability approach can accommodate regarding development as freedom. / [ES] El Enfoque de Capacidad (EC) de Amartya Sen hace una importante contribución a la literatura del desarrollo. Se mueve del enfoque convencional en un único indicador: opulencia, a un énfasis en la gente, su pluralidad, y las múltiples dimensiones que caracterizan su calidad de vida. Así, propone una explicación de los seres humanos y su agencia. Sin perjuicio de sus ventajas, su noción de agencia parece merecer estudio a profundidad. Esta disertación explora el alcance real de la agencia del EC así como sus limitaciones, y sugiere una forma de complementarla. Una elaboración del agente capacitario abarca dos elementos: libertad o elección y racionalidad o razonamiento. Así, el EC rechaza al agente racional convencional y promueve uno razonante. Por tanto, la agencia del EC parece requerir atención a la medición y explicación (observables) así como al significado e interpretación (inobservables), lo que demanda moverse más allá de una filosofía de la ciencia positivista. Al mismo tiempo, se encuentra que esta noción parece dejar gente que tiene a otros eligiendo y razonando por ellos sin explicación. Para brindar un complemento al EC en ambos aspectos, se propone el pragmatismo de John Dewey. Es una filosofía con una propuesta de cómo la gente piensa y actúa. La elaboración de la agencia pragmática se hace desde la ontología filosófica. El pragmatismo se ubica como una filosofía de la ciencia analiticista pues adopta el monismo mente-mundo y el fenomenalismo. Mientras el primero se evidencia en su concepto de transacción, sugiriendo una mutua constitución entre humanos y contextos, el segundo lo hace en su atención a objetos, todo lo que una persona nota (incluyendo en principio inobservables). El significado de los objetos se expresa en términos de acción y dependen de hábitos, que son predisposiciones para acciones y, por tanto, son más íntimos e informativos que las elecciones. Así, se abarca más que la acción reflexiva. Explicar al transagente pragmático requiere el estudio de objetivos y hábitos, lo que implica la inclusión de significados e interpretación. Consecuentemente, se encuentra que el agente razonante del EC puede beneficiarse de la inclusión de en principio inobservables mediante los objetos y hábitos pragmáticos, ampliar los elementos que constituyen a los individuos con los mismos elementos, darle sentido a la naturaleza y función de valores y preferencias, y enriquecer su explicación de la relación entre individuos y su contexto mediante la transacción pragmática. Por tanto, el transagente pragmático puede incluir grupos abandonados por el EC. Adicionalmente, el pragmatismo puede complementar al EC en otros aspectos. Sobre la ontología, mientras el EC se ha abstenido de tratar temas ontológicos, el pragmatismo se adhiere a una filosofía de las ciencias analiticista, que parece coincidir con el agente razonante del EC y sus elementos constitutivos: elección (observables) y razonamiento (inobservables). Con respecto a asuntos empíricos, el EC ha basado su flexibilidad en un entendimiento inexperto del pragmatismo, ya que parece mantener rastros positivistas. Suscribirse a su filosofía puede resultar beneficioso. A propósito de la libertad, la filosofía naturalista del pragmatismo puede ayudar a aliviar la atención del EC a la elección y abordar la continuidad del comportamiento, abarcando acción no reflexiva y reflexiva, que parece ser el énfasis del EC. Sobre la democracia, el pragmatismo amplía la red más allá que el EC al aplicar la democracia a todos los niveles de asociación humana, no solo la sociedad y el estado, que parece ser el interés del EC. Finalmente, acerca de la normatividad, aunque ambos son consecuencialistas, mientras el EC propone las capacidad y funcionamientos como fines, el pragmatismo promueve la acción. Estas no son posiciones incompatibles. En la medida en que el EC pueda avanzar la acción, un enfoque de capacidad pragmático puede alojar considerar al desarrollo como libertad. / [CA] L'Enfocament de Capacitat (EC) d'Amartya Sen fa una important contribucio a la lliteratura del desenroll. Se mou de l'enfocament convencional en un unic indicador: opulencia, a un emfatis en la gent, la seua pluralitat, i les multiples dimensions que caracterisen la seua calitat de vida. Aixina, propon una explicacio dels sers humans i la seua agencia. Sense perjuï de les seues ventages, la seua nocio d'agencia sembla mereixer estudi a fondaria. Esta dissertacio explora l'alcanç real de l'agencia de l'EC aixina com les seues llimitacions, i sugerix una forma de complementar-la. Una elaboracio de l'agent capacitat albarca dos elements: llibertat o eleccio i racionalitat o raonament. Aixina, l'EC rebuja a l'agent racional convencional i promou un raonant. Per tant, l'agencia de l'EC sembla requerir atencio a la medicio i explicacio (observables) aixina com al significat i interpretacio (inobservables), lo que demanda moure's mes alla d'una filosofia de la ciencia positivista. Al mateix temps, se troba que esta nocio sembla deixar gent que te a atres triant i raonant per ells sense explicacio. Per a brindar un complement a l'EC en abdos aspectes, se propon el pragmatisme de John Dewey. Es una filosofia en una proposta de com la gent pensa i actua. L'elaboracio de l'agencia pragmatica se fa des de l'ontologia filosofica. El pragmatisme s'ubica com una filosofia de la ciencia analiticist puix adopta el monisme ment-mon i el fenomenalisme. Mentres el primer s'evidencia en el seu concepte de transaccio, sugerint una mutua constitucio entre humans i contexts, el segon ho fa en la seua atencio a objectes, tot lo que una persona nota (incloent en principi inobservables). El significat dels objectes s'expressa en termens d'accio i depenen d'habits, que son predisposicions per a accions i, per tant, son mes intims i informatius que les eleccions. Aixina, se compren mes que l'accio reflexiva. Explicar al transagent pragmatic requerix l'estudi d'objectius i habits, lo que implica l'inclusio de significats i interpretacio. Conseqüentment, se troba que l'agent raonant de l'EC pot beneficiar-se de l'inclusio d'en principi inobservables mediant els objectes i habits pragmatics, ampliar els elements que constituixen als individus en els mateixos elements, donar-li sentit a la naturalea i funcio de valors i preferencies, i enriquir la seua explicacio de la relacio entre individus i el seu context mediant la transaccio pragmatica. Per tant, el transagent pragmatic pot incloure grups abandonats per l'EC. Adicionalment, el pragmatisme pot complementar a l'EC en atres aspectes. Sobre l'ontologia, mentres l'EC s'ha abstingut de tractar temes ontologics, el pragmatisme s'adherix a una filosofia de les ciencies analiticist, que sembla coincidir en l'agent raonant de l'EC i els seus elements constitutius: eleccio (observables) i raonament (inobservables). En respecte a assunts empirics, l'EC ha basat la seua flexibilitat en un enteniment inexpert del pragmatisme, ya que sembla mantindre rastres positivistes. Subscriure's a la seua filosofia pot resultar beneficios. A proposit de la llibertat, la filosofia naturalista del pragmatisme pot ajudar a aliviar l'atencio de l'EC a l'eleccio i abordar la continuïtat del comportament, comprenent accio no reflexiva i reflexiva, que sembla ser el emfatis de l'EC. Sobre la democracia, el pragmatisme amplia la xarcia mes alla que l'EC a l'aplicar la democracia a tots els nivells d'associacio humana, no nomes la societat i l'estat, que sembla ser l'interes de l'EC. Finalment, al voltant de la normativitat, encara que abdos son conseqüèncialistes, mentres l'EC propon les capacitat i funcionaments com fins, el pragmatisme promou l'accio. Estes no son posicions incompatibles. En la mesura en que l'EC puga alvançar l'accio, un enfocament de capacitat pragmatica pot estajar considerar al desenroll com llibertat. / Garcés Velástegui, PF. (2020). Towards a pragmatic capability approach: Essays on human development, agency and pragmatism [Tesis doctoral no publicada]. Universitat Politècnica de València. https://doi.org/10.4995/Thesis/10251/153796 / TESIS / Compendio

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The goal of this paper is to illustrate the real effects of maintaining an inaccurate and conflated view of the relationship between ‘sex’ and ‘gender,’ and to provide possible solutions to this quandary by analyzing the sources in both philosophy and the social sciences. The terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ are often rife with misunderstanding in the scientific and medical community, as well as in common usage. While neither term means the same thing contextually, both are constructed socially and require refinement for their usage in and outside of the scientific community. ‘Sex’ and ‘gender’ ought to be understood as interconnected socially constructed concepts, rather than hierarchically at odds where speculations about sex are valued greater than those on gender. A pluralistic, contextual understanding of both sex and gender as well as a clearer understanding of biological sex as an equally socially informed (and thus fallible) concept should be adopted to prevent possible harms as well as missuses of either term. The conflation of the terms within the medical community has significant consequences on some of the most vulnerable identities, particularly transgender people and especially trans people of color. The eventual delivery of poor health outcomes for trans people first begins with the fundamental definitions for ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ in the medical literature, as well as the medical literature’s basic understanding of non-normative sexuality. As a result, medical school education does not provide physicians in training with the adequate tools to provide care for trans people, or anyone outside the spectrum of accepted normative sexuality (heteronormative sexuality), and in addition primes them to further perpetuate and reinforce stigma. Possible solutions to this systemic medical injustice are to incorporate a pluralistic understanding of sex and gender to revise the medical literature, as well as going beyond simple cultural competency training for physicians and instead completely innovate how sexuality and sexual identity is taught in medical school education. / Urban Bioethics