自1980年代以來，中共海軍展開了現代化工程。美國無疑是亞太地區安全的關鍵性角色，由於中美兩國存在戰略上的衝突，美國藉由駐軍、美日安保形成對中共的圍堵，其中美國海軍扮演了重要角色，因此中共海軍現代不乏對此一戰略態勢的回應。綜觀目前中共海軍的現代化發展，將使中共擁有「局部制海權」與「有效核嚇阻」的能力，提高美國介入東亞局勢的風險。對美國的影響包含兩個層面：其一，美國在東亞地區領導與影響能力將會縮小；其二，美國的軍事戰略優勢將受到挑戰。

海軍主要的活動空間在於廣闊浩瀚的海洋，尤其絕大部分在公海，故具備可在和平時期自由跨出國門、馳騁大洋之特性，遂行支持國家外交政策之任務，並被賦予「國際軍種」之地位。且由於海軍除扮演軍事角色外，並具備警察與外交之功能。故有關海軍在境外遂行非戰爭軍事行動任務，以及各類對外交往、裝備技術援贈、支援涉外科考與聯合軍演等活動，都屬於海軍外交的範疇。 近年來中共隨著外交政策與國際環境的改變，海軍外交的內容擴展到艦艇互訪、兼具經濟與外交考量的裝備技術援贈，尤其在海洋與領土主權爭議浮上檯面，「台灣問題」與「南沙問題」成為中共亟待解決的重大事項情況下，其開始運用相對優勢的海軍軍力，展現以武力為後盾解決爭議的企圖，這是海軍外交朝向非友好方向運用的轉變，也是中共海軍外交運用的另一個新面向。 未來隨領導人對於海軍任務能力的要求，無論在範圍與性質等方面更甚以往，尤其隨著非傳統安全領域威脅日漸受到重視，中共海軍外交的實施手段更見多元、範圍更廣泛，合作對象也將擴及到更多國家。

冷戰結束之後，亞太地區的情勢因蘇聯內部共黨勢力的瓦解，而美國也因內部經濟問題無法負擔龐大的軍事費用而逐漸退出亞太，造成亞太地區的權力真空。這段期間內，中共已從1979年後的改革開放中取得綜合國力的提升，使中共得以在亞太地區竄起，逐漸發展成為區域強權，到現在被視為是美國潛在對手的世界強權。 中共之所以能取得今天的地位，主要靠的就是經濟的持續成長，然成長的動力乃來自於對能源之需求。目前中共為僅次於美國的全球第二大石油消費國，不過，這背後卻是高度依賴進口石油，其中80 %是經印度洋、麻六甲海峽及南海運抵大陸。從安全及經濟戰略的角度切入，中共沒有不掌握南海控制權的理由。這也道出後冷戰時期國家戰略的轉變，逐漸從陸地轉為重視海上的主權與安全，由此，中共在南海戰略布局，建立海軍基地，正是為了維護在南海的利益。 　　然而這樣的利益卻因為南海議題至終仍僵持不下，影響中共在南海戰略的目標與規畫，例如1982年的海洋公約法各自宣布經濟海域之範圍，使得各國主權的行使上具有相互重疊的部分，加上南海區域所蘊含著可觀的石油資源和航線價值，導致各個當事國皆不願放棄其主權的擁有。更不用說是境外勢力的介入，都使得南海問題變得更加複雜，進而改變中共在南海的戰略。 　　由此，本文將從這個錯綜複雜的問題中，先探討南海爭議的源頭與脈絡，有助於了解中共制定南海政策的背景。其次再從政治、經濟以及軍事方面來分析中共在南海的意圖和戰略，包括了在海南設立海軍基地、加速發展潛艦和航母等，研究中共海軍建軍的進程與南海戰略之關係。最後，再評估中共的南海戰略對區域安全所造成的衝擊，以及如何影響周邊國家和區外國家的行為。 / After the Cold War, there is no strong power in the Asia Pacific region as a result of the collapse of the communist Soviet Union while the United States (U.S.) had the economic problem which also made it to withdraw forces from that region. During this timeframe, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has improved its overall national power by reforms and transformations since 1979 which gave it opportunity to raise and become regional superpower and is being recognized as a potential global superpower and adversary to the U.S. 　　PRC gained today’s position mainly through its continued economic growth and its growing momentum is constructed upon the energy requirement. Currently, PRC is the second largest oil consumer besides the U.S. and is heavily dependent upon the imports in which 80 percent come from the Indian Ocean, Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. From the security and economics point of view, there is no reason PRC should give up the control of the South China Sea which explains its national strategy has shifted from continent thinking to focusing on the maritime sovereignty and security. Thus, PRC’s strategy in South China Sea and the construction of naval bases are to protect its interest in that area. 　　However, the territorial disputes of the South China Sea have influenced PRC’s strategic goal and planning. For instance, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 has the clause to announce economic zone which would overlap with neighboring countries. Furthermore, the potential undiscovered oil underneath the South China Sea and the critical sea lanes made relevant nations unwilling to give up their claims, not to say the involvement of foreign powers. All these have made the South China Sea a complicated issue which also affected PRC to change its South China Sea strategy. 　　Thereby, this paper will examine the origin of this complicated South China Sea issue which will help readers to understand the background of the forming of PRC’s South China Sea policy. Next, we will analyze PRC’s intent and strategy from political, economical and military aspects, including its set up of naval bases in that area and the speedup of the development of aircraft carrier and submarine, and also the relationship between PLA Navy’s buildup and the South China Sea. Finally, we will analyze the security impact to that area by PRC’s South China Sea strategy and how it affects peripheral nations’ behavior and nations outside that area.

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