產業組織理論中，企業的結合行為，可能產生嚴重的反競爭效果，故在反壟斷法規有關於結合的反競爭分析中，結合模擬（Merger Simulation）是結合審查過程中常用的工具，作為評估結合適當性的經濟證據。而模擬的方法，是利用結合前的資料，預測結合後的經濟後果，但結果是否失真，還需運用事後實際市場資料，回顧模擬預測的結果，而這長期效果之評估，將有助於增加判決的品質。本研究將以結合模擬的回顧分析方向出發，以中國汽車市場為例，分析以實際資料衡量的結合效果是否與模擬預測有異。 模擬預測之結合效果，本文以Hu, Lu, and Zhu（2013）之結論為主要參考：結合行為會使得結合企業的產品價格提升，增強結合廠商的市場能力。實際資料衡量的結合效果，本研究以 2009 年 1 月至 2011 年 11 月中國汽車 295 個車款的混合資料，運用自然實驗（Natural Experiment）法的差異中之差異法 （Difference in Difference，DID）分析 2009 年 11 月中國三家汽車公司發生結合對價格的影響效果。然而，由於結合模擬諸多的假設上以及未考量企業結合後的綜效，例如靜態模型估計設定、成本協同（Cost Synergy）效應、產品進行重新定位（Reposition）等，導致結合模擬預測結果與實際資料估計出之實證結果並不完全相符。

中國經濟發展快速的情況下，人民對於汽車的需求也一直再提高，在基礎建設尚未追上汽車數量增加之下，道路擁擠與環境汙染成為了許多城市必須面對的問題。北京市政府於2010年12月23日實施汽車限購政策，希望透過此政策降低汽車增加的速度。另一方面，中國將發展汽車自主品牌作為重要政策之一，希望藉由外資的技術讓自主品牌的汽車打入國際。因此本文將使用差中差法進行估計，研究北京市在汽車限購政策之後，政策對於自主品牌銷售的影響。 研究中所使用的資料為中國「中國車輛登記管理所」之中的「全中國登錄各月新增車輛」，加上「易車網」的汽車特性資料整理而成。以北京市的自主品牌車系作為實驗組，非自主品牌車系作為對照組進行多次估計，其中包括加入時間趨勢及將極端樣本去除等。研究結果皆顯示，在汽車限購政策後，確實對於自主品牌汽車銷售有下降的影響，最後也加入了穩定性檢驗，證明自主品牌的銷售下降是否與政策有關。最後結果亦與預期相同，證實北京市的汽車限購政策對於自主品牌的銷售有負向的效果。 / With the rapid economic growth in China, people’s demand for automobiles has risen continuously during the past decades. Furthermore, because the infrastructure in China failed to sustain the increase in the quantity of automobiles, traffic congestion and environmental pollution are the problems many cities have to be confronted with. Therefore, Beijing government adopted Automobile Purchase Limit Policy in Dec. 23, 2010, hoping that through the policy it can decrease the growth rate of automobiles. On top of that, developing self-owned Brand for automobiles in China is its primary policy, China government hoped to take advantage of foreign technology to make its self-owned Brand step into the international market. Consequently, this article uses Difference-in-Difference method to analyze how the sales of self-owned brand automobiles would be affected after the Automobile Purchase Limit Policy was enacted. Data used in this article is from Monthly Increase in Registered Vehicles Across China, which is from Vehicle Registration and Managemet Bureau of Chian, and from Yiche Network. Setting the self-owned brand mobiles in Beijing city as an experimental group and non-self-owned brand mobiles as a control group, we are to estimate many times. We try to take time series effect into account and eliminate outlier samples. The result shows that after the Automobile Purchase Limit Policy, the sales of self-owned brand automobiles significantly decrease. Finally, we add stability test to observe whether the decrease in the sales of self-owned brand automobiles is related to the policy or not. The result reveals that the Automobile Purchase Limit Policy in Beijing has a negative impact on the sales of self-owned brand automobiles.

北京市為解決嚴重的道路堵塞問題，自2010年12月23日實施汽車限購政策。北京市於2010年10月傳出將要實施汽車限購政策，而本研究使用差中差方法估計消息傳出至開始實施日期間，政策消息對於汽車銷售量之影響。 研究中所使用之汽車銷售資料來源為中國「車輛登記管理所」中的「全中國登錄各月新增車輛」，以及「太平洋汽車網」的汽車詳細特性資料整理而成。以北京市為實驗組，其他非北京城市，與重慶市、天津市等為對照組，在控制了汽車特性以及加入了時間趨勢之後，可從實證結果得知，不論是以哪些城市當作對照組，在這段期間內，北京市的汽車銷售量皆有顯著的增加，與預測的結果相符。 在研究最後進一步使用穩定性檢驗，證明北京市汽車銷售量的突然增加是否真的為政策消息影響。最後結果亦與預期相符，證實北京市的汽車銷售量突然增加是由汽車限購政策消息所影響。 / To solve the serious road congestion problems, Beijing has implemented the restrictions on car ownership. In October, 2010, news started to spread that Beijing would bring the automobile purchase limit policy into practice. This study, using a method named “difference-in-difference”, estimated the policy’s impact on automobile sales volume in the period from when the news was launched to the day the policy was actually implemented. The data in this paper come from “Monthly Increase in Registered Vehicles Across China” of “Vehicle Registration and Management Bureau of China”, and the detailed characteristic data of vehicles from “Pacific Automobile Network”. We set Beijing as the experimental group, and the non-Beijing cities such as Chongqing and Tianjin as the control group. After controlling the characteristics of vehicles and adding time trend, we can learn from the experimental result that no matter which city is used as the control group, during the period, the vehicle sales volumes in Beijing increase significantly, which meets our expectation. In the last step of the research, stability test is used to prove whether the sudden increase of Beijing’s automobile sales volume is affected by the spread news. And the final result is also in accord with our expectation: the sudden increase in Beijing’s automobile sales volume is affected by the spread news of the automobile purchase limit policy.

上世紀80年代中國產生了許多的變化，在經濟上採取較為開放的態度。汽車產業也在這樣的趨勢下與國外的跨國汽車企業合作，發展自己的汽車製造工業，至今中國已經成為最大的汽車製造國。為了發展汽車產業，中國透過國有企業與跨國企業合作成立許多合資公司，本文所取用的東風汽車集團與廣汽集團旗下都存在許多這樣的子公司。國家透過國有企業作為帶動產業發展的火車頭，但國有企業複雜的所有權問題牽涉中央與地方關係的運作，影響著汽車產業的發展。運用國有企業作為中介制度的同時，中央與地方關係也同時在運作，在長時間的發展下因國企所有權差異而產生的不同發展模型也逐漸變化，最終中國的汽車發展模式趨於類似。在這過程中，國家的影響實際上分做中央與地方同時進行，短期而言似乎看不到到中央的影響力，但就長期而言中央確實引導了中國汽車產業並助其發展。在理論方面，筆者以為中國汽車產業的成長長久以都是在國家資本主義的途徑上進行的，而非是發展型國家或管理型國家的模式。因為中國雖然引進市場經濟相當長的一段時間，但是實際上不管是中央還是地方的手都不曾離開過這個領域，即便是現在中國最主要的汽車生產與銷售仍舊以國有企業為主。 / China had has series transitions since 1980s years, and it had adopted open attitude at economical work. In this trend, state owner enterprises cooperated (SOEs) with foreign cross-national enterprises (CNEs) to develop self’s automotive industry. Now, China had become biggest country of automotive produce. For developing automotive industry, it established many companies by Chinese SOEs and foreign CNEs, for example Dongfeng motor group, Guangzhou automobile group. SOE like locomotive that it brings development, but it has problem of property that affect working of central-local relationship. While state utilizes SOE to be intermediary institution, central and local is continually interaction. In long time, ownership led to differently developmental model that was changed that trend to similar model. In fact, national affection is divide two parts: central and local. In short term, we difficultly observe central affection but, in long term, central affection is remake. In theoretically, I argue that Chinese automotive industrial development below to approach of state capitalism and it is not developmental state and regulatory state. China had work market economy but government, central and local, still intervenes domestic market, instead of major firm of Chinese produce and selling is SOEs.