由於環境保護議題的興起，以歐盟為首，各國對電子相關產品相繼遞出各種法規限制，企業為了因應綠色潮流與各國法規之要求，與供應商體系的緊密配合更顯重要，在此情境之下，企業如何選擇供應商管理的方法，與供應商共同面對綠色趨勢與漸趨嚴苛的法規規定，並且同時避免在交易過程中所衍生出的各種阻礙廠商之間交易效率的成本是本研究之研究重點。 本研究從綠色供應鏈管理的角度出發，以台灣電子製造業為研究對象，了解企業對關鍵零組件供應商的依賴程度、企業本身投入綠色活動的積極度，兩者對供應商管理方法的選擇、以及企業與供應商交易的過程中所衍生的各種交換成本，即外顯單位效益成本、資訊搜尋成本、道德危機成本與專屬資產陷入成本之影響，並進一步找出對這四個交換成本有顯著影響的供應商管理方法為何。 本研究採用問卷調查的方式，以1263家的台灣電子業上市公司作為抽樣對象，於回收的173份有效樣本之統計分析結果顯示：企業對關鍵零組件供應商的依賴程度、以及企業本身投入綠色活動的積極度，兩者會造成企業在選擇供應商管理方法上有所不同，因而對交換成本有不同程度之影響。當企業投入綠色活動的意願愈高，愈會選擇多種的供應商管理方法來加強對供應商的控制，藉以確保供應商提供的商品能符合企業的需求，而這類型的企業在與供應商交易的過程中，總體的交換成本是相對較低的；相反地，當企業較不積極地投入綠色相關的活動時，也會較不投入於供應商管理，總體的交換成本較高，特別是在企業對供應商的依賴程度愈低時，整體的交換成本愈高。而在供應商管理方法中，最能有效降低交換成本的方法為「關係品質」，即企業與供應商之間擁有共同的目標、將品質列為優先考量、彼此之間存在信任、並且了解雙方的需求。

如何有效率管理或執行組織間交易活動，是學術界及實務界有興趣的議題。以成本觀點觀之，交易組織管理交易活動愈多，即代表付出的管理成本愈高。 本研究以交易買方角度，思考組織間交易過程中，我方管理交易活動複雜度。故本研究焦點設定在我方在決定與他方進行交易後，交易過程中的協調與管理活動。研究問題主要欲瞭解我方在決定交易對象後，執行該交易的管理成本為何；即瞭解影響我方管理交易付出活動多寡的因素為何。 為能確認研究議題相關之實務現象，本研究先進行個案研究，訪談六家電子產業公司、十二個交易個案。與理論對話後，整理出「我方交易管理複雜度」構面，並建構出本研究架構﹕考量交易特性、交易重要性及交易經驗與知覺他方投機行為對我方交易管理複雜度之影響。進一步地進行實證研究。 本研究透過問卷調查，共蒐集電子製造業產業170個有效交易樣本，研究假設經檢測後，本研究結果發現，在組織間交易過程中影響我方交易管理複雜度之因素包括：(1)交易任務流程的相互依賴程度愈高，因作業流程彼此銜接或為合作的資訊取得需要，我方管理重點將置於流程的協調，故我方會付出較多的管理行為來溝通協調交易的作業，包括對內整合與對外(即他方)溝通協調的管理活動。(2)交易任務不確定程度，包括交易品質的不確定與交易數量的不確定，我方將增加管理複雜度，例如進行監督、增加互動頻率或溝通來降低品質與交期的不穩定。(3)交易的重要程度高，表示該交易標的物取得對我方具有潛在優勢。當交易的作業重要性愈高時，我方在管理該交易時將增加管理行為取得或增加我方權力、或降低對他方的依賴，故我方交易管理複雜度將提高。(4)當我方知覺到他方有投機行為時，因交易任務流程相互依賴高的情況下，我方擔心資訊不對稱可能造成我方損失、或擔心我方須不平衡地多付出，我方除加強溝通協調取得更多作業資訊外，也須付出其他監督他方行為成本，形成我方整體交易管理愈趨複雜。 / Managing inter-organizational transactions efficiently is an important issue in practice and in research field. From cost perspective, when an organization manages transaction activities more, it pays the management cost more. This study takes the view of the buyer organization on transactions, and it considers the management complexity for inter-organizational transactions. It focuses on coordination and management for inter-organizational transactions after buyer organizations decided the transaction party. In other word, this research wants to explore what influence buyer organization to manage inter-organizational transaction on management cost. In order to explore the issues, this study adopted two study researches. At first, this study took 12 case studies form 6 companies to develop the construct of management complexity and build this research framework. Secondly, the study collected 170 samples of transaction in electronic industry by questionnaire investigation. The findings include below. (1) The higher the task-process interdependency is, the more management complexity buyer organizations pay for coordinating, communicating inter-organizational operational process or gathering more transaction information. (2) Task gets more uncertainty, including quality uncertainty and quantity uncertainty of transactions, then buyer organization will do more management complexity, e.g., monitoring transaction party and interacting frequently to each other. (3) As the transaction is important to buyer operations, buyer organization would do more management complexity in order to get more power in inter-organizational relationship or reduce dependency on transaction party. (4) If buyer organizations feel the transaction party opportunism, they would pay more attentions to safeguard. Especially, buyer organization will do something more to prevent getting loss from asymmetric information, when the task-process is getting more interdependent. Hence, the higher task-process interdependency trends to make buyer organizations pay more management complexity, when buyer organizations perceive higher opportunism

代工廠商承接訂單時，為特定品牌客戶投資各種專屬的設備和人力是普遍存在的現象。相較之下，台灣的代工廠商處於相對弱勢的地位。代工廠商並不容易在交易初期就從品牌客戶端，取得對等的保護機制，故契約的執行的風險也相對升高。但實務上，我們發現台灣的代工廠商在沒有事前保護機制的情況下，卻仍持續為特定客戶投資。如果代工廠商必須先承諾關係專屬投資，才能爭取得到訂單。在沒有事前保護機制的情況下，代工廠商該有那些配套措施，來保護交易關係？ 本研究以代工廠商角度，探討如何透過交易後的保護策略，改變代工廠商與客戶之間的依賴關係。本研究根據交易成本理論和權力依賴理論推論，代工廠商傾向先承諾關係專屬投資，並於交易後採取事後保護策略。事後保護策略有兩類，分別是槓桿策略（資源獲取、擴大客戶範疇）和連結策略（擴大垂直範疇、共同決策與行動）。槓桿策略企圖降低代工廠商的依賴程度；連結策略則會提高客戶的依賴程度。藉由代工廠商與品牌客戶之間的權力變化，進而保護關係專屬投資免於套牢的威脅。 本研究分三個子研究進行，分別為（1）探索性個案研究、（2）關係專屬投資量表發展、（3）問卷調查研究。第一、探索性個案研究發現，不對稱的組織間關係使得代工廠商必須配合品牌客戶的需求而承諾關係專屬投資，但在「小對大」的格局之下，較為弱勢的代工廠商仍有具有生存空間。個案研究發現代工廠商對品牌客戶的投資，除了單一交易的成本與利益之外，還會考量對未來交易以及其他交易對象的影響。所謂「將欲奪之，必固與之」，代工廠商透過關係專屬投資被整合到產業的價值網絡中，換取廠商的生存機會。 第二、關係專屬投資量表發展研究發現，關係專屬投資為一多構面構念，可分為「實體資產投資」、「無形資產投資」和「資產專屬程度」三個次構念。由此可知，關係專屬投資既是一種資產，有助於交易關係之維持；也可能成為負債，限於少數交易的困境。 第三、本研究整合交易成本理論和權力依賴理論，並根據個案研究和量表發展結果，推論關係專屬投資程度、事後保護策略、依賴程度三者之間的關係。問卷調查研究證實，代工廠商對品牌客戶的無形 資產投資會增加代工廠商的依賴程度。但如果代工廠商投資之後，採取資源獲取策略。藉由品牌客戶的背書，提升知名度或市場地位，則關係專屬投資與代工廠商依賴程度之間的關係就會減弱。另外，關係專屬投資也會提高客戶對代工廠商的依賴程度。投資實體資產和無形資產的代工廠商，會藉由擴大服務範疇，與客戶共同決策與行動，來提高客戶依賴程度。 / In original equipment manufacturer (OEM)-supplier relationships, OEM suppliers commonly make investments that are specialized to the requirements of a particular buyer. Taiwanese OEM suppliers are small-medium firms with limited resources and low in market visibility. They are initially in a weak bargaining position, so they have no ability to vertical integrate or demand any kind of ex ante safeguards at all. Knowing that clients may have opportunistic behaviors, suppliers in Taiwan still make relation-specific investments for them without their commitments. How do these suppliers governance the asymmetric interorganizational relationships to avoid falling into the trap predicted by the transaction cost theory? This study takes the view of a supplier, the small party in asymmetric OEM-supplier relationship, who adopts ex post strategies to create inter-organizational dependency with OEMs. According to transaction cost theory and power dependency theory, we argue that OEM suppliers are more likely to make relation-specific investments first and follow by ex post strategies. We model the ex post strategies adopted by OEM suppliers to protect specific investments in asymmetric OEM-supplier relationships by using leveraging strategy (resource acquisition, customer scope) and bonding strategy (vertical scope, joint action). Leveraging strategies will lower the level of suppliers’ dependence on OEMs while bonding strategy will increase the level of OEMs’ dependence on suppliers. We conducted three studies to explore the issues: (1) exploratory case research; (2) scale development of the construct of relation-specific investment; (3) survey research. First, we found that investment decision of small party is beyond the scope of a single transaction. After making relation-specific investments, OEM suppliers redeploy their resources and work closely with their buyers to maintain exiting and future transactions. They also acquire strategic resources from OEMs and apply them to a broader customer base. Second, the concept of relation-specific investment is a multidimensional construct with three sub-dimensions as tangible investment, intangible investment, and asset specificity. Relation-specific investments create an inherent dilemma because they have the potential both to promote and reduce transaction cost for investing parties. Third, we integrated two theories to explore the relationships between relation-specific investment, ex post strategies, and dependency. According to survey results of 146 OEM suppliers in Taiwan, we confirmed the positive relationship between suppliers’ intangible asset investment and their dependency on OEMs. However, if suppliers leverage their clients’ reputations and reposition themselves as first-tier suppliers, they can lower the level of suppliers’ dependency due to their relation-specific investments. On the other hand, the more relation-specific investments suppliers make, the morel likely suppliers would adopt bonding strategy by expanding vertical scope in supply chain and by actively involving in joint decision making. We found that relation-specific investment itself and suppliers’ bonding strategy will increase the OEMs’ dependency on suppliers.