1998年在全球各地環保團體、消費者團體、社會正義團體等非政府組織跨國串聯反對下，擊敗了正在經濟合作暨發展組織為了一致化外國直接投資規則進行的多邊投資協定談判，這是非政府組織成功在全球經濟治理領域發揮影響力的重要案例。本論文的研究目的在於探討：第一、反對多邊投資協定談判的非政府組織跨國倡議活動為什麼成功及如何成功；第二、他們反對的理由是什麼；第三、從這個案例來看非政府組織倡議活動正在或將對國際政治經濟決策過程帶來何種程度的衝擊。這個個案研究使用Margaret E. Keck與Kathryn Sikkink的跨國倡議網絡（transnational advocacy network, TAN）理論，分析公民反抗行動如何成功影響在全球層次的政治決策，TAN理論強調議題共鳴、網絡密度、與目標對象脆弱性三種因素的重要性。本論文除了用這三種因素檢視反多邊投資協定運動過程，並發現非政府組織的倡議活動是否能夠與政府力量取得連結的重要性，作為TAN理論的補充。其次，本論文發現反多邊投資協定運動策略性地轉變為以國內為基礎的運動，透過國內爭議政治的傳統反抗手法向政府表達公民的訴求，以避開國際組織對非政府組織不利的政治機會結構，呈現出與TAN理論的「迴力鏢效果」相對立的發展。最後，這個個案研究發現反多邊投資協定運動更接近基於民族主義的傳統政治，而不能說是一種世界主義政治的發展。世界主義論者預期在一個形成中的全球公民社會中國家的角色正在消退，在這個案例中顯然並無法獲得足夠的證明。 / In 1998, a transnational NGO coalition of environmentalist, consumer rights, and social justice activists helped to defeat the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), a draft treaty to harmonize rules on foreign direct investment under the aegis of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This dissertation addresses why and how the transnational NGO advocacy sank the MAI negotiation, what are their advocacy reasons, and to what extent the transnational NGO advocacy activities will influence and are influencing the international decision making process. This case study uses Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s transnational advocacy network (TAN) theory, which stresses the importance of issue resonance, network density, and target vulnerability, to explore how citizen’s resistance struggle succeed in influencing policy at global level. First, in supplementing Keck and Sikkink’s TAN theory, the work suggests whether the NGO advocacy links with its governmental power is also at stake. Second, contrary to the “boomerang effect” from their TAN theory, the work finds that the transnational NGO campaign against MAI strategically shifted to country-based campaigns to address citizen’s claims through traditional repertoire of contention politics, in bypassing unfavorable political opportunity structure in international arena. Finally, the anti-MAI campaign was found to be much closer to traditional politics in a view of nationalism than the alleged cosmopolitan politics, which expects the role of state has eroded in an emerging global civil society.

跨國公司與開發中國家官員之賄賂關係被稱為骯髒聯盟。非國家行為者是形塑與改變國際規範之重要參與者，本研究檢視重點在於國際透明組織為切斷骯髒聯盟之供需關係，如何運用其獨特之跨國倡議網絡模式，透過建立聯盟(coalition-building)途徑，促成國際公約並且改變簽署國之國家行為。該非政府組織影響國際關係之具體成果為1997年簽署之OECD反賄公約，該公約是第一個從供應方(supply-side)切斷跨國商業賄賂鏈之國際規範，其立法歷程與會員國之國家偏好改變足以證明國際透明組織之影響力。 主流學派之結構現實主義者主張國際關係是結構決定論，以強權國家為主要的、具決定性之行為者，國家偏好是外生給定的利益排序。本研究主張以建構主義為基礎之全球反貪運動則是反其道而行，國際透明組織建構之跨國倡議網絡，擅用人氣政治與切身性政治，以合作取代對抗，有效促成已開發國家採取集體行動，簽署OECD反賄公約。當強權之間拒絕改變現狀時，非國家行為者之理念說服行動可以逐一改變國家偏好，進而改變國際規範。在倡議國際反貪議題上，國際透明組織的確是國際新規範之催生者。 本文採案例研究，主體為國際透明組織，客體為OECD反賄公約，交叉運用深度訪談與調查式過程追蹤研究，密集而深入取得相關當事人提供之第一手資料，彌補既有文獻靜態分析之不足。 / Non-state actors are essential participants in shaping and changing international norms. There has been a long-standing practice of a tacit “dirty alliance” between multinational corporations and developing countries officials. This research focuses on Transparency International(TI), which seeks to sever the supply and demand chain relationships of the dirty alliance by mobilizing a unique model of transnational advocacy network (TAN), engaging coalition-building, lobbying for a new set of international norms and persuading the changes of signatory states’ behavior. The fruits are the adoption of the 1997 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, which is the first supply-side norm to cut off transnational business bribery chain. Both the key events of the legislative process and the changes of state preferences among the signatories validify the argument for the TI’s significant influence. Contrary to mainstream international relations theories such as structural realism claiming structural determinism, predominant role of powerful states, and exogenously given nature of state preferences, this research proves constructivism prevails. TI’s TAN model artistically exercises popularity politics as well as proximity politics, advocates cooperation instead of confrontation against bribe-givers and bribe-takers, and effectively persuades developed countries to take collective actions by adopting and ratifying the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. While powerful states resist changing the status quo, non-state actors indeed demonstrate their capability of persuading states to change their preferences. TI is entitled to be the midwife in formulating new international norms against transnational corruption. This research applies case study methodology, making TI as the subject and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention as the object. Diligent analysis and interpretations are based on the cross-references of in-depth interviews and investigative process-tracing method to extract the primary data from relevant parties so as to supplement the deficiencies of the available literatures.

有關政府採購研究，現行大部分關注在法律層面、制度層面。本研究擬從政策變遷與宏觀角度切入，就發包中心設置過程因果關係，發現決策者信念、政策中間人、聯盟運作等對政策影響。本文擬透過Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 所建構政策倡議聯盟架構（Policy Advocacy Coalition Framework，[PACF ]），從不同面相研究觀察，以宏觀之政策面，研究分析市府發包中心重新設置之動態過程。 本研究採文獻分析法、深入訪談及焦點團體訪談法，分析探討1995至2015年臺北市政府聯合採購發包中心設置之政策變遷過程。藉由分析架構內外在系統的影響因素，探討執政輪替與決策者的信念是否為影響政策變遷主要因素。經研究發現：第一，市府倡議聯盟間（發包中心與洽辦單位、集中採購與分散採購）透過政策導向的學習，跨越聯盟達成共識。第二，避免陳水扁時代採購案件延宕，改以折衷版集中採購。第三，柯文哲市長主張集中採購，設置發包中心政策是其競選政策白皮書。第四，市府發包中心設置政策變遷主因，決策者信念與執政輪替。 / With regard to government procurement research, most of them focus on the legal and institutional aspects. This study intends to proceed from the perspective of policy changes and macroeconomics. It will investigate the cause-and-effect relationship of the setup process of the contract issuing center, and discover the impact of decision makers' beliefs, policy middlemen, and alliance operations on the policy. Using the policy advocacy coalition framework (PACF) constructed by Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith , we observe and analyze the dynamic process of the resetting of the city's outsourcing centers. This study used document analysis, in-depth interviews, and focus group interviews to analyze and explore the process of policy changes at the Joint Purchasing and Contracting Center of the Taipei City Government from 1995 to 2015. By analyzing the influencing factors of the internal and external systems of the architecture, it is discussed whether the alternation of governance rotation and decision makers' beliefs are the main factors affecting policy changes. The study found that: First, the city’s initiative among the alliances (contracting centers and contact agencies, centralized procurement and decentralized procurement) through policy-oriented learning, reached consensus across the alliance. Second, to avoid delays in Chen Shui-bian’s era of procurement cases , it used eclectic centralized procurement. Thirdly, Mayor Ko Wen-je advocated centralized procurement and set up a contract center policy as a white paper on his election policy. Fourth, the main reasons for the policy changes in the city's outsourcing centers are decision makers' beliefs and governance rotation.