本研究以1980年至2015年美國及加拿大上市公司為研究對象，探討具有會計專長之執行長（CEO）與外界反應的關係。在探討外界反應之前，本文先檢視具有會計專長之CEO對於盈餘品質的影響，透過此結果，推論專業人士（包含會計師與分析師）與市場投資人之反應。本研究預期，當CEO具有會計專長時，會使盈餘品質降低，故審計風險隨之提高，導致審計公費增加，且分析師的追隨意願降低，同時也將影響市場投資人的反應。 研究結果發現，具會計專長CEO與盈餘管理、審計公費、公司累積異常報酬呈現顯著正相關，與分析師追隨數則為顯著負相關，顯示當CEO具有會計專長時，因有盈餘操控的情況，所以審計公費提高、分析師追隨數減少；但市場投資人或許無法體認盈餘操控的事實，故仍相信具有會計專長之CEO，有可能為公司帶來正面的影響。 / This study investigates the relationship between CEOs with accounting expertise and external reactions of investors, auditors and analysts. The sample firms used in this study are all the stock-listed companies in America and Canada during 1980-2015. Before examining such external reactions, this paper explores the association between CEOs with accounting expertise and earnings quality, which help us to obtain an explanation why auditors, analysts and investors have such reactions. The empirical results show that CEOs with accounting expertise manage earnings more aggressively than CEOs without such expertise. As a consequence, the firms with such CEOs will be charged higher audit fees and have less analyst following. However, investors might not recognize this fact; they still believe that CEOs with accounting expertise will have a positive influence on firms. Our findings could offer a reference for a company looking for a CEO that could bring accounting quality.

本研究以中國2007年至2012年的A股上市公司為研究對象，探討管理當局能力與分析師盈餘預測行為的關係，預測行為迴歸模型以分析師追蹤人數、分析師盈餘預測準確性及預測離散程度三種特性進行分析。 研究結果發現，管理當局能力與分析師追蹤人數、盈餘預測精確度皆呈現顯著正相關，與預測離散程度則為負相關，但并不顯著。這表示經理人能力較好，則分析師對該公司之追蹤意願較高，且盈餘預測誤差與預測離散度較低。本研究藉此結果推論，管理當局能力愈佳之企業，經理人愈會提供品質良好、具可靠性的財務報導，故分析師將愈信賴該公司所提供之資訊，並可幫助分析師做出更精確之盈餘預測，並降低彼此間之預測誤差。 / This study examines the relation between managerial ability and financial analysts’ earnings forecast behaviors in China from 2007 to 2012. We use several analysts’ attributes: number of analysts following, forecasts error, and forecasts dispersion. According to the empirical results, in general, analysts tend to follow firms with more ability of managers, and managers with superior ability might decrease analysts’ forecast errors and the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts.

本研究檢測會計師事務所總所審計與分析師盈餘預測行為的相關性。以中國大陸2010年至2015年A股上市公司為研究對象，構造分析師盈餘預測行為的回歸模型，並以分析師追蹤人數、分析師盈餘預測準確度及預測分歧度三種特性進行分析。 研究結果顯示，會計師事務所總所審計與分析師追蹤人數、盈餘預測準確度皆呈顯著正相關，與預測分歧度呈顯著負相關。進一步檢測發現：總所的審計公費更高，經會計師事務所總所審計的企業，分析師更願意對其股票給予較高的投資評級。這也顯示會計師事務所總所付出的努力更多，審計品質更好，因而分析師對其會計資訊信賴程度更高，對該公司之追蹤意願更高，盈餘預測誤差與預測分歧度更低，分析師也更願意推薦其股票。 / The primary objective of this thesis is to explore the association between headquarter office auditors and analysts’ earnings behaviors. I use a sample of firm observations from China during 2010-2015. The main findings can be summarized as follows. I find that firms audited by headquarter office auditors have more analysts following compared to those audited by branch office auditors. Secondly, I find that analysts’ earnings forecasts are more accurate and less dispersed for firms audited by headquarter office auditors than firms audited by branch office auditors. Further analysis indicates that the reason for the above results is that headquarter office auditors exert more effort, measured as audit fees, than branch office auditors. Finally, the empirical results indicate that analysts make more favorable recommendations for firms audited by headquarter office auditors than for those audited by branch office auditors. Overall, the findings suggest that headquarter office auditors have better audit quality and in turn result in more analysts following and issuing higher-quality forecasts and favorable recommendations.