管理當局與利害關係人(stakeholders)之間，透過會計資訊的提供，可降低代理問題及資訊不對稱。惟會計資訊的提供，依管理當局介入的程度不同，會有層次上的差別。 本文即從層次開始，界定了盈餘管理(Earnings Management)與盈餘操縱(Earnings Manipulation)的不同，而透過營運政策中的營業活動(operational activities)來影響盈餘的方式地處兩者之間的灰色地帶，目前至今尚少討論。Roychowdhury(2006)則以美國市場為對象，首開先例發展了如何偵測公司透過營業活動的實質盈餘管理行為。 本文同樣選定避免報導損失為盈餘門檻，考量台灣市場的特性後，偵測台灣企業是否有真實營業活動的盈餘管行為。實證結果顯示，無論是透過銷貨操縱、降低裁決性支出還是過量生產以降低銷貨成本的實質交易操作，都得到顯著地支持。進一步分析那些特性的企業，較容易透過真實營業相關的活動來從事盈餘管理行為時發現，債務契約壓力高、成長性機會高及利害關係人緊密度高者符合預期，而製造業性質則與預期相反，盈餘管理彈性則未得到支持。另外在機構投資人持股方面，則發現高機構投資人持股可降低過量生產實質交易操作的可能，但未能有效防止降低裁決性支出的操作。 / Through providing accounting information for stakeholders , management could somewhat reduce agency problem and information asymmetry.But accounting information quality could be different depending on how management intervene in . This article begins from distinguishing between Earnings Management and Earnings Manipulation.To intervene in business policy through real operational activities is not only one way that is hard to categorize in Earnings Management or Earnings Manipulation but also receives little attention to date. Roychowdhury(2006), taking American market as observation values,was the first one who developed how to detect real operational activities earnings management. Following Roychowdhury(2006),I define avoiding reporting loss as earnings threshold to detect whether real operational activities earnings management exists in Taiwan business.There is obvious evidence suggesting sales manipulation、reduction of discretionary expenditures and overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold to improve reported margins.To go a step further,I test observation values of what characters are inclined to manipulate earnings through real operational activities. I find supporting evidence in observation values with higher debt stress、higher growth opportunity、higher connection with stakeholders and samples on non manufacturing industry.But I find no evidence in observation values with higer earnings management elasticity.In addition,I find observation values with higher instutional holding shares could abate the possibilities of overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold,but fail to avoid the manipulation of reduction of discretionary expenditures.

公司名稱不僅僅是識別的代號，還具有深切的意義存在，且更名還需花費很大的成本、面對原有客戶流失的風險，故企業更名背後的真正涵義是值得深入探討的。 本研究旨在探討在CRSP有更名紀錄之美國上市公司，是否會透過實質交易或裁決性應計之方式進行盈餘管理。除了比較更名前後盈餘管理程度之差異，同時也以更名公司為實驗組，並選取未更名公司作為對照組，檢測在更名後，更名公司與未更名公司之盈餘管理程度是否有顯著差異。另外，為額外分析不同類型的更名原因，是否會採取不同的盈餘管理方式，依不同標準選取以下二類之更名公司：第一類為因業務範圍改變而更名；第二類為無原因之更名。 實證結果發現，更名公司在更名後，比起更名前及未更名公司，可能有以操縱銷貨來壓低現金流量、透過過量生產以降低銷貨成本的實質交易行為，進行裁決性應計項目之盈餘管理也較為嚴重。額外分析不同原因的更名公司之實證結果則發現，無原因之更名公司在更名後，進行實質交易之情形較業務範圍改變之更名公司嚴重。 / This study investigates the impact of corporate name changes on earnings management. We examine earnings management behavior in the period leading to the passage of name change effective year and in the period following the passage of name change effective year, focusing on both real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management. To make further investigations, we conduct analysis of firms that change name because of broader or narrower focus the firm’s scope of business versus firms that change name with no reason. The empirical results show that name change firms use more accruals and real earnings management after name changes when compared to similar firms. Furthermore, we also find that firms change name with no reason tend to adopt real earnings management when compared to the firms that change name because of broader or narrow focus.