鑑於近年來中國大陸經濟高度成長，當地金融市場在其內需市場強勁，以及均富水準普遍提升下，更顯得朝氣蓬勃，本論文係以分析過去外資金融機構在中國大陸相關佈局模式及進行相關實證研究，並續以剖析臺灣銀行業未來佈局中國大陸市場策略，以作為現階段國內高度競爭金融環境下，拓展另片藍海空間之策略與方向。 本論文首先說明外資金融機構於近年來在高度發展中國大陸金融市場所扮演的角色與目標，並應用Cox比例強度存活模型，分析採行參股策略方式進入中國大陸銀行之動機與機率強度，並以主成份分析進行資料萃取及最大概似法估計模型參數。再者，藉由此參股機率估計值進而求得外資金融機構最適參股機率強度門檻，可作為日後金融機構（含臺灣銀行業）參股動機之衡量指標。實證研究顯示，過去外資金融機構採行參股策略之目的主要在於創造被參股對象市場價值，以增加其參股投資報酬。對於獲利能力及資產品質較佳之外資金融機構，以及資產品質較佳之中國大陸銀行，則往往具有較高的參股與被參股潛在動機。 再者，為進一步探討外資金融機構採行參股策略後之風險與報酬關係，本論文係以或有求償權之模式，同時納入參股外資金融機構與被參股中國大陸銀行之個別資產價值，以及匯率波動等三項動態因子，在股東權益價值極大化為目標，及因應風險性資產所導向之資本管制，據以剖析外資金融機構經參股後之資產價值風險及其影響因素，並以靜態分析所對應之最適參股比例變化情形。其數值分析研究發現：當參股外資金融機構資產價值遞增、負債比率降低，以及所面臨法定風險權數增加時，對於其參股後之整體資產組合風險將有所降低。同時，對於具有高資產品質、獲利佳及多元化幣別資產組合之外資金融機構，以及面臨資產品質佳且著重本土金融開發之被參股中國大陸銀行，將有助於提高外資金融機構之最適參股比例。 針對臺灣銀行業參股模式方面，以投資中國大陸股份制商業銀行之動機強度為最高，其中泛公股銀行相對民營銀行更具有條件優勢，並以具備綠色通道優惠之大西部地區為佳。研究亦顯示，在外資金融機構已著墨中國大陸金融市場些許時日下，對於身為追隨性金融機構的臺灣銀行業而言，在當地金融服務未臻飽和、初始投資成本降低，以及台商業務平均需求成長趨勢下，將有助於降低其進入門檻。同時，研究中也採行模型論證，對於現階段臺灣銀行業實務上多以先行成立代表人辦事處後升格分行，並儘速於合規範內取得人民幣業務承做資格方式，以深根當地金融市場之經營方向，同時研究亦指出臺灣銀行業應具備創新化業務與利基性策略，方能提高採行成立獨資子銀行或參股之進入動機。 / In recent years China has experienced rapid economic growth that enables the advancement of the local financial industry, which benefited from the strong domestic consumption as well as improvement in average income per capita. The purpose of this paper is to point out an alternative direction for Taiwanese banks by mapping out the future China market expansion strategy, as the Taiwanese banks are facing prolong highly competitive domestic market. This paper applies Cox’s proportional-hazard survival model to analyze the strategic decisions of foreign financial institutions about acquiring equity stakes in Chinese banks. Based on principal component analysis, we extract significant independent variables from Cox’s model and employ a maximum likelihood method to estimate parameters. With the probability of equity stake acquisition, we obtain the optimal probability hazard threshold and treat it as a criterion for the foreign financial institutions to conduct equity stakes acquisition. Our empirical results confirm that the decisions of foreign financial institutions about equity stake acquisitions are to increase the profitability and market values of the target Chinese banks. In general, financial institutions with higher earning ability and better asset quality have stronger motives to take part in the acquisition or disposal of equity stakes. The contingent claim model is applied in this paper to examine the risk and return of foreign financial institutions after acquiring equity stakes of a Chinese bank. The model considers dynamic factors such as individual asset value and exchange rates to achieve the goal of maximizing shareholder value. In addition to analyzing the asset value and factors associated with risk after participation, this paper evaluates the optimal acquiring equity stakes proportion with numerical analyses under capital control. For China banking sector, we discover the overall portfolio risk of foreign financial institution will decrease after acquiring equity stakes when the asset value increases, the debt ratio decreases, and the required risk-weighted asset increases. Overall, these foreign financial institutions have well-diversified currency portfolio and enjoy a better asset quality and surplus earning; therefore, they will likely increase their optimal acquiring equity stakes proportion if the invested Chinese banks are with good assets quality and focused on local business. For the analysis of equity stake acquisition in China banks by Taiwanese banks, invested in the joint-stock commercial banks exists the higher intensity than others, and pan-government-owned Taiwanese bank also stands on the better vantage point than private banks. Under the possession of policy advantage for its green channels, the Western China Region is the best district in China for Taiwanese banks. This paper also examines the appropriate time and method to enter the market in China by applying the real options model. Being the market follower, Taiwan banking industry would need to find the right timing when ready entering China sine the market is pretty much laid out by many other foreign financial institutions. Therefore, the paper discovered some salubrious circumstances for Taiwan banking industry to enter the market, for example, the local financial service has not saturated, and initial investment cost is lower or Taiwan businessman demands more service gradually. The paper also confirms the current practice, which is to establish a representative office first and then promote it to a branch, seems to be practical for Taiwanese banks enter the market. Once meet the standard requests and acquire the license to operate RMB business, Taiwanese banks can establish wholly-owned subsidiary bank or take ownership stakes by having the innovation and business strategy in the local financial market.

本文立基於Merton(1974)或有求償權評價法及Leland(1994)內生破產資本結構模型上，加入次順位債券的考量，建立一個連續時間資本結構分析模型，量化的資本結構可作為企業融資之決策依據。內生破產行為與風險移轉行為都是股東與債權人之間可能產生的代理問題，本文的模型不但分析這兩種代理問題，更計算其所產生的代理成本。由模擬的結果發現內生破產成本雖然不大，但是其對無風險利率及公司非槓桿價值的波動度卻是非常的敏感。在本文的模型下，只要債務契約不能重新訂立，次順位債券的發行永遠都會降低優先債務的價值。在本模型中次順位債券的風險貼水比優先債券的風險貼水高；但是本文發現不管是優先債券或是次順位債券的風險貼水，當公司接近宣告破產時，公司非槓桿價值的波動度對兩種債券風險貼水的影響出現高風險低報酬的現象，可能的解釋理由如下：當公司接近宣告破產時，公司非槓桿價值波動度的增加使破產可能性提高，進而使風險貼水減少的間接力量大於波動度增加直接使風險貼水上升的力量。 / Based on Merton(1974) and Leland(1994), we construct a continuous-time capital structure model with subordinated debt. Quantitative results may serve the guidance of financial policy of the firm. Both endogenous bankruptcy and risk shifting behaviors are the agency problems between the equityholders and debtholders. Based on our model, the agency problems is considered and the agency costs are calculated. From the result of simulation, endogenous bankruptcy agency cost is small but sensitive to the volatility of unlevered asset value of the firm. Under renegotiation-proof, the senior debt is harmed by the issuance of the subordinated debt in our model. The risk premium of the subordinate debt is higher than that of the senior debt is confirmed by the model, however, when the firm is near bankruptcy, the behavior of "high risk high return" of both debts is reversed. The reason for the junk bond behavior may be explained as the negative effect of risk premiums due to the increase of the probability of bankruptcy is higher than the positive effect of the greater risk caused by higher volatility.