在2006年1月，立法院通過了總金額合計高達1410億水患治理特別條例、石門及其集水區整治特別條例。本文以許多民間非營利組織為監督治水預算成立的1410大禹治水聯盟為研究個案，希望能瞭解立法過程裡，民間聯盟如何監督公共政策？又如何打破國會與官僚的結盟結構，實際影響政策？本文採用深度訪談、報章資料與參與觀察等方式，藉由McAdam的政治機會結構理論為分析架構，以說明治水預算裡行動者擴編預算的動機與過程。並分析在立法院審查各階段治水聯盟的因應策略、實際行動和內部運作，以及監督成效。研究發現在地方水患陰影下，又面對官僚、國會與地方政府三者鐵三角般的互利合作，主張審慎監督的治水聯盟其實無力回天。一方面因議題範圍實在太大，無法動員特定地區相關者；另一方面也是鐵三角間同盟關係非常穩固，國會遊說發揮不了作用。故只能藉少數友好立委，在朝野協商爭取加入更多資訊公開、績效評估與公民參與機制。透過這些機制，在後續八年政策執行過程中找出更多公共參與和監督的著力點。藉此也讓原先僅有地區性互動的環保運動與社區大學運動在本案上交會。此新合作方向是否會對未來環保運動帶來新的在地網絡與群眾支持，值得後續觀察與研究。 / In January 2006, the Legislative Yuan passed the Special Enactment on Flood Management in Areas Susceptible to Floods and the Special Enactment on Restoration of Shi-Men and its Catchments Area amounting to NT$141 billion. This paper makes a study of the 1410 Ta-Yu Water Management Alliance formed by a number of civil non-profit organizations for the purpose of supervising and auditing the water management budget. The study seeks to understand how the civil alliance supervises public policies during the legislative process and how they break the alliance structure between the Legislative Yuan and bureaucracy to actually influence policies. By using McAdam’s political opportunity structure theory as its analysis structure, this paper gives an account of the motives and processes of activists in the creation of the water management budget through in-depth interviews, newspaper reports and participate observation. It also analyzes the countering strategies, activities, internal functioning and the results of the supervisory actions of the Water Management Alliance. This research discovered that in the face of the alliance’s proposition of prudent supervision could not be upheld in the face of mutual cooperation within the iron triangle of bureaucracy, the Legislative Yuan and local government. On one hand is the alliance’s inability to mobilize related parties in specific areas due to the issues covering too wide a range and on the other hand is the solid relationship within the iron triangle alliance and negates lobbying efforts in the Legislative Yuan. It is only by a few friendly legislators that mechanisms for the increased disclosure of information, performance evaluation and civil participation were added during negotiations between the ruling and opposition parties. Through these mechanisms it is hoped that more foothold for public involvement and supervision can be found in the following eight years of policy implementation. Also, such mechanisms would allow conservation movements and community college movements which used to be limited to territorial interactions to meet. Whether this new direction in cooperation brings new grassroot support for future environmental movements remains worthy of follow up observation and research.