隨著社會經濟之全球化發展，公司儼然已成為各國經濟活動之核心組織，掌握絕大多數之資源與財富，影響人民之生活至鉅。且隨著公司資金需求之愈趨龐大，股份有限公司乃成為現今主要之公司型態。我國公司法在繼受外國立法例過程中，對於股份有限公司之機關設計採取其分權、制衡之機關分立方式，以股東會為公司最高意思決定機關，董事會為公司業務執行機關，監察人為公司常設監察機關，其目的即在追求經營之效率與避免專權之弊害。然而在公司規模日趨龐大、商業環境瞬息萬變的今日，此種權限分配制度是否仍能夠有效地發揮制衡公司經營者之功能，已日漸受到挑戰與質疑，我國自民國八十七年以來發生一連串撼動企業界及金融界的「地雷股」事件即為最好之警訊。該等上市、上櫃公司之所以發生財務危機，綜觀其原因，除了肇始於外在經濟環境的催化外，其餘多肇因於人謀不臧。其經營者每每利用職務之便，犧牲廣大股東、債權人及利害關係人之權益，以掌控公司資金、財產及人力等資源之便，以圖利自身，導致公司經營發生危機，進而影響到整個金融系統。 針對該等問題，政府乃積極籌思解決之道，並於民國九十年大幅度修正公司法，一方面積極開放，明訂董事會職權、放寬董監選舉之方式、放寬董監資格限制，以尊重公司自治。另一方面有效管理，對於公司內部監控的制度加以適度之強化，以避免公司經營者濫用前述開放後所獲得之權限，而危害公司股東、債權人及利害關係人之權益，例如修訂或增訂董事當然解任之規定、董事缺額強制補選期限、增訂臨時管理人制度、降低股東代表訴訟之門檻等。台灣證券交易所股份有限公司及財團法人中華民國證券櫃檯買賣中心於民國九十一年十月四日共同制定上市、上櫃公司治理實務守則；證券交易所有價證券上市審查準則第九條亦於民國九十一年二月二十二日初次納入獨立董、監事之規定，以期提升企業之營運品質。 惟如何在積極開放下取得有效管理之平衡，實應記取過去企業風暴之教訓，並吸取他國立法經驗以為我國公司法制進一步改造之方向，因此本文乃針對民國八十七年以來所發生重大財務危機並引發社會高度關注之上市、上櫃公司為研究對象，歸納其發生財務危機之原因，並參酌外國法制，探討我國公司內部監控機制之問題，進而提出今後修法之方向與公司組織建構之建議如下： 一、提高董事間之制衡 (一)檢討並嚴格限制關係企業間交叉持股 (二)廢除公司法第二十七條第二項及第三項之規定 (三)廢除董事代理出席董事會制度 (四)全面引進獨立董事制度宜審慎考量 二、強化監察人之獨立性 (一)廢除公司法第二十七條第二項及第三項之規定 (二)檢討現行監察人之選任制度 (三)全面引進獨立監察人制度宜審慎考量 三、加強監察人之專業能力 (一)財報簽證會計師宜改由監察人聘任 (二)公司內部稽核人員宜改由監察人聘任 (三)強制規定公司監察人應通過一定之資格考核 四、引進股東提案制度以增加股東會監控權限 五、改進股東代表訴訟制度以增加少數股東監控權限　 六、強化檢舉制度 七、重建企業倫理 / As social and economic globalization continues to deepen, companies appear to have become the core units for economic activity in country after country, gaining control over the lion’s share of resources and wealth with profound effects on people’s lives. And, with companies’ demands for funds growing ever greater, companies limited by shares are firmly entrenched as the dominant corporate form. Taiwan’s Company Law has repeatedly borrowed from foreign legislative examples. In this process, corporate organs of companies limited by shares have been designed by adopting a decentralized compartmentalized approach, with the shareholders’ meeting as the highest decision-making organ, the board of directors as the organ that executes the business of the company, and the supervisors as the standing supervisory organ; the purpose of this being to seek operational efficiency while avoiding the evils of monopolized power. However, with today’s ever-larger corporations and constantly changing business climate, the idea that this sort of distributed authority system can still provide effective balance for the corporate leadership function is being challenged and questioned more every day. Perhaps the best warning has come from the string of incidents involving “landmine stock” companies that have rocked the corporate and financial communities in Taiwan since 1998. Looking at the overall explanation for why these publicly listed companies encountered financial crises, one sees that some crises were originally catalyzed by the external economic environment, but most originated in the shortcomings of individuals and their plans: the leadership of these companies sacrificed the interests of the shareholding public, creditors and other stakeholders, using their control over their companies’ funds, assets, manpower and other resources to divert them for their own personal profit, leading their companies into crisis and even impacting the entire financial system. The Government has been aggressively addressing these problems and looking for solutions, and in 2001 major amendments to the Company Law were made. On the one hand, the reforms were towards greater openness and flexibility: out of respect for corporate self-governance, the prerogatives of boards were clearly laid out, the methods for electing directors and supervisors were made more flexible than before, and the qualifications for membership less restrictive. On the other hand, they were also aimed at making management more effective, moderately strengthening companies’ internal controls in order to prevent corporate officers from abusing their authority, once their prerogatives were liberalized, thereby harming the interests of shareholders and others stakeholders. For example, the law was revised or amended to provide rules for the certain dismissal of a director and time limits on the mandatory election of directors to fill vacant seats on the board; an amendment on provisional managers was added, and the threshold was lowered for legal action by shareholders’ representatives. On October 4 2002, The Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and the GreTai Securities Market (OTC) jointly established a code of practice for corporate governance; and on February 22 2002, Article 9 of “Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Regulations for Review of Securities Listings” included for the first time rules providing for independent directors and supervisors, with the expectation that this would raise the quality of business operations. However, if the question is how to achieve balance between effective management and greater flexibility/liberalization, one must truly recall the lessons learned from the scandals of the past and absorb the legislative experience of other countries, then chart a path towards further reforms in Taiwan’s corporate law system. Therefore, this thesis shall take as the object of research the major financial crises that have occurred since 1998 and those public companies that have generated a high degree of concern within the society. It will summarize the reasons why their financial crises happened, refer in detail to other countries’ legal systems, and investigate problem with the corporate internal control system in Taiwan. It will further propose directions for legal reform and suggestions for structuring corporate organizations as follows: 1.Increase checks and balances among directors: a.Analyze and strictly limit transactions and crossholding of shares between related businesses; b.Discard the rules in items 2 and 3, Article 27 of the Company law; c.Discard system whereby one director may choose another as his/her representative at board meetings; and d.Give careful consideration to introducing independent board member system across the board. 2.Strengthen the independence of supervisors: a.Discard the rules in items 2 and 3, Article 27 of the Company Law; b.Analyze the current system for electing supervisors; and c.Give careful consideration to introducing independent supervisors system. 3.Improve the professional capabilities of supervisors: a.Analyze and strictly limit transactions and crossholding of shares between related businesses; b.Make the appointment of accountants to audit financial statements the responsibility of supervisors; and c.Make it a mandatory requirement that supervisors pass a qualifying examination. 4.Introduce a shareholder proposal system to increase shareholders’ control authority. 5.Improve the shareholders’ representative(legal) action system to increase the control authority of minority shareholders. 6.Strengthen system for bringing accusations. 7.Rebuild business ethics.

雖然近年來的文獻已嘗試以有系統的方式，探討創投的參與投資，是否有助於提昇被投資公司的價值，然而這些實證研究卻鮮少剖析創投是透過何種途徑來影響被投資公司的價值。再者，此類研究往往從被投資公司上市、上櫃時的股票折價幅度，來探討創投的介入是否對於被投資公司的價值有所貢獻，不過卻較少針對被投資公司的長期經營績效和上市、上櫃後的股價績效進行分析，特別是有關創投對於被投資公司的經營績效影響之相關研究仍付之闕如。因此，本研究嘗試為相關研究另闢蹊徑，以期瞭解創投的參與投資是否確實為被投資公司帶來實質的貢獻。 首先，經由文獻探討和個案分析得知，將代理理論引用至本研究主題確實具有合理性。因此，本研究以代理理論的觀點，嘗試克服傳統「基本主理人──代理人的模式」之限制，並藉由Von Neumann-Morgenstern 效用函數而針對創投的介入對於被投資公司在經營績效和技術上的影響進行理論模式推導，故本研究的理論模式不僅強調技術的提昇為刺激高科技公司產出增加的原動力之外，同時亦考量監控機制和激勵制度彼此可能具互補性的特質。 本研究的各個研究假說分別演繹自理論模式結論或歸納自文獻探討暨個案分析。在實證研究方面，本研究將實證分為三個層次：第一層次係比較國內有創投參與投資的上市、上櫃公司和無創投參與投資的上市、上櫃公司，其在長期經營績效與短期股價表現上是否具有差異性。實證結果發現，有創投參與投資的公司，其在長期經營績效和短期股價表現上皆較無創投參與投資的公司來得差；不過，創投的介入確實承擔了被投資公司本身的部分風險。 實證的第二層次則在於檢視，創投是透過何種途徑來影響被投資公司的績效表現。實證結果顯示，主要創投的持股比例、參與被投資公司的創投家數、創投佔被投資公司的董監事席位比例、創投所承擔被投資公司的技術股股本佔總資本額的比例，或創投投資被投資公司的時點越早，皆對於被投資公司的長期經營績效表現有顯著的正面影響。 另外，創投佔被投資公司的董監事席位比例、創投所承擔被投資公司的技術股股本佔總資本額的比例、主要創投成立的年數越長，或創投參與被投資公司的時點越早，則對於被投資公司上市、上櫃後的短期股價表現有顯著的正面影響。 實證之第三層次，旨在探討創投的參與投資是否加速被投資公司上市、上櫃的時間。根據實證結果得知，有創投參與投資的公司，其從公司設立至上市、上櫃的時間確實較無創投參與投資的公司來得短，此意謂創投可加速被投資公司上市、上櫃的時間，使得被投資公司可以較早在資本市場上募得資金。 綜合上述實證結論，囿限於國內創投的籌資壓力和追逐聲譽的壓力，以及在「逆選擇」的前提之下，導致國內有創投參與投資的公司其績效表現較無創投參與投資的公司來得差。然而，本研究的實證結果並不否定創投的能力，換言之，本研究的實證結果肯定創投的專業能力和監控能力，同時亦肯定創投在國內產業升級上所扮演的重要角色。 / Although recent work attempts to explore what venture capitalists do and whether venture capitalists' involvement adds value for venture-capital-backed firms, it does not investigate the ways in which venture capitalists add value to their portfolio companies.　Moreover, recent empirical research usually investigates whether venture capitalists' involvement reduces underpricing when their portfolio firms going public, but it seldom explicitly examines the effect of the presence of venture capitalists on operating performance of venture-capital-backed firms.　As a matter of fact, a number of issues relate to the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs have not been fully addressed.　Therefore, the objective of this study is to fill both theoretical and empirical gaps. This study applies agency theory which captures the essence between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, and use Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function to analyze the effect of venture capitalists' involvement on their portfolio firms' operating performance and skills.　Our theoretical model not only considers the importance of new technology in modern economies, but also includes the possibility that these two control mechanisms, monitoring and incentives, might be complementary. Moreover, empirical results of this study reveal several important findings.　First, we contrast venture-capital-backed firms with companies that have no venture-capital backing. Our empirical results indicate　operating performance and after-market stock performance of firms with venture-capital backing are both inferior to that of firms without such backing, and the differences are statistically significant.　However, venture-capital-backed firms seem to have lower levels of firm risk. Secondly, empirical results provide evidence that the fraction of equity holdings of the lead venture capitalist, the number of venture capitalists, the number of the venture-capital-backed firm's board seats held by venture capitalists, stock compensation system and the length of time that venture capitalists have invested are all positively associated with operating performance of venture-capital-backed firms. In addition, the number of the venture-capital-backed firm's board seats held by venture capitalists, stock compensation system, the age of the lead venture and the length of time that venture capitalists have invested are positively associated with after-market stock performance of firms with venture-capital backing.　Not surprisingly, empirical results also provide evidence that venture-capital-backed firms go public earlier than non-venture-capital-backed firms. Overall, the results of this study support the idea that venture capitalists do provide much more than financing to their portfolio firms.　However, in a venture capital setting, adverse selection, grandstanding and money-recycling are important concerns; these　concerns might explain why performance of venture-capital-backed firms are significantly inferior to that of non-venture-capital-backed firms.　Indeed, our findings support the notion that venture capitalists' investment behavior does influence performance of their portfolio firms in a number of ways due to their skills, expertise and monitoring abilities.

本研究試圖以外部監控機制及高階管理團隊為出發點，探討兩者與經營績效之關係。外部監控機制變數如何與高階管理團隊變數交互作用，包括樣本敘述統計之基本分析、相關分析、迴歸分析及整體模式之檢測討論。 在自變項與應變項的關係間，外部監控機制正向影響經營績效，其中以機構投資人構面對ROA及ROE顯著。而高階管理團隊對經營績效的影響不成立，但TMT功能背景異質性對營收成長有顯著的正向關係。 在調節變項的效應方面經實證發現，機構投資人持股比例*TMT規模、分析師追蹤人數*TMT教育程度、機構投資人持股比例*TMT教育程度都對ROA及ROE達到p=0.05顯著水準，同時TMT規模與TMT教育程度這兩個變數與外部監控機制交互作用後，加入迴歸模型可以提高模型的解釋能力，因此驗證TMT規模與TMT教育程度作為調節變項為成立。TMT規模與TMT教育程度顯著干擾外部監控機制與ROE及ROA間的關係。