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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

合作任務特性、共識凝聚型態與中小企業合作關係維持機制之關聯 / The correlation of maintaining mechanisms used by small businesses in the cooperative relationships and their char- acteristics of tasks and congruence formation

侯文山, Hou, Wen-Shan Unknown Date (has links)
本研究最主要的目的在於瞭解:在臺灣中小企業眾多型態的合作關係中,不同型態合作關係所呈現的不同特性,是如何影響合作雙方共識之形成,並進而影響其維繫並管理此一合作關係的方式。本研究引用與組織間合作關係有關的文獻,包括以動態觀點的研究、資源依賴理論、網路理論,以及社會學者的田野觀察結果等,從中整理出本研究的觀念架構。自變數為「合作任務特性」,包含「合作關係經濟本質」、「合作成員互動特性」兩部份;中介變數為「共識凝聚型態」,包含「對彼此互賴程度的預期」、「成員默契形成之程度」兩部份;應變數為「合作關係維持機制」。本研究運用定性研究方式,在針織染整、進口化學原料,以及鐵門窗製造產業中,各選取一家中小企業作為深度訪談對象,了解其各種對外合作關係的運作本質,以其為分析單位,並利用前述之架構發展命題,所獲之研究發現如下: 一、「合作關係之經濟本質」與「對彼此互賴程度的預期」間具有正向之關聯。二、「成員互動特性」與「成員形成默契之程度」間亦具有正向之關聯。 三、「對彼此互賴程度的預期」高,「成員彼此形成默契之程度」高的合作者,其對合作效率的重視度高於公平,以默契、交情、合作利益降 低不確定性並化解衝突,工作角色與人際互動互為輔翼。 四、「對彼此互賴程度的預期」高,「成員彼此形成默契之程度」低的合作者,其對合作效率的重視度同於公平,以資訊蒐集降低不確定性,以較高之談判力主導衝突之解決,並以工作角色作為雙方互動的主軸。 五、「對彼此互賴程度的預期」低,「成員彼此形成默契之程度」高的合作者,其對合作效率的重視度同於公平,以交情、網路成員制裁力降低不確定性,依行規解決衝突,並以人際關係作為主要互動方式。 六、「對彼此互賴程度的預期」低,「成員彼此形成默契之程度」低的合作者,其對合作效率的重視度低於公平,以提高對方之依存度降低不確定性,顧忌較少的衝突常造成合作關係瓦解,以工作角色作為主要互動方式。
2

供應鏈中的跨階管理:以焦點廠商、一階供應商、二階供應商的三方關係為例 / Managing Across Tiers in a Supply Chain: Case Studies in the Triad Relationship of 'Focal Firm - First Tier Supplier - Second Tier Supplier'

張雯然 Unknown Date (has links)
供應鏈中的各廠商彼此專業分工,專注於自己的核心能力,藉市場交易交換資源,可以讓整個供應鏈的生產效率最佳化。組織間的管理也是一樣,若每一個廠商都能管理好直接的上下游廠商,提昇合作的品質,則供應鏈整體的績效也會提昇。若有缺乏生產能力或管理能力的廠商,也會被市場機能淘汰。當供應鏈中每一階層的市場機能運作良好時,任何上下游市場的變化,也會層層傳遞到其他階層的市場,而影響了廠商的決策,並回過頭來傳遞而影響原來發生變化的源頭市場。因此,在理想的狀態中,廠商並不需要關心直接上下游之外的其他階層的市場的狀況,廠商在本身所面對的市場中做的決策自然會影響其他階層的市場,並最終達成整個供應鏈中各市場的均衡。但是,在實務上,我們卻發現廠商跨過直接的供應商去管理更上游的二階以上的供應商的情況愈來愈普遍。什麼原因造成了前述市場機能的失靈,且不能只依賴各階段市場中適當的混合統合模式選擇來回應市場失靈,以致於廠商必須協助或代替供應商去管理更上游的供應商(即本論文所稱的跨階管理)呢?在過去供應鏈管理相關文獻中,缺乏專文討論跨階管理的現象。僅能由一些供應鏈管理的研究中找到部份與跨階管理有關的案例描述,且缺乏理論的解釋。因此,本論文以「焦點廠商-一階供應商-二階供應商」的三方關係為分析單位,做為更一般化的跨階管理的代表,研究焦點廠商為何要介入一階供應商對二階供應商的管理,或焦點廠商為何要直接管理二階供應商。本論文透過個案研究,選擇具先進供應鏈管理實務的台灣資通產業中的九家廠商進行訪談及次級資料收集,歸納式地分析個案資料,以找出跨階管理的內涵及理由。 本論文發現跨階管理的內涵,可以用組織間關係中的協調(coordination)、控制(control)、協商(negotiation)為管理元素加以拆解。第一,焦點廠商介入一階供應商對二階供應商的管理,可以重新拆解為焦點廠商協調、控制、協商一階供應商對二階供應商的協調、控制、協商。第二,焦點廠商直接管理二階供應商,即為焦點廠商對二階供應商進行協調、控制、協商的行動。這兩種跨階管理做法的深度不同,但都是為了達到相同的結果,因此可以合併為更高層次的「跨階管理」構念,以這兩種做法代表中等程度及較高程度的跨階管理的水準表現。跨階管理的理由包括了焦點廠商對一階供應商的資訊不對稱及權力不對等、一階供應商對二階供應商的管理能耐不足及權力不對等、一階供應商處於二階供應商及焦點廠商間的資訊處理能力及任務協調能力不足。更進一步歸納這些原因,可以形成兩個類別,分別是一階供應商的投機和無能,導致焦點廠商必須進行跨階管理。一階供應商的投機是因它位於焦點廠商和二階供應商之間,而有資訊不對等和權力不對等的優勢。一階供應商的無能又分為管理二階供應商時協調、控制能力不足和談判力不足,以及做為焦點廠商和二階供應商的居中協調者卻在資訊傳遞及任務協調上的能力不足。而焦點廠商進行跨階管理後,可以改善或部份取代原來「焦點廠商-一階供應商」及「一階供應商-二階供應商」的關係及績效,因此可以提昇「焦點廠商-一階供應商-二階供應商」三方關係所形成的體系的整體績效。
3

移動彈性與組織間關係策略之研究 / A study of mobility of flexibility and interorganizational relationship strategy

張朝清, Chang, Chao Ching Unknown Date (has links)
在委外代工與採購的垂直交易結構中,供應商關係管理是廠商垂直整合策略中重要的決策。中心廠若能與提供關鍵要素的主要供應商維持緊密的合作關係,可發揮降低營運成本、聚焦組織核心能力之策略性效益,但若過度依賴特定的主要供應商,則可能導致供應商優勢的發生,並陷入非對稱依賴交易結構中所產生的套牢風險。實務中常見的管理問題,即在於如何維持交易關係的彈性,避免被特定供應商所套牢,並維持雙方的合作關係的穩定與發展。本研究從中心廠的角度,探討在與主要供應商之間,高度互賴且非對稱的交易關係中,中心廠如何避免套牢風險,並提高與主要供應商之關係彈性。 本研究透過廠商個案研究中歸納中心廠對於與主要供應商之間的關係管理機制,以降低主要供應商之移動彈性、增加中心廠本身移動彈性為主要的策略邏輯。個案研究顯示,關係深化、價值深化、關係探索等關係管理策略,透過降低主要供應商移動彈性,藉以增加雙方互賴程度;價值深化、關係探索、結構探索等關係管理策略,則致力於提高中心廠本身的移動彈性,增加本身可選擇空間,並降低對主要供應商之依賴程度。 本研究接著以我國紡織業與資訊業為對象進行廠商問卷調查,採取結構方程模式分析250份樣本資料,驗證12項研究假說。實證結果支持8項研究假說:主要供應商移動彈性與中心廠認知合作績效呈負相關、中心廠移動彈性與中心廠認知合作績效呈正相關。關係深化、交易價值深化、關係探索等三項關係管理策略,與主要供應商移動彈性呈負相關;交易價值深化、結構探索兩項關係管理策略,與中心廠移動彈性呈正相關。 本研究結合交易成本、資源依賴、廠商行為等理論觀點,以中心廠及主要供應商雙方的移動彈性作為組織間關係之決策準則,探討中心廠與其主要供應商之關係策略與管理作法,並進行理論意義與實務意涵之討論。 / Managing the transaction relationships with the key supplier is a critical decision related to vertical integration. The previous literature suggest that a firm can achieve the strategic benefits such as reducing operation cost and focusing on organizational core competence through outsourcing, while maintaining a close cooperative relationship with the key supplier who provides essential key factors such as key components or key material. However, focal firm may also hold-up by the key supplier when it over-dependent on the opposite site. Therefore, the practical puzzle is how to maintain flexibility of relationships in vertical transactions as well as to avoid hold-up by specific key supplier and to extend the transaction stability with the key supplier. Standing the view of focal buyer, the study explores two related questions: how to avoid hold-up problem in an asymmetric buyer-supplier transactions, and, in the ex post transaction, how to increase relational flexibility in highly interdependence situation. The dyadic transactions between focal firm and its key supplier are the units of our analysis to confer with the managerial mechanism of key supplier relationship. The study conducted interviews dozens of Taiwanese firm as case studies. We model an exploration-exploitation framework adopted by focal firm adapt to ex post asymmetric interorganizational relationships. Thus we see two behavioral mechanisms: reducing key suppliers’ mobility of flexibility through relational exploitation as well as exploration on transaction value and relationship for reinforcing interdependency in dyadic transactions, and, increasing focal firms’ mobility of flexibility through structural exploration as well as transaction value exploitation so as to diminish the dependency on the key supplier and heighten alternatives to cooperate with. Using structure equation modeling approach, research hypotheses are tested on a sample of 250 focal firms established in Taiwan. We found the positive relationships between focal firms’ mobility of flexibility and cooperative performance perceived by focal firm, and, the negative relationships between key suppliers’ mobility of flexibility and cooperative performance perceived by focal firm. Empirical results confirmed the negative relationships between key suppliers’ mobility of flexibility and focal firm’s exploitation in relationship and transaction value as well as relationship exploration. The positive relationships between focal firms’ mobility of flexibility as well as structural exploration and transactional exploitation were also supported. The study develop a theoretical extension based on the transaction cost theory, resource dependence theory, and the behavioral theory of firm. We also address dyadic mobility of flexibility as the decision criterion for balancing exploration and exploitation in the interorganizational relationship. These findings provide theoretical and managerial implications for vertical coordination in supplier relationship management in particular.
4

不對稱組織間交易關係之統治 / Governance in asymmetric buyer-seller relationships

康敏平, Kang, Min-Ping Unknown Date (has links)
代工廠商承接訂單時,為特定品牌客戶投資各種專屬的設備和人力是普遍存在的現象。相較之下,台灣的代工廠商處於相對弱勢的地位。代工廠商並不容易在交易初期就從品牌客戶端,取得對等的保護機制,故契約的執行的風險也相對升高。但實務上,我們發現台灣的代工廠商在沒有事前保護機制的情況下,卻仍持續為特定客戶投資。如果代工廠商必須先承諾關係專屬投資,才能爭取得到訂單。在沒有事前保護機制的情況下,代工廠商該有那些配套措施,來保護交易關係? 本研究以代工廠商角度,探討如何透過交易後的保護策略,改變代工廠商與客戶之間的依賴關係。本研究根據交易成本理論和權力依賴理論推論,代工廠商傾向先承諾關係專屬投資,並於交易後採取事後保護策略。事後保護策略有兩類,分別是槓桿策略(資源獲取、擴大客戶範疇)和連結策略(擴大垂直範疇、共同決策與行動)。槓桿策略企圖降低代工廠商的依賴程度;連結策略則會提高客戶的依賴程度。藉由代工廠商與品牌客戶之間的權力變化,進而保護關係專屬投資免於套牢的威脅。 本研究分三個子研究進行,分別為(1)探索性個案研究、(2)關係專屬投資量表發展、(3)問卷調查研究。第一、探索性個案研究發現,不對稱的組織間關係使得代工廠商必須配合品牌客戶的需求而承諾關係專屬投資,但在「小對大」的格局之下,較為弱勢的代工廠商仍有具有生存空間。個案研究發現代工廠商對品牌客戶的投資,除了單一交易的成本與利益之外,還會考量對未來交易以及其他交易對象的影響。所謂「將欲奪之,必固與之」,代工廠商透過關係專屬投資被整合到產業的價值網絡中,換取廠商的生存機會。 第二、關係專屬投資量表發展研究發現,關係專屬投資為一多構面構念,可分為「實體資產投資」、「無形資產投資」和「資產專屬程度」三個次構念。由此可知,關係專屬投資既是一種資產,有助於交易關係之維持;也可能成為負債,限於少數交易的困境。 第三、本研究整合交易成本理論和權力依賴理論,並根據個案研究和量表發展結果,推論關係專屬投資程度、事後保護策略、依賴程度三者之間的關係。問卷調查研究證實,代工廠商對品牌客戶的無形 資產投資會增加代工廠商的依賴程度。但如果代工廠商投資之後,採取資源獲取策略。藉由品牌客戶的背書,提升知名度或市場地位,則關係專屬投資與代工廠商依賴程度之間的關係就會減弱。另外,關係專屬投資也會提高客戶對代工廠商的依賴程度。投資實體資產和無形資產的代工廠商,會藉由擴大服務範疇,與客戶共同決策與行動,來提高客戶依賴程度。 / In original equipment manufacturer (OEM)-supplier relationships, OEM suppliers commonly make investments that are specialized to the requirements of a particular buyer. Taiwanese OEM suppliers are small-medium firms with limited resources and low in market visibility. They are initially in a weak bargaining position, so they have no ability to vertical integrate or demand any kind of ex ante safeguards at all. Knowing that clients may have opportunistic behaviors, suppliers in Taiwan still make relation-specific investments for them without their commitments. How do these suppliers governance the asymmetric interorganizational relationships to avoid falling into the trap predicted by the transaction cost theory? This study takes the view of a supplier, the small party in asymmetric OEM-supplier relationship, who adopts ex post strategies to create inter-organizational dependency with OEMs. According to transaction cost theory and power dependency theory, we argue that OEM suppliers are more likely to make relation-specific investments first and follow by ex post strategies. We model the ex post strategies adopted by OEM suppliers to protect specific investments in asymmetric OEM-supplier relationships by using leveraging strategy (resource acquisition, customer scope) and bonding strategy (vertical scope, joint action). Leveraging strategies will lower the level of suppliers’ dependence on OEMs while bonding strategy will increase the level of OEMs’ dependence on suppliers. We conducted three studies to explore the issues: (1) exploratory case research; (2) scale development of the construct of relation-specific investment; (3) survey research. First, we found that investment decision of small party is beyond the scope of a single transaction. After making relation-specific investments, OEM suppliers redeploy their resources and work closely with their buyers to maintain exiting and future transactions. They also acquire strategic resources from OEMs and apply them to a broader customer base. Second, the concept of relation-specific investment is a multidimensional construct with three sub-dimensions as tangible investment, intangible investment, and asset specificity. Relation-specific investments create an inherent dilemma because they have the potential both to promote and reduce transaction cost for investing parties. Third, we integrated two theories to explore the relationships between relation-specific investment, ex post strategies, and dependency. According to survey results of 146 OEM suppliers in Taiwan, we confirmed the positive relationship between suppliers’ intangible asset investment and their dependency on OEMs. However, if suppliers leverage their clients’ reputations and reposition themselves as first-tier suppliers, they can lower the level of suppliers’ dependency due to their relation-specific investments. On the other hand, the more relation-specific investments suppliers make, the morel likely suppliers would adopt bonding strategy by expanding vertical scope in supply chain and by actively involving in joint decision making. We found that relation-specific investment itself and suppliers’ bonding strategy will increase the OEMs’ dependency on suppliers.

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