近年來，公司治理問題受到重視，加上我國成立投資人保護中心，因此投資人求償意識提高，主導經營決策的董監事及重要經理人被求償頻率與金額上也有增加之趨勢，故董監事及經理人(下稱D&O)責任保險投保需求日益增加。 然而，保險市場中一直存在資訊不對稱的問題，過去研究多以車險、醫療險、傷害險為主，責任險部份較少提及。D&O責任保險承保範圍特色主要為董監事及重要經理人個人執行職務之錯誤、不當行為，因此對於保險公司能否辨別風險、收取相對應之費率存疑。實務上，保險公司仍比本研究能觀察的資料更多，因此本研究僅能以公開資訊探討D&O責任保險市場。 本研究使用2010至2014年之間上市櫃公司投保D&O責任保險資料進行分析，收集可觀察之承保事故紀錄，並以公司特性之資產規模、資產報酬率、負債資產比率、財報是否為四大會計事務所簽核、是否為高波動性產業等變數，觀察事故發生與否與高保額之間的相關性，以公開資訊探討我國D&O責任保險市場。實證結果發現，事故發生與否與高保額保單有正相關，表示相關公開資訊與D&O責任保險市場存在資訊不對稱問題。

目前國際推廣之公司治理制度，非常重視董事會的專業能力，由於董事會是企業的幕後推手，舉凡公司長期策略、經營方向、任免高階主管等重大政策，莫不是董事會的權責，也攸關企業經營成效的良窳，因此如何提升董事會的效能，實為公司治理的共同課題。我國政府於1998年起開始，陸續宣導公司治理之重要性，並推動獨立董事、獨立監察人制度，以及制定符合國情之「上市上櫃公司治理實務守則」，引導國內企業強化公司治理，進而提升國際競爭力。依我國現行相關法令，董事除對公司負有忠實與注意義務外，對於第三人就公司業務之執行，如有違反法令致其受有損害時，對該第三人亦應與公司負連帶賠償之責。由於董事、監察人在人力、時間及所處環境等因素，難免會出現判斷失誤等情況，從而承擔重大的責任與風險，進而影響到部分專業人士擔任獨立董事之意願，董、監事暨重要職員責任保險制度可適時轉移董、監事之風險。故本研究以董、監事暨重要職員責任保險制度的規範為主軸，首先論述我國金融機構-金融控股公司、銀行業、證券商及保險業董、監事主要責任，其次探討對董事會職能的影響，最後對健全公司治理結構與落實公司管控的有效性，提出董、監事暨重要職員責任保險制度予以法制化之建議，以落實公司治理並提升董事會之效能。 / The current proposed company governance structure emphasizes the professional abilities of the board; as the board works behind the scenes of a corporation and is responsible for major policy and strategies such as a company’s long-term strategy, operational direction, hiring and firing high-level managers. These are all decisions that affect an organization’s performance, so improving the capability of the board is a joint issue with corporate governance. Since 1998, the nation’s government has continued to address the importance of corporate governance and promoted structures such as independent boards, independent supervisors, and “publicly traded company corporate governance guidelines” that fit national culture to guide the nation’s corporations in strengthening corporate governance and increasing global competitiveness. According to the nation’s current related legal regulations, the board is responsible for the loyalty and care of the company but also must pay damages to third parties and companies if the company causes damages due to illegal activity. As the board and supervisors may err due to elements such as labor, time, and environmental constraints in shouldering major responsibilities and risks, this has affected the desire for certain professionals to hold board and supervisory positions so critical employee responsibility insurance mechanisms can suitably transfer the risk of board or supervisory members. This study explores critical employee responsibility insurance standards as the main topic by first discussing the main responsibilities of board and supervisory members in the nation’s financial institutions such as financial holding companies, banks, security firms ,and insurance companies. We will then explore the board’s effect towards functions and finally propose suggestions to legalize critical employee responsibility insurance standards that promote healthy corporate governance structures to realize effective management of companies in order to appropriate corporate governance and increase the performance of boards.

本研究針對國內2008至2012年非金融業之上市上櫃公司，探討董監事及重要職員責任保險之需求因素，並研究這些需求因素之彼此關連性，形成董監事責任保險之需求因素路徑分析，最後根據實證結果建立路徑圖。 研究結果顯示，股東總數、公司規模、董監事持股比例、外部持股比例和獨立董監事比例，對董監事責任保險金額呈顯著正相關；董事長兼任總經理與董監事責任保險金額呈顯著負相關。經理人持股比例、資產報酬率和負債比率因樣本分配較分散，迴歸分析受極端值影響，導致在統計結果中不顯著。此外，董監報酬若對董監事責任保險金額採單一迴歸時，具有顯著相關。但在路徑分析中，會因受其他變數影響，導致不具相關性。 / Based on a sample of firms, except for financial companies, listed in Taiwan Securities Exchange and Gre Tai Securities Market over the period of 2008-2012, this study examines the determinants of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and the cause-effect relations among these determinants which are presented by path diagram. The empirical result indicates that the number of shareholders, size, directors’ and supervisors’ ownership, outsider ownership, and percentage of independent directors and supervisors in the board of directors are positively related to the amount of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. The chief executive officer as the chairman of the board is negatively associated with the amount of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance. The manager ownership, return on asset, debt ratio and the directors’ and supervisors’ reward are not related to the amount of directors’ and officers’ liability insurance.