本研究針對解決代理問題機能中的管理激勵計畫作深入探討，實證國內民營企業高階主管薪酬計畫的實施情況，並探討情境因素對薪酬計畫的影響另外，並由高階主管薪酬的決定因素中，瞭解薪酬與績效的關連。 本研究以民國七十疚手為研究期間，利用問卷調查方式，以國內製造業與服務業各前五百大的民營企業總經理為分析對象，實際有效樣本在薪酬計畫與薪酬決定因素中分別為115 與88家公司。 本研究的實證結果如下： 1.高階主管薪酬計畫實施分析 (1)民營企業對其高階主管較常使用的薪酬項目依序為：年終獎金、當年給付紅利、加薪。 (2)民營企業較常採用「獎助過去的薪酬」，較少採用「獎助過去並激勵未來的薪酬」。 2.情境因素對高階主管薪酬計畫的影響 (1)製造業在股票購買選擇權及績效股的採行上，顯著多於服務業。 (2)上市公司在股票購買選擇權、績效股、當年給付紅、利提升身份地位的採行上，顯著多於未上市公司。 3.高階主管薪酬決定因素 (1)在決定總經理總薪酬時，公司規模、公司績效與高階主管的權力均為重要因素。而其中以權力一項影響程度較大，公司規模次之，公司績效則居後。 (2)在決定總經理薪資時，公司規模是最重要的考量因素，受教育年數則次之。 (3)在決定總經理獎金紅利數額時，權力是最重要的考量，績效則居次。

高階主管薪酬計畫與股權結構是解決公司代理問題的重要機制，代理理論提出以績效決定酬勞的制度，可提供高階主管努力誘因，促使股東與高階主管之間的目標一致；同時股權結構也會影響高階主管的努力，進而對公司的。故本研究旨在探討我國上市公司股權集中度、酬勞計畫與公司經營績效之關係，並利用模式推導相關的命題與假說。 本研究利用混合迴歸就四年度主管薪酬資料加以分析，Scheffe檢定檢驗高階主管的持股比例與薪酬計畫的關係，實證結果整理如下： １、董事長持股比例與薪酬無關，總經理持股比例與薪酬有關。 ２、公司價值與董事會持股比例呈非線性的關係。 ３、機構投資人偏向效率監督假說。 ４、總經理薪酬計畫中的項目比薪酬水準的高低重要。 ５、公司經營績效與高階主管薪酬呈正相關 / In agency theory, executive compensation contracts and ownership structures provide primary mechanisms for solving agency problems. Top executive compensation linked to performance can align the incentives of firms'' top executive with firms''stockholder. Ownership structure can influce the effort of the top executive. The main purpose of this study is to examine the relationship among top executive compensation　scheme, ownership structure and firm performance for listed companies in Taiwan, and use modelling to develop related propositions and hypotheses. Pooling regressions using four years'' pool data and Scheffe test are performed to test hypothese, Empirical results are summarized as follows: 1.The holdings of chairman has nothing to do with the level of compsation and that of CEO has something to do with. 2.The non-linear relationship between firm value and holdings of board of directors. 3.The role of institution tends to be efficinet monitoring hypothesis. 4.Incentive component of CEO compensation scheme tends to be more important than level of that sheme. 5.Firm performance is positively associated with top executive''s cash compensation.

高階主管薪酬計畫與股權結構是解決公司代理問題的重要機制，代理理論提出以績效決定酬勞的制度，可提供高階主管努力誘因，促使股東與高階主管之間的目標一致；同時股權結構也會影響高階主管的努力，進而對公司的。故本研究旨在探討我國上市公司股權集中度、酬勞計畫與公司經營績效之關係，並利用模式推導相關的命題與假說。 本研究利用混合迴歸就四年度主管薪酬資料加以分析，Scheffe檢定檢驗高階主管的持股比例與薪酬計畫的關係，實證結果整理如下： 1.董事長持股比例與薪酬無關，總經理持股比例與薪酬有關。 2.公司價值與董事會持股比例呈非線性的關係。 3.機構投資人偏向效率監督假說。 4.總經理薪酬計畫中的項目比薪酬水準的高低重要。 5.公司經營績效與高階主管薪酬呈正相關。 / In agency theory, executive compensation contracts and ownership structures provide primary mechanisms for solving agency problems. Top executive compensation linked to performance can align the incentives of firms' top executive with firms'stockholder. Ownership structure can influce the effort of the top executive. The main purpose of this study is to examine the relationship among top executive compensation　scheme, ownership structure and firm performance for listed companies in Taiwan, and use modelling to develop related propositions and hypotheses. Pooling regressions using four years' pool data and Scheffe test are performed to test hypothese, Empirical results are summarized as follows: 1.The holdings of chairman has nothing to do with the level of compsation and that of CEO has something to do with. 2.The non-linear relationship between firm value and holdings of board of directors. 3.The role of institution tends to be efficinet monitoring hypothesis. 4.Incentive component of CEO compensation scheme tends to be more important than level of that sheme. 5.Firm performance is positively associated with top executive's cash compensation.