當前我國各級政府財政因窘、公共建設財源短缺，地方期盼興建捷運建設，惟捷運建設成本高昂，國家發展委員會參考美國租稅增額財源機制（Tax Increment Financing, TIF）制度核定「跨域加值公共建設財務規劃方案」，該方案廣泛用於配置捷運建設經費，主要係結合創新財源及「自償率」機制促使地方政府善盡財政努力，改善早期建設外部效益未能內部化的缺點，由中央及地方依自償率共同分擔捷運建設經費。本研究發現中央為減少財政負擔設置自償率門檻作為補助依據，恐造成地方為求計畫核定，將配合中央或自行美化財務參數，導致未來財政上的道德危機，觀之美國爭議個案，發現以未來的租稅增額挹注公共建設時隱含道德危機及財政排擠，相關問題管制措施不足，我國援用美國相關制度時應特別注意其制度上的缺點，然目前國內制度及相關研究尚未就捷運建設營運期之自償性經費提出對應的管考措施。 依財政分權理論，捷運建設自償性經費可按財政總量管制的理念進行管考。本研究分析美國管考機制爭議案例後續處理方式，再歸納愛荷華州管考機制相關作法，發現該州管考措施多元，不僅明訂資訊公開項目，亦限制制度運用範圍，可作為我國管考道德危機及財政排擠問題之參考。然而，美國制度與我國「跨域加值公共建設財務規劃方案」未完全相同，為設計適合我國之管考機制，本研究邀請曾經參與該方案之中央及地方相關人員，以及國內大眾捷運系統學者參與焦點團體座談會及個別訪談，針對現況課題進行深入的探討。經分析訪談意見，發現捷運建設財務規劃現況問題包含中央面臨地方違背財務承諾道德危機，地方則可能出現財政排擠問題，故管考機制應發揮財務預警、資訊透明功能。 本研究建構一套管考機制，以計畫、執行、檢查、改進（Plan-Do-Check-Act）的實施程序進行下列管考措施：（1）審議期間由中央依捷運建設貢獻審議各計畫租稅增額投入建設經費比例，並制定財務監督及輔導原則、資訊公開原則，供地方據以制定相關配合辦法。（2）建設期間中央給予補助前，監督地方檢討非自償性經費執行情形。（3）營運期間由地方主管機關每年向地方公共債務管理委員會提報自償性財源收益績效，中央每5年檢核地方綜合成效。（4）配套措施包含由中央擴充、開放資訊系統供地方及民眾運用，落實財政透明及公共課責，輔助推動管考機制。同時運用彈性獎勵策略，促使地方政府提升財務績效，促使地方自我改善地價評議制度，以充分反映公共建設貢獻，達成外部效益內部化。 / Currently, government is facing financial difficulty on all levels and is short of public funds for public works. Local governments are looking forward to the construction of MRT facilities. However, the costs of these are very high. Referencing the tax increment financing (TIF) system in the U.S., the National Development Council approved the “Project for Cross-Field Value-Adding in Public Works Financial Planning,” which is widely used for the allocation of the MRT construction funds. By combining innovative financial resources and a “self-liquidation ratio” mechanism, local governments are encouraged to make financial efforts to overcome the failure to internalize the external benefits of early construction. Central and local governments share the MRT construction funds based on the self-liquidation ratio. In the present study, we summarized the literature related to self-liquidating public works and found that during the process of reviewing MRT construction plans, in order to reduce the financial burden and increase the self-liquidation ratio of local governments. However, to seek approval for their plans, local governments beautify their financial indicators, resulting in a moral hazard in finance. By analyzing disputes in the U.S., we found that this system implies moral crises and financial exclusion. Control measures on related issues are inadequate. When borrowing related systems from the U.S., the Taiwanese government should pay special attention to their shortcomings. Neither the current domestic system nor related research has proposed appropriate measures to supervise and evaluate self-liquidation funds during MRT construction and operation. According to the theory of fiscal decentralization, self-liquidating funds for MRT construction can be supervised and evaluated as per the framework of growth control quotas. After analyzing subsequent settlements of disputes on supervision and evaluation mechanisms in the U.S. and summarizing practices related to these mechanisms in the state of Iowa, we found that the state has diverse supervision and evaluation measures, which not only clearly stipulate the disclosure of project information, but also set limitations for the scope of applying the system. This can be used as a reference for the Taiwanese government to handle the moral hazard and financial exclusion of the supervision and evaluation system. However, the systems in the U.S. and the “Project for Cross-Field Value-Adding in Public Works Financial Planning” in Taiwan are not entirely the same. To design an appropriate supervision and evaluation system for Taiwan, those who had participated in the development of the plan from central and local governments as well as scholars of the domestic mass transit system were invited for focus group and individual interview. In-depth discussion on current issues was carried out. After analyzing their opinions from the interview, we found that the current situation of financial planning for MRT construction is as follows: the central government is facing the moral hazard that local governments may violate financial commitments and local governments may experience financial exclusion. Thus, the supervision and evaluation system should perform the functions of financial forecasting and information transparency. In this study, we constructed a supervision and evaluation mechanism to implement the following measures through the plan-do-check-act procedure: (1) During the reviewing phase, the central government considers the ratio of tax increment invested into the construction funds for each proposed plan according to the contribution of MRT construction while developing financial supervision and counseling principles and information disclosure principles to serve as a basis for local governments to formulate supporting measures. (2) During the construction phase, prior to granting subsidies, the central government should supervise the review of the implementation of the non-self-liquidating funds by the local governments. (3) During the operation phase, each local authority should report annually to the local Public Debt Administration Committee its earnings from self-liquidating resources and the central government should inspect the overall performances of the local governments every five years. (4) The supporting measures include the central government expanding and opening information systems for local governments and the people, implementing fiscal transparency and public accountability, and prompting the promotion of supervision and evaluation mechanism. Simultaneously, the central government may use flexible incentive strategies to encourage local governments to improve their financial performance and land appraisal systems to reflect fully the contributions of public works and to internalize the external benefits.