本文以鄉鎮政府的財政運作為例，解釋中國大陸地方政府在預算外收入增加的同時，也不斷在累積負債的現象。本文認為，當前中國大陸地方政府預算外收入和負債的增加是「軟預算約束」的表現，而「官僚協調機制」與「公有制產權」的交互作用則是導致地方政府軟預算約束的主要因素。特別是，官僚協調機制下縣級政府的刻意放縱，以及土地集體所有制事實上成為幹部所有制，使得鄉鎮政府可以不斷擴張預算外收入並且累積政府債務。在此種財政運作的情況下，改革地方財政面臨到環環相扣的問題，然而，由於官僚協調機制的制約和欠缺改革所需的正確財政資訊，使得環環相扣的問題難以被克服，這不僅阻礙了未來改革的可能性，也讓現行的改革方案難以收到真正的效果。

當俄羅斯正經歷著政治結構與經濟體系同時轉變的考驗時，連年下降的國有企業生產力與總產量並未隨著改革工作的進展而有所提升，即使改革措施因為先前政策的成效不彰而有所調整，但俄羅斯的總體經濟表現依然不理想。為了探究 1992 年年初到 1994 年年中這段期間俄羅斯國有企業政策的內容、實施的成效，以及政策取向變化的原因，本文先從財產權途徑與市場結構途徑著手，分析決策過程中不同的部門對國有企業的預算約制、協調機制與市場結構的看法，然後歸納出兩種不同的政策取向：保護取向與效率取向。保護取向者以國有企業員工及立法機構的成員為主，主張維持現有制度與就業水準，避免失業引發社會問題，並增加對國有企業資源的投入以提高企業產量。效率取向者以新興的經濟學家及部份的內閣成員為主，希望建立新的機制以減少資源投入的數量，但賦予國有企業提高生產效率的誘因，使其提高產量，如此一來便可以減輕政府的財政負擔，並達到穩定金融及控制通貨膨脹的目的。1992年年初俄羅斯行政機構中的效率取向者取得了優勢的決策地位，並且開始採取穩定化與價格自由化等改革措施，但緊縮資源投入的改革方式卻造成國有企業員工的恐慌，從系統論的觀點來看，民主化之後的俄羅斯因為政策承受者的反饋機制開始強化，因此效率取向者的改革措施便遭到立法機構中保護取向者的修正，而開始向擴張支出的政策方向傾斜。雖然效率取向者試圖以憑證私有化政策換取民眾對改革的信心，甚至以發動流血政變、重新制定憲法等方式變更制度設計以重新取得優勢的決策地位，但因為其緊縮政策忽略了市場結構因素，難以提升企業產量，又引發企業員工對失業的恐懼，因此保護取向者便又在 1994 年年初佔領了優勢的決策地位，主導了政策的走向。總括 1992 年年初到 1994 年年中俄羅斯國有企業改革政策的走向，便可以得出政策取向在保護取向與效率取向之間連續擺盪，但結果卻受保護取向影響較深的局面。 / When people in Russia suffered from the transformation of the political structure and the economic system, the performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in Russia did not improve , either. In order to find out the options of reform strategy and the cause of failure, this research applies the property rights approach and the market structure approach to analyze the budget constraint, coordination mechanism, and market structure problems of SOEs. Combing those problems with the decision making process founded on systems model, we made a conclusion that there were two policy orientations in solving the SOE problems: one is the protection-orientated policy, and the other is the efficiency-oriented one. Most employees of SOEs and legislators preferred the protection-oriented policy because they were afraid of unemployment and bankruptcy of their enterprises by privatization. On the contrary, the efficiency-oriented government placed its emphasis on the rampant inflation and preferred to cut the government expense by reducing the investment in SOEs. At the beginning of 1992, the efficiency-oriented stabilization policy and the liberalization of price became the focuses of reform. Those retrenchment policies limited the spending of SOEs and reduced the government's popularity, too. In order to keep the enterprises operating, employees of SOEs and legislators expected more investment from the government. With the feedback function performed by legislators, the protection-oriented policy substituted the efficiency-oriented one from the mid of 1992. To dominate the reform strategy again. President Yeltsin dismissed the congress in September 1993 and called for the referendum of new constitution and the election of new congress in December 1993. Although the efficiency-oriented government tried to recover the public confidence of reform by controlling the inflation, but the employees, living in the fear of unemployment, did not place their trust in government. After the election, the protection-oriented deputies still occupied the majority seats and turned the direction of reform strategy again. In sum, the orientation of reform policy of SOEs in Russia swung all the time since 1992 to 1994, but the protection-oriented policy had more influence on it in general.