This dissertation explores the problem of violent ethnic conflict in ethnically polarized developing countries using the concept of social capital. Ethnically polarized developing countries typically have high levels of intra-ethnic social capital (social capital existing within groups) but low levels of inter-ethnic social capital (social capital existing between groups). Violent conflict can be averted by cultivating higher levels of inter-ethnic social capital. High levels of inter-ethnic social capital create incentives for elites to adopt moderate strategies. A civic compact emerges when the general population internalizes the norms of inter-ethnic social capital (the rule of law; the right to participation; and the right to continued physical and cultural existence). The civic compact is associated with a general expectation that elites will not pursue extra-institutional strategies such as violence to advance their interests. Peace processes that originate in “hurting stalemates” afford fragile opportunities to begin to cultivate inter-ethnic social capital. At such moments, elite incentive structures align in such a way as to overcome barriers to reform associated with path dependence. The cultivation of inter-ethnic social capital is initiated by integrating the norms of inter-ethnic social capital into the structure of the peace process, although eventually state institutions (which must incorporate these norms into their design) will also re-enforce these norms. Elites begin to internalize the norms of inter-ethnic social capital by repeatedly engaging with each other during the peace process in a manner that actualizes these norms into their experiences. I explore how the norms of inter-ethnic social capital can be integrated meaningfully into the peace process so that elites begin to absorb these norms and so that the institutions that emerge from the process are perceived to be legitimate. Inter-ethnic social capital is developed among the masses primarily through the interactions that the masses have with state institutions. The peace process must focus on rehabilitating the relationship between the masses and the state. This dissertation assesses how this relationship may be rehabilitated and how the norms of inter-ethnic social capital can be integrated into the process of rehabilitating this relationship so that the masses can begin to internalize these norms.

This thesis explores the participation of children within legal discourse by looking at how laws and policies engage or disengage children. The basic premise is that to understand children’s participation is to confront the discourse of children and childhood where we uncover underlying assumptions, interests and agendas that inform our conception of who the child is and what the experience of childhood entails. Specifically, the thesis examines child participation within the Philippine legal framework by looking at the status, conditions and circumstances of children in four contexts: family, educational system, work environment and youth justice system. It argues that our conceptions of children and childhood are not only produced from a particular discourse but in turn are productive of a particular construction and practices reflected in the legal system. In its examination, the thesis reveals a complex Philippine legal framework shaped by competing paradigms of children and childhood that both give meaning to and respond to children’s engagements. On the one hand, there is a dominant discourse based on universal patterns of development and socialization that views children as objects of adult control and influence. But at the same time, there is some concrete attraction to an emerging paradigm influenced by childhood studies and the child rights movement that opens up opportunities for children’s participation. In advocating for broader acceptance of the emerging paradigm, the thesis identifies distinctive understandings of this paradigm in the Philippine context. A central argument is that in reconstructing the legal discourse of children and childhood, children’s participation grounded on the emerging paradigm does not necessarily introduce “new” understandings of children and childhood in the Philippines but, in fact, confirms existing beliefs and practices that articulate deeply held indigenous relational values. Within this contextualized understanding of the emerging paradigm, the thesis articulates children’s participation as: recognition of children as rights-bearers; acknowledgment of children’s realities as lived and experienced by them; and respect for the meaningful and constitutive relationships that children establish. Consequently, the intrinsic quality and meaning of actions of the child and towards the child take on a significant legal, social and moral value.

This study offers the so-called ”Choice-Based Perspective” of the choice-of-law question or “CBP”. Drawing on the legal philosophy of Immanuel Kant and through careful evaluation of comprehensive theory of Kant’s follower- Friedrich Carl von Savigny, CBP offers a purely private conception of the subject which rejects the conventional wisdom that choice-of-law has to be grounded on the principle of states’ sovereignty. Furthermore, it will be argued that the proposed approach holds much sway in practice, for the normative underpinnings of CBP are already embedded in many traditional and contemporary choice-of-law rules, doctrines, and concepts.

This study offers the so-called ”Choice-Based Perspective” of the choice-of-law question or “CBP”. Drawing on the legal philosophy of Immanuel Kant and through careful evaluation of comprehensive theory of Kant’s follower- Friedrich Carl von Savigny, CBP offers a purely private conception of the subject which rejects the conventional wisdom that choice-of-law has to be grounded on the principle of states’ sovereignty. Furthermore, it will be argued that the proposed approach holds much sway in practice, for the normative underpinnings of CBP are already embedded in many traditional and contemporary choice-of-law rules, doctrines, and concepts.

Recently, some in the anti-abortion movement have begun to assert that abortion harms women and access to abortion should be restricted or prohibited to protect women’s rights. This paper suggests that woman-protective anti-abortion (“WPA”) arguments could become more recognizable in Canada if other kinds of woman-protective legislation are adopted. In particular, this paper focuses on private member’s Bill C-510, an Act to Prevent Coercion of Pregnant Women to Abort (Roxanne’s Law). This paper suggests that Bill C-510 is problematic because its differential treatment of women reinforces historical stereotypes of motherhood and female vulnerability, the same stereotypes upon which the WPA relies. By reinforcing these same stereotypes, Bill C- 510 creates a climate in which WPA restrictions on access to abortion appear more reasonable. The paper concludes by suggesting that the existing aggravated circumstances sentencing sections in the Criminal Code already provide judges with discretionary powers to deal with offences like coerced abortion.

Recently, some in the anti-abortion movement have begun to assert that abortion harms women and access to abortion should be restricted or prohibited to protect women’s rights. This paper suggests that woman-protective anti-abortion (“WPA”) arguments could become more recognizable in Canada if other kinds of woman-protective legislation are adopted. In particular, this paper focuses on private member’s Bill C-510, an Act to Prevent Coercion of Pregnant Women to Abort (Roxanne’s Law). This paper suggests that Bill C-510 is problematic because its differential treatment of women reinforces historical stereotypes of motherhood and female vulnerability, the same stereotypes upon which the WPA relies. By reinforcing these same stereotypes, Bill C- 510 creates a climate in which WPA restrictions on access to abortion appear more reasonable. The paper concludes by suggesting that the existing aggravated circumstances sentencing sections in the Criminal Code already provide judges with discretionary powers to deal with offences like coerced abortion.

I address claims of offence of feelings, religious freedom and language rights, which are all ‎justified by the intrinsic interest individuals attach to their culture. I call them ‘claims from ‎cultural identity’. I develop a conception of substantive equality, understood as distributive ‎justice and underpinned by dignity, for regulating claims from cultural identity in the legal ‎system of multicultural states. I call it Equality of Cultural Identity. ‎ It is a ‘complex equality’ model, which takes cultural identity to be a sphere in ‎peoples’ lives. Unlike majority members, cultural minority members are usually under ‎constant pressure to compromise their cultural identity and assimilate in the majority ‎culture to succeed in other spheres of their lives like education and career. In accordance ‎with Walzer’s theory of Spheres of Justice, I propose a regulative principle to determine ‎the extent of cultural protection minority members deserve, according to which the ‎influence of other spheres of their lives on their sphere of cultural identity should as ‎minimal as possible. ‎ I apply this principle to claims of offence to feeling, which I re-conceptualize as ‎claims from integrity of cultural identity. I suggest the vulnerable identity principle: The ‎more vulnerable a person’s cultural identity, the stronger her claim from integrity of ‎cultural identity. This principle enhances a just distribution of symbolic goods between ‎majority and minority members, is based on objective evaluation standards, and avoids ‎legal moralism. Thus, it overcomes the major liberal worries about regulating speech. ‎ With respect to the language rights and religious freedom, I comparatively analyze ‎them qua cultural rights. I argue that the right to religious freedom, which is generously ‎interpreted by courts, bears all of the allegedly unique features of language rights that are ‎used to support their restrained judicial interpretation. Thus, the existing arguments for ‎their restrained interpretation are not valid. I identify a novel argument for their restrained ‎interpretation, which is that they impose a cultural burden on majority members, but ‎drawing on my conception of equality, I argue that it is not sound as the burden they ‎impose is not great.‎

I address claims of offence of feelings, religious freedom and language rights, which are all ‎justified by the intrinsic interest individuals attach to their culture. I call them ‘claims from ‎cultural identity’. I develop a conception of substantive equality, understood as distributive ‎justice and underpinned by dignity, for regulating claims from cultural identity in the legal ‎system of multicultural states. I call it Equality of Cultural Identity. ‎ It is a ‘complex equality’ model, which takes cultural identity to be a sphere in ‎peoples’ lives. Unlike majority members, cultural minority members are usually under ‎constant pressure to compromise their cultural identity and assimilate in the majority ‎culture to succeed in other spheres of their lives like education and career. In accordance ‎with Walzer’s theory of Spheres of Justice, I propose a regulative principle to determine ‎the extent of cultural protection minority members deserve, according to which the ‎influence of other spheres of their lives on their sphere of cultural identity should as ‎minimal as possible. ‎ I apply this principle to claims of offence to feeling, which I re-conceptualize as ‎claims from integrity of cultural identity. I suggest the vulnerable identity principle: The ‎more vulnerable a person’s cultural identity, the stronger her claim from integrity of ‎cultural identity. This principle enhances a just distribution of symbolic goods between ‎majority and minority members, is based on objective evaluation standards, and avoids ‎legal moralism. Thus, it overcomes the major liberal worries about regulating speech. ‎ With respect to the language rights and religious freedom, I comparatively analyze ‎them qua cultural rights. I argue that the right to religious freedom, which is generously ‎interpreted by courts, bears all of the allegedly unique features of language rights that are ‎used to support their restrained judicial interpretation. Thus, the existing arguments for ‎their restrained interpretation are not valid. I identify a novel argument for their restrained ‎interpretation, which is that they impose a cultural burden on majority members, but ‎drawing on my conception of equality, I argue that it is not sound as the burden they ‎impose is not great.‎

The lack of clarity of Canadian insolvency legislation with respect to the treatment of environmental claims has left Canadian courts wondering whether they should advance the public order policies embodied in the environmental legislation or promote creditors' interests and the private relief afforded by bankruptcy. This thesis examines the state of the law on the question and provides a critical assessment of the legislation and the relevant case law. The author points to the flaws of the legislation and its judicial interpretation, while uncovering the underlying reasons for the existence of such a confused body of jurisprudence. Building on these findings, the author proposes a reform of the insolvency legislation that would uphold the protection of the environment as a fundamental value in Canadian society.

This thesis explores the participation of children within legal discourse by looking at how laws and policies engage or disengage children. The basic premise is that to understand children’s participation is to confront the discourse of children and childhood where we uncover underlying assumptions, interests and agendas that inform our conception of who the child is and what the experience of childhood entails. Specifically, the thesis examines child participation within the Philippine legal framework by looking at the status, conditions and circumstances of children in four contexts: family, educational system, work environment and youth justice system. It argues that our conceptions of children and childhood are not only produced from a particular discourse but in turn are productive of a particular construction and practices reflected in the legal system. In its examination, the thesis reveals a complex Philippine legal framework shaped by competing paradigms of children and childhood that both give meaning to and respond to children’s engagements. On the one hand, there is a dominant discourse based on universal patterns of development and socialization that views children as objects of adult control and influence. But at the same time, there is some concrete attraction to an emerging paradigm influenced by childhood studies and the child rights movement that opens up opportunities for children’s participation. In advocating for broader acceptance of the emerging paradigm, the thesis identifies distinctive understandings of this paradigm in the Philippine context. A central argument is that in reconstructing the legal discourse of children and childhood, children’s participation grounded on the emerging paradigm does not necessarily introduce “new” understandings of children and childhood in the Philippines but, in fact, confirms existing beliefs and practices that articulate deeply held indigenous relational values. Within this contextualized understanding of the emerging paradigm, the thesis articulates children’s participation as: recognition of children as rights-bearers; acknowledgment of children’s realities as lived and experienced by them; and respect for the meaningful and constitutive relationships that children establish. Consequently, the intrinsic quality and meaning of actions of the child and towards the child take on a significant legal, social and moral value.