John Donne’s poetry has long been famous for its metaphysical conceits, which powerfully register the impact of the “New Philosophy,” yet the question of how his work is implicated in the new forms of knowledge-making that exploded in the early seventeenth century has remained unanswered. “Donne and the Sidereus nuncius” examines the relation between method and metaphor on the cusp of the Scientific Revolution by reading the poetry and prose of Donne in the context of developments in early modern astronomy, anatomy and natural philosophy. I focus primarily on two texts, Ignatius, his Conclave (1610) and the Anniversaries (1611-2), which are linked not only by chronology, but also by their mutual concern with the effects of distorted perception on the process of understanding the universe. Written directly after the publication of Galileo’s Sidereus nuncius (1610), these works offer a historicized perspective on Donne’s changing use of scientific metaphor in relation to the transformative crux of the discovery of the telescope, which provided a startling new optical metaphor for the process of knowing. In this context, “Donne and the Sidereus nuncius” considers the conceptual work performed by scientific metaphor as part of an ongoing transformation from emblematic to analogic figuration. Donne’s search for material that is, in his phrase, “appliable” to other subjects, depends on an analogic conception of metaphor, a comparison that enables new thinking by identifying underlying commonalities between disparate objects. Building on this understanding of metaphor as comparative, I examine Donne’s self-conscious use of metaphors of methodical knowledge making—invention, innovation, anatomy and progress—in the context of instrumental metaphors, such as the telescope, spectacles, perspective, and travel narratives. In doing so, I suggest that Donne’s metaphorical conceits explore the conflict between scientific attempts to discern order in nature and the distorting effects of methodological frameworks imposed on the object of analysis.

Between 1914 and 1919, Germans and Austrians experienced previously unimaginable sociopolitical transformations: four years of war, military defeat, the collapse of the Hohenzollern and Habsburg monarchies, the creation of democratic republics, and the redrawing of the map of Central Europe. Through an analysis of new state symbols and the staging of political and cultural celebrations, this dissertation explores the multiple and conflicting ways in which Germans and Austrians sought to reconceptualize the relationships between nation, state and politics in the wake of the First World War. Whereas the political right argued that democracy was a foreign imposition, supporters of democracy in both countries went to great lengths to refute these claims. In particular, German and Austrian republicans endeavored to link their fledgling democracies to the established tradition of großdeutsch nationalism – the idea that a German nation-state should include Austria – in an attempt to legitimize their embattled republics. By using nineteenth-century großdeutsch symbols and showing continued support for an Anschluss (political union) even after the Entente forbade it, republicans hoped to create a transborder German national community that would be compatible with a democratic body politic. As a project that investigates the entangled and comparative histories of Germany and Austria, this dissertation makes three contributions to the study of German nationalism and modern Central European history. First, in revealing the pervasiveness of großdeutsch ideas and symbols at this time, I point to the necessity of looking at both Germany and Austria when considering topics such as the redefinition of national identity and the creation of democracy in post-World War I Central Europe. Second, it highlights the need to move beyond the binary categorizations of civic and ethnic nationalisms, which place German nationalism in the latter category. As the republicans’ use of großdeutsch nationalism demonstrates, the creation of a transborder German community was not simply the work of the extreme political right. Third, it contributes to recent scholarship which seeks to move past the entrenched question of why interwar German and Austrian democracies failed. Instead of simply viewing the two republics as failures, it investigates the ways in which citizens engaged with the new form of government, as well as the prospects for the success of democracy in the wake of military defeat. In drawing attention to the differences between the German and Austrian experiments with democracy, this dissertation points to the relative strengths of the Weimar Republic when compared to the First Austrian Republic.

Peu de personnes se rappellent de la présence de la France en Inde. Quelques parties de l’Inde sont restées françaises jusqu’en 1954. À cette date, l’Inde française, consistant de quatre petits établissements (Pondichéry, Yanaon, Karikal et Mahé), était en pleine décadence et éclipsée par d’autres colonies françaises, plus grandes, plus lucratives et plus importantes pour la Métropole. L’Indochine et l’Algérie ne sont que deux exemples. Toutefois, les Français n’étaient pas disposés à abandonner leurs possessions en Inde sans résistance. Le présent mémoire cherche à expliquer la valeur des possessions françaises en Inde et les raisons de la fin de la tutelle française. Le titre du mémoire indique qu’un certain changement a eu lieu dans la politique française vis-à-vis de ses possessions en Inde. L’étude commence par un résumé de la situation politique et économique de l’Inde française depuis la fin de la dernière occupation anglaise en 1814 jusqu’à la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale. L’année 1920 est choisie comme point de départ de la période visée par le mémoire. Portant sur les années 1920, le premier chapitre examine l’hégémonie du parti Gaebelé qui a eu toutes les caractéristiques d’une dictature. Indifférentes à la vie politique de l’Inde française, les autorités métropolitaines étaient surtout attirées par le commerce que la colonie offrait dans la production de tissus et l’exportation d’arachides. Après la chute du parti Gaebelé, l’Inde française a été plongée dans une longue période d’agitation, un thème clé du deuxième chapitre sur les années 1930. Inconscientes de la réalité politique, les autorités métropolitaines ont toujours accordé la priorité au commerce. Durant les années 1940, l’Inde française n’a jamais arrêté de se rapprocher de l’Inde britannique. Ce rapprochement a aussi persisté lorsque l’Inde britannique est devenue l’Union indienne en 1947. Soudainement, les Français ont senti le besoin de réaffirmer leur position d’autorité en Inde française. Le commerce est passé au second plan au profit d’une série de réformes politiques. Toutefois, ce brusque changement de politique fut trop tardif. Le quatrième chapitre, centré surtout sur la période de 1950 à 1954 et vu à travers l’exemple d’Édouard Goubert, a souligné la méconnaissance des autorités métropolitaines des réalités qui confrontaient l’Inde française. Lorsque Goubert a cessé de servir comme porte-parole et principal allié du gouvernement français en Inde, les possessions françaises en Inde furent rattachées une par une à l’Union indienne. Rétrospectivement, les faits économiques, vitaux pour le début du mémoire, sont quasiment absents de deux derniers chapitres. Se retrouvant face à la menace de perdre leurs possessions en Inde, les Français ont compris que l’Inde française était précieuse pour des raisons autres que le commerce. Un accent particulier fut mis pour souligner ces avantages culturels et politiques. De petite taille, les possessions françaises étaient importantes pour l’ordre et la stabilité dans les autres colonies de l’Empire. Parallèlement, elles représentaient des points d’appui pour l’expansion de la culture française dans l’immense sous-continent indien. / Few people today can relate to the presence of the French in India. That said, a few cities in India remained under the control of the French until 1954. By then, French India, consisting of four cities (Pondicherry, Yanaon, Mahe, and Karikal) had reached its irrevocable point of decline, overshadowed by other French colonies that were larger, more lucrative and more important to France. Indochina and Algeria are but two examples. Even so, it must be stated that the French were reluctant to abandon their possessions in India without any resistance. This particular thesis seeks to explain the value of the French possessions in India and the reasons that led to their demise. The title of the thesis suggests that a certain change occurred in the politics of the French vis-à-vis their possessions in India. The thesis commences with a summary of the political and economic situation in French India from the end of the last British occupation in 1814 until the end of World War I. The year 1920 was chosen as a starting point for this thesis. Focusing on the 1920’s, the first chapter examines the hegemony of the Gaebelé party which had all the characteristics of a dictatorship. Indifferent to the political climate in French India, politicians in Paris felt most attracted by the colony’s commerce, especially its production of textiles and exports of oleaginous plants. After the fall of the Gaebelé party, French India plunged into a long period of turmoil and political unrest. This is a key theme of the second chapter analyzing the 1930’s. Unaware of the political realities, authorities in Paris continuously prioritized the colony’s commerce. During the 1940’s, French India never stopped drawing closer to British India. This connection persisted after the independence of British India in 1947. Suddenly, the French felt an urge to reaffirm their position of authority in French India. The colony’s commerce fell second to a series of political reforms. Nevertheless, the timing of this abrupt shift was too late. The fourth chapter, centered on the period from 1950 to 1954, confirms the lack of awareness of the French authorities in Paris for the realities confronting French India. The example of Edouard Goubert is a case in point. As soon as Goubert ceased to serve as the main spokesperson and ally of the French government in French India, the remaining French possessions were incorporated one by one to India. In retrospect, facts concerning the colony’s commerce and economy, while being vital in the beginning, are hardly mentioned in the last two chapters of the thesis. Faced with the very real threat of losing their possessions in India, the French understood that French India was valuable for reasons other than commerce. A particular emphasis was placed on the cultural and political value of French India. Small in area, French India was significant in maintaining order and stability in the other colonies of the French Empire. Simultaneously, the French possessions in India represented starting points for the expansion of French culture in the vast Indian sub-continent.

This dissertation addresses early British intelligence activities and Anglo-Ottoman relations by viewing the activities of army officers and private individuals as a collective pursuit to safeguard British imperial interests. It offers a new understanding of the relationships between intelligence, grand strategy, and diplomacy before the Great War. It also examines the role that pre-1914 intelligence played in that conflict. The Boer War had shown that the geographic expanse of the British Empire was a source of strategic danger as well as a foundation of global power. The revelation of weakness propelled Britain to begin collecting intelligence on possible sources of conflict in preparation for the next war. A 1906 border incident between Egypt and Turkey marked turning points in Anglo-Ottoman relations and British intelligence efforts. Intelligence began to focus on railways that threatened Britain’s commercial position, on the disposition of Arab tribes who might revolt against Turkish authority, on the state of the Turkish army, and on the extent of European activity in Turkey. In 1914, British policy in the Middle East was unco-ordinated. Needing an effective means of combatting the Turco-German Jihad proclaimed in 1915, London created the Arab Bureau as an advisory organ based in Cairo. It became the central repository for much of the intelligence gathered before 1914. Officials in Cairo and London created new maps, compiled route reports, and assembled intelligence handbooks for distribution. Once the Arab Revolt began in 1916, intelligence helped marshal Britain’s resources effectively in pursuit of victory. Placing pre-1914 intelligence in the context of British imperial concerns extends our understanding of Anglo-Ottoman relations by considering strategic and diplomatic issues within a single frame. It demonstrates the influence of the Boer War in initiating intelligence-gathering missions in the Ottoman Empire, showing that even those undertaken before the establishment of a professional intelligence service in 1909, although lacking organization, were surprisingly modern, and ultimately successful. Analysis of under-utilized sources, such as the handbooks created by the Arab Bureau and the Royal Geographical Society, demonstrates the value of pre-war intelligence in detailed ways. It deepens understanding of the role British intelligence played in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and shows how one nation’s intelligence, military, and diplomatic bodies operated separately and collectively in an era that presented them with unprecedented challenges and opportunities.

This dissertation addresses early British intelligence activities and Anglo-Ottoman relations by viewing the activities of army officers and private individuals as a collective pursuit to safeguard British imperial interests. It offers a new understanding of the relationships between intelligence, grand strategy, and diplomacy before the Great War. It also examines the role that pre-1914 intelligence played in that conflict. The Boer War had shown that the geographic expanse of the British Empire was a source of strategic danger as well as a foundation of global power. The revelation of weakness propelled Britain to begin collecting intelligence on possible sources of conflict in preparation for the next war. A 1906 border incident between Egypt and Turkey marked turning points in Anglo-Ottoman relations and British intelligence efforts. Intelligence began to focus on railways that threatened Britain’s commercial position, on the disposition of Arab tribes who might revolt against Turkish authority, on the state of the Turkish army, and on the extent of European activity in Turkey. In 1914, British policy in the Middle East was unco-ordinated. Needing an effective means of combatting the Turco-German Jihad proclaimed in 1915, London created the Arab Bureau as an advisory organ based in Cairo. It became the central repository for much of the intelligence gathered before 1914. Officials in Cairo and London created new maps, compiled route reports, and assembled intelligence handbooks for distribution. Once the Arab Revolt began in 1916, intelligence helped marshal Britain’s resources effectively in pursuit of victory. Placing pre-1914 intelligence in the context of British imperial concerns extends our understanding of Anglo-Ottoman relations by considering strategic and diplomatic issues within a single frame. It demonstrates the influence of the Boer War in initiating intelligence-gathering missions in the Ottoman Empire, showing that even those undertaken before the establishment of a professional intelligence service in 1909, although lacking organization, were surprisingly modern, and ultimately successful. Analysis of under-utilized sources, such as the handbooks created by the Arab Bureau and the Royal Geographical Society, demonstrates the value of pre-war intelligence in detailed ways. It deepens understanding of the role British intelligence played in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and shows how one nation’s intelligence, military, and diplomatic bodies operated separately and collectively in an era that presented them with unprecedented challenges and opportunities.

Peu de personnes se rappellent de la présence de la France en Inde. Quelques parties de l’Inde sont restées françaises jusqu’en 1954. À cette date, l’Inde française, consistant de quatre petits établissements (Pondichéry, Yanaon, Karikal et Mahé), était en pleine décadence et éclipsée par d’autres colonies françaises, plus grandes, plus lucratives et plus importantes pour la Métropole. L’Indochine et l’Algérie ne sont que deux exemples. Toutefois, les Français n’étaient pas disposés à abandonner leurs possessions en Inde sans résistance. Le présent mémoire cherche à expliquer la valeur des possessions françaises en Inde et les raisons de la fin de la tutelle française. Le titre du mémoire indique qu’un certain changement a eu lieu dans la politique française vis-à-vis de ses possessions en Inde. L’étude commence par un résumé de la situation politique et économique de l’Inde française depuis la fin de la dernière occupation anglaise en 1814 jusqu’à la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale. L’année 1920 est choisie comme point de départ de la période visée par le mémoire. Portant sur les années 1920, le premier chapitre examine l’hégémonie du parti Gaebelé qui a eu toutes les caractéristiques d’une dictature. Indifférentes à la vie politique de l’Inde française, les autorités métropolitaines étaient surtout attirées par le commerce que la colonie offrait dans la production de tissus et l’exportation d’arachides. Après la chute du parti Gaebelé, l’Inde française a été plongée dans une longue période d’agitation, un thème clé du deuxième chapitre sur les années 1930. Inconscientes de la réalité politique, les autorités métropolitaines ont toujours accordé la priorité au commerce. Durant les années 1940, l’Inde française n’a jamais arrêté de se rapprocher de l’Inde britannique. Ce rapprochement a aussi persisté lorsque l’Inde britannique est devenue l’Union indienne en 1947. Soudainement, les Français ont senti le besoin de réaffirmer leur position d’autorité en Inde française. Le commerce est passé au second plan au profit d’une série de réformes politiques. Toutefois, ce brusque changement de politique fut trop tardif. Le quatrième chapitre, centré surtout sur la période de 1950 à 1954 et vu à travers l’exemple d’Édouard Goubert, a souligné la méconnaissance des autorités métropolitaines des réalités qui confrontaient l’Inde française. Lorsque Goubert a cessé de servir comme porte-parole et principal allié du gouvernement français en Inde, les possessions françaises en Inde furent rattachées une par une à l’Union indienne. Rétrospectivement, les faits économiques, vitaux pour le début du mémoire, sont quasiment absents de deux derniers chapitres. Se retrouvant face à la menace de perdre leurs possessions en Inde, les Français ont compris que l’Inde française était précieuse pour des raisons autres que le commerce. Un accent particulier fut mis pour souligner ces avantages culturels et politiques. De petite taille, les possessions françaises étaient importantes pour l’ordre et la stabilité dans les autres colonies de l’Empire. Parallèlement, elles représentaient des points d’appui pour l’expansion de la culture française dans l’immense sous-continent indien. / Few people today can relate to the presence of the French in India. That said, a few cities in India remained under the control of the French until 1954. By then, French India, consisting of four cities (Pondicherry, Yanaon, Mahe, and Karikal) had reached its irrevocable point of decline, overshadowed by other French colonies that were larger, more lucrative and more important to France. Indochina and Algeria are but two examples. Even so, it must be stated that the French were reluctant to abandon their possessions in India without any resistance. This particular thesis seeks to explain the value of the French possessions in India and the reasons that led to their demise. The title of the thesis suggests that a certain change occurred in the politics of the French vis-à-vis their possessions in India. The thesis commences with a summary of the political and economic situation in French India from the end of the last British occupation in 1814 until the end of World War I. The year 1920 was chosen as a starting point for this thesis. Focusing on the 1920’s, the first chapter examines the hegemony of the Gaebelé party which had all the characteristics of a dictatorship. Indifferent to the political climate in French India, politicians in Paris felt most attracted by the colony’s commerce, especially its production of textiles and exports of oleaginous plants. After the fall of the Gaebelé party, French India plunged into a long period of turmoil and political unrest. This is a key theme of the second chapter analyzing the 1930’s. Unaware of the political realities, authorities in Paris continuously prioritized the colony’s commerce. During the 1940’s, French India never stopped drawing closer to British India. This connection persisted after the independence of British India in 1947. Suddenly, the French felt an urge to reaffirm their position of authority in French India. The colony’s commerce fell second to a series of political reforms. Nevertheless, the timing of this abrupt shift was too late. The fourth chapter, centered on the period from 1950 to 1954, confirms the lack of awareness of the French authorities in Paris for the realities confronting French India. The example of Edouard Goubert is a case in point. As soon as Goubert ceased to serve as the main spokesperson and ally of the French government in French India, the remaining French possessions were incorporated one by one to India. In retrospect, facts concerning the colony’s commerce and economy, while being vital in the beginning, are hardly mentioned in the last two chapters of the thesis. Faced with the very real threat of losing their possessions in India, the French understood that French India was valuable for reasons other than commerce. A particular emphasis was placed on the cultural and political value of French India. Small in area, French India was significant in maintaining order and stability in the other colonies of the French Empire. Simultaneously, the French possessions in India represented starting points for the expansion of French culture in the vast Indian sub-continent.

My dissertation, Making Imperial Futures: Concepts of Empire in the Anglo-Spanish Sphere, 1763-71, engages the grand narrative of exploration at the point at which that very concept was reaching the point of exhaustion and argues that the rough completion of European cartographical knowledge of the world had a profound impact on the evolution of the imperial experience. I examine the evolving concept of empire within a context of cross-imperial knowledge and rivalry, Enlightenment ideals and the changing ways in which Europeans related to the concept of a progressive future. Furthermore, I challenge the historiographically dominant notion that the British and Spanish experiences of empire are best categorized and isolated as distinct historical subjects. The first section shows that British successes in the Seven Years’ War energised the British imperial imagination, generating a broad-based debate on how best to exploit the situation and opening up the opportunity to put more than one approach into action when Britain and Spain went to war in 1762. But the Peace of Paris brought discord, and a perceived need for the government to discipline the imperial imagination and to establish an approved pathway for the future of empire in the Atlantic world. The second part looks at how the Spanish government applied state power in direct pursuit of the pan-Atlantic imperial project. In particular, it re-examines the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Spanish empire in 1767 and makes the argument that the expulsion was a response to the perceived Jesuit threat to pan-Atlantic imperial norms. My third section suggests that the experimental burst of modern, state-centric imperialism that began in the wake of the Seven Years’ War suffered a reversal during the Falklands Crisis of 1770-1, during the general historical moment in which Europeans finished constructing their shared cartographical conception of the world. Although the growth of state power and impetus was temporarily reversed to some extent in the 1770s, this period helps prefigure the more extensive shift from empires primarily based on exploration and tenuous consolidation to empires that depended on dense, active exploitation to lend validity to their ontological claims.

My dissertation, Making Imperial Futures: Concepts of Empire in the Anglo-Spanish Sphere, 1763-71, engages the grand narrative of exploration at the point at which that very concept was reaching the point of exhaustion and argues that the rough completion of European cartographical knowledge of the world had a profound impact on the evolution of the imperial experience. I examine the evolving concept of empire within a context of cross-imperial knowledge and rivalry, Enlightenment ideals and the changing ways in which Europeans related to the concept of a progressive future. Furthermore, I challenge the historiographically dominant notion that the British and Spanish experiences of empire are best categorized and isolated as distinct historical subjects. The first section shows that British successes in the Seven Years’ War energised the British imperial imagination, generating a broad-based debate on how best to exploit the situation and opening up the opportunity to put more than one approach into action when Britain and Spain went to war in 1762. But the Peace of Paris brought discord, and a perceived need for the government to discipline the imperial imagination and to establish an approved pathway for the future of empire in the Atlantic world. The second part looks at how the Spanish government applied state power in direct pursuit of the pan-Atlantic imperial project. In particular, it re-examines the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Spanish empire in 1767 and makes the argument that the expulsion was a response to the perceived Jesuit threat to pan-Atlantic imperial norms. My third section suggests that the experimental burst of modern, state-centric imperialism that began in the wake of the Seven Years’ War suffered a reversal during the Falklands Crisis of 1770-1, during the general historical moment in which Europeans finished constructing their shared cartographical conception of the world. Although the growth of state power and impetus was temporarily reversed to some extent in the 1770s, this period helps prefigure the more extensive shift from empires primarily based on exploration and tenuous consolidation to empires that depended on dense, active exploitation to lend validity to their ontological claims.

No description available.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Michael A. Ramsay / This dissertation examines combat leadership in the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in infantry and machine gun units at the company level and below to highlight the linkages between the training and professional development of junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and the army's overall military effectiveness in World War I. Between 1865 and 1918, the growing lethality of the battlefield had forced changes to tactics and formations that placed novel demands on small unit leaders. The proliferation of new weapons in infantry companies and the thinning and extension of formations required junior officers and NCOs able to exercise an unparalleled degree of initiative and independence while also mastering new tactical and technical skills. When the United States entered World War I, the Regular Army was still grappling with how to reconcile its traditional expectations of small unit leadership with the new "skill sets" required of junior leaders in modern warfare. Faced with the need to produce officers and NCOs to lead its rapidly expanding mass army, the regulars improvised a system for identifying, training, and assigning company-level leaders. Unfortunately, the Regular Army's unpreparedness to wage a modern war, and the host of systemic problems associated with raising a mass army, meant that much of the training of these key leaders was so ill-focused and incomplete that the new officers and NCOs were woefully unprepared to face the tactical challenges that awaited them in France. These problems were only compounded when unexpected casualties among officers and NCOs in the summer and fall of 1918 led to a further curtailment in leader training the U. S. Army. The end result of the U. S. Army's failure to adequately train and develop its junior leaders was that its combat units often lacked the flexibility and "know how" to fight without suffering prohibitively high casualties. When the junior leaders failed, faltered and bungled, the AEF's battles became confused and uncoordinated slugging matches that confounded the plans and expectations of the army's senior leaders. The heavy casualties that resulted from these slugging matches further undermined the AEF's effectiveness by reducing the morale and cohesion of the army's combat units and hindering the army's overall ability to learn from its mistakes due to the high turn-over of junior officers and NCOs.