Die Tradierung von Studien über Hegel hat in den letzten Jahrzehnten sehr an Bedeutung gewonnen, und zwar sowohl was die zahlenmäβige Zunahme der Hegel gewidmeten Werke angeht, als auch im Hinblick auf den modus operandi der Theamtisierung und Präzisierung der Probleme und Reflexionen, die sich aus seinem Werk ergeben. In diesem Kontext der Renaissance der hegelschen Philosophie erscheint das Problem der Anerkennung als eines der wichtigsten der Hegelforschung. Freilich sind im Rahmen dieses neuen Interesses an der Anerkennung die Arbeiten selten, die darauf abzielen, das Thema Anerkennung von seiner logischen Wurzel her aufzugreifen. Die vorliegende Forschungsarbeit hat es sich zur Aufgabe gesetzt, die Rekonstruktion der logischen Struktur der Anerkennung herauszuarbeiten, wobei sie ihre Stufen anhand der Wissenschaft der Logik ausdrücken wird. Die vorliegende These von hermeneutisch-bibliografischem Charakter ist darauf angelegt, dieses Ziel zu erreichen, was sie in einer in 05 (funf) Kapitel aufgeteilten Struktur unternimmt. Die Aufgabe des ersten Kapitels ist es, den Forschungsstand über die Anerkennung in der zeitgenössischen Philosophie herauszuarbeiten. Das zweite Kapitel konstituiert die erste Schicht der Anerkennung und zeigt, wie die Logik als transitiver Nenner arbeitet. Das dritte Kapitel etabliert die zweite Schicht der logischen Struktur der Anerkennung und rekonstruiert die Konditionen der subjektiven Interaktion, die Andersheit als würde sie durch zwei ihr eigene Modi ausgedrückt: durch Beziehung und durch Verhältnis. Das vierte Kapitel stellt die dritte logische Schicht der Anerkennung vor durch die Präzisierung der Subjektivität und die Arten der Relation der Subjektivität, ausgehend von ihren semantisch-pragmatischen meta-Niveaus des Universellen, Partikulären und Singulären. In einer zweiten Argumentation stellt das viertel Kapitel dar, wie die Subjektivität in ihrer theoretischen Dimension als Wissen und in ihrer praktischen Dimension als Wollen zu verstehen ist. Das fünfte Kapitel schlieβlich stellt dar, wie die drei logischen Metaebenen der Erkenntnis, die sich aus dem Kennen und Anerkennen ergeben, im historischen Prozess erkennbar werden durch das Mittel der Phänomenologie des Geistes in seinem 4. Kapitel. Das fünfte Kapitel will auch zeigen, daβ es möglich ist, eine logische Struktur zu rekonstruieren, ohne die Fakten der Theorie zu unterwerfen. Wir erwarten deshalb als Schlussfolgerung, daβ angesichts der logischen Erklärung und Rekonstruktion der Schichten der Transitivität, des relationalen Andersseins und der Subjektivität in Bezug auf die Einheit des Subjekts zwischen dem theoretischen und praktischen Ich, die die Anerkennung betreffende logische Struktur sich zeigen wird. / A tradição de estudos hegelianos assumiu nos últimos decênios uma grande importância, tanto em referência a ampliação numérica dos trabalhos dedicados ao hegelianismo como em relação ao modus operandi de tematização e explicitação dos problemas e reflexões que lhe são oriundos. Dentro deste contexto de Renaissance da filosofia hegeliana, o problema do reconhecimento emerge como de importância capital na Hegel-Forschung. Todavia, a par deste novo interesse sobre o reconhecimento são raros os trabalhos que se propõem a enfrentar o tema reconhecimento desde a sua matiz lógica. O presente trabalho de pesquisa se propõe estabelecer a reconstrução da estrutura lógica do reconhecimento, exprimindo os seus níveis a partir da Wissenschaft der Logik. A presente tese de caráter hermenêutico bibliográfico se configura para a consecução de tal objetivo, dividindo internamente o trabalho em comento em 05 (cinco) capítulos. O primeiro capítulo se destina a situar o estado da arte nas pesquisas sobre o reconhecimento na filosofia contemporânea. O segundo capítulo constitui o primeiro nível do reconhecimento e apresenta a lógica operando como um denominador transitivo. O terceiro capítulo estabelece o segundo nível da estrutura lógica do reconhecimento e reconstitui as condições de interação subjetiva, a alteridade (Andersheit) como se explicitando por dois modos próprios: por referência (Beziehung) e por relação (Verhältnis). O quarto capítulo apresenta o terceiro estágio lógico do reconhecimento pela explicitação da subjetividade e os modos de relação da subjetividade a partir de seus metaníveis semântico-pragmáticos do: universal, particular e singular. Num segundo momento, o quarto capítulo expõe como a subjetividade se compreende enquanto dimensão teórica: como conhecer, e em sua dimensão prática como querer. Por fim, o quinto capítulo, expõe como os três metaníveis lógicos do reconhecimento, os quais seguem do conhecer (Kennen) ao reconhecer (Anerkennen), se fazem explicitar no processo histórico pelo recurso a Fenomenologia do Espírito em seu capítulo IV. O quinto capítulo objetiva ainda demonstrar que é possível reconstruir uma estrutura lógica sem subordinar os fatos à teoria. Espera-se por tanto, a título de conclusão, que mediante a explicitação e reconstrução lógica dos níveis da transitividade, da alteridade relacional, e da subjetividade enquanto unidade no sujeito entre o eu teórico e prático, se faça exprimir a estrutura lógica subjacente ao reconhecimento. / During the last decades, the tradition of studies of Hegel has assumed great importance, as much referring to the amount of work dedicated to his philosophy as to the mode of operation of focusing and explaining the problems and reflections raised by him. In this context of the revival of Hegel’s philosophy, the problem of recognition emerges as of capital importance in the research about Hegel. However, in the context of this new interest about recognition, studies that go about pursuing the theme of recognition until its logical matrix are rare. The present study aims at establishing a reconstruction of the logical structure of recognition, expressing its levels starting from the Wissenschaft der Logik. The present theses of hermeneutic-bibliographic character is conceived to reach this aim, internally dividing the work in 05 (five) chapters. The first chapter aims at showing the state of research in the studies of recognition in contemporary philosophy. The second constitutes the first level of recognition and presents logic working as transitive denominator. The third chapter establishes the second level of the logical structure of recognition and reconstitutes the conditions of subjective interaction, the otherness (Andersheit) as being made explicit by two proper modes: by reference (Beziehung) and relationship (Verhältnis). The fourth chapter presents the third logical stage of recognition by making explicit the subjectivity and the mode of relationship of subjectivity starting from its semantic-pragmatic metalevels: the universal, the particular and the singular. In a second moment, the fourth chapter exposes how subjectivity is to be understood in its theoretic dimension as knowledge, and in its practical dimension as wish. Lastly, the fifth chapter shows how the three logical metalevels of recognition, which proceed from knowledge (Kennen) to recognition (Anerkennen), are made explicit in the historical process by the tool of the Phenomenology of Spirit in its fourth chapter. The fifth chapter also aims at showing that it is possible to reconstruct a logical structure without subordinating fact to theory. It is hoped, however, in terms of a conclusion, that in the face of a logical attempt at making explicit and reconstructing the levels of transitivity, of relational otherness and the subjectivity in terms of unity of subject between the theoretical and the practical I, the logical structure subjacent to recognition can be made to express itself.

Die Tradierung von Studien über Hegel hat in den letzten Jahrzehnten sehr an Bedeutung gewonnen, und zwar sowohl was die zahlenmäβige Zunahme der Hegel gewidmeten Werke angeht, als auch im Hinblick auf den modus operandi der Theamtisierung und Präzisierung der Probleme und Reflexionen, die sich aus seinem Werk ergeben. In diesem Kontext der Renaissance der hegelschen Philosophie erscheint das Problem der Anerkennung als eines der wichtigsten der Hegelforschung. Freilich sind im Rahmen dieses neuen Interesses an der Anerkennung die Arbeiten selten, die darauf abzielen, das Thema Anerkennung von seiner logischen Wurzel her aufzugreifen. Die vorliegende Forschungsarbeit hat es sich zur Aufgabe gesetzt, die Rekonstruktion der logischen Struktur der Anerkennung herauszuarbeiten, wobei sie ihre Stufen anhand der Wissenschaft der Logik ausdrücken wird. Die vorliegende These von hermeneutisch-bibliografischem Charakter ist darauf angelegt, dieses Ziel zu erreichen, was sie in einer in 05 (funf) Kapitel aufgeteilten Struktur unternimmt. Die Aufgabe des ersten Kapitels ist es, den Forschungsstand über die Anerkennung in der zeitgenössischen Philosophie herauszuarbeiten. Das zweite Kapitel konstituiert die erste Schicht der Anerkennung und zeigt, wie die Logik als transitiver Nenner arbeitet. Das dritte Kapitel etabliert die zweite Schicht der logischen Struktur der Anerkennung und rekonstruiert die Konditionen der subjektiven Interaktion, die Andersheit als würde sie durch zwei ihr eigene Modi ausgedrückt: durch Beziehung und durch Verhältnis. Das vierte Kapitel stellt die dritte logische Schicht der Anerkennung vor durch die Präzisierung der Subjektivität und die Arten der Relation der Subjektivität, ausgehend von ihren semantisch-pragmatischen meta-Niveaus des Universellen, Partikulären und Singulären. In einer zweiten Argumentation stellt das viertel Kapitel dar, wie die Subjektivität in ihrer theoretischen Dimension als Wissen und in ihrer praktischen Dimension als Wollen zu verstehen ist. Das fünfte Kapitel schlieβlich stellt dar, wie die drei logischen Metaebenen der Erkenntnis, die sich aus dem Kennen und Anerkennen ergeben, im historischen Prozess erkennbar werden durch das Mittel der Phänomenologie des Geistes in seinem 4. Kapitel. Das fünfte Kapitel will auch zeigen, daβ es möglich ist, eine logische Struktur zu rekonstruieren, ohne die Fakten der Theorie zu unterwerfen. Wir erwarten deshalb als Schlussfolgerung, daβ angesichts der logischen Erklärung und Rekonstruktion der Schichten der Transitivität, des relationalen Andersseins und der Subjektivität in Bezug auf die Einheit des Subjekts zwischen dem theoretischen und praktischen Ich, die die Anerkennung betreffende logische Struktur sich zeigen wird. / A tradição de estudos hegelianos assumiu nos últimos decênios uma grande importância, tanto em referência a ampliação numérica dos trabalhos dedicados ao hegelianismo como em relação ao modus operandi de tematização e explicitação dos problemas e reflexões que lhe são oriundos. Dentro deste contexto de Renaissance da filosofia hegeliana, o problema do reconhecimento emerge como de importância capital na Hegel-Forschung. Todavia, a par deste novo interesse sobre o reconhecimento são raros os trabalhos que se propõem a enfrentar o tema reconhecimento desde a sua matiz lógica. O presente trabalho de pesquisa se propõe estabelecer a reconstrução da estrutura lógica do reconhecimento, exprimindo os seus níveis a partir da Wissenschaft der Logik. A presente tese de caráter hermenêutico bibliográfico se configura para a consecução de tal objetivo, dividindo internamente o trabalho em comento em 05 (cinco) capítulos. O primeiro capítulo se destina a situar o estado da arte nas pesquisas sobre o reconhecimento na filosofia contemporânea. O segundo capítulo constitui o primeiro nível do reconhecimento e apresenta a lógica operando como um denominador transitivo. O terceiro capítulo estabelece o segundo nível da estrutura lógica do reconhecimento e reconstitui as condições de interação subjetiva, a alteridade (Andersheit) como se explicitando por dois modos próprios: por referência (Beziehung) e por relação (Verhältnis). O quarto capítulo apresenta o terceiro estágio lógico do reconhecimento pela explicitação da subjetividade e os modos de relação da subjetividade a partir de seus metaníveis semântico-pragmáticos do: universal, particular e singular. Num segundo momento, o quarto capítulo expõe como a subjetividade se compreende enquanto dimensão teórica: como conhecer, e em sua dimensão prática como querer. Por fim, o quinto capítulo, expõe como os três metaníveis lógicos do reconhecimento, os quais seguem do conhecer (Kennen) ao reconhecer (Anerkennen), se fazem explicitar no processo histórico pelo recurso a Fenomenologia do Espírito em seu capítulo IV. O quinto capítulo objetiva ainda demonstrar que é possível reconstruir uma estrutura lógica sem subordinar os fatos à teoria. Espera-se por tanto, a título de conclusão, que mediante a explicitação e reconstrução lógica dos níveis da transitividade, da alteridade relacional, e da subjetividade enquanto unidade no sujeito entre o eu teórico e prático, se faça exprimir a estrutura lógica subjacente ao reconhecimento. / During the last decades, the tradition of studies of Hegel has assumed great importance, as much referring to the amount of work dedicated to his philosophy as to the mode of operation of focusing and explaining the problems and reflections raised by him. In this context of the revival of Hegel’s philosophy, the problem of recognition emerges as of capital importance in the research about Hegel. However, in the context of this new interest about recognition, studies that go about pursuing the theme of recognition until its logical matrix are rare. The present study aims at establishing a reconstruction of the logical structure of recognition, expressing its levels starting from the Wissenschaft der Logik. The present theses of hermeneutic-bibliographic character is conceived to reach this aim, internally dividing the work in 05 (five) chapters. The first chapter aims at showing the state of research in the studies of recognition in contemporary philosophy. The second constitutes the first level of recognition and presents logic working as transitive denominator. The third chapter establishes the second level of the logical structure of recognition and reconstitutes the conditions of subjective interaction, the otherness (Andersheit) as being made explicit by two proper modes: by reference (Beziehung) and relationship (Verhältnis). The fourth chapter presents the third logical stage of recognition by making explicit the subjectivity and the mode of relationship of subjectivity starting from its semantic-pragmatic metalevels: the universal, the particular and the singular. In a second moment, the fourth chapter exposes how subjectivity is to be understood in its theoretic dimension as knowledge, and in its practical dimension as wish. Lastly, the fifth chapter shows how the three logical metalevels of recognition, which proceed from knowledge (Kennen) to recognition (Anerkennen), are made explicit in the historical process by the tool of the Phenomenology of Spirit in its fourth chapter. The fifth chapter also aims at showing that it is possible to reconstruct a logical structure without subordinating fact to theory. It is hoped, however, in terms of a conclusion, that in the face of a logical attempt at making explicit and reconstructing the levels of transitivity, of relational otherness and the subjectivity in terms of unity of subject between the theoretical and the practical I, the logical structure subjacent to recognition can be made to express itself.

Este trabalho pretende demonstrar a importância e o papel da consciência de si no desenvolvimento da Filosofia do Direito, de forma que se possa estabelecer uma relação entre esta obra e a Fenomenologia do Espírito. Na Fenomenologia, a consciência de si apresenta-se como a consciência prática, que vive situações atemporais da existência humana, como o desejo, o reconhecimento, e a luta por independência, isto é, situações que não são particulares de algum momento histórico, mas a todos eles. Sendo assim, estas experiências repercutem no trabalho racional do indivíduo, que na Filosofia do Direito, como pessoa, sujeito, e membro da comunidade, realiza, conforme sua vontade livre, a Idéia de Liberdade. Neste sentido, o objetivo é comprovar como estas experiências da consciência de si podem influenciar as dimensões políticas e jurídicas, tendo como ponto de partida que o §142 da Filosofia do Direito apresenta o conceito de Eticidade como fundamentado na consciência de si. Ademais, para se reforçar a relação entre as duas obras, será apresentada também a seção da Fenomenologia também intitulada como Eticidade, que naquele caso, apresenta-se como o desenvolvimento do mundo grego, de forma que se possa conhecer a relação e as diferenças entre os dois modelos éticos. / This work aims to demonstrate the importance and role of self-consciousness in the development of Philosophy of Right, so that it can establish a relation between this work and the Phenomenology of Spirit. In the Phenomenology, the selfconsciousness appears as a practice conscious, living no time situations of human existence, as desire, recognition, and the struggle for independence, that is, situations that are not particular of some historical moment, but all of them. Thus, these experiences reflect in the rational work of the individual, who in the Philosophy of Right, as a person, subject, and community member, holds as its free will, the idea of freedom. In this sense, the objective is to show how these experiences of the selfconsciousness can influence the political and legal dimensions, taking as a starting point that § 142 of Philosophy of Right introduced the concept of "ethical life" as based on selfconsciousness. Furthermore, to strengthen the relationship between the two works, will also be apresented the section of the Phenomenology also named as "ethical life", in which case, it appears as the development of the Greek world, so it can be knew the relationship and differences between the two ethical models.

No description available.

Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The health of the medical profession hangs in the balance. Scepticism, mistrust and legal restraints have entered its hallowed corridors and are threatening its integrity and independence. There are myriad seemingly intractable moral dilemmas that doctors, ethicists and judges are trying to resolve with the aid of available principles and rules of ethical discourse; yet, the answers remain elusive. Hegel, the eighteenth century philosopher, postulated that perplexity only exists because we do not look at the world correctly: because we tend to think in an oppositional way, we abstract from the complex interrelation of things. He therefore suggested that one should step back and think reflectively about the problem and seek the one-sided assumptions that led to the impasse. My proposition is that at the heart of many of the current medical dilemmas lies the opposition between paternalism and autonomy. These two fundamental concepts arose out of two different traditions, and now, because they have been abstracted from the contexts and histories that inform them, seem to be diametrically opposed. Paternalism arose out of the ethics of competence that originated in ancient Greece. The art of medicine was still in its infancy and physicians had to prove their ability and benevolence to a mistrustful public. Demonstration of competence became a necessary component of any successful practice. As the power of medicine grew with the scientific and technological advances of the Enlightenment, professionals' authority and competence were reinforced and systematically fostered a paternalistic attitude at the expense of adequate protection of the individual. In response to the power differential found in the political and social arena, individual human rights were promulgated in the eighteenth century. In the medical sphere, the culture of rights was translated into, among others, the fundamental right to autonomy. Patients now have the right to decide on interventions and treatment in accordance with their own conception of a good life. Paternalism thus developed out of a societal system that embraced the virtues and communal responsibility within the bounds of the polis of antiquity; autonomy arose out of the designs of the Enlightenment where the individual was hailed supreme. Remnants of both traditions are evident in contemporary medicine, but they have been abstracted from their original purpose and meaning, leading to perplexity and antagonism. Following the Hegelian method of dialectic, I postulate a thesis of paternalism, and in response to this, an antithesis of autonomy. I attempt to show that an intransigent insistence on one side or the other will only serve to strengthen the paradox and fail to lead to an acceptable solution. I aim to develop a synthesis where both concepts are embraced with the help ofa better understanding of human nature and the inevitable limits of human knowledge. Influenced by the work of the psychoanalyst Carl Jung, I firstly argue for the existence of a biological human need for compassion and thus the importance of virtue ethics, which embraces this need. Secondly, focusing on the ethics of futurity developed by Hans Jonas, I delineate the altered nature of human action and the derivative need for an ethics of responsibility. I propose possibilities for the future based on the ideas of compassion, virtue and responsibility and argue that they can only be reconciled in a pluralistic ethic. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die mediese professie het'n dokter nodig. Een wat kan sin maak van die wantroue en vyandigheid wat te bespeur is in die pasient-dokter verhouding en wat toepaslike terapie kan voorskryf Al die pogings tot behandeling deur middel van reëls, regulasies en etiese kodes het tot dusver misluk en het vele skynbaar-onoplosbare morele dilemmas agtergelaat. Die Duitse filosoof, Hegel, het in die agtiende eeu aangevoer dat verwarring onstaan bloot omdat ons die wêreld op die verkeerde wyse beskou: die mens is geneig tot opposisionele denke en neem daarom nie die komplekse onderlinge verbintenisse van die onderskeie elemente in ag nie. Hegel het dus voorgestel dat wanneer ons met sulke hardnekkige situasies gekonfronteer word, ons 'n tree terug neem en die situasie reflektiewelik ondersoek vir eensydige veronderstellings. My hipotese is dat baie van die etiese dilemmas wat op die oomblik in medisyne voorkom, voortvloei uit die opposisie tussen paternalisme en outonomitiet. Hierdie twee fundamentele beginsels het uit twee verskillende tradisies ontstaan en nou, omdat hulle nie meer in hulle oorspronklike konteks voorkom nie, vertoon hulle skynbaar teenstellend. Paternalisme het onstaan vanuit die etiek van bevoegdheid wat teruggevoer kan word na die tyd van Hippocrates. Medisyne was 'n nuwe professie wat nog sy eerbaarheid en welwillendheid aan 'n wantrouige publiek moes bewys. Bevoegdheid was dus 'n essensiële komponent van enige suksesvolle praktyk. Indrukwekkende vooruitgang in die dissiplines van wetenskap en tegnologie sedert die agtiende eeu het dokters se gesag en bevoegdheid bevorder en stelselmatig 'n paternalistiese houding gekweek ten koste van toepaslike beskerming van die individu. In respons tot die magsverskil in die politieke en sosiale sfeer het 'n beweging in hierdie tyd ontstaan om universêle mensseregte te bewerkstellig. In medisyne het hierdie regsbeweging gekulmineer in, onder andere, die fundamentele reg tot self-beskikking - in ander woorde, outonomiteit. Die pasient is dus nou geregtig daarop om selfte besluit oor ingrepe en behandeling op grond van sylhaar konsep van 'n goeie en sinvolle lewe. Paternalisme het dus ontstaan uit 'n samelewing waar die deugte en gemeenskapsverantwoordelikhede integraal was tot die funksionering van die polis; outonomie aan die ander kant, het ontstaan uit die idees van Die Verligting waar die individu as belangriker as die gemeenskap geag is. Volgens die Hegeliaanse dialektiese metode, postuleer ek dus 'n tesis van paternalisme en in respons daartoe, 'n antitese van outonomiteit. Ek voer aan dat 'n eiewillige aandrang op een of die ander die dilemma net sal verdiep. Ek poog dus om 'n sintese te ontwikkel wat albei konsepte inkorporeer met behulp van 'n analise van die aard van die mens en die noodwendige beperkinge van sy kennis. Geskool op die werk van die psigoanalis Carl Jung, bespreek ek die mens se biologiese behoefte aan medelye en stel dus die saak vir die belang van 'n etiek van deugte wat hierdie behoefte onderskraag. Tweedens, beinvloed deur die etiek van die toekoms, soos beskryf deur Hans Jonas, ontwikkel ek die idee van die gewysigde skaal van menslike dade en gevolglik die noodsaklikheid van 'n etiek van verantwoordelikheid. Ek postuleer dus 'n benadering wat wentel om die konsepte van medelye, deug en verantwoordelikheid wat slegs in die vorm van 'n pluralistiese etiek tot uiting kan kom.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-07-25T11:57:07Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Andrezza Cacione.pdf: 1380246 bytes, checksum: 70140b96b4c0cbf9c9bd395f8542f91e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-25T11:57:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Andrezza Cacione.pdf: 1380246 bytes, checksum: 70140b96b4c0cbf9c9bd395f8542f91e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-04-14 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The work in question discusses the usage of probabilistic arguments on the Kinetic Theory of gases by James Clerk Maxwell, more specifically when describing the speed of the gas particles. The reflection on the gas behavior and its constituents develops during the 19th century. In this context, it can be verified the use of probabilist arguments in formulation of this knowledge. This work aims to identify the factors that influenced the use of such probabilistic arguments in the development of the Kinetic Theory of gas by Maxwell, and in which sense his approach differentiates from the existing ones, since the probability was already considered in previous formulations of the same theory. In order to identify the subjects studied by Maxwell and the varieties of reflections to which he was exposed, we searched for information on the calendar of the Cambridge University in the period he frequented the institution, we also researched papers published which he might have had contact with and letters exchanged with family and friends / O trabalho em questão versa sobre a utilização de argumentos probabilísticos na Teoria Cinética dos Gases por James Clerk Maxwell, mais especificamente ao descrever a velocidade das partículas que compõem um gás. A reflexão sobre o comportamento dos gases e de seus constituintes ocorreu ativamente ao longo do século XIX. Nesse contexto, percebe-se a utilização de argumentos probabilísticos na construção desse conhecimento. Este trabalho tem como objetivo identificar fatores que influenciaram o uso de argumentos probabilísticos na construção da Teoria Cinética dos Gases por Maxwell e em que sua abordagem a diferencia das teorias já existentes, uma vez que a probabilidade já era considerada em formulações anteriores para a mesma teoria. A fim de identificar os assuntos estudados por Maxwell e a quais tipos de reflexão ele foi exposto, buscamos informações no calendário da Universidade de Cambridge nos anos em que ele a frequentou, em artigos publicados na época com que de alguma forma ele tenha tido contato e também em cartas trocadas com familiares e amigos

Los tiempos contemporáneos le han dado la razón a Hegel en su diagnóstico de las tendencias principales de la vida social moderna. Dejada a su autorregulación, la moderna economía de mercado ha ofrecido (y aún ofrece), a los agentes privados, la posibilidad de obtener altísimas tasas de ganancia, pero, al mismo tiempo, ha expuesto a las sociedades modernas a una preocupante inestabilidad y precariedad socioeconómica. Por lo pronto, la reciente crisis global ha obligado a los Estados a controlar el mercado de una forma que hasta hace algunos años era condenada por ser contraproducente para el crecimiento económico y el progreso social de un país / Tesis

As France expanded its empire in North Africa, French artists, writers and explorers traveled to Algeria in order to gain artistic inspiration and greater understanding of the culture, geography and inhabitants of the new colony. This dissertation places music within the context of French colonial culture, identifying the interconnections between government policies and cultural production during France's occupation of Algeria. A central theme is the examination of colonial difference and a phenomenon that may be characterized as colonial textuality in music. Drawing from Homi Bhabha, I define colonial textuality as a space where signifiers of value, judgment and power are encountered, negotiated and embedded within colonial discourse. Three composers--Ernest Reyer (1823-1909), Francisco Salvador Daniel (1831-1871) and Camille Saint-Saëns (1835-1921)--are presented as case studies to understand the complexities and tensions that arose out of the colonial moment and to examine how each figure negotiated his own compositional style, musical career and artistic identity vis-à-vis colonial Algeria. The dissertation is organized chronologically by examining the lives and compositions of three composers living in Algeria during three key periods of French political history, the July Monarchy, Second Empire, and Third Republic. Chapters draw on archival research, reception studies, travel journals, government reports, cultural and political history, and musical analysis to explore the ways in which music, broadly defined, addressed social issues of identity, nation, race, and ethnicity. Topics include how violent tactics and events during the 1840s infiltrated the early musical compositions of Reyer and how music may be considered an act of violence; Salvador Daniel's opportunistic musical career in Algeria from 1853-1865; Salvador Daniel's Album de chansons arabes, mauresques et kabyles as a reflection of French politics and travel writing; Algerian tourism and Saint-Saëns's Africa fantasy and Suite algérienne; and unisonance, soundscape and the typography of what I call Saint-Saëns's "colonial marches." In conclusion, I discuss a 2008 recording of Salvador Daniel's Algerian song transcriptions by the soprano Amel Brahim-Djelloul and the Ensemble Amedyez, thus illustrating that musical encounters with colonialism are continually reunderstood and readapted in the twenty-first century.

Although the wilderness preservation movement has emerged as a political force relatively recently, man's desire for retreat and renewal in untamed wilderness environments has a rich history in North America. Using contemporary guidetooks, diaries and journals, this study examines the early nineteenth century "Fashionable Tour" from New York City to Niagara Falls and combines description of the most important "natural wonders" en route with an analysis of their cultural meaning and value. There are two major themes. (1) Although pompous religiousness of language suggests conventional religiosity, pilgrims were overwhelmed with feelings of reverence, awe and wonder when face to face with natural wonders. (2) The extravagance of the New World's natural wonders influenced American and European images of the American experiment. Romanticism and Scottish Common Sense Realism are the intellectual and aesthetic background for this study. After some preliminary observations and definitions, I review the widespread importance of these two movements in early America and their points of contact with American sensibilities. Significant iconological moments in the lives of three leading Americans -- John Bartram, Samuel Mitchill and Timothy Dwight -- who donned their tourist habits to visit the Catskill Mountains, illustrate both the diversity of these influences and the beginnings of the Fashionable Tour. Analysis of the tour itself begins with chapter three. From their steamboat, tourists divided the Hudson River Valley into five "reaches" symbolizing grandeur (the Palisades), repose (Tappan Sea), sublimity (the Highlands), picturesqueness (the Hillsides) and beauty (the Catskills). In the first four reaches (chapter 3), the sublime Highlands dominate the landscape. But the "view from the top'' and Kaaterskill Falls at Pine Orchard in the Catskills were the most significant natural wonders in the Hudson Valley. Chapter five introduces Part II: West to Niagara Falls. The overwhelming effect of ongoing European settlement on the wilderness -- on flora, fauna and native Americans -- differentiates the unpredictable trip west from the predictable trip north. At Albany, tourists left their luxurious steamboats and transferred to stagecoaches and/or canalboats. Cohoes Falls, Little Falls and especially Trenton Falls, N. P. Willis' "Rural Resort," highlight the journey from Albany to Utica and suggest greater wonders to come. Images of the wilderness west of Utica comprise chapter seven. "Soft" pastoral landscapes, as in the Finger Lakes Region, did not arouse the intense response that major wonders such as the "view from the top" and Trenton Falls did. Niagara Falls was the climax and conclusion of the pilgrimage. The "greatest natural wonder" known and accessible to early nineteenth century tourists, Niagara elicited a torrent of enthusiasm and verbiage. After a detailed examination of tourist expectations and anticipations, descriptions and dreams, I focus specifically on the religious sentimentality which laced images of Niagara Falls. Pilgrims, responding with awe and protestations of "indescribableness," found evidence to support their popular religiosity. The trip from New York to Niagara was not just a relaxed holiday, but a highly focussed pilgrimage for persons seeking mystery and majesty in the sublime and the beautiful. Niagara, and to a lesser extent the other natural wonders; along the Hudson and across New York State, became religious shrines in early nineteenth century America.

O texto que se segue trata da certeza sensível e da significação na obra de nome Fenomenologia do Espírito de Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Mostramos que Hegel elabora na Certeza Sensível uma teoria da significação que estabelece condições necessárias para o exercício mesmo da filosofia. / The following text treats of Sense-certainty and Meaning in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s work named Phenomenology of Spirit. We show that Hegel develops in the Sense-certainty chapter a theory of Meaning that sets up necessary conditions to the very exercise of philosophy.