Between 1898 and 1913, the limited manpower and resources of the United States Army forced it to employ thousands of Cubans and inhabitants of the Philippines to fight the Spanish and Philippine-American and Moro Wars and conduct civil administration in Cuba and the Philippines. The colonial military labor of Cubans and Philippine islanders both affirmed and challenged the claims of American political and military leaders that the United States practiced a liberal and benevolent form of colonial and neo-colonial rule. In the Pacific Ocean and Caribbean Sea, the U.S. army's exploitation of ordinary colonial subjects breathed new life into often coercive colonial institutions, such as Chinese migrant contract labor, forced labor for public works such as roads, and the impressment of interpreters and guides and other intermediaries for military operations. The impact of American military labor relations in war and occupation endured well into periods of civilian rule in these countries, shaping the politics of race and immigration, infrastructure development and public obligation, and the civil apparatus of colonial and neo-colonial states.

The Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 has been the subject by contemporary and modem historians alike of a plethora of studies on most aspects of the conflict, including its military operations. None, however, has focussed specifically on the response ofthe Colony ofNatal, which formed an important base of military operations, nor on the conduct and effectiveness of its force of Volunteer soldiers. This study seeks to fill this significant gap in the historiography of the war. The central theme to emerge in this investigation of the response ofNatal to the war is that of a distinct gap between the perception of the scale and consistency of the commitment to military operations and the mobilization of colonial resources on the one hand, and, on the other, the socio-economic, political and military reality. The Natal Volunteer forces, especially the mounted infantry units such as the Natal Carbineers, were never able to exercise a significant influence on the conduct ofthe war in the Colony. There were several reasons for this. In terms ofimmediate military factors, the force was not considered sufficiently reliable by the British Army, and was therefore seldom deployed effectively, particularly in the formal phase of the war. This Volunteer force was also the victim of British strategic errors, such as that which led to the investment of Ladysmith by Boer forces from 2 November 1899 to 28 February 1900. The bulk of the Volunteer force was effectively removed from the war effort in the Colony for this period. Its marginalisation was, however, also evidence of a conflicting and fickle mobilization for war by the Natal government and the Colony's English speaking settler population. Cultural and Imperial affinity to Britain was countered by parochial regional interests such as economic affiliation with the Transvaal, which meant that Natal did not welcome a British war for confederation in the region. Qualified official and popular support in Natal for the war lasted only as long as the invading Boer forces posed a perceived threat to the Colony, from October 1899 to October 1900. In fact, from the date of the relief of Ladysmith, Natal colonial interests - directed by a ruling settler agricultural, legal and mercantile elite which controlled political authority, as well as economic policy - agitated for a reduction of military and economic commitment to the war. Natal's commitment to the British military effort, and the political policy that underwrote it, was retrospectively embellished in the immediate wake of the war as British hegemony in the region appeared to have been restored. However, this masked what effectively had been a muted and disputed response to the Anglo-Boer War. / Thesis (PhD.)-University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2002.

Were it not for mankind’s memory of Historic events there would be no need for the preservation and commemoration of those events and according to Nietzsche - the 19th century German philosopher - in order for the memory to remain it must cease to hurt (Dubow 2001). There is a process then by which tragic events and traumatic memories are eased into memory and it’s often the memorial which serves this “Cathartic Function” (Snyman 1999) removing the hurt and allowing the memory to live on, a process which is “necessary for survival” (Snyman 1999) Crain Soudien - author of Emerging discourses around identity in new South African museum exhibitions - has identified that in representing the new South Africa a particular politics of memory has surfaced “Consisting on the one hand, of discourses of nostalgia, and, on the other, discourses of reconstruction” (Crain 2008). In this treatise government policies are looked at briefly as a way to understand the dialogue of nostalgia, but the focus is on the latter; the discourse of ‘reconstruction’, the issues associated with reconstruction and construction and the mediums through which this has been or will be achieved both on an international and local platform. Having achieved this, a case will be made for the South African Anglo Boer wars and a discourse for the preservation and commemoration of this historic event will be sought. The South African Anglo Boer Wars of: 1881 and 1899 - 1902 dramatically changed the landscape of South Africa for ever. Originally known as the Boer War or even the Anglo Boer War the name was officially changed to the South African War before 1999 as the years 1999 to 2002 was the period of ‘Boer War’ centenaries. It was envisaged that the name change would better reflect the constitutional policy of all-inclusiveness in South Africa among fears that any centenary celebrations would be a sectarian affair as many considered, up until Peter Warwick produced his seminal study dispelling the “old hoary argument that this was essentially a “white man’s war” (Starfield, 2001) that the Anglo Boer War was a whites on whites War. This policy fell under a mandate known as the National Legacy Project (Marschall, personal communication) along with various other heritage projects. The South African Anglo Boer War - as it is often officially called - and its battlefields are protected under national heritage legislation and are therefore a determinant of our national identity. The battles of 1881 are precursors to the Great Boer War and are thus included. It is in this light that this study of heritage portrayal and celebration finds its case, in order to determine a design model for the preservation and commemoration of a part of our nations’ identity for generations to come. The theoretical framework determined to achieve this considers conceptual deliberations on: Issues of design, and mediums of design revealed in a range of precedents deliberately centred on the built environment as 'the museum or memorial is intended to create a setting for the projection of memory onto a built form providing a new linkage between memory and space” (Reconstructing Recollection 2000 cited by Mudenge 2006) Preservation and Commemoration: to keep alive or in existence; make lasting: to preserve our liberties as free citizens. and a service, celebration, etc., in memory of some person or event. Heritage: something that comes or belongs to one by reason of birth; an inherited lot or portion: a heritage of poverty and suffering; a national heritage of honour, pride, and courage. / Thesis (M.Arch.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2010.

This thesis gives an account of the Treasury's role in preparing for, and conducting, the South African War, at a time when the orthodox Gladstonian principles of public finance were being challenged. It is a case study, in an exceptional instance, of the nature and effectiveness of Treasury control over expenditure on imperial expansion; of the Treasury's view of how a colonial war should be financed and who was to pay for it, of what cost-benefit analysis the Treasury applied to a colonial war, and of why it relied on recouping a substantial part of the war cost from an indemnity levied on a defeated Transvaal. The thesis is an attempt to define the vague concept of "Treasury control", not in constitutional theory, but as it worked in practice. It is argued that Treasury control and the rigidity of the annual peace time budget obstructed before the war the taking of any serious military precautions, left no reserve fund for war contingencies, and made any long-term strategic planning almost impossible. Rather than run the risk of asking money from Parliament for reinforcements to South Africa, which would be unpopular, as it might require increased taxation, and which might prove unnecessary, the Cabinet waited till the need to spend taxpayers' money had been demonstrated, although it could result in initial setbacks and in a longer and more expensive campaign. This, in conjunction with Milner's and Chamberlain's political strategy, dictated a military solution to the crisis. It is further argued that at first the Treasury estimated the cost of the war at £10 million, while assuring Parliament that a substantial part of it would be recouped by way of indemnity from the Transvaal. But the colonial expedition turned into a war on a European scale, the final charge to the British Exchequer was £217 million, and not a penny of indemnity was exacted from the Transvaal. The Treasury's view was restricted largely to the current year's budget and the following year's estimates, and how to secure their approval in Parliament. In this case, Treasury control was as ineffective during the war, as its estimates of the cost of the war and who would pay for it, were unrealistic.

This thesis examines the controversial South African War's influence on English poetry, highlighting the individual responses of established poets and drawing on the work of numerous minor verse-writers to define the changing tradition of 'patriotic' and 'war' poetry. Chapter I sketches the historical and social background, noting how events in South Africa assumed great magnitude for contemporaries whose popular Imperialism was severely tried and who made an unprecedented national 'war-effort'. In Chapter II the late-nineteenth-century tradition of 'patriotic' poetry is identified, through analysis of verse-anthologies and contemporary critical opinion, and by briefly studying the war's lesser poetry which confirmed this mood of Art-for-Morality's-sake writing. Chapter III describes Kipling's personal affection for South Africa, and the political aspirations which were related to his dedicated 1890s' verse-lessons. His reactions to the conflict reveal the disillusionment which distanced Kipling from his audience and changed his patriotic and imperialistic teaching. Inflated by the war, 'Rudyard Kiplingism' became a powerful literary movement. Chapter IV explains the discredit brought by Robert Buchanan's 'Hooligan' criticism, Edgar Wallace's 'barrack-room ballad' imitations, and Kipling's own ill-judged verses 'The Absent-Minded Beggar', but also argues that certain soldier-poets usefully exploited his reputation. Chapter V evaluates the contributions of four respected and influential patriotic poets: the 'undistinguished adequacy' of Alfred Austin, Poet Laureate; the strident verses of W.E. Henley; Henry Newbolt's strongly idealistic encouragement and consolation; and William Watson's brave but costly anti-war stance. Chapter VI considers a variety of poets in demonstrating how, while religious sanction for human conflict and empire-building was emphatically re-affirmed, some questioned the principle of War (including Meredith and Hardy) and denounced the sufferings inflicted on the Boers. The strain imposed on fireside poets' customary responses and rhetoric is outlined in Chapter VII, which also discusses the sentiments of Hardy's discontented 'war-poetry' and The Dynasts, before assessing the impact of personal bereavement on A.E. Housman's loyal poetry.

Thesis (M.A.(History)--University of Pretoria, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1949 -(Dept. of) History. / Bibliography: 5 leaves at end of volume.

Thesis (Ph.D. (Historical and Heritage Studies))--University of Pretoria, 2009. / Abstract in English. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1951. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 552-558).

This dissertation deals with the efforts of the British forces to regain control of northern Natal from the Boers, during the second quarter of 1900. In March Boer forces had dug themselves in along the Biggarsberg. In early May a British force advanced on the Biggarsberg. Exploiting their numerical superiority and with a turning movement to their right, the British army forced the Boers to retire to the Drakensberg in the Majuba area. There followed a period of re-organisation and preparation during which General Buller attempted to persuade the Boers to lay down their arms. When this failed he launched another attack on the Boer defence line. In quick succession the British force gained success at Botha's Pass (8 June) and at Alleman's Nek (11 June). These reverses forced the Boers to retire from their Drakensberg positions and they thereby relinquished all control of Natal to the British forces / History / M.A. (History)