Diploma thesis "Film Department of the Ministry of Information 1945 - 1953" deals with the cultural policy in Czechoslovakia after the Second World War. The introductory chapter focuses on evolution of the negotiations on the post-war organization in the restored Czechoslovakia. In this chapter was mentioned historical context with a focus on foreign and domestic resistance movement. A significant part of the diploma thesis is devoted to the constitution and development of the Ministry of Information and its influence on the culture policy of the state, especially to the activities of the Film Department which became one of the most important department of the Ministry of Information after the nationalization of the film industry in the summer of 1945. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia used the department and cinematography for spreading communist ideology in society. In connection with historical context, the role of the Culture and Promotion Department of the Central Comitee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the issue of the import and distribution of foreign films were analyzed. The development of the role of the Ministry of Information and the Film Department within the framework of the state's cultural policy is also in the diploma thesis outlined in connection with the events...

Diploma thesis "Film Department of the Ministry of Information 1945 - 1953" deals with the cultural policy in Czechoslovakia after the Second World War. The introductory chapter focuses on evolution of the negotiations on the post-war organization in the restored Czechoslovakia. In this chapter was mentioned historical context with a focus on foreign and domestic resistance movement. A significant part of the diploma thesis is devoted to the constitution and development of the Ministry of Information and its influence on the culture policy of the state, especially to the activities of the Film Department which became one of the most important department of the Ministry of Information after the nationalization of the film industry in the summer of 1945. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia used the department and cinematography for spreading communist ideology in society. In connection with historical context, the role of the Culture and Promotion Department of the Central Comitee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the issue of the import and distribution of foreign films were analyzed. The development of the role of the Ministry of Information and the Film Department within the framework of the state's cultural policy is also in the diploma thesis outlined in connection with the events...

This thesis traces the relationship between militarism and geographical thought in the United States during the early Cold War. It does so by traveling across certain spaces, or environments, which preoccupied American geopolitics and American science during the 1940s and 1950s. Indeed, geopolitics and science, understood during the Second World War as markedly distinct terms, came together uniquely to wage the Cold War from the position of strategy. The most intriguing and influential conjunctions were made possible by militarism, not in the deterministic sense of conditioning technologies or funding lines, but as a result of antagonistic, violent practices pervading American life. These practices reaffirmed America's status as distinctly, powerfully modern, while shoring up the burden of global responsibility that appeared to accompany this preeminence. Through militarist reasoning, the American world was turned into an object that needed securing - resulting in a profoundly insecure proliferation of danger that demanded an equal measure of global action and retreat behind new lines of defence. And in these American spaces, whether expanded or compressed, the identity of America itself was defined. From the global horizons of air power and the regional divisions of area studies to the laboratories of continental and civil defence research, the spaces of the American Cold War were material, in the sense that militarism's reach was clearly felt on innumerable human and natural landscapes, not least within the United States. Equally, however, these environments were the product of imaginative geographies, perceptual and representational techniques that inscribed borders, defined hierarchies, and framed populations governmentally. Such conceptions of space were similarly militarist, not least because they drew from the innovations of Second World War social science to reframe the outlines of a Cold War world. Militarism's methods redefined geographical thought and its spaces, prioritizing certain locations and conventions while marginalizing others. Strategic studies formed a key component of the social sciences emboldened by the successes and excesses of wartime science. As social scientists grappled with the contradictions of mid-century modernity, most retreated behind the formidable theories of their more accomplished academic relatives, and many moved into the laboratories previously associated with these same intellectual stalwarts. The result was that at every scale, geography was increasingly simulated, a habit that paralleled the abstractions concurrently promoted in the name of political decisiveness. But simulation also meant that Cold War spaces were more than the product of intangible musings; they were constructed, and in the process acquired solidity but also simplicity. It was in the fashioning of artificial environments that the fragility of strategy was revealed most fully, but also where militarism's power could be most clearly expressed. The term associated with this paradoxical condition was 'frontier', a zone of fragile, transformational activity. Enthusiastic Cold Warriors were fond of transferring this word from a geopolitical past to a scientific future. But in their present, frontiers possessed the characteristics of both. / Arts, Faculty of / Geography, Department of / Graduate

Si l'accueil réservé à la conduite initialement déployée par le gouvernement Truman en Corée à la suite de l'invasion de la Corée du Sud par les forces nord-coréennes en juin 1950 se veut largement favorable, il en va tout autrement lorsque le leader communiste chinois Mao Tse-tung dépêche, à la fin novembre, ses troupes au-delà du fleuve Yalou. Les États-Unis subissent dès lors l'une des pires défaites militaires de leur histoire. Face à une telle situation, les membres du Congrès américain ne tardent pas à réagir. Le présent mémoire cherche principalement à comprendre l'attitude adoptée, consécutivement à cette attaque, par les législateurs, républicains et démocrates, siégeant entre la fin novembre 1950 et le 1er mars 1951. Une consultation attentive du Congressional Record nous a permis de constater que parmi les membres du Congrès qui s'expriment au lendemain de la riposte communiste, la plupart se révèlent insatisfaits et mécontents de l'implication du président Truman, du Département d'État et du secrétaire Acheson. Plusieurs parlementaires, en outre, ne manquent alors pas de critiquer l'Organisation des Nations unies.

LD2668 .T4 1966 B583 / Master of Science

This thesis deals with the role of the JOS as the principal military advisers of the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government. It concentrates on the JSC’s perception of Soviet military and political intentions and capabilities in the postwar era and on the JCS’s military proposals regarding the external threat. The purpose of the thesis is to assess the JCS’s role substantively rather than to evaluate the relative role of the JCS as an agency amongst other key agencies dealing with foreign policy.

The dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur on April 11, 1951, from all of his commands by President Truman furnished the impetus for this survey of editorial opinion and reaction. The newspaper editorial opinion represents five major daily newspapers with broad geographic coverage of the State of Indiana, plus a wide range of political reaction to the topic. The editorial opinion is also representative ofea diverse socio-economic base.Of the five newspapers, the Evansville Courier was one of two that retained a consistently rational outlook toward the American scene during the Truman-MacArthur conflict. It took the position early that the Korean War should not be expanded, that the chance of an expanding war with China was to be avoided. The Courier expressed its dissatisfaction with the Truman foreign policy record, including the loss of China. It supported executive privilege and roundly attacked MacArthur.The Fort Wayne News Sentinel was very conservative, expertly vindictive, and at times somewhat irrational in its editorial opinion. At other times, its tenor was completely opposite. After fighting had been stabilized at the 38th parallel, it advised moving no further north,thus supporting limitation of the war. The News Sentinel supported MacArthur to the hilt and generally, deplored American negotiations and her "cringing" under Russian communism.The Gary Post Tribune's record in regard to the Truman Administration was that it had failed in its Far Eastern foreign policy and that the policy was unclear. It called MacArthur's dismissal unfortunate, but added that the move was supported in the interest of preserving civilian supremacy and the western alliances. Early in the Senate hearings, it applauded the conduct of those proceedings but as they ground on, pleaded for their end. Imploring its readers to rational thinking, the Post Tribune insisted "Cold Reason Must Rule" and deplored the fact that it felt that negotiation was becoming synonymous with appeasement.The Indianapolis Star's production of editorial opinion was prolific, in comparison to the other newspapers. The Star maintained a consistent conservative Republican approach to all issues. The Truman Administration was condemned for loss of the World War II "Pacific victory," for appeasement and defeatism, and for the formulation and execution of its Far Eastern foreign policy. Russia was seen as the real enemy of America, and early in the Korean War, military limitations were supported but later those same limitations were attacked vigorously. The concept of limiting the war was said to encourage further aggression. The Star advocated the protection of executive privilege, and as the Senate hearings progressed, informed its readers that no new information could be gained from the testimony.Of the five newspapers, the Palladium Item was the most reactionary and irrational. Although, at times, emotionalism and an occasional case of irrationality overcame the News Sentinel and Star, the Palladium Item made a steady diet of those "entrees." In describing the toll of American lives in the Korean War, the paper revealed its nature in the editorial, the "Truman Meat Grinder." Allies were seen as worthless and Truman as a "puppet" of England. The paper insisted that Truman's "hatchet-men" were trying to smear the General's character, because he was a "champion" against "traitorous" elements in America.The editorial reaction of the five papers was conservative and condemned the Truman Administration foreign policy, especially in the Far East. The Evansville Courier and the Gary Post Tribune presented well thought-out opinions based on a rational approach to the frustrations of Americans in the Korean War and adherence to the concept of limited war. The Republican newspapers, the Indianapolis Star, the Fort Wayne News Sentinel, and the Richmond Palladium Item, adhered to the Republican condemnation of the Truman Administration.

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In the sprint of 1948, President Harry S. Truman's chances of being re-elected to the presidency of the United States seemed very dubious. It was uncertain that he would even secure the Democratic nomination for that office. Truman's pre-convention Western trip. In the early summer of 1948 President Truman left the Capitol on a supposedly non-political Western trip. Although his aids insisted the journey was to be non-political, the fiction deceived no one. However, it enabled the President to charge off the cost of the excursion to his $30,000 a year travel allowance instead of sending the bill to a poverty-stricken Democratic National Committee. But it was not to hear non-political speeches that forty-two newspaper and magazine writers, five radio correspondents, four newsreel men, four still photographers, and a bevy of Western Union telegraphers, for whom an entire car had been turned into a press room, were aboard. The itinerary covered more than 8,500 miles from the Capital to Seattle, to Los Angeles, and back to Washington, D. C. He was to make five major speeches and nearly fifty back platform appearances. His objective was to put his program and his personality before the voters, and his plans before the politicians. So clear was Truman's purpose that he quickly found himself unable to maintain his non-political pose. He made only one feeble attempt when his train stopped in Crestline, Ohio, but a sturdy housewife in the crowd, which had gathered to see him, interrupted, "Aw, we don't want to hear that, we're all Democrats here."1 Laughing at himself, the President declared, "On this non-partisan, bipartisan trip we are making here, I understand there are a lot of Democrats too."2 After that Truman made little effort to hide the political nature of his trip.