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This paper is an examination of conflicting views regarding American defense policy which surfaced in a debate during the winter and spring of 1950-51 between the Truman Administration and its supporters and a group of conservative Republicans. The research problem involved unraveling the debate’s manifold issues, determining its outcome, and analyzing the impact of that outcome on the future of American foreign policy, particularly in Asia. The debate’s principle issues centered around American defense of Europe versus defense of Asia and the reliance on ground troops rather than on sea and air power. The Administration, while believing the United States should help repel the Communist invasion of South Korea, also advocated sending additional troops to Europe. Republican critics disagreed, arguing there was no overt Communist threat in Europe, only in Asia, and American efforts there should be redoubled. Furthermore, they claimed that whatever defense of Europe was necessary could best be accomplished through the use of naval and air power, not the infantry. The immediate result of the debate was victory for the Administration. A majority of senators was convinced that additional American troops were needed in Europe, and the Senate passed a resolution expressing that opinion in early April, 1951, ostensibly ending the debate. The victory was short-lived, however. The debate had repercussions at the polls in 1952 and helped sweep the Republicans into office. The ultimate outcome of the debate was to bring the conservative arguments to the fore and remold American foreign policy so that it conformed to those views. The information used in this paper was collected from books and contemporary periodicals, newspapers, and government publications. The only leading conservative critic still living, William F. Knowland, did not respond to a letter requesting clarification of statements he made during the debate. The memoirs of President Truman and Dean Acheson, his Secretary of State, received special attention. Works on and by Senator Robert A. Taft, the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, The New York Times and The Times of London, and the Department of State Bulletin were particularly useful. One potentially important primary source, a paper written by the National Security Council in 1950, remains classified and was thus unavailable.

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The question arises in the analysis of foreign policy decision making regarding how consensus or approval by the public is attained for policies. Some authors have suggested that consensus is obtained through the manipulation of opinion by decision makers. One case often cited as an example of manipulation is the 1947 announcement of the Truman Doctrine. In determining the validity of these arguments a review was conducted of the language of the doctrine and the interpretations of newspaper columnists. In addition, a review of personal documents of the decision makers was conducted to determine their impressions. The data compiled from these sources indicate that the authors who claim manipulation might have exaggerated the case.

Σκοπός της παρούσας εργασίας είναι η ανάλυση της οικονομικής σκέψης και της οικονομικής πολιτικής στην Ελλάδα κατά την πρώτη μεταπολεμική περίοδο 1945-1953 η οποία χαρακτηρίζεται ως περίοδος ανασυγκρότησης. Επιχειρείται μια εκτενής ανάλυση όσον αφορά τα αίτια που οδήγησαν τη χώρα στην οικονομική κυρίως, αλλά και στην κοινωνική και πολιτική της κατάρρευση μετά τη λήξη του Β’ Παγκοσμίου Πολέμου, το οικονομικό χάος που άφησε πίσω του το κατοχικό καθεστώς μετά την αποχώρησή του καθώς και όλες τις προσπάθειες που κατέβαλλε το ελληνικό έθνος προκειμένου να μπει σε τροχιά ανάπτυξης και να οδηγηθεί σε μια νέα εποχή. / The purpose of this work is the analysis of the economic thought and the economic policies that had been implemented in Greece during the first postwar period 1945-1953 which is characterized as the period of reconstruction. It is attempted a detailed analysis as far as the reasons that leaded the country in the economic collapse mainly and secondly in the social and political disaster after the end of the Second World War is concerned, the economic disorder that had left behind the occupational regime after its departure as well as all the attempts that the greek nation tried in order to be leaded in the development and to a new economic era.

On April 11, 1951, President Harry S. Truman dismissed General Douglas MacArthur as Commander of United Nations forces in Korea. Since the dismissal, contemporaries of the Truman-MacArthur era and historians have tried to make sense of Truman's momentous decision to relieve one of America's greatest military heroes. While a great number of studies have devoted attention to the controversy, few if any have placed the Truman-MacArthur conflict within the context of the unprecedented militarization of American foreign policy that took place during the early cold war. This study departs from the traditional "blame-casting" that has dominated Truman-MacArthur scholarship in the past and concludes that General MacArthur was a casualty who was dismissed because he failed to grasp the global nature of the post-World War II American foreign policy agenda.Chapter One analyzes the literature dealing with the Truman-Macarthur controversy and illustrates why historical scholarship has failed to grasp the larger forces at work in American foreign policy while MacArthur was UN Commander in Korea. Chapter Two traces the tumultuous events of the controversy from the outbreak of war in Korea to MacArthur's April 11 dismissal. Finally, Chapter Three analyzes the Senate hearings that followed MacArthur's dismissal, illustrates the importance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's testimony, and explores the broader, global issues the Truman Administration faced in transforming its foreign policy while General MacArthur failed to grasp the nature of this transformation. / Department of History

The purpose of this paper is to examine the background of the rift between the Soviet and Western allies by selecting several of the more critical points of controvercy involved with the formulation of the Truman Doctrine.

Call number: LD2668 .T4 1965 M11 / Master of Science

Call number: LD2668 .T4 1958 B76 / Master of Science

This thesis traces the relationship between militarism and geographical thought in the United States during the early Cold War. It does so by traveling across certain spaces, or environments, which preoccupied American geopolitics and American science during the 1940s and 1950s. Indeed, geopolitics and science, understood during the Second World War as markedly distinct terms, came together uniquely to wage the Cold War from the position of strategy. The most intriguing and influential conjunctions were made possible by militarism, not in the deterministic sense of conditioning technologies or funding lines, but as a result of antagonistic, violent practices pervading American life. These practices reaffirmed America's status as distinctly, powerfully modern, while shoring up the burden of global responsibility that appeared to accompany this preeminence. Through militarist reasoning, the American world was turned into an object that needed securing - resulting in a profoundly insecure proliferation of danger that demanded an equal measure of global action and retreat behind new lines of defence. And in these American spaces, whether expanded or compressed, the identity of America itself was defined. From the global horizons of air power and the regional divisions of area studies to the laboratories of continental and civil defence research, the spaces of the American Cold War were material, in the sense that militarism's reach was clearly felt on innumerable human and natural landscapes, not least within the United States. Equally, however, these environments were the product of imaginative geographies, perceptual and representational techniques that inscribed borders, defined hierarchies, and framed populations governmentally. Such conceptions of space were similarly militarist, not least because they drew from the innovations of Second World War social science to reframe the outlines of a Cold War world. Militarism's methods redefined geographical thought and its spaces, prioritizing certain locations and conventions while marginalizing others. Strategic studies formed a key component of the social sciences emboldened by the successes and excesses of wartime science. As social scientists grappled with the contradictions of mid-century modernity, most retreated behind the formidable theories of their more accomplished academic relatives, and many moved into the laboratories previously associated with these same intellectual stalwarts. The result was that at every scale, geography was increasingly simulated, a habit that paralleled the abstractions concurrently promoted in the name of political decisiveness. But simulation also meant that Cold War spaces were more than the product of intangible musings; they were constructed, and in the process acquired solidity but also simplicity. It was in the fashioning of artificial environments that the fragility of strategy was revealed most fully, but also where militarism's power could be most clearly expressed. The term associated with this paradoxical condition was 'frontier', a zone of fragile, transformational activity. Enthusiastic Cold Warriors were fond of transferring this word from a geopolitical past to a scientific future. But in their present, frontiers possessed the characteristics of both.