This thesis aims to present and analyse economic relations between Czechoslovakia and Argentina in the years 1945-1989 (i.e. a period that almost precisely coincides with the duration of the Cold War. The work focuses on a historical analysis of primary sources and archival documents of the Czechoslovak Federal Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade. This material was selected in light of the rarity of secondary literature devoted to this area. To a certain extent, this is a pioneering work, especially given the fact that the archives of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Trade have not yet been declassified and still enjoy only limited usage (processing) in a single publication. One primary function of foreign trade with the Latin American countries (with the obvious exception of Cuba) was to foster good relations between South America and Czechoslovakia during the Cold War. The study of this use of trade as a foreign policy instrument can provide useful lessons about pragmatic considerations to be borne in mind when designing foreign policy as a whole. The thesis presents new findings on the topic and attempts what may constitute the most comprehensive attempt to address economic relations between the aforementioned countries within a defined period.

This study analyzed defense intellectuals' metaphors to determine if the metaphors minimize or ignore the negative effects of nuclear war. The study specifically analyzed 30 texts from Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy with the metaphorical criticism method. Once the texts were analyzed, the findings suggested that defense intellectuals' metaphors describe nuclear war as ordinary and non-threatening, as a game or relationship. In addition, the study found that the defense intellectuals used metaphors that deflected responsibility for building and using nuclear weapons away from world leaders. The findings also suggested that the defense intellectuals are not numb to the effects of nuclear war, as others claim. Instead, the defense intellectuals' metaphors acted as cognitive blinders that prevented them from discussing the effects of nuclear war. Finally, the study found that each journal's metaphors were aligned with a particular world view of international relations; Foreign Affairs belonged to the realist school of thought, while Foreign Policy belonged to the neo-liberal institutionalist school of thought. / Department of Speech Communication

The purpose of this study is to examine the 1960 presidential campaign of John F. Kennedy and the 1968 presidential campaign of Robert F. Kennedy in order to analyze the similarities and differences that exist in their campaigns and their rhetoric. Specifically, the study examines the primary campaign rhetoric of the candidates and determines the rhetorical vision and fantasy themes that are created in three speeches from each campaign. The following research questions are proposed: What are the differences and similarities between John Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, in terms of their presidential rhetoric, their presidential campaigns, and their rhetorical visions? Does Robert Kennedy's rhetoric seem to be an extension of his brother's rhetoric or does it stand as his own?The study selects three speeches from each campaign as artifacts. The first speech by each candidate was the announcement of his candidacy. The second followed soon thereafter, before primary election results were a factor. The last speech reviewed in each campaign occurred after primary election results were announced, and the candidates had achieved success and failure in their campaigns.Fantasy theme analysis is employed to determine the fantasies that exist in the rhetoric and the rhetorical vision that is presented in each campaign. The analysis finds that each vision is comprised of four fantasy themes. The findings reveal that Robert Kennedy's rhetoric and rhetorical vision act as an entity separate from John Kennedy's, with unique goals and a different focus. / Department of Speech Communication

This dissertation seeks to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the political pressure group the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), which formed in 1976. The group's establishment, attainment of credibility, and influence in critical national security debates during the late 1970s has not yet been given sufficient attention. The Committee on the Present Danger has often been interpreted as a disingenuous propaganda group that dishonestly compiled an alarmist message to deceive politicians and journalists of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. However, the dissertation argues that the Committee's alarmism was genuine. The fact that CPD board members themselves became so fearful of the Soviet threat is the most striking aspect of the group's first four years of operation, and is the primary focus of this study. An examination of the group's formation and activities from 1976 to 1980 permits a more sophisticated appreciation of the group's goals, the promotion of its views, and the effects of its campaign on national security debates during this period. The dissertation adopts a chronological approach that recognises the creeping alarmism of the CPD over these years: warning of the dangers of détente gave way to prophesising an imminent Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Keeping the CPD as the focus of study in this period permits one to argue that the Committee's members, as a private citizens' group without government oversight and a shared worst-case methodology for assessing national security risks, sincerely came to believe in the veracity of their analysis of imminent Soviet military expansion. Committee experts generated and publicised a number of metrics that purported to demonstrate a military imbalance between the Soviet Union and the United States. Over time, and seemingly confirmed by alleged Soviet global aggression, the Committee came to believe that their worst-case estimates reflected reality.

No description available.

Strategic upheavals, such as the emergence or disappearance of geopolitical threats or radical technological changes, generate profound uncertainty and intense debate about a state’s future strategy. How do decisionmakers reexamine and revise strategy amidst these upheavals? Existing theories of strategic change recognize the significance of upheavals, but raise questions about the mechanisms by which decisionmakers embrace or discard new ideas about strategy. contend that understanding strategic change requires attention to narratives––stories about the past and present of international politics that suggest legitimate pathways for future action. I develop a theory of narrative emergence, positing that after upheavals, national security elites compete to mobilize support for their vision of future policy. They use public and private debates to legitimate their positions and build domestic coalitions. I identify four rhetorical strategies––persuasion, rhetorical coercion, co-optation, and transgression––that have different effects in mobilizing or demobilizing coalitions. If one coalition builds cross-cutting support, this can entrench their rhetoric in public discourse over time as part of a dominant narrative that shapes subsequent strategy debates through constraining and enabling effects. I evaluate this theory in the context of two cases of strategic upheaval in the United States, focusing on the puzzles of U.S. nuclear strategy: the arrival of the atomic age and the achievement of strategic parity between the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. In the first case, I use qualitative and text analysis to track the rise of a dominant narrative about nuclear weapons during the early Cold War. In this contradictory narrative which I label “Waging Deterrence,” the bomb was both an unusable, revolutionary deterrent and an essential tool for fighting and winning the next war. I draw on archival sources to trace the emergence of this narrative during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, showing this narrative was not predetermined, but contingent on domestic debates as speakers––Presidents, civilian advisors, military elites, and others––used rhetorical strategies in public and private to co-opt and silence opponents. This narrative constrained the possibilities for strategic revision during the later Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. In the second case, parity’s mutual vulnerability upended this narrative; narratives remained unsettled until the Carter administration, where domestic legitimation contests facilitated the return of Waging Deterrence to justify competitive nuclear postures that had a lasting impact on U.S. nuclear strategy. The project offers a novel mechanism to understand strategic change and highlights the discursive and domestic politics of nuclear strategy, showing that foundational U.S. deterrence concepts emerged in part from domestic legitimation contests that rendered other options illegitimate. It also offers insights into policy debates about the future of nuclear and grand strategy amidst contemporary upheavals, suggesting contested processes of narrative construction will be central to shaping future strategy.

L'histoire de l'Arabie Saoudite moderne est fascinante : Ibn Saoud réalisa l'une des dernières épopées conquérantes du XXe siècle. Le pétrole en fit ensuite l'un des royaumes les plus riches de la planète. En 1945, les États-Unis réussirent à obtenir le monopole de l'exploitation pétrolière jusqu'en 2005! Une collaboration étroite se développa alors entre les deux régimes idéologiquement opposés. Comment l'opinion publique américaine perçut-elle cette relation pour le moins paradoxale? Un regard sur les pages éditoriales du New York Times nous donne certains éléments de réponse. Il est intéressant de voir ce qui s'est dit (et ne s'est pas dit) dans le journal sur ce régime fondamentaliste et sur la stratégie étrangère de Washington. Dès lors, nous pouvons mieux comprendre la perception de la monarchie saoudienne par rapport aux autres « Arabes » et constater que ce pays a été traité comme un cas bien particulier aux États-Unis.

En 1945, lorsque la Seconde Guerre mondiale se termine, les États-Unis se démarquent immédiatement en tant que superpuissance. Par contre, ils ne sont pas seuls, car l'Union soviétique jouit du même sort, ce qui annonce un nouveau conflit à l'horizon. Dans ce contexte, les Américains sont soucieux d'entretenir des liens étroits avec leurs alliés dans le but de solidifier leur sécurité, un aspect qui devient une priorité. La place du Canada est évidemment de premier ordre dans la tête des parlementaires siégeant à Washington. Les membres du Congrès le considèrent comme un allié essentiel et l'entretien de bons rapports avec ce dernier devient une priorité. À travers des thèmes comme la construction de la voie maritime du Saint-Laurent, les relations politiques ou encore les rapports économiques, les législateurs de Capitol Hill, qu'ils émettent des propos positifs ou négatifs à l'égard d'Ottawa, s'assurent toujours de considérer avant tout le bien de leur propre nation. Ils sont soucieux de protéger les intérêts domestiques et les propos qu'ils ont face au Canada traduisent cette situation.

Ma thèse de doctorat explore les tournées de ballet des « six grandes » compagnies mondiales pendant la Guerre froide (1945-1968) :ballet de l’Opéra de Paris, Royal Ballet de Covent Garden, Bolchoï et Kirov, New York City Ballet et American Ballet. Elle envisage le ballet comme un outil de diplomatie culturelle transnationale, avec un focus particulier sur les acteurs, qu’ils soient institutionnels, artistiques ou commerciaux. Outre un aspect quantitatif qui nous a amené à cartographier les tournées, il s’agit d’une histoire incarnée par des femmes et des hommes − les danseurs − dont le métier est de tourner sur les scènes internationales, encadrés par des administrateurs et des gouvernements, qui n’ont pas les mêmes priorités et agendas les uns et les autres. <p>Cette recherche met justement en avant les tensions, les difficultés et les dynamiques entre les différents acteurs. La thèse se construit autour de tournées représentatives du lien ténu entre danse et politique, des épisodes qui mettent en valeur les points chauds de cette Guerre froide, ayant comme point de départ ou d’arrivée Londres et Paris.<p>La description de la danse comme un langage, une pratique physique et un métier permet de comprendre en quoi la danse peut être un outil de communication politique et comment il a été utilisé comme tel dans la longue durée et en particulier pendant la guerre froide. Les différentes échelles – le passage régulier de la macro-histoire à la micro-histoire et inversement ainsi que les flux d’échanges culturels multiples à l’échelle internationale – ont permis de mettre en avant une multiplicité d'acteurs (artistiques, gouvernementaux, commerciaux). La constitution du mythe de la danseuse étoile, et ses représentations, résonne également avec d’autres figures mythiques construites dans la Guerre froide, comme celle de l’astronaute. / Doctorat en Histoire, art et archéologie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / During the early Cold War, 1949 through 1963, the federal government, through such agencies as the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) (1950-1957), the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) (1958-1960), and the Office of Civil Defense (OCD) (1961-1963), regarded children and young adults as essential to American civil defense. Youth-oriented, voluntary organizations, including the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) and the Girl Scouts of the United States of America (GSUSA), assisted the federal civil defense programs by promoting civil defense messages and agendas. In this thesis, I will explore how the GSUSA and BSA translated federal civil defense policies for their Scouts. What were the civil defense messages transmitted to Scouts during the early Cold War? How were those messages disseminated? Why? What was the social impact of BSA and GSUSA involvement with civil defense on America’s evolving national ideals?