Orientador : Shiguenoli Miyamoto / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-18T22:34:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Belli_Benoni_M.pdf: 4572509 bytes, checksum: c78c43fa66a4ac8644bd056b4fb28d6f (MD5) Previous issue date: 1994 / Resumo: Não informado / Abstract: Not informed. / Mestrado / Mestre em Ciência Política

Orientador: Wilson Suzigan / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas. Instituto de Economia / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-14T00:30:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Andrade_RogerioPereirade_M.pdf: 3299672 bytes, checksum: 73a969c7e62b4684d5a525d7c2a9d454 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1991 / Resumo: Não informado / Abstract: Not informed. / Mestrado / Mestre em Economia

<p>This thesis falls within the category of historical studies that is concerned with a difficult legacy of South Africa̕s liberation struggle, namely the practice of necklacing that accompanied it. My interest in the practice is limited to its emergence and politicising as it relates to the ANC, the UDF and the apartheid state. The ANC and the UDF overwhelmingly understood the practice as resistance, yet ambivalently so. The question guiding this thesis therefore asks: how is necklacing written into the narrative of struggle history? Here I refer to its (re)representation, its (re)characterisation, its (re)articulation in a wider discursive war of propaganda strategies that was waged through the interplay of an apartheid state discourse and what I consider to be an official non-state discourse, that of the ANC and the UDF.</p>

<p>This thesis falls within the category of historical studies that is concerned with a difficult legacy of South Africa̕s liberation struggle, namely the practice of necklacing that accompanied it. My interest in the practice is limited to its emergence and politicising as it relates to the ANC, the UDF and the apartheid state. The ANC and the UDF overwhelmingly understood the practice as resistance, yet ambivalently so. The question guiding this thesis therefore asks: how is necklacing written into the narrative of struggle history? Here I refer to its (re)representation, its (re)characterisation, its (re)articulation in a wider discursive war of propaganda strategies that was waged through the interplay of an apartheid state discourse and what I consider to be an official non-state discourse, that of the ANC and the UDF.</p>

Magister Artium - MA / This thesis falls within the category of historical studies that is concerned with a difficult legacy of South Africa's liberation struggle, namely the practice of necklacing that accompanied it. My interest in the practice is limited to its emergence and politicizing as it relates to the ANC, the UDF and the apartheid state. The ANC and the UDF overwhelmingly understood the practice as resistance, yet ambivalently so. The question guiding this thesis therefore asks: how is necklacing written into the narrative of struggle history? Here I refer to its (re)representation, its (re)characterization, its (re)articulation in a wider discursive war of propaganda strategies that was waged through the interplay of an apartheid state discourse and what I consider to be an official non-state discourse, that of the ANC and the UDF. / South Africa

A crise de legitimidade que permeou o mandato do presidente José Sarney deveu-se a fatores fundamentalmente políticos, em especial, à associação direta de seu nome com o desprestigiado regime militar. Abandonado pelas lideranças políticas e rechaçado pela sociedade civil, o governo da Nova República encontrou na adoção de medidas econômicas de ampla repercussão popular o meio de se legitimar. A inflação e o estrangulamento externo compunham os dois principais entraves ao desenvolvimento da economia brasileira na década de 1980. Na tentativa de conter a crescente elevação dos preços, lançou-se, em 1986, o Plano Cruzado, cujos resultados imediatos conferiram a mais alta popularidade já ostentada por um chefe do Executivo brasileiro. À medida que o plano sucumbia, o governo passou, então, a utilizar-se do tom nacionalista conferido à questão da dívida externa para granjear o apoio político que sempre lhe faltou. Este trabalho visa a contribuir para o entendimento dos motivos que levaram o governo Sarney, em fevereiro de 1987, a decretar a moratória da dívida brasileira. A argumentação desenvolvida sustenta a hipótese de que esta decisão, a despeito da base técnica em que se calcou, respondeu primordialmente a imperiosidades políticas, em especial, à necessidade de o presidente Sarney legitimar-se perante a sociedade brasileira. / The legitimacy crisis that affected President Sarney’s mandate was due to political reasons, principally to the direct association of his name to the illegitimate military regime. Abandoned by political leaders and repelled by civil society, New Republic’s government found in economic measures with expected popular repercussion the way to obtain political support. Inflation and the external restrictions were the two main problems that Brazilian economic development had to face during the 1980´s. In order to contain the former, the Cruzado Plan was launched in 1986. Its immediate results gave the highest popularity ever achieved by an Executive chief leader. However, as the success of the plan succumbed, the government turned then to the use of the same nationalist tone given to the issue of the external debt, desperately seeking the political support it had never had. This essay aims at contributing to the understanding of the reasons that led Sarney’s government, in February of 1987, to order the default on the Brazilian external debt. The argumentation developed to justify this decision sustains the hypothesis that, in spite of the technical basis upon which it seems to rest, it is mainly the response to political imperiousness, especially to the President’s need to legitimate himself in front of Brazilian society.

A crise de legitimidade que permeou o mandato do presidente José Sarney deveu-se a fatores fundamentalmente políticos, em especial, à associação direta de seu nome com o desprestigiado regime militar. Abandonado pelas lideranças políticas e rechaçado pela sociedade civil, o governo da Nova República encontrou na adoção de medidas econômicas de ampla repercussão popular o meio de se legitimar. A inflação e o estrangulamento externo compunham os dois principais entraves ao desenvolvimento da economia brasileira na década de 1980. Na tentativa de conter a crescente elevação dos preços, lançou-se, em 1986, o Plano Cruzado, cujos resultados imediatos conferiram a mais alta popularidade já ostentada por um chefe do Executivo brasileiro. À medida que o plano sucumbia, o governo passou, então, a utilizar-se do tom nacionalista conferido à questão da dívida externa para granjear o apoio político que sempre lhe faltou. Este trabalho visa a contribuir para o entendimento dos motivos que levaram o governo Sarney, em fevereiro de 1987, a decretar a moratória da dívida brasileira. A argumentação desenvolvida sustenta a hipótese de que esta decisão, a despeito da base técnica em que se calcou, respondeu primordialmente a imperiosidades políticas, em especial, à necessidade de o presidente Sarney legitimar-se perante a sociedade brasileira. / The legitimacy crisis that affected President Sarney’s mandate was due to political reasons, principally to the direct association of his name to the illegitimate military regime. Abandoned by political leaders and repelled by civil society, New Republic’s government found in economic measures with expected popular repercussion the way to obtain political support. Inflation and the external restrictions were the two main problems that Brazilian economic development had to face during the 1980´s. In order to contain the former, the Cruzado Plan was launched in 1986. Its immediate results gave the highest popularity ever achieved by an Executive chief leader. However, as the success of the plan succumbed, the government turned then to the use of the same nationalist tone given to the issue of the external debt, desperately seeking the political support it had never had. This essay aims at contributing to the understanding of the reasons that led Sarney’s government, in February of 1987, to order the default on the Brazilian external debt. The argumentation developed to justify this decision sustains the hypothesis that, in spite of the technical basis upon which it seems to rest, it is mainly the response to political imperiousness, especially to the President’s need to legitimate himself in front of Brazilian society.

A crise de legitimidade que permeou o mandato do presidente José Sarney deveu-se a fatores fundamentalmente políticos, em especial, à associação direta de seu nome com o desprestigiado regime militar. Abandonado pelas lideranças políticas e rechaçado pela sociedade civil, o governo da Nova República encontrou na adoção de medidas econômicas de ampla repercussão popular o meio de se legitimar. A inflação e o estrangulamento externo compunham os dois principais entraves ao desenvolvimento da economia brasileira na década de 1980. Na tentativa de conter a crescente elevação dos preços, lançou-se, em 1986, o Plano Cruzado, cujos resultados imediatos conferiram a mais alta popularidade já ostentada por um chefe do Executivo brasileiro. À medida que o plano sucumbia, o governo passou, então, a utilizar-se do tom nacionalista conferido à questão da dívida externa para granjear o apoio político que sempre lhe faltou. Este trabalho visa a contribuir para o entendimento dos motivos que levaram o governo Sarney, em fevereiro de 1987, a decretar a moratória da dívida brasileira. A argumentação desenvolvida sustenta a hipótese de que esta decisão, a despeito da base técnica em que se calcou, respondeu primordialmente a imperiosidades políticas, em especial, à necessidade de o presidente Sarney legitimar-se perante a sociedade brasileira. / The legitimacy crisis that affected President Sarney’s mandate was due to political reasons, principally to the direct association of his name to the illegitimate military regime. Abandoned by political leaders and repelled by civil society, New Republic’s government found in economic measures with expected popular repercussion the way to obtain political support. Inflation and the external restrictions were the two main problems that Brazilian economic development had to face during the 1980´s. In order to contain the former, the Cruzado Plan was launched in 1986. Its immediate results gave the highest popularity ever achieved by an Executive chief leader. However, as the success of the plan succumbed, the government turned then to the use of the same nationalist tone given to the issue of the external debt, desperately seeking the political support it had never had. This essay aims at contributing to the understanding of the reasons that led Sarney’s government, in February of 1987, to order the default on the Brazilian external debt. The argumentation developed to justify this decision sustains the hypothesis that, in spite of the technical basis upon which it seems to rest, it is mainly the response to political imperiousness, especially to the President’s need to legitimate himself in front of Brazilian society.

As políticas de combate à pobreza no Brasil entraram na agenda de governo na década de 30 com o presidente Getulio Vargas e desde este período parece não ter ocorrido inflexões na matriz das políticas formuladas. Neste sentido, a hipótese central é que existe continuidade na agenda das políticas de combate à pobreza no período de 1985 a 2010 nos governos de José Sarney (PMDB) ao governo Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT). Esta hipótese é testada a partir do uso do modelo de Equilíbrio Pontuado de Baumgartner e Jones e de Tsebelis sobre os atores com poder de veto que criam uma certa estabilidade decisória, contribuindo para a permanência da agenda de políticas. As variáveis utilizadas no estudo são o gasto público com políticas socias, a burocracia instalada e a percepção dos principais atores políticos e técnicos que participaram dos governos em estudo sobre a tese de continuidade e por fim a agenda de políticas de combate à pobreza formulada por cada governo. Ao analisar os dados é possível perceber a existência de incrementalismo no orçamento federal, a formulação da agenda por atores híbridos e uma forte percepção dos entrevistados sobre a continuidade da agenda das políticas de combate à pobreza nos governos foco do estudo. Com isso, é possível concluir que a agenda formulada pelo governo brasileiro no período de 1985 a 2010 sofreu reformas e incrementalismo sem efetuar inflexões capazes de alterar a matriz das políticas e apresentar uma nova agenda. / Anti-poverty policies in Brazil entered the government agenda in the 30s with President Getulio Vargas and from this period seems to have occurred inflections in the model of the policies formulated. In this regard, the central hypothesis is that there is continuity in the agenda of anti-poverty policies in the 1985-2010 period from government of José Sarney (PMDB) to the government Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (PT). This hypothesis will be tested for the use of the punctuated equilibrium model of Baumgartner and Jones and Tsebelis about the actors with veto power that create a certain operative stability, contributing to the permanence of the policy agenda. The variables used in the study are public spending on social policies, the installed bureaucracy and the perception of the main political actors and technicians who participated in a government study on the thesis of continuity and finally the agenda of poverty reduction policies formulated by each government. By analysing the data you can see the existence of incrementalism in the federal budget, the formulation of the agenda for hybrid actors and a strong perception of respondents about the continuing agenda of policies to combat poverty in governments focus of the study. Thus, we conclude that the agenda formulated by the Brazilian government in 1985-2010 period has been reformed and incrementalism without making inflections able to change the model of policies and present a new agenda.

As políticas de combate à pobreza no Brasil entraram na agenda de governo na década de 30 com o presidente Getulio Vargas e desde este período parece não ter ocorrido inflexões na matriz das políticas formuladas. Neste sentido, a hipótese central é que existe continuidade na agenda das políticas de combate à pobreza no período de 1985 a 2010 nos governos de José Sarney (PMDB) ao governo Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT). Esta hipótese é testada a partir do uso do modelo de Equilíbrio Pontuado de Baumgartner e Jones e de Tsebelis sobre os atores com poder de veto que criam uma certa estabilidade decisória, contribuindo para a permanência da agenda de políticas. As variáveis utilizadas no estudo são o gasto público com políticas socias, a burocracia instalada e a percepção dos principais atores políticos e técnicos que participaram dos governos em estudo sobre a tese de continuidade e por fim a agenda de políticas de combate à pobreza formulada por cada governo. Ao analisar os dados é possível perceber a existência de incrementalismo no orçamento federal, a formulação da agenda por atores híbridos e uma forte percepção dos entrevistados sobre a continuidade da agenda das políticas de combate à pobreza nos governos foco do estudo. Com isso, é possível concluir que a agenda formulada pelo governo brasileiro no período de 1985 a 2010 sofreu reformas e incrementalismo sem efetuar inflexões capazes de alterar a matriz das políticas e apresentar uma nova agenda. / Anti-poverty policies in Brazil entered the government agenda in the 30s with President Getulio Vargas and from this period seems to have occurred inflections in the model of the policies formulated. In this regard, the central hypothesis is that there is continuity in the agenda of anti-poverty policies in the 1985-2010 period from government of José Sarney (PMDB) to the government Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (PT). This hypothesis will be tested for the use of the punctuated equilibrium model of Baumgartner and Jones and Tsebelis about the actors with veto power that create a certain operative stability, contributing to the permanence of the policy agenda. The variables used in the study are public spending on social policies, the installed bureaucracy and the perception of the main political actors and technicians who participated in a government study on the thesis of continuity and finally the agenda of poverty reduction policies formulated by each government. By analysing the data you can see the existence of incrementalism in the federal budget, the formulation of the agenda for hybrid actors and a strong perception of respondents about the continuing agenda of policies to combat poverty in governments focus of the study. Thus, we conclude that the agenda formulated by the Brazilian government in 1985-2010 period has been reformed and incrementalism without making inflections able to change the model of policies and present a new agenda.